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Abstract 
 
As the government of Saudi Arabia begins a major evolutionary process of economic 
expansion, the Saudi stock market has become the focus of increased attention.  The legal 
framework that regulates the stock market is still considered to be underdeveloped, as only 
recently, in 2003, did the Saudi legislator issue a Capital Market Law (2003) and create a 
regulatory body vested with its enforcement. 
 
The securities market was built around this legislation, which helped to stimulate the economy 
by attracting investor. However, the Saudi stock market experienced a big crash in February 
2006, which had a profound impact in heavy losses for large and small investors. The practical 
application of these new laws brought to light some shortcomings in the regulations of the 
stock market, and specifically, the need for the legal protection of investor. 
 
Hence, the overarching aim of this thesis is to focus particular on four issues: on the question 
of whether or not the existing regulations of the Saudi stock market adequately protects investor 
from poor disclosure, insider trading and market manipulation induced partly by market 
brokers.  Thus, there are four primary objectives of this thesis: to enhance the effectiveness of 
existing rules to secure a suitable level of protection for investor against poor disclosure, 
market abuse and illegal practices by broker; to increase investor confidence and attractiveness 
of the market; to prevent a future repeat of the stock market collapse and avoid the steps that 
caused it; and finally, to provide useful material for Saudi Capital Market Law (2003) reforms 
in the future. 
 
In order to examine these sensitive issues, the thesis will first examine whether or not the 
disclosure regulations of the Saudi stock market provide adequate protection to investor and 
secondly assess the effectiveness of the legal framework of insider trading regulations for 
preventing insider trading. Third, it will ascertain how well the the law defines market 
manipulation and covers the most common forms of market manipulation under Saudi 
securities law. Lastly it will explore the responsibility that brokers in the Saudi stock market 
have to achieve the greatest degree of protection for investor. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research Aims and Objective 
	
The aim of this thesis is to provide a regulatory analysis of the existing regulations of the Saudi 
stock market, in order to examine whether these regulations provide investor with adequate 
protection, and subsequently restore their confidence in the stock market as a whole.  
 
Thus, there are four primary objectives of this thesis: to enhance the effectiveness of existing 
rules to secure a suitable level of protection for investor against poor disclosure, market abuse 
and illegal practices by broker; to increase investor confidence and attractiveness of the market; 
to prevent a future repeat of the stock market collapse and avoid the steps that caused it; and 
finally, to provide useful material for Saudi Capital Market Law (2003) reforms in the future. 
 
The Saudi Capital Market Law (2003) and its associated regulations were introduced and 
legislated with similar objectives in mind. However, this thesis will focus specifically on four 
key issues. These issues were selected for three reasons: firstly, they are key targets for 
regulations in virtually every country and considered to be key elements of protection for 
investor. Secondly, these factors may be considered a cause of the collapse of the Saudi stock 
market. And finally, this thesis argues that these four issues still present substantial problems 
for the current regulations of the Saudi stock market (SSM) from an investor’s protection 
perspective. The four issues are as follows:  
 
(1) The lack of transparency and disclosure by listed companies was one of the most 
important lessons taken from the collapse of the Saudi stock market (SSM) in 2006, 
as proper and effective disclosure regulations are required in order to afford proper 
protection to investor. Information disclosure is a key factor in their investment 
decisions. 
(2) Saudi Arabia has not been absolved from insider trading, as indicated by the 
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crash of the Saudi stock market. A situation such as this demands the creation of 
clear, strong standards for the maintenance of transparency and the prevention of 
the diversion of information, as such so justice amongst investor can be realized. 
The absence of regulations that would protect investor from practices such as 
insider trading would endanger the stability of these markets. Accordingly, this 
thesis aims to answer the question as to whether the regulations of insider trading 
in the Saudi stock market (SSM) protects investor from insider dealing. 
(3) Market manipulation causes detrimental damage to the fairness and integrity of 
the stock market, and thus weakens investors’ confidence in it. Consequently, 
Saudi’s capital authority market must enforce adequate systems that are able to 
detect, investigate and prosecute market manipulation in order to protect investor, 
ensure durability and make the market immune to another financial crisis. 
Therefore, this thesis assesses the current system of regulatory market manipulation 
in Saudi Arabia and debates whether it is adequate for the intended purpose.  
(4) Brokers are deemed significant in the process since they work as intermediaries 
who arrange on behalf of investor the sale and purchase of shares. In well-
functioning stock markets, it has long been considered that a broker should conduct 
its client’ transactions with due skill, care and diligence in accordance with sensible 
practice in the brokerage business. Therefore, it is argued, that stock markets were 
established; to restrict entrance to stock markets to brokers in order to guarantee the 
conduct of its members and to limit fraudulent practices.  Therefore, it can be argued 
that the behaviour of brokers can affect the health of stock market. Thus, one of the 
main aims of this thesis is to conduct an evaluation of regulatory duties provided 
by regulations regarding the brokerage business, in order to protect investor in the 
stock market.  
 
This thesis will have a particular focus on four selected issues: on the question of whether or 
not the existing regulations of the Saudi stock market (SSM) adequately protects investor from 
poor disclosure, insider trading and market manipulation induced partly by market brokers.  In 
order to examine these sensitive issues, the researcher will analyze and evaluate several 
fundamental concepts and address some crucial questions. 
 
  The thesis will first examine whether or not the disclosure regulations of the Saudi stock 
market (SSM) provide adequate protection to investor, which can be found in the Companies 
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Act 1965, Listing Rules and Corporate Governance regulations.  Do Existing Penalties Ensure 
Proper Implementation of Disclosure Rules? (Chapter 3) 
 
  Assess the effectiveness of the legal framework of insider trading regulations (Market 
Conduct regulations) for preventing insider trading.  To do so, the following questions must be 
answered: ‘Who is an insider?’ ‘What is inside information?’ ‘How is inside information 
transferred?’ ‘What actions are banned?’  ‘What is the theoretical basis for the imposition of 
sanctions against insider trading?’  ‘Enforcing civil or criminal sanctions?’ ‘Do enforcement 
mechanisms contribute to the effective implementation of insider dealing laws?’ (Chapter 4) 
 
  How well does the Saudi market enforce the Market Conduct regulations that define 
market manipulation? ‘To what extent do the laws of the Saudi stock market consider the most 
common forms of market manipulation?’  ‘Will intent be an obstacle for enforcing the Law?’ 
‘Can enforcement be effective with the existing regulatory gap?’ (Chapter 5) 
 
  Finally, it will explore the responsibility that brokers in the Saudi stock market have to 
achieve the greatest degree of protection for investors; the regulations under consideration is 
Authorised Persons regulations. To do so, the following questions need to be answered: ‘Is 
broker a source of market manipulation?’ ‘Do broker owe fiduciary duty?’ ‘How does a broker 
provide suitable recommendations to his/her client?’ ‘What is the significance of suitability in 
stock market under its regulations?’ What is the responsibility of broker under Saudi Law?'  
(Chapter 6). 
 
1.2 Research Significance  
	
In this thesis the researcher will analyze, evaluate, and propose to the Saudi stock market 
regulations, in order to examines whether or not the existing regulations provide adequate 
protection for investor and restored investors’ confidence in it.  Therefore, the main motive 
behind the selection of this subject is explained in the light of the following: 
 
Firstly: As increasing numbers of the public become aware of the value to both themselves and 
to their nation to be had from investing in local stock market, a case in point is the Saudi 
Arabian economy, wherein the lack of alternative investment opportunities contrasts with the 
huge financial surpluses generated by successive increases in oil prices and the return of a 
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considerable proportion of national migratory savings after September 2001. Saudis’ interest 
in their national stock market began at the end of 2002 and early 2003 with the initial public 
offering (IPO) of STC shares. Such offers prompted individual investor to continue investing 
in the stock market given the large profits that they earned. At that time, the Saudi investment 
population did not extend beyond 50,000 because most of the Saudi investor were the elderly 
and people with experience in business, and in view of universally low interest rates on ‘safe’ 
investments.1 
 
Secondly, there is also an even stronger reason to advance and develop the regulatory 
framework in Saudi stock market. As long as the existing regulatory structures are seen to be 
weak the market is open to financial crises with reference to the big crash that witnessed by 
Saudi stock market in February 2006 As a result of that Saudi stock index prices lost 52% of 
their value, and Saudis lost confidence in the capital market. moreover, inadequate regulatory 
capacity will provide the potential for an illegal practice in particular to the smaller investor.2  
Where rules against market manipulation, insider trading and asymmetries of information are 
seen to be avoidable and ineffective, institutional and large investor will take advantage of the 
smaller ones. 
 
Thirdly: An additional need for regulatory reform in Saudi securities market arises from the 
imminent likelihood of wholesale privatization of hitherto state or community-owned utilities 
across the region. Saudi Arabia have already, and is likely to continue in the near future, to 
privatize sensitive areas such as Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco)3 and water and other. 
Investor in newly privatized companies will certainly need efficient and robust protective 
regulations and accountability standards to ensuring the conduct of such businesses or the 
entire economic structure of each state is not put at risk. Claessens et al. find that privatization 
programs support stock market growth4. Additionally, Perotti and Oijen claim that privatization 
																																																								
1 Abdulrahman Y Baamir, ‘Issues of Transparency and Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market’ (2008) 
22 Arab Law Quarterly 63. 
2 Saudi Stock Exchange ‘Tadawul’, ‘Annual Report’ (2006). 
3   Saudi Arabian Oil Company, most popularly known just as Aramco, is a Saudi 
Arabian national petroleum and natural gas company. Saudi Aramco's value has been estimated 
between US$1.25 trillion and US$10 trillion, making it the world's most valuable company 
4 Stijn Claessens and others, ‘Stock market in Transition Economies’ (2000). 
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has an indirect positive effect on stock market growth within political risk reduction5.  
 
Once privatization is an established fact, securities market will find large numbers of 
companies seeking a listing and a step change in the volume of securities trading.  It will be a 
major test for governments to construct a regulatory framework that encourages economic 
growth and that raises living standards for all levels of society during the first decades of the 
twenty-first century. Saudi Arabia is trending towards encouraging foreign investment and 
giving foreigners access to its markets. As CAM took further steps to open up its stock market 
to foreigners (Saudi stock market has opened to foreign investor Qualified (QFIs) on June 15, 
2015) in a move that may help it get included in a key index of developing-nation equities. 
Therefore, the kingdom must therefore revise and modernize its regulatory regimes.  
 
The first thing that Capital Market Authority (CMA) must do is build a solid, well-considered 
and robust body of regulations that gives reasonable legal protection to those who make 
investments and set up businesses within the states. In order to attract foreign investment, it is 
essential to have a well-developed legal framework that would ensure the minimal protection 
for such investments. Second, the Saudi market, if compared with the developed markets, is 
limited in size. Thus, the absence of regulations that would protect national industries and 
investor from practices such as insider trading and market manipulation would endanger the 
stability of these markets. Finally, the institutional infrastructure of the market will be 
examined, along with the cultural and social characteristics of the investor whenever these 
factors are appropriate and relevant. 
 
1.3 Literature Review  
 
The present section reviews the literature relevant to the research objectives and frames this 
study in rapport with the literature. Subsequent parts of the study will address the research 
findings and related literature in greater depth. 
 
 
																																																								
5 Enrico C Perotti and Pieter Van Oijen, ‘Privatization, Political Risk and Stock Market Development 
in Emerging Economies’ (2001) 20 Journal of International Money and Finance P43.  
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The factors contributing to successful capital markets have been discussed by many studies. 
Despite the interdisciplinary nature of the current literature, wide agreement exists among both 
academics and governmental about a number of aspects6. These aspects include the necessity 
to have quality information about business value and the necessity to ensure the protection of 
minority shareholders against activities like insider trading7. Despite being of relevance to the 
Saudi capital markets, general literature has to be adapted to the particular context of Saudi 
Arabia due to the singular characteristics of the Saudi environment. 
 
The research performed yielded only a small number of academic and institutional studies on 
Saudi Arabian Capital Markets. Examples include: Firstly: a 2010 study prepared by Al Jazira 
Capital under the title: 'Financing Role of the Saudi Capital Market: Promising Prospects';8 
Secondly: a 2009 study conducted by the World Bank concerning the application of corporate 
governance practices in Saudi Arabia;9 Thirdly: a 2006 study conducted by the International 
Money Fund concerning the stability of Saudi Arabian financial system;10 Fourthly: a book 
chapter titled 'The Saudi Capital Market' written by Mohammed Ramady in his 2005 book 'The 
Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements and Challenges'; 11  and Finally: a 2002 
conference paper written by Abdulaziz Al-Dukheil under the title: 'The Saudi Stock Market'12. 
 
Such studies are helpful for understanding how the Saudi capital market institutions developed 
and what their existing situation is, as well as for understanding the socio-economic conditions 
in which those institutions operate. On the other hand, the studies do not address the revision 
of the doctrine underlying the regulatory framework. 
 
However, just three studies investigating the general regulatory framework underlying Saudi 
																																																								
6 Bernard S Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’ (2000) 48 
UCLA L Rev 781. 
7 Abdullah Ibnrubbian, ‘Effects of Regulation, Islamic Law and Noise Traders on the Saudi Stock 
Market’ (A Thesis  S ubmitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Brunel University 2012). 
8 Al Jazira Capital, ‘Financing Role of the Saudi Capital Market: Promising Prospects’ (2010). 
9 International Monetary Fund, ‘Saudi Arabia: Financial System Stability Assessment,   Including 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on  the Following Topics, Monetary and Financial 
Policy Transparency,  Banking Supervision, and Payment Systems’ (2006). 
10 IMF, ‘Saudi Arabia: Financial System Stability Assessment’ (IMF Country Report No. 06/199, June 
2006). 
11  Mohamed A Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges 
(Springer Science & Business Media 2010). 
12 Abdulaziz Al-Dukheil, 'Saudi Stock Market' (The Future Vision for the Saudi Economy, 2002).   
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capital markets were identified, namely: 
 
a) a PhD thesis submitted by Awwad Saleh Awwad in 2000 under the title: 'Legal Regulation 
of the Saudi Stock Market: Evaluation, and Prospects for Reforms'13; b) a journal article written 
by Joseph Beach in 2005 under the title: 'The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical 
Study of the Creation of Law in Developing Markets'14; and c) a journal article written by 
Gouda Bushra Ali Gouda in 2012 under the title: 'The Saudi Securities Law: Regulation of the 
Tadawul Stock Market, Issuers, and Securities Professionals under the Saudi Capital Market 
of 2003'15. 
 
The topic of Awwad’s doctoral study is the same as that of the current study in some aspects, 
but some findings and information are no longer relevant and up-to-date as the study was 
undertaken before the revision of the Saudi capital market regulatory framework in 2003. 
Nevertheless, there are not many studies investigating the development of the earlier regulatory 
framework, therefore, Awwad’s study is still important from this perspective. 
 
A particularly important contribution of Awwad’s study is that it establishes correlations 
between doctrinal and non-doctrinal materials and contrasts Saudi doctrine against other 
doctrines. It must also be noted that Awwad derived research data from primary sources that 
other researchers could not get access to, namely, fieldwork and interviews with Saudi officials. 
Furthermore, despite focusing on the same topic, this study and Awwad’s study address 
different dimensions of the topic, which is normal, given the temporal distance between the 
two studies. 
 
The journal article written by Beach provides a direct overview of how the 2003 Capital Market 
Law came to be introduced, since the author took part in the drafting of this law. Through most 
of the article, Beach adopts a descriptive instead of an analytical approach to discuss the 
blueprints or source points associated with the law. Some of the information in the article may 
																																																								
13 Awwad Saleh Awwad, ‘Legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market: Evaluation, and Prospects for 
Reforms’ (University of Warwick 2000). 
14 Joseph W Beach, ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law 
in Developing Markets’ (2005) 41 Stan J Int’l L 307. 
15 Bushra Ali Gouda, ‘The Saudi Securities Law: Regulation of the Tadawul Stock Market, Issuers, and 
Securities Professionals under the Saudi Capital Market Law of 2003’ (2012) 18 Ann Surv Int’l & 
Comp L 115. 
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have become irrelevant because the regulatory framework has been changed several times since 
the article was published in 2005. 
 
As far as the current researcher is aware, the latest and most detailed secondary source on the 
Saudi capital market regulatory framework is the article written by Bushra Ali Gouda. 
However, since the author is a practicing attorney in New York, USA, the article is concerned 
mainly with describing and examining the black letter of the law and so it seems to be intended 
more for practitioners. The article does not comprehensively deal with the use of capital market 
institutions to achieve socio-economic aims, how those aims are promoted by the regulatory 
framework, or how systemic stability is maintained. 
 
Due to the secondary materials it uses, the article does not mention the IOSCO standards16, the 
five-year plans developed by the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) or the Capital 
Market Authority of Saudi Arabia (CMA) yearly reports. In fact, the article and the present 
study do not address the same dimensions of primary sources and highlight specific 
components of doctrine differently. To sum up, despite all being products of the legal discipline 
and having a wide scope, the three identified studies are incompatible with the present study 
due to dealing with different aspects or using different primary and secondary sources. 
 
However, the efficiency of particular aspects of the regulatory framework of the Saudi capital 
market has been assessed by only a couple of studies, such as: 
 
a) a PhD thesis titled 'An Evaluation of Investor Protection in Secondary Securities Markets: 
A Comparative Study of Regulatory Regimes in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia', 
submitted in 2012 by Sultan Alabdulkarim17; and b) a PhD thesis titled 'Corporate Governance: 
The Saudi Arabian Capital Market and International Standards', submitted in 2010 by 
Mohammed Alsanosi18. 
 
																																																								
16 This IOSCO sets out 38 Principles of securities regulation, which are based upon three Objectives of 
securities regulation. These are: protecting investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and 
transparent; reducing systemic risk. 
17 Sultan Alabdulkarim, ‘An Evaluation of Investor Protection in Secondary Securities Markets’ [2012]. 
18  Mohammed Takuk Alsanosi, ‘Corporate Governance: The Saudi Arabian Capital Market and 
International Standards’ (Thesis, University of Leicester 2011). 
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The above studies are useful because of their legal viewpoint and the use of methodological 
approach (i.e. empirical investigation) and primary and secondary sources similar to those used 
in the present study. However, the general scope of this study is only partially covered by these 
studies, which focus instead on other research aims. 
 
1.4 Background 
	
The legislation and regulations that govern the operation of securities market are there to do 
two things: to protect those who invest in securities from predatory or downright criminal 
exploitation, and to prevent institutional failure. If a securities market implodes that will 
adversely affect the financial stability of the state.19 This happened in 2006 in Saudi stock 
market. 
 
The Saudi stock market was exposed to a big crash in February 2006 which continued until the 
end of 2006, which had a profound impact on investor and the economy.20 The Saudi stock 
index prices lost 52% of their value by the end of 2006 in comparison to the end of 2005. As a 
result, Saudi people lost a lot of their money as many people tended to invest in stock market 
after the boom in 2003. This was caused by securities trading in an anarchic way in a market 
that still in its evolution process.21  
 
Accordingly, The Saudi stock market crash of 2006 prompted this thesis into whether 
regulations of Saudi securities market aimed at regulating the above four issues to afford better 
protection to investor. Therefore, effective disclosure and transparency regulations are needed 
to afford proper protection to investor. In addition, market abuse, in which the absence of 
regulatory laws leads to the provision of the necessary motivation for the practice of market 
manipulation, insider trading and illegal practices of brokers, is also a growing concern.22  
 
																																																								
19 George J Stigler, ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Markets’ (1964) 37 The Journal of Business 
P117. 
20 Baamir (n 1). 
21  Bader Abdulaziz Alkhaldi, ‘The Saudi Capital Market: The Crash of 2006 and Lessons to Be 
Learned’ (2015) 8 International journal of business, economics and law 135. 
22 Baamir (n 1). 
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Currently, stock market in Saudi Arabia is an important and timely topic as the Saudi 
government enters a major evolutionary process of economic expansion. A strong, domestic 
financial system should be appropriately maintained to ensure are country a cope with the risks 
associated with globalization.  As noted by Many authors of modern applied economics studies, 
such as Cameron, Gurley and Shaw,23 and more recently, Levine24 , confirm that a close 
relationship exists between the evolution of stock market and rates of economic growth. stock 
market generally supports economic growth and development through a number of their 
economic functions. Nevertheless, the absence of adequate financial sector policies and a 
developed financial system can produce disastrous outcomes, as illustrated by global financial 
crises. A strong domestic financial system should therefore be appropriately maintained to 
enable countries to cope with the risks associated with globalisation in general and the global 
integration of financial market in particular.25 
 
Moreover, Saudi stock market is an emerging market, so the legal framework that regulates the 
stock market is still considered to be underdeveloped, as is the institutional infrastructure in 
this market which is still in an evolutionary process. Thus, having efficient and effective 
regulations will reduce the market’s risk by making it safer and stronger by increasing their 
ability to respond to financial markets’ fluctuations and accelerated growth, on the other hand, 
a poorly regulated, or in practice unregulated, securities market has a markedly damaging effect 
on investor and the economy of the state.26 
 
Thus, Emerging market have the greatest need of robust and efficient securities regulations to 
ensure their economic growth. 27 Major economies, such as those in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, have legislation to ensure that investor are adequately protected. This 
legislation has evolved over the years in an effort to increase the level of protection. For 
																																																								
23 John G Gurley and Edward S Shaw, ‘Financial Aspects of Economic Development’ (1955) 45 The 
American Economic Review P515. 
24 Ross Levine and others, ‘Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth’ (1996) 10 World Bank 
Economic Review P323. 
25 Thomas Barnebeck Andersen and Finn Tarp, ‘Financial Liberalization, Financial Development and 
Economic Growth in LDCs’ (2003) 15 Journal of international development P189. 
26 Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘The Role of the State in Financial Markets’ (1993) 7 The World Bank Economic 
Review 19. 
27  M BIS, ‘Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies’ [1997] Bank for International 
Settlements, Basle. 
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example, in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has two main objectives. The first 
is a strategic objective to ensure that the qualified market function well.28 Secondly, there are 
operational objectives to secure a suitable level of protection for investor, to protect and 
enhance the integrity of the UK financial schemes29, and to encourage effective competition in 
the interest of consumers.30 By comparison with the UK, Saudi is still at the early stages of its 
evolutionary process to improve investor protection. 
 
Therefore, theoretical argument was raised that countries whose tend to enhance the growth of 
their securities market have implied laws that protects all investor especially small ones and 
present the investor with useful information. According to La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer 
& Vishny who proved that there is a correlated relationship between the level of protection that 
a country provides to its small investor and its capital market strength31. it was also La Porta et 
al proven that the growth of security market protection is heavily relies on the nature of 
countries regulations.  Coffee has found that the existence of securities protection regulations 
is valuable to investor.32 He also pointed out that investor who suffer from operating in a 
country that provides an environment with insufficient legal protection are able to overcome 
such a problem by listing their shares in an advanced legal protection environment.33 
 
1.5 The Importance of the Stock Market  
	
The importance of capital market in economic development lies in their role as a mechanism 
for collecting private and public savings and directing these towards various investment 
channels. Capital market also represent a connection between sectors (i.e. savings) that have 
																																																								
28 According to part 1A, section 1F of the Financial Services Act 2012. 
29 According to part 1A, section 1I of the Financial Services Act 2012. 
30 Financial Services Act 2012, pt 1A s 1B. 
31Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’ [1998] American 
economic review 537.  
32 John C Coffee Jr, ‘Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance 
and Its Implications’ (1998) 93 Nw UL Rev PP 641. 
33 ibid. 
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surplus resources and sectors that lack the liquidity to fund investments. This relationship, in 
turn, serves the objectives of development, regardless of the country at issue.34  
 
Many authors of modern applied economics studies, such as Gurley and Shaw35, and more 
recently, Levine36, confirm that a close relationship exists between the evolution of capital 
market and rates of economic growth. Capital market generally support economic growth and 
development through several their economic functions. Nevertheless, the absence of adequate 
financial sector policies and a developed financial system can produce disastrous outcomes, as 
illustrated by global financial crises. A strong domestic financial system should therefore be 
appropriately maintained to enable countries to cope with the risks associated with 
globalisation in general and the global integration of financial market in particular37. Thus, this 
section will explore the importance of stock market firstly for Economic and for company and 
finally for investor. 
 
Firstly: The importance of the stock market for economic can been seen over the past decade, 
global equity market has witnessed the most explosive growth and the emerging equity market 
have experienced an increase even more notable than developed countries’ equity markets, 
taking on an ever-larger share of this global boom. For instance, overall global capitalization 
rose from US$4.7 trillion to US$15.2 and the emerging equity market share jumped from less 
than 4 to 13 percent in the same period.  Since 1985, the value of shares traded in developing 
market has risen from less than three percent of the world’s $1.6 trillion total stock 
capitalization to 17 percent of the $9.6 trillion total in 1994.38  The global boom and the 
emerging markets’ contribution to it have drawn the attention of both academics and 
policymakers. Consequently, many studies are now focusing on how to measure the benefits 
																																																								
34 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, ‘Law, Finance, and Firm Growth’ (1998) 53 The 
Journal of Finance P2107. 
35Gurley and Shaw (n 22).  
36 Levine and others (n 23). 
37 John H Boyd and Bruce D Smith, ‘The Evolution of Debt and Equity Market in Economic 
Development’ (1998) 12 Economic Theory 519.  
38 Hamid Mohtadi and Sumit Agarwal, ‘Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: Evidence 
from Developing Countries’ [2001] On line] Available at: http//www uwm edu/mohadi/PA-4-01 pdf. 
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of globally-diversified portfolios, "while a large number of countries expound regulatory 
reforms to foster capital market development and attract foreign portfolio flows".39 
 
However, there are very few empirical studies showing that how importance the stock market 
to economic growth also, no single study exists in the developing countries. There is one study 
by Levine and Zervos that shows40 a positive relationship between Stock market development 
and long-term economic growth,41 but their study “relies on a cross-sectional approach with 
well-known empirical limitations including the inability to sort country-specific effects”.42 
In this context, the stock market appears to have not only the effects of the level, but also to 
assess the effects however, in this context there is an argument, on side believe that stock 
market support long-run growth43. Greenwood and Smith44 support this opinion by saying that 
"stock market lower the cost of mobilizing savings, facilitating investments into the most 
productive technologies". 45  Obstfeld proves that the stock market provides a vehicle for 
diversifying risk through internationally integrated stock market46, whilst Bencivenga47 and 
Levine48 have claimed that stock market liquidity – the ability to trade equity simply – plays a 
key role in economic growth.49 
The second perspective throws into question the contribution of stock exchanges to long-term 
																																																								
39 ibid. 
40 Levine and others (n 23). 
41 Andreas Billmeier and Isabella Massa, ‘What Drives Stock Market Development in Emerging 
Markets—institutions, Remittances, or Natural Resources?’ (2009) 10 Emerging Market Review P23. 
42Mohtadi and Agarwal (n 37).  
43 Rojid Sawkut and others, ‘Stock Market Development and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries’ [2010]. 
44 Jeremy Greenwood and Bruce D Smith, ‘Financial Market in Development, and the Development of 
Financial Markets’ (1997) 21 Journal of Economic dynamics and control P145. 
45Levine and others (n 23). 
46Maurice Obstfeld, ‘Risk-Taking, Global Diversification, and Growth’ (National bureau of economic 
research (1992).  
47Valerie R Bencivenga and others, ‘Liquidity of Secondary Capital Markets: Allocative Efficiency and 
the Maturity Composition of the Capital Stock’ (1996) 7 Economic Theory P19.  
48Levine and others (n 23) P23. 
49 Mohtadi and Agarwal (n 37). 
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economic development. For instance, the function of stock exchanges in improving 
informational asymmetries has been addressed by Stiglitz, who contends that stock exchanges 
uncover data through price changes quickly.50 However, questions have been raised about the 
contribution of liquidity to long-term growth. Demirguc-Kunt show that increased liquidity 
may limit growth through three channels51. To begin with, it may lessen saving rates through 
wage and substitution impacts. "Second, by reducing the uncertainty associated with 
investments and greater stock market liquidity may reduce saving rates because of the 
ambiguous effects of uncertainty on savings".52  
 
Gurley and Shaw53 long ago advanced a particular view of the relationship between financial 
market and real activity, which is that financial market are a fundamental aspect of the process 
of economic growth. Their argument was that financial market could improve the borrower’s 
financial capacity and the efficiency of trade, and that well-developed financial exchange can 
provide the necessary liquidity to investor for their projects.54 “Much of the literature on the 
relationship between financial market and real output suffered a lack of evidence until the 
1970s when studies by Goldsmith, Shaw and McKinnon found that development of financial 
market was significantly correlated with the level of per capita income”55. 
 
Moreover, Primary/ Secondary market: both the money market and the stock market consist of 
a primary market and secondary market; here it will briefly highlight the importance of each 
market for the economy.  The primary market assists economic growth through its ability to 
move savings and financial surpluses of individuals and institutions from the circle of 
compactness to the circle of beneficial and worthwhile investment. It provides the necessary 
funds for productive work and development projects from various sources, especially from the 
private sector, the participation of which the market seeks to maximize because of its large 
																																																								
50  Sanford J Grossman and Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets’ (1980) 70 The American economic review P393. 
51 Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt, Developing Country Capital Structures and Emerging Stock market (World 
Bank Publications 1992) vol P933. 
52Sawkut and others (n 42). 
53 Gurley and Shaw (n 22). 
54Boyd and Smith (n 36). PP1,9. 
55Guglielmo Maria Caporale and others, ‘Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: The 
Causal Linkage’ (2004) 29 Journal of economic development P33. 
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financial surpluses and the significant role, which it is expected to contribute to development.56 
 
When it comes to the secondary market, investor is starting to wonder about its activity in terms 
of market impact and role in the economy; does the intensity of trading operations serve 
economic development? Productive economic sectors gain no benefit as a result of this activity, 
it does not necessarily increase the size of national savings or increase investment operations 
in the stock (because trading in the secondary market does not represent any actual investment 
that adds to the economy), and it is not a new real investment. It is merely transition of 
ownership from one individual to another that does not help the national economy directly, 
though it is clear that the most important tasks of secondary market in securities are to provide 
liquidity for the IPOs of shares, to facilitate trading of these securities, and to be converted into 
cash quickly and easily whenever the bearer wishes to do so. 57 
 
If investing in securities capable of being acted in a short time at competitive prices, it raises 
the value of this investment and thus raises the yield relative to these securities compared to 
other financial instruments. Therefore, the weakness of secondary market consequent lack of 
or low relative yield securities, and thus lead to a decline in demand and this includes the high 
costs of capital and reduces the incentives to invest in new projects.58 
This of course is not in the interest of the economy; hence the secondary market is one of the 
important factors in the growth of the national economy because it contributes to the allocation 
of savings available to it. The success of the secondary market and increased activity makes 
securities attractive to savers. This is reflected positively in the primary market where it leads 
to increased investor appetite and their interactions with the operations of the primary market, 
whether in new companies or to increase the capital of companies continuing to develop their 
production processes. It undoubtedly maximizes opportunities for establishment of new public 
joint-stock companies, which is sought by the stock market to help the national economy.59 
																																																								
56 Andriansyah Andriansyah and George Messinis, ‘Equity Market and Economic Development: Does 
the Primary Market Matter?’ (2014) 90 Economic Record P127. 
57 ibid. 
58 Caporale and others (n 54) P35. 
59Electronic Bulls and Bears: U.S. Securities Market and Information Technology. (DIANE Publishing 
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Finally, the importance of capital market in the process of economic development is its role as 
a mechanism for collecting private and public savings directed towards various investment 
channels Dailami and Aktin60. Moreover, it represents a connection between the sectors (i.e., 
savings) that have surplus resources and the sectors that lack the liquidity to fund investments, 
which in turn serves the objectives of development no matter the specific country.61 
 
It has been confirmed by studies62of modern applied economics that there is a close relationship 
that links the evolution of capital market and rates of economic growth. In general it can be 
said that the capital market support the process of economic development and economic growth 
through a number of their economic functions, which can be summarized as follows:63 
 
Firstly:  Increasing the rate of investment growth in the national economy: The stock market 
works to encourage savings investment in general and to encourage small investor to save in 
particular. Those who cannot establish investment projects for a number of reasons, such as 
small amounts of savings or lack of knowledge of the available and feasible investment 
opportunities, prefer to buy securities with their money. This increases the rate of investment 
growth and increase employment rates and thus increase the rate of economic growth. 
 
Secondly: Transferring via the stock market financial resources from groups that have a surplus 
(savers) to groups that need this money (investors) to establish investment projects which are 
reflected in an increase in operating activity and an improvement in the standard of living in 
the community. Thirdly: Contributing to the financing of projects for economic and social 
development in the country where the stock market is providing the funds needed by the 
government for the establishment of investment projects. This is especially true for 
infrastructure projects, where government securities enable governments to increase their 
efficiency in the implementation of fiscal policy and monetary assessments. These tools are 
also a major means of financing the fiscal deficit and managing liquidity. In terms of financial 
																																																								
60 Mansoor Dailami and Michael Atkin, Stock market in Developing Countries: Key Issues and a 
Research Agenda (World Bank Publications 1990). 
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markets, they give the investor the option of liquidating all or some assets easily and at an 
affordable price. 
 
Fourthly: Representing an indirect supervisory authority on the efficiency of companies and 
projects that trading their securities in the market, thus providing a tool for evaluating 
companies and investment projects. Fifthly: Providing a range of financial instruments that 
create broader opportunities for the investor to choose in various areas of investment, which 
reduces the inefficiencies of individual savers having to research and choose investments that 
suit them. 
 
Sixthly: Reducing rates of inflation in the national economy by attracting the savings of 
individuals and institutions, thus absorbing excess liquidity and directing those savings towards 
investment rather than consumption. Seventhly: Taking advantage of global financial and 
economic developments, since the stock market operates with increasing interdependence with 
the outside world. Finally: Providing a reliable daily indicator of investment conditions and 
trends, reflecting both the strength (or weakness) of the national economy and the level of 
performance of broader economic sectors and individual companies. 
 
Secondly: the importance of the stock market for companies; an advantage of these companies 
is that they are characterized by the possession of legal personality separate from the personal 
owners of capital. They exercise the activities of producing, marketing, investing and financing 
under the name of the company, not on behalf of the partners. The personal independence of 
the company can continue the company, regardless of the continuing relationship with existing 
shareholders, so the exit of any shareholder of ownership in the capital does not mean the 
company stops. Another advantage is that the debt owed by the company for the benefit of 
others is not the responsibility of the shareholders64. 
 
Furthermore, the fragmentation of capital on a number of share can involve a large number of 
investor in capital financing, thus providing large amounts of capital that are not available in 
other types of markets. They all remain responsible for the company as much as if they owned 
shares only. The fragmentation of capital and limited liability for investor and the separation 
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of capital ownership from management help in the trading of the company's shares in the open 
market, which provides liquidity to the shareholder who wishes it. Another important 
advantage involves where grants put its IPO. Thus, market tend to look at public companies as 
being managed in a more professional and transparent way (i.e., audits and the publication of 
periodic financial statements and performance data).65  
 
 It also facilitates the ability of investor to use their shares as guarantees to get loans. 
Consequently, improved marketing helps the company's investor and reduces the company’s 
problems. It also helps to meet the liquidity needs of investor who prefer to keep their wealth 
in the form of assets instead of in their interest in the company. Moreover, the financial 
situation of the company is improved, which is a direct result of the sale of the company's 
shares to the public. This strengthened financial position facilitates the search for loans to the 
company and helps in negotiating the terms of these loans.66 
 
However, “indicators of Saudi stock market have reflected the depth of the market and its 
financing, which creates an environment suitable for funding, and which total market 
capitalization at the end of 2010 attained US$ 353.44 billion, arise of 10.86% in comparison 
with the end of previous year. The total value of shares traded for 2010 was US$ 202.45 billion 
as against US$ 337.07 billion for the previous year, a fall of 39.94%. The total number of 
transaction executed during the year 2010 reached 19.54 million compared to 36.46 million 
trades for the previous year, decreasing by 46.42%, while a total of 33.10 billion shares were 
traded in 2010 compared to 57.13 billion over the previous year, a fall of 42.22%”.67 
 
Finally: the importance of the stock market for investor, one of the most important factors is 
the ease of trading in the shares of these companies in the stock market. They represent a 
transfer of ownership of these operations from the hands of equity investor to other investor 
without affecting the continuity of the company's business or causing any confusion that occurs 
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because of these transactions. It also ensures freedom and speed of trading in the shares of joint 
stock companies. The ease of the transfer of shares to liquidity needs may have shareholders, 
which tempts investor.68 Moreover, shareholders’ exposure to losses or profits is artificially 
high because of speculation in the stock market, to the detriment of small-scale shareholders. 
 
Moreover, shareholders, especially small shareholders, can be involved in the conduct of the 
business of the company. However, the indifference of many of them to attend the meetings of 
the General Assembly, which convenes annually to discuss the company's business during the 
year, leads to limiting the decision-making to a few investor who own the majority of shares 
and who in most cases are in the management of the company. Through stock market, investor 
can implement investment decisions quickly compared with the private sector, which invests 
in companies or real estate, so it can buy or sell listed companies easily. In uncertain times, 
liquid investments provide an invaluable advantage.69 
 
Another important factor is that investing in stock market in an inflationary environment can 
protect investor from impairment by increasing corporate profits. By purchasing additional 
shares, investor become part owners of the companies in which they invest, which means the 
acquisition of interests in real estate, machinery and products owned by companies listed on 
the stock exchange. Even a small allocation of investment in the stock provides the advantages 
of diversification of risk in the sense that it follows the most important rule in investing: ‘Do 
not put all your eggs in one basket’70. However, investor can face huge losses if the value of 
shares drops dramatically. Many factors can impact the prices of shares, such as natural 
disasters, negative rumours, and profit downgrade, which can lead to a fall in share prices.71 
 
1.6 Theoretical Framework for Securities Regulations 
	
We might start with the view of a number of academics, of which an example is Ronald72 
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(Nobel Prize Winner in Economics), who asked whether any regulatory action by governments 
is appropriate, or at least, at what kind of level. Governments should keep out of the securities 
markets. Any external interference can only have a distorting effect on their operation.73  
 
In that regard and as previously noted, this view makes the assumption that investor transacting 
in the securities market are informed and experienced parties. It is also part of the argument 
that underwriters, brokers, and issuers are anxious to preserve a reputation for fair and 
competent dealing, which they would see as essential for the success of their businesses.  
Investor in these market enter into contracts that are up-to-date and understood by all the parties 
involved so ordinary contracts and tort will be enough protection against any breaches of them. 
According to this view, investor only want to be informed where they scent false prospectuses 
or bogus deals.74  
 
A study by Stigler made a before and after comparison of the US stock market in relation to 
the setting up of the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1933, and found that 
investor in common stocks post SEC in the 1950s did hardly better than they had in the 1920s, 
and no better at all if they only held the securities one or two years.75 
 
The "law matters" scholars who take the opposite stand, fall into two main schools of thought, 
having in common that the law in relation to contracts and torts is not precise or strong enough 
to protect the smaller investor from being cheated, but they have divergent opinions on what 
kind of regulatory regime should be imposed. The first school believes that such regulations 
should be concerned only to ensure that contracts entered into in securities market are 
standardized, making clear exactly what liabilities are being taken on and what responsibilities 
shouldered by each party, and providing enough information to protect the investor.76  It is 
assumed that through standardization and clear guidelines that judges and the injured parties 
will be able easily to rule that there has, or has not, been a breach which will facilitate 
enforcement. This would be reducing both uncertainty as well as lower costs. In this view, the 
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mechanism for private enforcement remains the most suitable method of imposing securities 
regulations.77  
 
The other school believes that private enforcement through the courts is not enough to protect 
the smaller and less powerful investor.78 regulations should be made and enforced by a public 
enforcer. Those with this view take the line that the judges are unsuitable for this kind of 
enforcement as they "courts are under financed, unmotivated, unclear as to how the law applies, 
unfamiliar with economic issues, or even corrupt “.79  They also maintain that a public enforcer, 
it is easier to encourage a regulator compared with a judge, as regulator is committed to 
enforcing the regulations it itself has set up, whereas judge  are harder to motivate because the 
nature of their independence and their post.  Against this, highly-motivated regulators and, in 
some instances, judges, may be too keen to enforce through previously poorly-publicized or 
obscure requirements – inhibiting companies from listing for fear of being trapped in some 
unforeseen byway of the rules.80 
 
The Coase argument for little or no public regulations will not work in the Saudi securities 
market that investor, brokers, and other involved parties in Saudi market are nothing like as 
mature as the argument’s supporters assume. Neither is reliance on private enforcement will 
not be valid. This is due to the fact that in general, investor and investor activism is largely 
inactive in all but a very few exceptional cases. The Saudi securities market needs a public 
enforcer to make and enforce regulations so that this market is seen as efficient, operated in an 
honest spirit, and stimulating investor confidence in it. Therefore, the need for regulations is 
noticeable, as evidenced by several financial crises and scandals, from which Saudi is not 
protected. Nevertheless, of the theories, the reality is that financial crises have occurred, people 
have suffered as a result, and this could have been avoided by having sound regulations in 
place. There is a greater development toward intervention in and regulations of the market. 
 
It is worth to mention that there are three crucial elements of securities regulations: firstly, the 
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legal framework itself, secondly, supervision thirdly, enforcement of related laws. Supervision 
and enforcement are tools used to ensure compliance with the legal framework. Compliance 
indicates to obedience to laws and regulations, whereas supervision intentions to identify non- 
compliance with laws and regulations, and enforcement aims to identify and punish non-
compliance. finally, both supervision and enforcement obtain to encourage implementation of 
laws and regulations.81 
 
One of the main feature of the regulatory is creating a supportive infrastructure for contract 
enforcement and dispute determination. This infrastructure has many features that collectively 
are known as the “rule of law”. Luis Rubio argues that there are three main features of the rule 
of law in financial markets.82 “First, it includes both political and legal guarantees of civil 
liberties and property rights. Second, the rule of law presumes an efficient judicial system that 
cuts transaction costs and limits predatory behavior. Third, it establishes legal security, 
meaning that under this rule of law citizens can plan their future courses of action and execute 
these plans in a context of well-known rules that will not be changed arbitrarily”.83 
 
Generally, the current financial theory of stock market growth outline two sets of elements 
affecting the growth of stock / financial markets: “macroeconomic elements” and “institutional 
elements”. However, institutional elements include variables that reflect the state of regulatory 
and supervisory institutions, such as legal frameworks etc.84 A sufficient regulatory framework 
is critical to the growth of stock market. A strong and transparent legal framework needs to be 
developed for public issuers of securities, market brokers, settlement processes and 
transparency requirements and controls to prevent market abuse.  
 
 
																																																								
81  Kamal A El Wassal, ‘The Development of Stock market: In Search of a Theory’ (2013) 3 
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues P606. 
82 Coffee Jr and others (n 75). 
83 Luis Rubio, ‘A Rule of Law Emerges in Mexico, Slowly’ (2001) 27 Wall Street Journal Eastern 
Edition PA19. 
84 Mr Amat Adarov and Mr Robert Tchaidze, Development of Financial Market in Central Europe: The 
Case of the CE4 Countries (11–101, International Monetary Fund 2011). 
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1.7 Protection of Investor from an Economic Perspective 
 
 Any proposals or suggestions for reforming anything must always be examined in order to 
avoid any unintended consequences. Is there any chance that the situation following the reform 
might be worse, in economic terms, than the one that held in the unreformed situation? As the 
aim of stock market regulations is to have a perfect capital market, this aspect deserves close 
scrutiny.  
 
It is only when the price of securities is governed solely by supply and demand, with no investor 
or players having a privileged or artificially created superiority over others, where all have 
equal access to information and the process of buying and selling is transparent that a market 
can be called ‘efficient’, which is what regulations strives to achieve. Without the enforcement 
of full disclosure and transparency in operations, evidence from the past tells us the ordinary 
private investor, lacking the resources and the know-how of the institutional punters, will 
always end up being short-changed and taking losses.85  
 
According to Carvajal and Elliott that regulations of the stock market need to address 
asymmetries of information between issuers and investor, client  and broker and between 
counterparties to transactions, in addition to settlement mechanisms that will prevent market 
disruption and promote investor confidence.86 The key stone of regulating of stock market is 
to ensure that an information asymmetry between investor and the market is best reduced by a 
system of truthful disclosure, where Stock market investor rely on the availability of accurate 
information to make quick decisions.87 
 
Perhaps it should not, as many academics have done, make too much of the positive effects 
bequeathed by regulations enforced by market or governments. There are other voices arguing 
that investor protection has its downside too. Some will say that regulations – which they would 
describe as over-regulations, results in lower levels of corporate earnings – and that especially 
																																																								
85Eugene F Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 The 
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86 Ana Carvajal and Jennifer A Elliott, Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulations: A 
Global Analysis (2007–2259, International Monetary Fund 2007). 
87 Stijn Claessens and others, ‘Corporate Governance Reform Issues in the Brazilian Equity Markets’ 
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hits hard on the share values held by managers of successful businesses. This, it is maintained 
will inescapably lead to poor quality financial reporting. Daniel Verier predicts that excessive 
investor protection could result in companies preferring to borrow rather than raise capital in 
the market.88 
 
At least let us observe that regulations do not come cost-free and so market regulations must 
result in a balance between costs and benefits. Consequently, stock market should not be over-
regulated in zones where free market forces should predominant, as well as stock market should 
not be under-regulated where a normal regulatory framework should be support the market 
confidence. 
 
In addition, upholders of traditional interactions between law and economics, hold that 
financial market should be regulated lightly and investor should be left to negotiate and enforce 
contracts. Those who endorse this view argue that courts are responsible for and capable of, 
enforcing these complex contracts. Not all economists agree, and have a good deal of research 
to dismiss the premises which underlie the view.  Rafael La Porta, along with others, showed89 
that light regulations is not efficient and ought not to be practiced. States that have stringent 
and robustly-enforced securities regulations to protect investor, generally have better and more 
developed capital markets.90  
 
In this thesis the researcher gives three main reasons why comprehensive securities market 
regulations is absolutely necessary in Saudi. They are: The private contract hypothesis of 
securities transactions demands regulatory institutions and robust enforcement to function 
																																																								
88Daniel Verdier and others, Financial Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock market (European 
University Institute 1999). 
89 "... the emphasis on legal rules and Regulations protecting outside investor stands in sharp contrast 
to the traditional law and economics perspective on financial contracting. According to that perspective, 
most Regulations of financial market are unnecessary because financial contracts take place between 
sophisticated issuers and sophisticated investors. On average, investor recognize a risk of expropriation, 
penalizing firms that fail to contractually disclose information about themselves and to contractually 
bind themselves to treat investors. well. Because entrepreneurs bear these costs when they issue 
securities, they have an incentive to bind themselves through contracts with investor to limit 
expropriation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As long as these contracts are enforced, financial market 
do not require Regulations (Stigler, 1964; Easterbrook and Fischei, 1991)." 
90La Porta and others (n 30). 
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efficiently, and this is not currently the case in the Saudi jurisdiction; The theory that private 
investor can enforce equitable contracts is based on an assumption that virtually all investor in 
Saudi market is sophisticated; this is simply not the case in the Saudi market; many investor 
lack the power and knowledge to engage in negotiated contracts with corporate and 
institutional investor; and there is tangible evidence that states with well-structured and 
robustly enforced securities regulations have uniformly enjoyed more efficient, more liquid, 
and less volatile market than their unregulated counterparts in other jurisdictions.91 
 
Regulations that is effective in protecting investor from the kinds of fraud and swindling will 
make a major contribution to the growth of relatively new market such as Saudi stock market. 
Investor who are confident that anyone who attempts to perpetrate such expropriation or cheat 
them will be detected and punished will be comfortable investing, will increase their 
investments and consequently attract more companies to raise capital and have their securities 
publicly traded.92 
 
1.8 Research Methodology 
	
In order to achieve the multi-objective purpose of this thesis, the appropriate method will be 
applied to the previously stated objectives. Thus, the thesis will adopt a combination of 
methods including doctrinal, theoretical, comparative, and contextual. 
 
The doctrinal method used by the thesis will contain an analysis of the existing legislations, 
regulations and statutes related to the stock market. The primary focus will be on Capital 
Market Law 2003 and its associated regulations, specifically Listing rules, Corporate 
Governance, Authorised Persons and Market Conduct regulations, as well as additional, 
relevant Saudi laws and regulations affecting the protection of the investor in stock market. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis will apply the theoretical method to examine the questions and notions; 
‘Is regulations of a stock market necessary?’ and ‘How should the stock market be regulated?’  
Protection of investor from an economic perspective, as well as the importance of the stock 
market, will be discussed as Chapter One described. 
																																																								
91 Porta and others (n 73). 
92 Leora F Klapper and Inessa Love, ‘Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in 
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In addition, the methodology in some parts of the thesis can be considered contextual, since 
the thesis examines the law within its social and economic context.  Chapter Five, for example, 
examines the socio-environments of Saudi Arabia of insider trading regulations. The aim is 
therefore to assess whether the future regulatory efforts that CAM may undertake are likely to 
succeed from the perspective of investor protection.  
 
It is necessary to use the descriptive method in some parts of the thesis, especially Chapter 
Two, as to enhance the effectiveness of existing rules to secure a suitable level of protection 
for investor. Overall, the thesis uses the critical analysis method in its remaining sections 
dealing with four controversial issues previously outlined, concerning the protection of investor 
in stock market.  
 
Also, it is crucial to use the comparative method in this thesis (particularly throughout Chapters 
Five and Six). In legal studies, as Mantysaari argued that it is broadly known that the use of a 
comparative study plays a fundamental role in developing and improving the reformation of 
laws and legislations in any country.93 Also, according to Zweigert and Kotz, comparative law 
not only aims to criticize existing rules but also to make law in general more efficient and 
indicative of the best ways to enhance the effectiveness of existing rules, as well as formulating 
entirely new ones.94 
 
As part of the process of reforming and improving law in a given jurisdiction, it must be 
advisable to make comparisons between legislations one state to another; a view shared 
globally by legislators themselves. The purpose of comparisons is not to condemn or criticize 
what is in place but, to take a concept from business activities, to adopt and adapt best practice; 
hence making existing laws and regulations more effective and accessing the best of legislation 
and regulations from outside. As Hill concluded in his study, a comparative method can support 
to "demonstrate the extent to which the form and substance of any legal system are not 'natural', 
but result from the implementation of moral and political values".95 
																																																								
93Petri Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance: Investor as a Rule-Maker (Springer Science & 
Business Media 2005). 
94 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
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The UK legal system and stock market regime are appropriate reference points for comparative 
analysis due to their series of features. 
 
First of all, The CMA is the regulatory authority active in Saudi Arabia, whereas the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) is the regulatory authority in the UK. The need to deal with the 
problems of market manipulation, insider trading and inadequate disclosure, which have 
affected the UK for more than 50 years, is the reason why the FCA is preferred in this country. 
 
Other reason for selecting stock market regulations of uk, is that the many cases of market 
manipulation, insider trading and inadequate disclosure undertaken in the UK is another reason 
for choosing this country as an assessment standard. Furthermore, the UK system is part of a 
wider regulatory framework because it includes the EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD). 
Additionally, the FCA has considerable deterrence power as it enjoys extensive authority in 
regulation enforcement. 
 
Additionally, reformation of the stock market regulations in Saudi Arabia is based on the UK 
stock market regulations as they are better developed, and they are selected as a model or 
benchmark to reform Saudi stock market regulations. Moreover, rather than trying to address 
limitations in the UK stock market regulations, the aim is to benefit from their advanced 
development and to learn from them to deal with the weak aspects of the Saudi stock market 
regulations. 
 
Moreover, When the Thatcher government came to power, it sought to reform the public sector, 
through privatizations as she described in her memoirs, Lady Thatcher saw privatization as 
“fundamental to improving Britain’s economic performance”96.  public services in particular, 
due to inadequacies. The Saudi government is facing a similar position, as Saudi Arabia have 
already, and is likely to continue in the near future, to privatize sensitive areas such as Saudi 
Arabian Oil Company (Aramco), as the Saudi government adopted the so-called Saudi Vision 
203097. 
																																																								
96	Stanford Jim, ‘Privatization If Necessary, but Not Necessarily Privatization?’ (2008) 54 Review of 
Income and Wealth 116. 
97  For further information about Saudi Vision 2030 visit: Saudi Vision, ‘A Developed Digital 
Infrastructure’ 
(vision 2030.gov.sa, April 2016) < http://vision2030.gov.sa/en >accessed 20th November 2018. 
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The UK stock market regulations is selected to be the model as its law is not one civil code but 
a common law, which is supported by legislation as well as precedent. This gives the legal 
system its flexibility, practicality and, most notably, predictability. Thus, the English legal 
system can be easily adapted to commercial requirements and transforming conditions and to 
technological innovations. 
 
Another reason for choosing the stock market regulations of UK, as their regulations are 
examined to determine what limitations such systems have. The use of comprehensive security 
regulations and the appointment of special authorities in charge with financial market 
monitoring are the basis for their similarities to those of the Saudi system. Also, the present 
study will assess how applicable and relevant these frameworks are in the Saudi setting based 
on investigation of how limitations are addressed by the UK authorities. 
 
Furthermore, In the specific case of stock market regulations, this thesis will compare the 
current KSA legal structure with that of UK, both those that would be described as developed, 
and those that are described as still finding their way to that degree of sophistication. Where 
relevant and necessary it will also address several legal jurisdictions with regard to economic 
aspects. The intention is to benefit from the UK’s advanced development and to draw useful 
lessons from it to remedy weaknesses in Saudi regulations). Yet, the springboard for this 
comparison is, the UK since it has long-established capital markets and developed legal 
systems. 
 
This thesis does not aim to be a comprehensive comparative study, but will present examples 
to illustrate the issues under discussion. Most of the chapters in the thesis will focus on a 
comparative analysis between KSA and the UK, taking into account various perspectives. It 
should be pointed out that there are, of course, inherent difficulties in comparing two legal 
systems in two different jurisdictions, since they are shaped by different customs and attitudes. 
Nevertheless, the aim of this comparative study is to identify strengths in the UK Stock market 
law that could be transferred to Saudi stock market regulations. Accordingly, this study seeks 
to look at various ways of effecting legal reform within the remit of these regulations. 
 
As the thesis is a doctrinal study, it should be pointed out that this thesis will not only discuss 
stock market regulations, but will also explore some rules in different regulations, such as Saudi 
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and UK company law. In this study I will review case law, stock market regulations, and 
circulars and governmental decisions in the relevant area. In addition, this thesis will be carried 
out using both primary and secondary materials, such as legislation, judgments, literature, 
reports and opinions.   In addition to this, this thesis will be carried out using both primary and 
secondary materials, such as legislation, judgments, literature, reports and opinions. A diverse 
range of electronic databases, including the LexisNexis database, will be consulted to ensure 
access to a wide range of contemporary and topical journals. The Internet will also be used, to 
allow access to important websites. Also, all other available and relevant sources will be used; 
these will include legal textbooks, journals (Westlaw, Lexis, Oxford and Cambridge Journals), 
case reports, legislative documents, international treaties on financing law, and other legal 
sources as necessary. 
 
Subsequently, a combination of these methods is deemed the most appropriate approach with 
which to accomplish the objectives of the thesis. As has been claimed, showing a critical study 
without a foundation in analytical data would lead to unjustified outcomes, whereas showing 
an analytical study without a critique is useless.  It should be pointed out that, secondary 
sources on the structure of regulations of the Saudi Arabian capital markets are scarce, which 
is unfortunate because the information within secondary sources is generally wider and goes 
deeper than can be had from primary sources. Secondary sources are useful to the researcher 
because they may draw attention to valuable but not necessarily obvious primary sources. They 
are also useful in throwing light on the background and reasons that created the primary 
sources. They also offer analysis of the primary sources and the different ways in which 
primary data can be processed.  
 
1.9 Research Scope and Limitations 
	
This thesis does not aim to be a comprehensive comparative study, but will present examples 
to illustrate the issues under discussion.  
 
• This study’s conclusions and generalizations are only applicable to Saudi Arabia and 
cannot be extrapolated and applied to countries with different investment environment, cultural 
norms and social composition. 
• In Saudi Arabia cases are not published or catalogued, so there is no ready access to 
judicial decisions and this presents problems for the researcher, so the researcher had to go 
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some cases personal. It appears possible that cases may be published in the future, but this 
initiative is still in its infancy. 
• Unfortunately there is little readily available information from secondary sources on 
the structure of the regulations which shape Saudi Arabia’s capital market. This is regrettable, 
since secondary sources usually provide fuller and broader-ranging information than primary 
sources. 
•       It should be pointed out that there are, of course, inherent difficulties in comparing two 
legal systems in two different jurisdictions, since they are shaped by different customs and 
attitudes.  
 
1.10 Research Contribution 
 
The results of this research have thrown up a number of findings which contributions to the 
current body of knowledge in the field:  
  
• To the researcher best knowledge, this is the first study to have investigated the measures 
which have been put in place to regulate the Saudi stock market, within the general context of 
investor protection under Saudi stock market regulations and re-establish investors’ confidence 
in its market. 
 
• This thesis’ findings will enhance the body of legal knowledge in Saudi Arabia, particularly 
in especially in understanding the role of laws and regulations of Saudi stock market. It is 
significant that the analysis offered of the legal structures and of the regulations which apply 
to the capital market has theoretical implications for deliberations which are taking place in 
other academic fields. The findings of this thesis are intended to provide useful material for 
Saudi Capital Market Law (2003) reforms in the future. In addition, they can also be used as 
an instrument for reforming the Saudi stock market and shaping its growth, so that investor 
confidence rises and expands. 
 
• There is little available literature on this topic in the region as a whole, and particular in Saudi 
Arabia itself. This thesis sets out to narrow the research gap and provide a legal viewpoint on 
how stock market regulations can have a positive impact on Saudi Arabia’s stock market, and 
drive its development from an investor protection perspective. 
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• The Saudi stock market is gradually becoming more regulated, and this thesis focuses on 
regulations of Saudi stock market which exist or are being introduced, and pinpoints hurdles 
to their successful execution and application. Highlighting the problems in this area will assist 
policymakers and practitioners to draw up effective stock market regulations and improve 
current practice. This will, in turn, tackle pressing hurdles to transparency and investor 
confidence, such as market brokerage and manipulation, insider trading and issues surrounding 
disclosure. As a means of increasing the investment climate and international competitiveness 
and to ensure the development of Saudi stock market and restored investors’ confidence in it.  
 
• This study will assist both the government and the regulators to evaluate whether the market 
reforms they have introduced have met their aims. In addition, those who invest in the stock 
market need to be reassured about its efficiency, its stability and the effectiveness of the 
measures taken to protect investor and to inspire confidence in the stock market.  
 
• Now that the Saudi stock market has opened to foreign investor, the latter may find it helpful 
when deciding whether or not to invest in the emerging stock market such Saudi stock market. 
Therefore. This thesis’ findings will encourage Saudi regulatory authorities to attract foreign 
investment by have a well-developed legal framework that would ensure the minimal 
protection for such investments. 
 
1.11 Research Outline 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter reviewed the theoretical framework for securities regulations along 
with the thesis objectives and aims; Also, it presented the importance of the capital market for 
Economic, companies and investor and protection of investor from an economic perspective. 
Moreover, this chapter concludes with the Methodology, as well as any difficulties or 
challenges it may face. 
 
Chapter 2: This chapter aims to present a historical review of the development stages; it also 
sheds light on the recent Saudi Stock Market crash by providing a description of the problem 
it. Moreover, this chapter concludes with overview of the current legal and judicial systems in 
Saudi with respect to the regulatory structure of the Saudi stock market. The focus is on 
exploring the legal regime that governs the stock market.  
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Chapter 3: the aims of this chapter is to assess the pattern of the disclosure rules in Saudi Arabia 
and financial reporting requirements also and periodic reporting requirements. Until recently 
there was very little concern about this issue. This chapter will, therefore, examine the current 
system of disclosure in Saudi Arabia, assessing whether they are adequate for their intended 
purpose. The researcher shall question whether, in light of the limitations of the current 
approach, a new set of rules is necessary to facilitate the release of information needed by 
investor.  
 
Chapter 4: This chapter explores the overall picture of insider trading in order to analyze insider 
trading regulations in Saudi Arabia, and briefly, those in the UK, in order to assess the 
effectiveness of current Saudi laws for preventing insider trading and mitigating crime as well 
as their level of complexity. Here it will review and analyze the concept of insider trading in 
light of its intricacies, difficulties, confusions and shortfalls. 
 
Chapter 5: This chapter defines market manipulation, elucidates its common forms and 
examines the effectiveness of current laws in preventing these forms. moreover, is to discover 
how well the law covers the most common forms of market manipulation as defined in the 
chapter. also, the chapter examines the current system of controlling market manipulation in 
Saudi Arabia to assess whether it is adequate for the intended purpose.   
 
Chapter 6: This chapter discusses the legal implications of brokerage firms as represented by 
brokers’ commitments and rights, which arose after the implementation of the market and the 
financial brokers’ agreement and to examine the legal aspects of the broker’s role as the 
backbone of any securities market, to achieve the greatest degree of protection for investor and 
to inspire confidence in the financial market. This includes reviewing the many submissions 
regarding unsuitable recommendations; the objective of which is to add weight to the recently 
designed law and thus support the Saudi court in its application of the new procedures and 
methods. As well as their suitability with the standards of disclosure, efficiency and 
transparency required in financial markets. 
 
Chapter 7: provides the conclusion and recommendations that Kingdom policymakers could 
undertake in order to enhance the protection of investor in Saudi stock market. 
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Chapter 2: The Historical and Legal Framework of 
Saudi Stock Market 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
	
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the development of an appropriate legal and regulatory 
framework is important to protect investor against market abuse and the lack of information 
symmetry among market participants, as well as to enhance investor confidence in the market. 
In the past decades, most developed countries have attached growing importance to the 
development of stock market and have focused on creating a legal and institutional 
environment conducive to domestic and foreign investments alike.  The emphasis is the result 
of a growing awareness of the important role that these market play in the process of economic 
development.98 
 
Are there opportunities to take advantage of the 2006 Saudi stock crisis? Or is avoiding the 
drawbacks the best we can do? 11 years have passed since the Great Depression resulting from 
the 2006 stock market crash in which the economy lost more than 2 trillion riyals that could 
have been invested in development sectors. Saudis lost confidence in the capital market, while 
a significant proportion of families and individuals were pushed close to the poverty line, 
leading many in the community to seek bank loans. The value lost by listed companies is 
disastrous.  There were no survivors, with only the company "Greer" retaining the same level 
of its stock over the period. Other negative effects will be mentioned in Section II. 
  
The general market collapse of 2006 revealed the low level of structural, operational, and 
organisational characteristics of the Saudi stock market. The market failed to detect the 
impending crisis before it occurred, and then failed to adequately manage and deal with the 
crisis leading to one of the largest economic disasters in the country's history. This chapter 
aims to present a historical review of the development stages of the structural, operational, and 
regulatory characteristics of the Saudi Stock Market. Moreover, the aim of this chapter is to 
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analyze the regulations that govern the Saudi stock market, and ascertain whether they can aid 
the development of a quality regulatory framework. 
 
The approach complements research on the relationship between investor protection and rules 
improvement. It also looks at problems relating to the recent Saudi Stock Market crash because 
it is considered an important historic event in the history of Saudi Arabia as well as the Calendar 
and can be seen as one of the most influential events in encouraging and stimulating the 
development of the stock market. The government has recently come under pressure to 
liberalise the securities market, including taking steps to counter insider trading and market 
manipulation by augmenting disclosure requirements. The government seeks to design a 
modern securities structure supported by a clear system of market rules. 
 
2.2 History of the stock market 
	
Financial market has existed since humans began to invest their savings until they reached the 
stage of projects that need financing beyond the capacity of their savings and therefore require 
large-scale investment. This prompted individual to use their savings to engage in profitable 
projects that would contribute to their savings, raise their level of income, and thus improve 
their standard of living.  The idea of financial market is based on Adam Smith's99 theory, which 
says that the division of work depends largely on the size of the market. Where there is a close 
relationship between the size of the market and the volume of production, this relationship is 
reflected in financial development and per capita income.100 
 
The development of capital market historically has been associated with the economic and 
industrial development experienced by most countries of the world, especially capitalist 
countries. The increase in the number of shareholding companies and the enthusiasm of 
governments to borrow led to a strong movement to handle financial instruments, which led to 
the emergence of stock exchanges.101 
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100 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Routledge Revivals) (Routledge 2013) P105. 
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Initially, instruments were traded on the side of the road in major countries, such as France, 
England, and America. Deals were then settled in private buildings, which later became known 
as stock market. At the beginning, it has to return to the idea of pluralism cash, which led to 
the birth of a new profession—currency exchange.102 In 527 BC, the rulers of ancient Greece 
ordered cashiers to switch the currencies of visitors to their cities. This profession developed 
rapidly in Greece and then spread throughout the Roman Empire.103 
 
In the first years after BC, this profession entered a dormant stage, with the exception of the 
Arab region. The profession then began to be practiced again and spread to northern Italy. 
Roman legislators decided at that time to establish a large number of laws and regulations 
relating to the operations of monetary deposits and currency exchange.104 
 
The profession was practiced in the republics of Italy, such as Genoa, Venice, and Florence 
because of their trade with the East, in which the international economy gained a prominent 
place. In Italy, capital began to accumulate, which necessitated the re-emergence of the 
profession of exchange. The title of persons working in that profession means bankers in 
English.  At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Belgian city of Bruges occupied the 
first position with respect to the cash market. During that period, members of the six large 
families that worked in the area of exchange usually met at the home of the president in order 
to study the process of buying and selling goods. They then wrote insurance policies and 
established procedures for everything related to the sale and purchase of money.105 
 
The word “bourse” dates back to the fifth century AD, originating in the name of the Vander 
Bourse family, which owned a hotel. Traders from Florence came to the Belgian city of Bruges 
to meet at the hotel, which was also frequented by traders from all regions. Because many 
traders did not take their goods with them, agreements were made in the form of contracts that 
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replaced the goods by future obligations based on mutual trust between the transacting 
parties.106 
 
Hence, the Bourse designates the place where traders and dealers met to conclude deals and 
contracts. Of course, before that date, traders had met in other places that were not called 
bourses. For example, the Pharaohs in Egypt allowed traders to display their goods and price 
them in marketplace where all the merchants met and deals were made. The first building to 
house a Stock market was known by that name: in 1460, the stock market was built in Onfrs, 
Belgium. Subsequently, many stock exchanges emerged in Europe. The first organized 
exchange of values took place in Lyon, France. In 1549 and 1563, stock market was established 
at Toulouse and Paris, respectively, and the Exchange Bordeaux was opened eight years later. 
The stock market of Rome was established in 1566, followed by stock market in Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands in 1608, and Vienna in 1762.107 
 
The London Stock market emerged in 1773, which was organically associated with the early 
emergence of British capital. The New York Stock market was established in 1792, and it is 
now considered the most important exchange of values in the world because of the daily 
volume of exchanges.108 
 
In the Arab world, the first Stock market was established in 1883 in the city of Alexandria. 
Seven years later, the Cairo stock market emerged. In the first half of the last century, stock 
exchanges have emerged in other Arab countries, such as such as Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Jordan, and Sudan. In particular, the establishment of market for securities has affected 
relations with European countrie0s. However, the Gulf States were not known in the capital 
market until financial resources increased, which started in 1973 with the massive correction 
in oil prices.109 Before the emergence of stock exchanges, if a person wanted to sell and buy a 
bond or share in some investment, it was necessary to announce his/her or desire by a simple 
means of advertising or to spread the news via friends in order to find a customer. However, 
																																																								
106 Gilbert Durieux and others, French Financial Market (Woodhead Publishing 1995) P54. 
107  Accounting T (n 98). 
108 Rik W Hafer and Scott E Hein, The Stock Market (Greenwood Publishing Group 2007) PP10,13. 
109 Ranald C Michie, The Global Securities Market: A History (Oxford University Press 2006) PP15,20. 
	 45	
this changed completely after the establishment of stock exchanges, at which all requests for 
sales and purchases to determine prices and announce to all.110 
 
2.2.1 History of The Saudi Stock Market  
	
Notwithstanding its comparatively short history, the growth of the Saudi stock market has been 
extraordinary. In less than 15 years, the Saudi stock market changed from an underdeveloped 
market into the biggest market in the Arabic-speaking world. This section documents the 
development of the Saudi Stock market, examining the three formative stages in its growth. 
The analysis of the market growth provides a foundation for systematically evaluating the 
current situation and prospects for reforms. 
 
2.2.1.1 The Preliminary Stage (1935 - 1982) 
	
For a period between the years 1935 and 1982, the Saudi government and the associated 
regulatory bodies failed to expand its capital market. At the time, the stock market in the 
country couldn’t keep up with international competition and was in urgent need of investment 
and positive change. It was relatively immature and quite basic. However, attempts to make 
improvements were largely unsuccessful and there are a number of probable explanations for 
this.  The first reason for the lack of development is the state of the economy in Saudi Arabia. 
It was in its infancy and, even though it was evolving and growing stronger, it was still a young 
economy, in need of experience and maturity. For this reason, it was more important for the 
Saudi government to improve living standards for its citizens. It was more concerned with 
building up a skilled workforce, for example, and expanding its infrastructure. While this 
direction of focus was practical and logical, it meant that the stock market fell behind, 
particularly in comparison with the rest of the world.111   
 
The second reason is that the stock market just wasn’t a primary target for financing for the 
government. In fact, it took a long time for its expansion to become a key government agenda. 
Saudi Arabia grew to be a very wealthy country, in a short space of time, due to its abundance 
of natural resources. As the exclusive owner of multiple massive oil reserves, the government 
was able to provide businesses with lots of different ways to access interest free lending. 
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Ultimately, the stock market lost out on this attention and the chance for growth during this 
period.112 
 
There are a number of studies which investigate this phase of the Saudi stock market and, in 
particular, its sluggish growth during the almost fifty-year period described. They have 
highlighted some key characteristics of the timeframe, which might help to explain why the 
stock market took so long to develop. For instance, Shook and Abdeen believe that it was 
because the stock market lacked order and foundation. It had no clear regulatory structure to 
guide it. Instead, there were four legal bodies (state operated) with the responsibility of 
directing the market. They are the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, the Ministry of Finance 
and National Economy, and the Ministry of Commerce.113  
 
It is certainly likely that, without an efficient legal structure or any clear regulatory guidelines, 
the stock market would have found it hard to grow and expand. It didn’t help that shares were 
routinely traded by unapproved and uncertified brokers. This contributed to the general sense 
of chaos within the market and less secure share ownership.  Also, the founding and/or board 
members owned a much bigger portion of the company shares. These individuals had lot more 
control and they could influence trades in a way which suited their personal interests. Needless 
to say, not many of their actions benefited low level stakeholders or the general public. The 
problem is that most Saudis didn’t have a complete working knowledge of the stock market. 
They couldn’t always trade securely or recognize when they were being exploited.114 They 
weren’t taught how to identify valuable trading opportunities or how to utilize basic technical 
evaluations. This uneven distribution of power had the effect of unbalancing the market.115 
 
On top of the vulnerabilities already discussed, there was a distinct lack of investment 
opportunity in Saudi Arabia. The dearth of investment choices meant that the general public 
didn’t take much of an interest in the market. Up until 1975, there were a mere 14 joint stock 
enterprises operating within the Saudi stock market. The limited amount of investment 
channels and pathways to domestic financial market began to encourage more speculative 
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activities.116 
 
By 1983, the amount of listed enterprises had climbed to 38. This is largely due to a period of 
intense oil investment and exploration during the seventies. It was further supported by a 
comprehensive ‘Saudisation’ plan from the government.  It aimed to privatize more businesses, 
substantially boost foreign investment and increase the number of foreign commercial 
banks.117  
 
2.2.1.2 The Established Stage (1984 - 2003) 
	
During the seventies, the government decided that it urgently needed to expand and develop 
its economy. For many years, the top export had been oil and it was responsible for a huge 
amount of the national income. The plan stretched across five years and it aimed to make the 
Saudi economy much more varied and independent. In fact, there were a number of ‘Five Year’ 
programs. The first began in 1970 and the objective was to strengthen the infrastructure of 
Saudi Arabia. The focus was on improving standards of living and building up a skilled 
workforce. With the release of the third Five Year plan, the government began incentivizing 
investment in the national economy, so that private companies would take an. In 1986, it 
established a more robust regulatory system for private-public ventures, which it hoped would 
support foreign investment.118  
 
These economic plans were the beginning of a new phase for the Saudi economy. This was 
when it entered what is known as the ‘established’ stage of maturity. The first step was the 
complete modernization and organization of the stock market, so that it could compete with 
those of other countries. The second step was a three-member partnership of legal bodies, 
which was, in 1983, appointed with the monitoring and leadership of the market.119 
 
This three-member partnership was made up of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, and the Ministry of Commerce. Each body 
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was appointed with a specific duty. For instance, SAMA had the job of supervising the daily 
actions of the stock market and making sure that it operated efficiently. The Ministry of Finance 
and National Economy was tasked with managing its expansion and development. And, finally, 
the Ministry of Commerce dealt with the initial public offering and regulations of the joint 
stock enterprises.120   
 
During the second stage of the market (between 1983 and 2003), far reaching changes were 
seen right across the stock market. They influenced almost every organizational and regulatory 
aspect; from the overall market structure to trading policies, and daily operations.121 The 1997 
SAMA review describe the following improvements and developments:122  
 
The number of commercial banks permitted to carry out intermediation services was capped at 
twelve. The upper limit for service charges was set at 1%. In 1984, these twelve commercial 
banks established a principal ‘Saudi Share Registration Company.’ The association had been 
converted into a fully automated resource by 1989, but for some time, it handled the settlement 
of share purchases and the registration of limited enterprises.  Also in 1989, the National Centre 
for Financial and Economic Information created a general index of shares. It was designed to 
evaluate and monitor the efficiency of the market. It operated via a points based system. The 
base value was 100 points, which were adjusted according to a value weighted system. In 1995, 
a second stock market index was created – the Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment 
Index. 
 
In 1990, SAMA introduced a digital shares data system. It marked the beginning of the 
‘floorless’ market in Saudi Arabia. This is because it allowed lots of investor, spread across 
many geographical locations, to continue trading on the market, all at the same time.    Soon 
after the millennium, the original title of the digital shares data system (the ESIS) was changed 
to the Tadawul All Share Index (or TASI). It operates a little differently as well, because the 
newly named resource added a T + 0 (same day transaction guarantee). For the first time, digital 
trading became a major part of the Saudi stock market. In fact, it dominated the TASI, as it is 
built to handle large amounts of internet activity. The updated index also incorporated a much 
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more sophisticated deposit structure and more efficient trading guidelines. Plus, it provides a 
greater number of financial options, including debentures, investment enterprise units, 
corporate bonds, and treasury bonds too.  
 
The operational abilities of the stock market were similarly improved and expanded. This was 
achieved with the incorporation of more detailed financial data and timelier (‘real time’) 
updates. This resource was made available on the official digital platforms and helped traders 
to make secure, efficient transactions. Finally, in 1997, foreign investor was permitted to take 
part in the Saudi stock exchange. This was forbidden during the initial stage of its 
development.123   
 
Due to the scope and reach of these changes, the Saudi stock market began to experience 
substantial growth and improvement, particularly in comparison with its earlier phases. New 
technologies were introduced and they further refined stock market activities and made it easier 
to trade. In addition to this, clearer regulations meant that trading was safer and more secure. 
On the other hand, there was still no independent body responsible for its supervision and 
direction.124  
 
This lack of a unified regulatory body is an important detail, because the existing three-member 
partnership was not as efficient as hoped. There is, in large part, because the three entities 
didn’t interact very efficiently. They were rarely unified and didn’t always work together to 
achieve unified objectives. It should also be noted that the degree of activity and contribution 
to the stock market (in terms of investment) was actually quite low, particularly in terms of 
turnover. In 2002, for example, the level of investment was only around 28.9%. At this point, 
there were 68 joint stock enterprises operating within the market, but this is still quite a small 
amount and it could be one of the reasons why the stock market continued to perform 
sluggishly. The Saudi government (and only a handful of wealthy families) owned most of the 
shares in these listed enterprises. This meant that there was only a minimal amount of shares 
left available for free stock market activity. This, undoubtedly, slowed the growth of the Saudi 
market.125   
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For quite some time, enterprises weren’t obliged to share financial data. In fact, there was a 
distinct lack of interest in issues like liability and transparency. The joint stock listed 
enterprises were asked to reveal their profits once per year, but there were no punishments for 
refusing to do this. Ultimately, the general ‘fairness’ of the market just wasn’t a top priority at 
the time. The maturity and rapid development of the stock market seemed much more 
important to the government.126   
 
There was no such thing as ‘voluntary disclosure’ at this time, so Saudi enterprises did not have 
to share data in the interests of transparency or for any other reason. Therefore, businesses 
revealed only the very minimum of information, particularly when it came to their profits. As 
a result, insider trading was rife and high level traders were able to influence the market in 
ways which best suited their interests. This added to the general imbalances within the market 
and made it even more pressing for the government to introduce stricter controls. In addition, 
there was a dearth of independent professional trading brokers, because only twelve 
commercial banks were permitted to carry out intermediary services.127   
 
2.2.1.3 The Modernized Phase (2003 - date) 
	
Fortunately, the government acknowledged the vulnerabilities and limitations of the market 
and its early development agendas. After a time, its Five Year plans focused on strengthening 
and improving the stock market, on a broader level. There has, since, been a greater emphasis 
on transparency, clearer regulations, and the construction of a rigorously controlled market 
structure which can compete with those in other countries. In 2003, the Royal Decree # M / 30 
established the ‘Capital Market Law.’ It marked the beginning of another new phase of growth 
for the Saudi stock market. 128 
 
This stage of development is often referred to as the ‘Modernized’ phase. In 2003, under the 
authority of the new Capital Market Law, the Capital Market Authority was introduced. It is 
an independent state established body, with the responsibility of supervising the stock market. 
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Ultimately, the Capital Market Authority has become the most dominant supervisory 
organization within the capital market (CMA Yearly Report, 2009). It is the enforcing body of 
the CML. It takes its findings directly to the Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia.129    
 
In the years since its creation, the primary purpose and function of the CMA continues to be 
the improvement and monitoring of the Saudi stock market, as a whole. This accounts for the 
maintenance, application, and supervision of the Saudi privatization scheme, which has been 
integrated with various different diversification plans and agendas. The overarching aim of 
these agendas is still to strengthen the economy of the country and identify more sources of 
profit and capital.     
 
During the third ‘Modernization’ stage of the stock market and its evolution, the following 
changes have been made:  In 2007, the Saudi Stock market (SSE) was constructed. It has the 
duty of supervising and handling financial transactions, via investment instruments based in 
Saudi Arabia. It also has a capital foundation of SR1200 million, which is controlled by a 
Public Investment Fund. The SSE used to be referred to as ‘Tadawal’ and it once operated as 
an independent joint stock enterprise. Originally, it took care of standardizing and finalizing 
financial transactions, in a way which guaranteed a fair, honest outcome. According to the 
CMA Yearly Report, this was an important objective for the Saudi government and the Capital 
Market Authority. The creation of the SSE essentially separated the operational elements of 
the market, by making them distinct and divided from its regulatory aspects.130  
 
Several new supervisory regulations were also introduced by the CMA. They were designed to 
ensure the fair distribution of data and the honesty of quality disclosers. It is keen to safeguard 
the frank, open disclosure of data for all investor working with listed enterprises. To achieve 
this, enterprises with initial public offerings need to be willing to provide accurate data about 
the issuers of securities. The CMA applies a number of key trade limitations relating to 
enterprise executives and board members, if they want to contribute to the stock market. To 
prevent insider trading from misbalancing the market, it also discloses data about the block 
holders of enterprises who own over 5% of their shares.131  
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In 2001, a resolution of securities conflicts was established by the CMA, in early 2011. This 
was designed to bring an end to disruptive trading challenges and clashes.   In 2008, there was 
a reshaping of the industrial elements of the stock market. The aim was to create a system 
which was substantially more efficient than the earlier definitions. The venture was directed 
by the CMA and it categorized all fifteen of the existing industrial sectors into a series of clear, 
concise classifications.   
 
According to the CMA Yearly Report, these new classifications formed the basis for updates 
to the Tadawul All Share Index. The objective of these changes was to provide a clearer 
representation of the stock market as a whole, so that investor could make informed, rational 
trading decisions. The following measures were introduced as a way to further expand and 
diversify the Saudi market:  In 2006, the CMA divided all share values from SR50 to SR10. In 
2007, GCC citizens were awarded investor approval, as a way to boost the level of activity 
within the stock market.132  In 2008, foreign investor and citizens were permitted to contribute 
to and make transactions within the Saudi market.133  
 
In 2009, the CMA helped a total of 110 independent professional broker to finalize 
transactions. After this point, banks were forbidden from carrying out intermediary services, 
unless appointed by the government.  In 2009, for the first time, corporate and SUKUK bonds 
were incorporated in the form of trading securities.  The measures are part of an attempt to 
diversify and improve the stock market, via the financial engineering of new tradable 
investment options across the whole trading system. They have boosted the value of corporate 
and SUKUK bonds, which was calculated at SR 280 billion in 2010. These new measures have 
also substantially increased the scope and depth of the market, overall.  
 
Throughout the most recent phase of the stock market (the Modernization stage), the CMA has 
incorporated lots of new investment opportunities. It has also expanded the financial market 
by forcing listed enterprises to accept more liability and for their activities and any 
consequences of these actions. To summarize, over many years, the Saudi government has 
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progressively and consistently improved its stock market, until it has been left with strong, 
robust trading system which can rival that of more mature economies. In 2009, the CMA 
delivered over one million copies of an investment awareness brochure. It contained a wealth 
of medial lessons and guidelines on the reporting of accounting disclosures for listed 
enterprises. This is just one example of the government’s new commitment to stock market 
education. The regulatory body also sponsored a university learning course, as a way to help 
students understand the market and the history of the Saudi economy.134   
 
2.2.2 History of the London Stock Market  
	
In London, the stock market began in 1698 in the Cafe Jonathan. The owner (Jonathan 
Castaing) decided to display lists of goods and stocks for those interested under the name of 
The Course of the Exchange and Other Things. In 1725, many of the brokers working in the 
City of London an had been customers of Cafe Jonathan decided to expand, and in 1773, they 
changed the name of the cafe to The Stock Exchange.135 
 
The announcement was made by John Taylor, who stated, “We sell and buy lottery tickets new, 
ration cards marine, bonds and the East India Company, and other public bonds”. As stocks 
grew and new companies joined to raise capital, the royal court also raised some monies. This 
is the earliest evidence of organized trading in marketable securities in London.136 In 1669, a 
regulated stock market was born when Gresham's Royal Exchange building was rebuilt and re-
established after it was destroyed in the great fire of London. This was a step towards an 
advanced model of the stock market. The Royal Exchange consisted of brokers, merchants and 
merchandise. However, it had problems with unlicensed brokers, which were resolved in 1697 
when Parliament established an act that imposed severe punishments, both physical and 
financial, on those brokering without a license.137 
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In 1720, the London Stock Exchange’s first case of a collapse of financial market in occurred 
when a wave of speculation led to an “explosion” of the first known bubble market—the South 
Sea Bubble!.138  "In 1802 the Exchange moved into a new building in Capel Court. And in 
1812, the first codified rulebook was created. The exchange had recovered by the 1820s, 
bolstered by the growth of the railways, canals, mining and insurance industries (there were, 
however, problems with stags and dividend payments). Regional stock exchanges were formed 
across the UK. Bonds (or gilt-edged securities) also began to be traded".139 
 
In 1836, the first regional exchanges opened in Manchester and Liverpool 1836. In 1845, 
speculative fever—this time “Railway mania”—swept the country. In March 1854, the Stock 
market was rebuilt.140 "In 1876 a new Deed of Settlement for the Stock market came into 
force". In 1914, the stock exchanges were hit hard by the outbreak of the First World War, 
which lead to closing the Stock market from the end of July until the New Year; thus, street 
business started again. In 1923, The Exchange received its own Coat of Arms with the motto 
Dictum Meum Pactum (My Word is My Bond).141 The US. stock market crash on October 29 
had a major influence in UK, As in December of 1929, a scandal on the London Stock 
Exchange, containing a great fraud by a promoter, caused a drop in the London Stock 
Exchange.142 
 
On the first day of September 1939, the Exchange closed and two days later, the beginning of 
World War II was announced after the declaration of war was signed. The Exchange's doors 
then reopened on September 7. In 1945, The Exchange closed for only one day because of 
damage caused by a V2 rocket; trading then continued in the building’s basement.143 In 1972, 
Queen Elizabeth opened the new building of the Stock Exchange, which is 321 feet tall, has 26 
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stores with Council and Administration at the top, and has a trading floor of 23,000 sq. ft.144 
"In 1973 the first female members were admitted to the market. The 11 British and Irish 
regional exchanges amalgamated with the London exchange".145 
 
In 1991, the trading name became “The London Stock Exchange” because the governing 
Council of the Exchange switched to a Board of Directors drawn from the Exchange’s 
executive, customer, and user base. In 1995, the London Stock market launched the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) to allow developing companies to expand into international 
markets.146  In 1997, with the launch of the electronic trading system of the Stock market 
service (SETS), stocks began trading with higher liquidity. This electronic system depends on 
the prices of orders. When the purchase price and the selling price match, the command is 
executed automatically.147  
 
“In 2000 the London Stock market transferred its role as UK Listing Authority with HM 
Treasury to the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Investor voted to become a public limited 
company: London Stock market plc”.148 In 2003, the London Stock market launched EDX 
London, a new international equity derivatives business in partnership with the OM Group," 
The Exchange also acquired Proquote Limited, a new generation supplier of real-time market 
data and trading systems".149 
 
In July 2004, Queen Elizabeth II opened a new building to house the London Stock Exchange, 
which moved from Threadneedle Street to Paternoster Square (EC4) close to St Paul's 
Cathedral.150 “On the 23rd June 2007, the LSE agreed to take over the Milan-based Borsa 
Italiana for 1.6 bn. euros (£1.1 bn.; $2 bn.) The Group operates out of the Stock Exchange's 
headquarters in Paternoster Square”.151 The London Stock market is the most important in 
Europe and one of the largest stock exchanges in the world. It lists more than 3,000 listed 
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companies. Exchanges are more prevalent at the international level, which includes 350 
companies from 50 different countries. London Stock market Securities are electronic; 
however, different systems are used for different types of trading stock.152 
 
2.3 Crash of The Saudi Stock Market 
	
Prior to 2006, the Saudi capital market had not endured a substantial crash. The capital market 
swiftly and unexpectedly grew a considerable percentage starting in 2003 and, in comparison 
to 2518.1 at the end of 2002, the “TASI” (Tadawul All Share Index) concluded in 2003 at 
4437.6 points.  It is stated that the significant increase in the capital market was generated by 
a number of contributing factors which included: a sense of improved assurance in the market, 
the expansion of the domestic economy, elevation in income for a series of corporations, the 
continually decreasing rate of return on deposits and, lastly, a high quantity of new market 
depositors153. The TASI had enlarged by 84% to 8206.23 points by the conclusion of 2004 and, 
by the conclusion of 2005, the TASI had grew by a considerable 103.7% to 16,712.64 points154.  
 
To look beyond the figures, amid the years 2002155 to 2003,156 the market capitalization of 
issued shares amplified exceedingly fast from US$75 billion to US$157 billion and, similarly 
between the years 2004157  to the end of 2005,158 the figure rose from US$306 billion to 
US$650. Ultimately, on 25/02/2006, the TASI registered the highest point in its history which 
was 20,634.86.159  At the end of 2005, SAMA issued new regulations intended to govern 
banks’ consumer finance agreements, which were enacted beginning in 2006. Consumer loans 
had grown between 2002 and 2005 by more than 370 percent, increasing from 38.4 billion 
riyals towards the beginning of 2002 to about 180.9 billion riyals by the end of 2005. At the 
same time, the number of stock market traders rose to about 2.6 million.160  
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The considerable escalation in demand as a result of high quantities of extra investor in the 
stock market, either via banks with numerous forms of portfolios or directly, is the principle 
cause of the intense and unrelenting expansion.161 It is recorded that, at one period in time, over 
50% of Saudi adults had invested into the stock market. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that, regrettably, a high proportion of these investor had liquidated their assets or 
taken out loans in order to finance their stock purchases.  
 
Basically, in the year 2005, over 75% of consumer loans were for the purpose of something 
besides long-lasting goods, real estate or lines of credit. From these figures, it is justifiable to 
propose that a high percentage of the investor believed it was an unmissable opening in the 
capital market as it was a period where the market was experiencing continual and extreme 
expansion. The notion of investing money which investor did not actually have, became a 
common and almost attractive risk to a large quantity of people as they were witnessing such 
a surge in the financial market162.  
 
According to a Saudi expert that a series of additional contributing factors were at play during 
this period. As a consequence of foreign and external unpredictability becoming a significant 
fear for investor following 9/11, a considerable quantity of capital began returning to Saudi 
from overseas. Subsequently, as there were no attractive additional investment options at this 
period in Saudi, a high percentage of the capital was invested straight into the stock market. 
However, the trading of shares was, on the whole, majorly unsupervised, banks delivered 
simple credit and physical facilities for the investor and, further, there was a significant and 
noticeable level of both legal and illegal speculation in the shares of a number of 
corporations.163 
  
Eventually, however, in February 2006 the dreams of many were shattered as “CMA” (Capital 
Market Authority) made the choice that the daily stock price fluctuation limit of listed 
companies was lowered to 5%. As a direct consequence of the decisions implemented by 
“CMA”, the TASI began to intensely and substantially drop towards the end of February 2006 
and, almost instantly, approximately 13000 points were lost. The initial 3 weeks following 
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25/11/2006, TASI diminished by 25% to 20,634.86. However, following this, it looked as if 
the TASI became constant for numerous weeks as it maintained just higher than 15000164.  
 
However, while it was widely believed that the TASI had levelled, it then dramatically dropped 
again during a period of 3 weeks to approximately 10000 points. Throughout these 2 months, 
the TASI had reduced by a staggering 50%165. At the conclusion of 2006, the TASI was 
recorded at 7,933.29 and, therefore, had diminished by 52.53% in comparison to 2005166. 
Essentially, the figures reveal that TASI had reduced by approximately 65% from the largest 
recorded period where it reached 20,634.86 points in 2006. Additionally, dropping 49.72% 
from the year 2005, the market capitalization plummeted to US$326.9 billion by the conclusion 
of 2006.  Throughout the time of extensive growth in the market, more than 4 million Saudis 
had invested money into the Saudi stock market. A high proportion of the depositors were 
considerably inexpert and naïve to this field and, notably, a large percentage were also retired, 
widowed or individuals with low incomes who believed, by liquidating all their financial 
savings and additional assets, they would receive momentous revenues.167  
 
Unsurprisingly, losing this amount of money in the stock market was a momentous loss to these 
individuals and, as a result, there were substantial ramifications felt throughout the Saudi 
economy.168 What made this situation even more problematic was, instead of forming informed 
and educated decisions from taking advice from financial experts regarding the general and 
long-term forecast for Saudi’s economy, these individuals made financial decisions based on 
the information given from their friends, work colleagues, family and the Saudi media.169 
 
As a result of the 2006 stock market crash, the economy lost more than 2 trillion riyals that 
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could have been invested in development sectors. Saudis lost confidence in the capital market, 
and the losses pushed a significant proportion of families and individuals close to the poverty 
line, thereby forcing community members to seek bank loans. This problem disrupted 
individual development and the overall progress of the Saudi community. It also resulted in the 
collapse of the stock market as the withdrawal of millions of families reduced the levels of 
savings and investments.170  
 
Moreover, the pricing-related losses incurred by companies listed in the market reached a 
record proportion of up to 97 percent in 2006. During the last ten months of that year, the local 
stock market experienced one of the most difficult stages of its development. This stage saw 
repercussions similar to the Great Depression in that the market had been growing at an 
unprecedented rate for more than two decades. Overall, the index reached a yearly cumulative 
average growth rate that exceeded 719 percent from the beginning of 2003 to the pre-collapse 
period up to 25 February 2006.171 
 
Determining why the stock bubble burst in 2006 necessitates first understanding how the 
bubble formed. The occurrence of the bubble can be explained through an analogy of a vehicle 
that is driven on the wrong lane. At the end of the lane, this vehicle is instructed to stop by a 
traffic officer, who asks the driver to return to the starting point and drive on the right lane. 
The driver is imposed a fine for the violation, an expensive outcome from the reckless violation 
of traffic rules. Similarly, imprudent or legally unsound investment decisions resulted in 
expensive losses. Investment ‘offenses’ came with an upper limit of more than five million 
portfolios (the price of the offenses) as compensation for owners. Such compensation 
highlights the importance of adherence to laws, regulations and legislation.  
 
Although providing a single encompassing explanation for the occurrence and explosion of the 
stock market bubble is difficult, three reasons can, in combination, account for the 
aforementioned events. The theories demonstrate that the collapse of the Saudi stock market 
was caused by directly and indirectly related factors, which centre on four points: poor 
disclosure and transparency, market manipulation and insider trading along with market 
brokers. 
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While it must be acknowledged that idealistic and improbable hopes were large factors which 
generated such high levels of investment, it is also realistic to suggest that specific elements of 
the market may have added to constructing an idyllic image of the stock market between the 
years of 2004 and 2005.  Prices rose artificially as a number of affluent investor were actually 
buying and selling stock between themselves which formed a false impression of big margins 
and avid interchanging in the market. Further, it should be acknowledged that there were 
elements not relating to the economy which added to diminishing prices.172  
 
In some specific situations, inside information were a contributing factor, however, in a high 
proportion of the scenarios, Smaller investor based their financial decisions on artificial profit 
margins. Further, minor or less experienced investor may have carefully examined and 
observed the trends within the market, but made the catastrophic mistake of presuming that 
these figures would continually grow and, therefore, they made what they believed were 
educated decisions and bought shares for prices which were already overblown. Commonly, 
rather than banks giving investor’s realistic and levelled financial advice, they were too easily 
admitting credit to already financially stretched customers.173  
 
Unfortunately, yet unavoidably, the financial crash effected working class families most 
substantially. The devastation was anything from people becoming unemployed, begging for 
money or even being imprisoned as a consequence of being unable to pay the debts they owed. 
Huge proportions of the Saudi population had invested their whole life’s worth of financial 
savings during this period and, consequently, the backlash after the crash was devastating.174 
People had simply not predicted a financial crash was imminent and, therefore, it was a severe 
shock for many to live through such financial change and uncertainty. Large proportions of 
people became ill, developed mental conditions or it was actually recorded that some 
individuals had died as a result of the crash and accompanying factors.175  
 
Furthermore, the repercussions of the crash were not limited to Saudi and the effects spread 
over to additional “GCC” countries (Gulf Cooperation Council). As a consequence of such a 
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major crash, investor across these countries became dubious regarding how fair the market was 
and, consequently, many made the executive decision of keeping investment and trading with 
Saudi Arabia to an absolute minimum176.  
 
As a direct result of the financial crash in 2006, it is probable that the Saudi stock market would 
be viewed in a different light in comparison to other stock market across the globe. As a 
consequence of the speculation and artificial spiral, it was evident that a company’s 
performance levels were almost entirely detached from the share prices. It was actually 
recorded that some of the most unsuccessful corporations during 2005 and 2006 were among 
some of the largest values on the Saudi capital market177.  However, it must be acknowledged 
that simultaneously, a high proportion of large speculators bought and retailed the shares both 
as groups and individuals and, therefore, the price progressively grew as a result of the 
quantities of trading. Because of the lack of oversight and penalties, a high proportion of this 
illegal activity continued to occur even following the financial crash in 2006. Eventually in 
2007, the CMA decided they must interfere with this activity and postponed trading and 
exchange among corporations whose financial losses surpassed their assets by 75%.178  
 
Furthermore, there were additional contributing elements which would have added at work that 
artificially increased prices. Primarily, an increase in domestic liquidity was still continuing 
and, therefore, prices were growing to an irrational height irrespective of what the listed 
company’s financial statements would read.  Essentially, it was concluded that a percentage of 
companies were capable of utilizing their financial reserves in order to cleverly mask the fact 
that they were functioning at a substantial loss. Secondly, as a result of CMA being fearful of 
probable adverse results that would be generated when hard-hitting consequences were 
implemented against manipulators in the market, the abusive practices continued to happen.179  
A likely reason for the CMA having considerable doubts regarding the action they could take 
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is that they were only newly founded in 2004 and, therefore, were inexpert.180  
 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the CMA’s measures, predicting the usefulness of previous 
decisions to limit or eliminate speculation is difficult to accomplish. Effective restriction or 
elimination, in turn, depends on transparency and fairness, which are the first pillars of success 
in any investment environment. In this regard, financial market laws clearly indicate that 
regulations focuses on certain important aspects. To illustrate, I refer to two stipulations in the 
first law on the financial market, reported in the second quarter by the CMA: Article 1815(a), 
items 4 and 5. Item 4 mandates the protection of citizens and investor in securities from unfair 
or improper practices, such as fraud, deceit or manipulation. Item 5 indicates that the CMA 
shall work to achieve justice, efficiency and transparency in securities transactions. Second, 
item (a) of Article182 49 in Chapter 8 stipulates provisions for fraud and trading based on inside 
information. Specifically, the Act prohibits violation of the provisions of the Act and the 
intentional formulation of untruthful or misleading impressions regarding the market or the 
price/value of securities for the purpose of creating such impressions to encourage investor to 
buy, sell or subscribe to certain securities or to forgo such investment or refrain from exercising 
the rights granted by the securities investment.  
 
The stipulations above reflect emphasis on crucial principles, including those related to dealers 
and protecting them from factors that affect decision making and progress in the investment 
process. The stipulations for such protection include guaranteeing justice and transparency in 
transactions, although these regulations require application, review and modification for 
suitability to specific market conditions. Despite the existence of the aforementioned 
provisions. However, inappropriate or unethical practices persist, thereby considerably 
influencing investor behaviour. Some behaviours are subtle and may be difficult to address. 
Examples are speculator recommendations that encourage people to either buy or sell certain 
shares. The most prominent example of the systematic manipulation of return on equity is the 
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case of Borouge Insurance,183 in which the manipulation caused fluctuations in share price; in 
a period of seven months, share price ranged from 19 riyals to 258 riyals per share. Despite the 
business losses incurred by the company, the reduction of shareholder equity by more than 20 
percent within three years and the subsequent reduction in share price, Borouge Insurance has 
not been investigated or charged for suspicious transactions.184 
 
The failure to exhaustively police investment transactions generated a huge demand for trading, 
even if high prices do not reflect good performance of subsidiaries. Other recommendations on 
addressing the undeclared shares of some companies have been posted by some financial 
institutions on official sites and other media. Such active participation in the regulations of 
transactions gives rise to questions that the CMA has yet to answer. Some of these questions 
are detailed as follows.  Do these recommendations, regardless of whether they are accurate, 
influence the behaviour and performance of investor in the market, as well as the shares owned 
by parent companies in their investment portfolios? These recommendations constitute a 
violation of Article 49185 given that they urge investor to buy or sell.  
 
However, aside from the factors which caused this, it was recorded that as a consequence to 
the CMA’s reluctance to press charges, the behaviors continued to conduct illegal activity. 
While this activity stems back to as early as the year 2000, speculation and counter-speculation 
continued unabated.  The main objective of these speculators was to purchase as many 
overblown shares as they possibly could and, this way, they could take full advantage of profit 
margins.  Alongside the naïve and inexpert first time investor who invested money for 
unrealistic returns, the investor were the core reason why the artificial idyllic capital market 
was constructed.186 
 
There are also additional causes which added to the 2006 financial crash in Saudi. One of them 
was the lack of transparency and disclosure by listed companies, banks, and some 
governmental agencies that were associated to the stock market. Several listed companies 
failed to disclose their financial statements. This behaviour continually progressed and the 
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government failed to intervene or enforce some kind of regulations regarding insider trading, 
manipulating prices, and making false statements.  As there was no successful procedure 
applied to challenge or even slow down the development of these rumours, there failed to be a 
system which detected and prosecuted this criminal activity, partially because some investor 
had authority and relationships that allowed them access to material inside information. they 
continually expanded and grew during the years 2005 and 2006.187 
 
The investor utilised the inside information they could view in order to work either individually 
or as groups to illegally take risks in the stock market. Additionally, considerable inflation was 
generated in the Saudi stock market as a result of the high levels of liquidity with few listed 
companies. However, an ethical factor which must be carefully addressed is that, instead of 
limiting lending policies and providing individuals with realistic advice, Saudi banks extending 
their lending amounts and, consequently, the market was overran with liquidity.  The causes of 
these insider trading and market manipulation.188 The absence of disclosure and transparency 
encouraged recommendations for addressing these issues and caused problems related to inside 
information. The question is whether transparency and disclosure problems are caused by lack 
of control or legislative enforcement. The absence of transparency meant that the media 
coverage of Saudi Arabia was key to the dissemination of information in the stock market, 
driving many of the shareholding companies to disseminate necessary information to 
investor.189 
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This development enabled some investment and financial companies to exploit the media in 
promoting their shares, either directly or indirectly through financial analysts and technicians 
who appear on satellite television or write for local newspapers. Media reports and talks 
focused on the positive attributes and ignored the negative qualities of these companies. This 
practice, in turn, resulted in the distortion of information and facilitated immoral exploitation 
(moral hazard) by traders, who contributed to the large losses incurred from the lack of official 
information. In the April 2012 issue of the Journal of Finance, Solomon confirms that media 
coverage highlights the positive attributes but disregards the negative characteristics of 
companies, thereby resulting in increased share prices before results announcement. Studies on 
the influence of corporate investor relations (IR) and media coverage of investors’ expectations 
indicate that companies work on behalf of their client  to encourage high media coverage and 
the dissemination of positive news to raise the expectations of investor in the absence of market 
information.190  
 
Concerned authorities in developed countries limit exaggerated increases in stock value, 
whereas the Saudi market has no system in place for regulating twofold increases in company 
shares. The registered shares of some companies, including small companies such as Bisha,191 
announced an exaggerated stock price increase in 2006, from around 100 to around 2,400 
riyals. This value exceeded that of SABIC, a global company listed in the Saudi stock market. 
After the collapse, however, the authorities announced that these companies were losing money 
or were bankrupt.192 Whenever investor encounter difficulties in obtaining information on 
companies, they resort to media coverage as their channels for information delivery. In such 
coverage, information is disclosed in a way that deceives investor to believe that a given 
company exhibits excellent performance when the opposite is the case. Thus, quarterly 
announcements cause more surprise than do forecasts. Moreover, the fact that more than 50% 
of company shares are offered outside of trading exerts pressure on the trading process and 
causes an increase or decrease in share prices.193 
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The CMA, devoid of carefully analysing and assessing the decisions, methods and actions they 
had selected, began to attempt to cope with the unpredictable market.  As a consequence of 
these decisions hastily conducted by the CMA, the capital market became increasingly 
unpredictable and, therefore, a high proportion of investor were lost confidence about investing 
within the Saudi market. Overall, the financial crash in Saudi was generated by a convergence 
of a multitude of contributing factors. These included, limited investor experience and 
education regarding the risks of investment, too easily obtainable funds from banks and 
financial institutions which enabled and supported individuals from all kinds of backgrounds 
to invest their life savings, a half-hearted reaction from governing bodies regarding the 
revelation of insider trading, market manipulating and lack of disclosure.194 
 
Insider traders, including brokers, play a major role in the manipulation of the stock market. A 
study found that one of the reasons behind the crash of the Saudi stock market was that the 
inefficiency of brokers in the market caused significant delays in operation and with the 
consequence of associated high transaction costs. In addition, the situation was exacerbated by 
the fact that shares were routinely traded by unapproved and uncertified brokers. This 
contributed to the general sense of chaos within the market and an insecurity in share 
ownership.  In addition, there was a dearth of independent professional trading brokers.195 
 
2.4 Role of Sharia Law in the Business Environment (insider 
trading, poor disclosure and market manipulation) 
 
 
This section will present the role of Sharia to the business environment, and highlight 
specifically the impact of Sharia roles to the presented issues from investors protection 
prospective: insider trading, poor disclosure and market manipulation induced partly by market 
brokers.  
 
Absolute monarchy is the form of government in Saudi Arabia and Royal Decrees are rooted 
in the Sharia’a law, which consists of a series of principles extracted from the Holy Qur’an, 
the Sunna, and other sources. Islamic law dictates the interpretation of the majority of Saudi 
regulations. Saudi law is mostly based on the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence. This 
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school possesses majority and minority perspectives on various matters and approaches legal 
interpretation according to the principles of justice and fairness. Islamic law explicitly prohibits 
fasad196 and fraud. Furthermore, business practices that are predominant in the West, such as 
interest (riba) and uncertainty (gharar) are forbidden under the Sharia’a, and there is also no 
irrevocable power of attorney197. 
 
The human-God relationship as interpreted by Islamic theology is the core of Islamic law and 
implies individual obligations towards God, on the one hand, and towards other human beings, 
on the other hand198.  The two types of obligations mentioned above are respectively associated 
with worship (ibadat) and interactions (muamalat).199 From an anthropological viewpoint, an 
understanding of the significance of these aspects for players in the Saudi business sector is 
essential for Western and non-Muslim readers. 
 
The notions of responsibility in business and responsibility in the Qur’an, between an 
individual and others, and between an individual and God, are inextricably linked. All Muslims 
believe that every creature will be called to account for their actions on Doomsday, which is 
why they focus on leading a righteous life and comply with the Sharia’a200. The Sharia’a aims 
to protect against exploitation made possible by such illegitimate financial practices as insider 
trading, improper disclosure and market manipulation, meaning that Islam is the source of the 
Islamic principles governing the financial market201.  
 
However, due to the important role they play in societies, various different types of markets 
are allowed by Islamic Law, provided that rules and regulations are closely followed. Due to 
the great importance of markets, Islamic law has introduced rules and regulations intended to 
ensure fair market practices and avoid transgressions and damaging activities (e.g. cheating, 
fraud, stimulation, interest (riba) and uncertainty (gharar) endangerment (al-taqreer), Al-najash 
etc.). Therefore, market regulation is a major priority for rulers, with emphasis on monitoring 
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of market activities and sanctioning rule violators202. 
 
Upon arrival in Medina, the Prophet (peace be upon him) observed that the Arabs suffered 
abuse from the Jews who controlled the market. Therefore, the creation of a market only for 
Muslims was among the first decisions he made in Medina. But he did not create this market 
without providing guidance, he set out rules and one day announced publicly: ‘Who cheats is 
not one of us’ cheating was seen as a big sin that would remove cheater from of the Muslim 
community. He also appointed some of his great companions to control and check regularly 
the attitudes and behaviours of people in the market203. Islamic law paid great attention to 
business and markets and protecting them from any sort of misconducts and manipulations.  
 
The above example shows how Islamic law works, ensuring preservation of the aim of market 
creation by preventing market behaviours that could damage other market players or affect the 
stability of the market itself. The above discussion highlighted the extensive negative effects 
that stock market manipulation could have, calling for authorities to take proper measures to 
sanction it. 
 
 
Market manipulation is considered a deviant behaviour in the stock market, an intentional 
offence rather than just a harmless activity. In the context of Islamic finance, for example, 
market manipulation is defined in more specific terms, as discussed in the following part. One 
definition of market manipulation is that of endangerment (al-taqreer), which can take three 
forms: putting individuals in dangerous situations; convincing someone to buy a product by 
misrepresenting the qualities of that product to make them sound better than they actually are; 
and convincing someone to act in a certain way by deceit204. 
 
Endangerment and danger are not the same. Danger refers to something with an effect that is 
not known or the unknown among two allowances and the fairest is the best of them. On the 
other hand, danger and ignorance are similar to a certain extent. El Qrafi observed that what 
set these two terms apart was: He argued that danger referred to not knowing what was going 
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to happen, just as selling birds or fish before catching them, whereas ignorance referred to the 
lack of knowledge about the nature of something that has happened and therefore was known, 
such as selling anything one possesses without knowing what one has205. 
 
Danger differs from endangerment in that it refers to outcomes that are not known rather than 
to behaviour intended to deceive, as is the case with endangerment. Therefore, danger is 
associated with risk and endangerment is associated with deceit, which in turn results in risk. 
Based on how endangerment was defined at the beginning of this section and its associated 
terms, endangerment can be considered to be a type of market manipulation, as manipulation 
usually involves deceitful and fraudulent behaviour206. 
 
About fraud, Ibn Qudama says: ‘If one, with the intention of concealing a defect, hides it from 
the buyer instead of declaring it or covers it to delude the buyer into thinking that there is no 
defect, then they have committed fraud, meaning an injustice towards the buyer.’ And it has 
been said that ‘fraud can be committed in two ways: the first way is by hiding a defect and the 
other is by adding makeup to raise the price. From previous definitions it can be deduced that 
fraud is another form of market manipulation’207. 
 
Deceit is the use of illegitimate means to reach an objective, without putting much thought into 
the action and without being noticed by others. Manipulation has this feature, seeking to 
achieve a purpose by presenting some things and not others. Both deceit and endangerment are 
used by a gyp to convince someone to make a purchase, thus generating profit for the seller. 
However, in cases where a sale is made based on deceitful promotion, a gyp can involve danger 
as well, which means that it can be classified as a unique type of manipulation208. Manipulation 
thus involves convincing others that profit can be made by acting in a certain profit, when this 
is not actually true. Is this sort of behaviour merely play or deceit and betrayal?  
 
Manipulation usually takes the form of intentional oral communication of incorrect financial 
information for purposes of fraud, gyps, cheating, and hiding of faults, causing loss for traders. 
All types of manipulation are banned in financial markets and considered illegal. There is an 
abundance of evidence in the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah pointing to the justification of 
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forbidding cheating and fraud. For example, Allah said: ‘O’ you believers, do not consume 
your wealth among yourselves in falsehood, except where you trade in mutual agreement. And 
do not kill yourselves. Allah is the most merciful to you’209. 
 
 
Thus, manipulation and deception in financial transactions is forbidden.  Qais ibn Saad ibn 
Ebada said, ‘The Prophet said, ‘the deceiving is in the hell’ [the text states the deceiving as an 
action is in hell; but it means the deceiver]210. Cheating leads to hell and, accordingly, it attracts 
a harsh punishment, which seeks to deter such behaviour. Omar's son said, “The Prophet 
forbids gyp”211. Gyp is detrimental to any contractor since cheating can artificially raise the 
price of a product; therefore, fraudulence, cheating and concealment in the financial market are 
forbidden. Therefore, The Arabic term gharar can be widely translated as deceit, risk, fraud, 
uncertainty or hazard that may result in damage or loss and applies to transactions of products 
of uncertain existence or description because contract outcome or the character/quality of the 
related subject matter is unknown212.  
 
To give an example, according to the Prophet’s (pbuh) instructions, it is prohibited to buy 
animals yet-to-be-born, spoils of war before allocation, charities before they are received, and 
divers’ catch, as well as to sell milk from the udder without quantifying it. Any business 
transaction that is exploitative of or unfair to a contract party is expressly prohibited by Islam. 
Gharar is prohibited in commercial exchange contracts that are hazardous, risky or speculative 
in terms of the key transaction components or that are uncertain regarding a party’s upholding 
of its rights and obligations213.  
 
 
Such prohibition is intended to protect contract parties from lack of knowledge or fraud. To 
ensure equality between parties, every Islamic financial and business transaction must be 
transparent and correct, and all related information must be disclosed fully. Gharar is forbidden 
to make sure that contract parties are satisfied and provide full consent, which depends on 
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complete disclosure and transparency as well as comprehensive understanding of the opposing 
values that the contract parties wish to exchange.  Protection from unforeseen loss and potential 
conflict about information quality or degree of comprehensiveness is achieved by forbidding 
gharar214. 
 
To develop a sense of affinity and collaboration in business relationships, Sharia’a encourages 
the concept of sharing profit losses among banking institutions and entrepreneurs. The equal 
distribution of loss between all parties could reduce the impact of loss.  Nevertheless, to 
anticipate outcomes with sufficient reliability, precise and appropriate information must be 
available and contractual obligations must be free of even moderate risk and uncertainty215. 
 
No type of gambling is permissible in Islam either. Types of gambling transactions classified 
as completely unfair are maysir, whereby wealth is acquired effortlessly and by chance, 
regardless of the impact on other people’s rights, and qimar, whereby wealth is acquired by 
chance at others’ expense. It must be stressed that the Sharia’a does not forbid speculation that 
involves careful analysis of extensive economic and financial data as well as investment of 
assets, skills and labour, but speculation whereby profit is easily made through gambling. In 
the case of speculation based on analysis, buyers seek to make profit from transactions not via 
unfair acquisition of wealth at others’ expense, but via trading216. 
 
 
One of the evidence for prohibited market manipulation appears from Al-najash217, which 
refers to the practice of bidding high prices despite not intending to purchase, with the goal of 
increasing the price to produce greater benefits for the seller and more damage to the buyer. 
This practice provides the original support for interdiction of market manipulation218. Imam 
Shafi’ described Al-Najash: ‘when the item is for bidding and someone offers a price without 
intending to buy it, just to make the others follow him, so they make higher offers.’219 Even if 
they did not hear him, his intention alone makes him a sinner. 
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 Evidence from Hadith (Prophets’ teachings) to inhibit Najash: a) Ibn Omar narrated that the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) inhibited Najash. In Muatta’ (book of scholar Malik) Najash is 
defined as offering the seller a higher price than what is deserved, without intention to buy, just 
to stimulate others to offer more220. b) Abu Hurairah said: ‘the Prophet forbade that a man in 
the city should be commissioner of a man in countryside and prohibited Najash and that a man 
makes an offer to sale while his brothers’ is pending or makes a proposal for marriage while 
his brothers is pending or a woman should try to make her sister divorced to take her place.’221. 
 
 
Insider trading contravenes a number of key Islamic principles, so it is forbidden under Islamic 
Law. Those key principles are: 
 
First: Fairness and justice, these principles are incompatible with insider trading, as this is a 
practice that gives one market player unjust advantage at the expense of other players. In the 
context of Islam, justice is understood as ensuring that something is in its lawful place and all 
people are treated equally 222 . Insider trading has no fairness and justice because of the 
imbalanced access to undisclosed information, which will impact the price of securities when 
published, despite not all interested parties having knowledge of the nature of that impact223. 
Allah says in the Holy Qur’an concerning justice and fairness, “Be Fair and Just, that is nearer 
to piety (Taqwa)”224. In another Surah, Allah says, ““And act justly. Truly God loves those 
who are just”225.  
 
Secondly: Trustworthiness, until confidential information is disclosed publicly, insiders with 
knowledge of that information act as its ‘trustees’ and therefore are forbidden from abusing it 
to handle company securities. Violation of this principle is considered a violation of trust. 
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Indeed, honesty and trustworthiness are highlighted as crucial principles in both the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Allah says in the Holy Qur’an, “Ye that 
believe! Betray not that trust of Allah and the Messenger, nor misappropriate knowingly things 
entrusted to you”226.  It is narrated from Abu Hurayrah by al-Mundhari on the authority of both 
al-Bukhari and Muslim that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said, “A hypocrite has three (3) 
signs: when he speaks he tells lies; when he makes a promise he does not fulfil it; and when he 
is entrusted with something he commits a breach of trust”227.  
 
Third: The right to equal, quality and correct information: Market information is highly 
important in Islamic finance, the norm of Islamic ethics being breached if crucial information 
is not disclosed (ghish). The Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) specifies that the party 
who did not have access to the same information as the other party when signing the contract 
can nullify the contract228.  According to Islamic scholars, a transaction is Islamic only if it has 
no misrepresentation (jahalah). Thus, great significance is given to market transparency and it 
is even deemed to be an Islamic duty for all transactions to be carried out in the market once 
all the related information has been carefully considered229. 
	
The dishonest practices of market manipulation, insider trading and poor disclosure are 
considered offences because they involve illegitimate appropriation of assets. Despite seeming 
similar to theft, the act involves a higher degree of sophistication, without any aspects of 
physical appropriation. Market abuse is typically classified as tazir230 under Islamic law, and 
therefore the decision regarding the punishment falls to the ruler. Basically, tazir represents the 
ruler’s discretionary power, the exercise of which is subject to legal restrictions that are more 
like standards instead of rules231. 
 
Tazir is not subject to rigid evidence rules applicable to other types of punishment because it 
is considered a strategy for meeting practical purposes of public order and moral maintenance. 
																																																								
226 Holy Qur’an, Surat Al-Anfal , Ayah 27. 
227 Narrated by Al-Bukhari, Hadith Number: 33, (n 20). 
228 Mohd (n 218). 
229 Ibnrubbian (n 7). 
230 In Islamic law there are three primary classifications of offences Hadd, Tazir and 
Qisas. 
231 Hossin Esmaeili and Jeremy Gans, ‘Islamic Law across Cultural Borders: The Involvement of 
Western Nationals in Saudi Murder Trials’ (1999–2000) 28 Denv J Int’l L & Pol’y 145. 
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Nevertheless, in the context of Islamic finance, tazir is deemed an appropriate tool for 
punishing individuals carrying out manipulative practices232. 
 
As well narrated by Amro Ibn Shuaib through his father through his grandfather who heard a 
man from Muzaina asking the Prophet (peace be upon him) on his opinion on a lost camel he 
replied: ‘Do not worry about it, it has its food and foot’ the man asked what about sheep, the 
Prophet replied: ‘for you or your brother or wolf’, the man asked again if someone took it from 
the pasture, he answered he will be punished and fined its price, and if he released it from its 
tether or taken out of its yard his punishment is to cut his hand, the man asked, ‘O you Prophet, 
what about fruit while on tree’, he said: ‘no problem if it is just to eat but if he took it he will 
be punished and fined its price (in another version he will be fined twice its price)’233. 
 
 
The Prophet’s sayings (Ahadeeth) state that individuals involved in practices of share price 
manipulation should be punished for deceitful action, as well as that the punishment must be 
clear to ensure that the consequences of market manipulation are known to all. More 
specifically, there are three types of punishments, which are fixed, range and proportional 
punishments234. This liaison can take a variety of forms. One such form that has not been 
addressed is the relationship between brokers and buyers/sellers; brokers act as representatives 
of buyers/sellers, so from a legal perspective, the brokers are the buyers/sellers and therefore 
any occurring faults will be attributed to the brokers. Naturally, several additional features are 
examined to determine whether the offence was intentional or unintentional235. 
 
However, IOSCO published guidelines for regulators responsible for overseeing the provision 
of products conforming to Sharia’a, thus addressing the unique characteristics of Islamic 
financial markets and the necessity to protect Muslim investors. Those guidelines highlight 
aspects that have not been addressed by the Saudi government and that require scrutiny236. 
 
																																																								
232 ibid. 
233 Narrated by Abu Dawood, Hadith number: 1710 (Darussalaam for Publication and Distribution, 
Saudi Arabia 1999). 
234 Aljloud (n 199). 
235 ibid. 
236 Ibnrubbian (n 7). 
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In the guidelines for Islamic capital market regulators, IOSCO specifies that securities 
regulators must indicate whether they are also in charge of regulating compliance with 
Sharia’a, and if so, they must provide clear and legitimate reasons for their course of action 
and/or interpretations. According to some researchers, regulation of compliance with Sharia’a 
should not be a responsibility of capital market regulators, who should only be responsible for 
implementing the procedural rules for evaluation of compliance237. 
 
 
The fact that Saudi governmental authorities are responsible for making sure that products in 
the Saudi capital markets are compliant with Sharia’a is not explicitly stated anywhere in the 
2003 Capital Market Law or the CMA Regulations. However, the assumption that standard 
legal and financial due diligence assessments of offers of securities put forth include Sharia’a-
compliance is incorrect. No requirement to validate that offered securities are compliant with 
Sharia’a is actually included in the Capital Market Law and CMA regulations.98 In general, 
the proposed issuer is left to deal with this matter as deemed fit, depending on the relevance or 
importance to the intended investors238. 
 
Verification of securities transactions to ensure they comply with Sharia’a has both strong and 
weak points. Sharia’a dominates Saudi law, so a certain level of supervision is to be expected. 
On the other hand, the CMA lacks the capability and resources to assess compliance with 
Sharia’a. Inspection of aspects related to Sharia’a should be the responsibility of international 
non-governmental institutions to avoid unsettlement by investors whose actions and decisions 
are based on religious principles. Such institutions could devise not only Sharia’a standards, 
but also rules for how Sharia’a boards should be established and operated. Cross-jurisdictional 
uniformization of standards and promotion transaction fluidity across borders should be the 
aim of international implementation of Sharia’a standards239. 
	
	
																																																								
237 ibid. 
238 ibid. 
239 ibid. 
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2.5 The Legal Structure of Judicial system in Saudi Arabia; and 
its subsequent development. 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Islamic law or 'Sharia' takes source primarily from the Quran, the book believed by Muslims 
to have been divinely descended onto prophet Mohamed through Angel Gabriel, as well as the 
sayings and actions of the prophet Mohamed. Secondary and subordinated sources include the 
interpretations and elaborations delivered by scholars in relation to the primary sources. 
Secondary sources are subject to debate240. 
 
Traditionally, Muslims hold mostly in high regard the interpretative rulings of four main 
scholars: Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Mohammad Shafei, Imam Malik Ibn Anas and Imam 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. Every one of those scholars has amassed a significant level of respect. The 
four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, though looked upon distinctively, agree and disagree in 
opinion on different matters. Within each school, in turn, minority and majority opinions exist 
amongst the scholars within them. The Saudi Arabian legal system focuses in great part on the 
school of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, although not exclusively.241  
 
Sharia was described by some as a "way of life" since it governs not only the public but also 
the private aspects of a Muslim's day-to-day life, including faith, worship, body care, and 
interactions with other (including commercial interactions).242 From the perspective of Muslim 
society, Sharia's scope extends to economic, political, cultural and social matters243. 
 
Sharia commandments are broad for the great part, save for a few precise ones. Broad 
commandments include those related to the respect of the rights and property of others, the 
honoring of commitments, sincerity in transacting, etc. To illustrate, Verse 2:188 of the Quran 
states that: "And devour not each other’s property among yourselves wrongfully, nor seek to 
gain access to that by bribing judges so that you devour a part of the property of men wrongfully 
while ye know"244. 
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240 Ahcene Lahsasna and M Kabir Hassan, ‘The Shariah Process in Product Development and Approval 
in ICM’ in M Kabir Hassan and Michaelhlknecht (eds), Islamic Capital Markets (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc 2012). 
241 Anthony Shoult, Doing Business with Saudi Arabia (GMB Publishing Ltd 2006). 
242 Lahsasna and Hassan (n 236). 
243  ‘ ’Report of the Islamic Capital Market Task Force... -’ (2004) 
<https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=%27Report+of+the+Islamic+Capital
+Market+Task+Force+of+the+International+Organization+of+Securities+Commissions%27+%28Jul
y+2004%29&btnG=> accessed 20 February 2018. 
244 Holy Qur’an, Surat Al- Baqarah. 
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As it is partially a human creation and partially divine commandment, the Saudi legal system 
is defined by researchers as ‘bifurcated’ or in ‘duality’.245 The Saudi government does have 
legislative powers, but no law of human creation is more important than the Sharia’a, as stated 
in the constitution.246 Compliance with Sharia’a is required in every aspect of Saudi society, 
and the legislative, executive and judicial authorities are no exception. Sharia’a rules must be 
strictly applied to all legal transactions, judicial ruling, policy, law and even constitution. 
Therefore, Sharia’a must be considered in investigations of aspects of the Saudi legal system, 
such as capital market institutions and transactions.247 
 
Muslims must not deal with financial products that do not comply with the Sharia’a otherwise 
they may be punished by losing their spiritual status in the hereafter. Furthermore, Muslims 
should not invest in products if they are unsure whether those products comply with Sharia’a.  
Due to these restrictions, international financial institutions have had to develop special 
products acceptable to Muslim investors.248There are three types of shares, based on the 
stipulations of the Sharia’a, namely, halal or legitimate shares, “mixed” shares, and 
forbidden or haram shares. Halal shares are those shares that conform to Islamic law 
completely and indicate the legitimacy of the activities and funding sources of an 
organisation under Sharia’a. The majority of shares in the Saudi agricultural industry 
are halal249. 
 
“Mixed” shares refer to the fact that the business operations of an organisation are halal and 
comply with Islamic law, but some of its funding sources are illegitimate. Even though it is 
halal to invest in this kind of equity, investors have to relinquish a portion of their profits 
corresponding to the profits obtained from operations associated with illegitimate funding 
sources. Traded securities in the Saudi industrial, cement and service sectors are considered 
																																																								
245 Prophet Mohamed was quoted as saying: "[e]ach of you is a Sheppard, and each of you will be 
accountable for his flock" (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 6719, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 1829) 
246 Ali Adnan Ibrahim, ‘The Rise of Customary Businesses in International Financial Markets: An 
Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of International Integration’ (2007–08) 23 Am U 
Int’l L Rev 661. 
247 Frank E Vogel, Islamic Law and the Legal System of Saudí: Studies of Saudi Arabia (BRILL 2000). 
248 Salman Syed Ali, ‘Islamic Capital Market Products - Developments & Challenges (Occasional 
Papers)’ (Occasional Paper, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI) 2005). 
249 saleh Mutawa, Securities and Applications Disputes in Saudi Arabia: Administrative - Criminal - 
Compensation (King Fahd National Library 2015). 
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mixed shares. Forbidden or haram shares cannot be bought or sold under Islamic law and they 
are associated with organisational activities involving payment or interest application. Shares 
in the banking industry with express payment or taking of interest are classified as haram 
shares250. 
	
2.5.2 The Saudi Legal System 
	
As mentioned in the first chapter, there is an increasing volume of market theory literature 
showing the significance of institutional structures and legal systems for the development of 
stock market and their participants. Therefore, as a precursor to this paper, it is important to 
briefly present the main features of the Saudi legal system, and to review its unique 
characteristics in order to offer a solid understanding of current stock market regulations.  
 
As the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in this era committed to Islam as a religion, and the Quran251 
constitution and Islamic Sharia regulations and legislation, Kingdom tended to organize the 
judiciary to be a practical application of Islamic justice system, with the development and 
expansion in line with the needs of the times, and the expansion of the work of the state, and 
the large number of disputes and lawsuits. Kingdom adopted a gradual and development 
approach, which issued several paint systems for judges of their approach in the light of Sharia, 
and this is what I am studied and presented in this section. The legal system of Saudi Arabia is 
based on Islamic law (sharia) derived from the Qu'ran and the Sunnah252 (the traditions of the 
Islamic prophet Muhammad), Ijma253 and Qiyas.254 
 
																																																								
250 ibid. 
251 Qu'ran: sacred text of Islam, divided into 114 chapters, or suras: revered as the word of God, dictated 
to Muhammad by the archangel Gabriel, and accepted as the foundation of Islamic law, religion, culture, 
and politics. 
252 Sunnah: The way of life prescribed as normative in Islam, based on the teachings and practices of 
Muhammad and interpretations of the Koran. Also called hadith. 
253 Ijmāʿ: is an Arabic term referring to the consensus or agreement of the Muslim community. Various 
schools of thought within Islamic jurisprudence may define this consensus as that of the first generation 
of Muslims only; the consensus of the first three generations of Muslims; the consensus of the jurists 
and scholars of the Muslim world, or scholarly consensus; or the consensus of all the Muslim world, 
both scholars and laymen. 
254 Qiyas: To establish and obtain a decision, a rule and judgment for a case due to a certain cause just 
because of the existence of the similar cause, rule and judgment in an other particular case. 
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In addition, Saudi law depends on regulations issued by the royal decrees255 (not contrary to 
Islamic law), which covers a number of modern issues such as intellectual property and 
corporate law. However, the remaining Shari'a is the primary source of law, particularly in the 
areas of criminal, family, commercial, contracts, and the Quran and Sunnah are the country's 
constitution. Saudi Arabia is the only country in Muslim world that its legal system relies in 
sharia without notation, which is mean that there is no system of judicial precedent. This system 
differs from other in legal systems recognized internationally, whether part of the Latin School 
of Law (such as Egypt - France) or within the Anglo-Saxon law school such as (Britain). There 
is considerable ambiguity surrounds the field of Saudi law. This later led to the declaration of 
the state intention to codify the rules of Sharia in 2010.256 
 
However, with regard to Saudi judicial system which consists of general courts and specialized 
tribunals. The Shariah court system in the kingdom (the general courts) under the authority of 
the Ministry of Justice it is already in the competence and jurisdiction and the other serves as 
the exception، this court is concerned with the types of quality issues, whether in Rights or 
Marriages or felonies or evidence. Etc. unless the law specifies otherwise. The Civil Courts 
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances and other agencies have the exclusive 
authority to decide upon disputes Government and commercial contracts, taxation, banking and 
labour issues.257 
 
Due to the fact that the Saudi legal system is based on Shariah law, the Shariah Court System, 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, serves as the country's general courts, and 
Shariah judges preside over any dispute arising within the Kingdom unless these disputes are 
excluded by law258. The first organization of a Shariah court system goes back to 1927 when 
King Abdul Aziz issued a Royal Decree unifying the judicial system in the country.   The first 
																																																								
255 Royal decrees: A decree is a rule of law usually issued by a head of state (such as the president of a 
republic or a monarch), according to certain procedures (usually established in a constitution). It has 
the force of law. 
256 Vogel (n 243). 
257 Campbell, C (2007). Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Middle East. 3rd ed. UK: Yorkhill Law 
Publishing. 25. 
258 Saudi judicial Regulations, issued under the Royal Decree No. 64, dated 14/7/1397, Art. 26 states 
that Shariah courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes and crimes except matters that are 
excluded by Rules. 
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step towards achieving justice and organization of courts issuing the Royal Decree (King 
Abdulaziz) in 1927 in the 24 articles as «system configurations Sharia Courts, which was the 
organization of the courts, and classification, and their terms of reference judiciary, The 
Shariah court system classified courts into three categories: Expeditious Courts, Shariah 
Courts, and Shariah Courts.259 
 
The first organization of the court system classified courts into three categories: Expeditious 
Courts, Shariah Courts, and the Commission for Judicial Supervision. This system has 
remained the main basis for the judicial system in the Kingdom. At present, the new judicial 
system concerned about multi-courts of general jurisdiction and diversity within the judicial 
system of the state, where Article IX of the Basic Law, rearranging and organized the ordinary 
courts and tribunals which divided into three types.260 
 
2.5.2.1 The Saudi Judicial System 
	
The Saudi judicial system consists of general courts and specialized tribunals. The Shari’a court 
system in the Kingdom (the general courts) is under the authority of the Ministry of Justice; it 
has full competence and jurisdiction over issues concerned with, for example, rights, marriage, 
crime, presenting evidence, etc., unless the law specifies otherwise. On the other hand, the 
Civil Courts are under the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances, and certain other agencies 
have exclusive authority to decide upon Government disputes, commercial contracts, taxation, 
banking and labour issues.261 
 
2.5.2.1.1 The Shari’a Court System 
	
Due to the fact that the Saudi legal system is based on Shari’a, the Shari’a court system, under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, serves as the country’s general courts, and Shari’a 
judges preside over any dispute arising within the Kingdom, unless such competence is 
excluded by law. The first Shari’a court system goes back to 1927 when King Abdul Aziz 
issued a Royal Decree unifying the judicial system of the country.  There were 24 Articles, 
																																																								
259 Vogel (n 243). 
260 ibid. 
261 Campbell, C (2007). Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Middle East. 3rd ed. uk: Yorkhill Law 
Publishing.P25. 
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which sought to delineate the competencies of the judiciary; accordingly, the Shari’a court 
system was classified into three categories: Expeditious Courts, Shari’a Courts and the 
Commission for Judicial Supervision. This system has remained the main basis for the judicial 
system in the Kingdom. The present judicial system incorporates multi-competence courts (of 
general jurisdiction), reflecting diversity within the judicial system of the state. Thus, Article 
IX of the Basic Law organizes the ordinary courts and tribunals into three types: the Supreme 
Court,	the Courts of Appeal and the Courts of First Instance.262 
 
2.5.2.1.1.1 The Supreme Court 
	
The Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority over the Saudi courts of general 
jurisdiction. According to the justice system, the Supreme Court in the city of Riyadh is at the 
top of the judicial organization in the Kingdom, and it is composed of a number of judges 
ranking Chief of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court is designed to monitor the 
application of the provisions of the Shari’a and the regulations issued by the King. It has the 
following competencies: reviewing judgments and decisions issued by or supported by the 
appellate courts (concerning severe sentencing), reviewing the judgments of a court that was 
not competent or deemed in error in its judgements, and determining whether a court is properly 
constituted as stipulated in the justice system.263 
 
2.5.2.1.1.2 The Courts of Appeal 
	
The second level of the Shari’a court system is the Courts of Appeal, which has the general 
mandate to hear all appeals from the Courts of First Instance. Their function does not stop at 
adjudicating the sentence being appealed, but includes issuing new guidelines based on any 
new facts and may extend to	establishing new legal rules and statutory court procedures for 
secondary appeals. Any	decision made by the Courts of Appeal is usually the last word on the 
case. For the justice system to be equitable, the Saudi government has established in every 
																																																								
262 Saudi judicial regulation, issued under the Royal Decree No. 64, dated 14/7/1397, Art. 26 states that 
Shariah courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes and crimes except matters that are excluded 
by Rules. 
263  Ministry of Justice. (2011). The Supreme Court. Available: http://www.moj.gov.sa/ar-
sa/Courts/Pages/HighCourt.aspx. Last accessed 6th April 2013. 
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district at least one Court of Appeal. Each Court of Appeal hears cases with three judges, with 
the exception of cases concerning severe sentencing, in which five judges sit.264 
 
2.5.2.1.1.3 Courts of First Instance 
	
In the Saudi justice system, Courts of First Instance are present in all provinces and regions of 
the Kingdom; these courts have wide jurisdiction and pass judgments on all ‘ordinary’ cases. 
The verdicts are subject to appeal, except any cases that are referred to the Supreme Judicial 
Council. Given the diversity of cases that fall under their remit, Article IX of the newly re-
arranged justice system has organized them into five types, namely: general courts, criminal 
courts, personal status courts, labour courts and	commercial courts.265 
 
2.5.2.1.1.4 The General Courts 
	
The General Courts are distributed across all regions of the Kingdom; they consist of a single 
judge or sometimes three judges, as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council. A single the 
General Court judge may not sit on cases involving murder, stoning or amputation, which are 
determined by three judges. The General Courts specialize in lawsuits relating to property and 
waqf	266(property endowment held in trust and used for charitable or religious purposes), and 
to the sukuk(bonds) that relate to property or waqf; they also specialize in lawsuits arising from 
traffic accidents and violations of the traffic laws.267 
 
2.5.2.1.1.5 Criminal Courts 
	
Criminal Courts are also distributed across all regions of the Kingdom. They constitute three 
judges, except in cases specified by the Supreme Judicial Council, which are seen by a single 
judge. The Criminal Courts have jurisdiction in all criminal cases.268 
																																																								
264 Hoshan, M & Abu Saif F (1975). introduction to the study of regulation. Alexandria: Modern 
Egyptian Bureau of Printing and Publishing . P45-52. 
265  Ministry of Justice. (2011). The Supreme Court. Available http://www.moj.gov.sa/ar-
sa/Courts/Pages/First.aspx. Last accessed 10th April 2013. 
266 Wakf: is an unconditional and permanent dedication of property with implied detention in the 
ownership of God in such a manner, that the property of the owner may be extinguished and its profits 
may revert to or be applied for the benefit of mankind except for purposes prohibited by Islam. 
267  Ministry of Justice. (2011). The Supreme Court. Available http://www.moj.gov.sa/ar-
sa/Courts/Pages/First.aspx. Last accessed 10th April 2013. 
268 ibid. 
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2.5.2.1.1.6 Personal status courts 
	
Personal Status Courts have several sections, and each has a single judge or sometimes more, 
as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council. These courts too are located in all regions of 
the Kingdom. Personal Status Courts consider all matters pertaining to proof of marriage, 
divorce, annulment of marriage, custody, alimony, wills, births and deaths, determination of 
heirs and inheritance.269 
 
2.5.2.1.1.8 Labour courts 
	
These are located in all the governorates and regions of the Kingdom. The Labour Courts have 
several sections, with each section having a single judge (or sometimes more), and have 
jurisdiction over disputes relating to employment contracts, wages and rights, and work-related 
injuries and compensation. They also adjudicate over the penalties stipulated in the Labour 
Law, and disputes arising from termination of employment, which may include complaints 
made by employers or workers and disputes relating to workers subject to the Provisions of 
Employment; these include government employees. Finally, disputes arising from the 
application of the Employment and Social Security system are settled by the Labour Courts.270 
 
2.5.2.1.1.9 Commercial courts 
	
These are distributed across all regions of the Kingdom. Commercial Courts are composed of 
specialized departments, and each one has a single judge or more, as determined by the 
Supreme Judicial Council. Commercial Courts have jurisdiction over the following: all 
disputes that occur between merchants, claims made against a merchant because of some aspect 
of his business, and disputes that occur between partners in companies. Moreover, the 
Commercial Courts are specialized in all claims and irregularities relating to the Saudi 
commercial system as well as to declaring and lifting bankruptcy.271 
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2.5.2.1.2 The Supreme Judicial Council 
	
The Supreme Judicial Council is headed by the President and Senior Associate, who has a 
Deputy and four Senior Judges. It has a variety of missions, but the most important is 
administrative; this concerns supervising the work of the courts described above, and it 
represents the only source of reference for all judicial departments in terms of their legal and 
administrative aspects. Moreover, it mediates between the judiciary and all the other ministerial 
departments and institutions; the Supreme Judicial Council	receives all orders, instructions and 
regulations issued by the government and sends them on to the various jurisdictions. It also 
checks all court decisions and advisory fatwas272 (legal judgements made an Islamic scholar), 
and considers complaints against judicial departments or staff. Finally, it monitors the work of 
the staff in all judicial departments as well as their recruitment, and promotes and dismisses 
judges.273 
 
2.5.3 Historical Development of the Saudi Judiciary 
	
In 1926, King Abdul Aziz issued instructions announcing interim reformations to the judiciary; 
these instructions were entitled “Temporary remedial materials to the Islamic courts”.  He 
explained then in his speech (published in newspapers on 16/01/1926) that the provisions of 
Islam would form the basis for the governing of Saudi Arabia.  In 1927, King Abdul Aziz 
ordered however that Ottoman law would continue in Hijaz274; he said, Ottoman law has 
existed for some time, so we agree to your proposal on the continuation of the provisions of 
that law.  Moreover, in 1928 the King issued a new law: ‘Conditions of Shari’a Courts and 
their Formation’, which was the first administrative system in Hijaz.275 
 
 King Abdul Aziz asserted that Saudi courts would follow the provisions of Shari’a without 
being constrained by any specific Islamic school.  However, in 1928 a royal order was issued 
																																																								
272 Fatwas: are formal legal opinions issued by a recognized religious legal authority. Fatwas are most 
frequently issued in response to questions about living everyday life in accordance with religious law. 
273 Al-training, S (1999). Judicial organization in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the light of Islamic 
law. Riyadh:  Imam Islamic University. P428. 
274 Hijaz:  region of northwest Saudi Arabia on the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea. It includes the holy 
cities of Mecca and Medina. 
275 Al-training, S (1999). Judicial organization in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the light of Islamic 
law. Riyadh:  Imam Islamic University. P280-285. 
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requiring judges to work under the Hanbali276 School in general and in the event of any 
departure from that doctrine evidence must be presented.  In 1950, the King issued a regulation 
entitled ‘Legitimate Conduct of Trials’, which illustrated the auditing provisions.277 
 
In 1937, ‘Law on Pleadings’	was issued, which was more detailed than its predecessor; it was 
reissued in 1953 under the name ‘Administrative Organization of Working in the Law’.  In 
addition, in 1939 the King issued ‘Concentration of the Responsibilities of the Religious 
Judiciary’, to ensure that the judiciary would be an official institution recognized across the 
whole country; it consists of eight chapters and 282 articles, and is the longest justice document 
in the history of the Kingdom.  In 1975, a regulation simply entitled ‘The Judiciary’ was issued, 
and in 1982 regulations for the Board of Grievances were established.278 
 
In addition, on 01/04/1990 Cabinet Resolution No. 60 was	issued, containing the approved list 
of discrimination provisions for legitimacy, while still working on ‘Instructions for 
Discrimination of Legal Provisions’, which was issued in 1967. Moreover, from 2001 to 2007 
several laws and regulations were	issued, including ‘Legitimate Arguments’ as well as the law 
on ‘Criminal Procedure’ and ‘The Practice of Law’.  Also in 2007 the laws governing the 
judiciary and the Board of Grievances were amended.279 
 
 
2.5.4 Stages of the Enactment of New Regulations in Saudi Arabia  
	
The passage of a law entails several stages, require constitutionally supported legislation before 
it can come into force, and these stages are: 
 
 
																																																								
276 Hanbali: one of the four schools of Islamic law, founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, predominating in 
Saudi Arabia. 
277  Supreme Judicial Council. (2011). Historical Development of the Saudi Judiciary. Available: 
http://www.scj.gov.sa/index.cfm?do=cms.conArticle&contentid=1144&categoryid=385. Last 
accessed 28th May 2013. 
278ibid. 
279  Hammad،  A. (2010). Judicial organization in Saudi Arabia . Available: 
http://www.afaaqlaws.net/Views/ViewResearch.aspx?artid=2. Last accessed 29th May 2013. 
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2.5.4.1 Proposal 
	
This represents the first stage of the process for enacting new regulations, and it starts with 
preparing a draft, which is presented to the legislature, represented by the Council of Ministers.  
Legislation is in place that determines the persons who are entitled to propose a draft law, who 
are members of the legislature or of the executive (government). According to Article 22 of the 
Regulations for the Council of Ministers, any Minister can also present a draft law to the 
Council if it deals with matters that are under that Ministry’s jurisdiction.280  Moreover, the 
Minister has the right to propose new regulations in the public interest.  After accepting the 
proposal, it is transferred to the Consultative Department, which is under the jurisdiction of the 
Council of Ministers, and which consists of a number of legal experts, who then study, consider 
and evaluate the proposed regulation.  Following this, the proposal is prepared as a final draft 
and then submitted as a report to the Council of Ministers.281 
 
2.5.4.2 Debate and vote 
	
This is the second stage for a draft law, wherein the legislature approves or rejects it through a 
majority vote, as determined by the appropriate law. After the Consultative Department has	
submitted its report to the Council of Ministers, the Council functions a legislative body and 
reviews that report, discussing it article by article.  The Council then votes on the project and 
should it be approved, the draft is referred to the Royal Court to be endorsed by the King.  If 
the Council of Ministers refuses the draft submitted by the Consultative Department, then it is 
shelved.282 
 
2.5.4.3 Ratification 
	
If the Council of Ministers approves the proposed law or regulation, it sends the draft to the 
Royal Court for submission to the King but he has the right to make objections or to reject it.  
Should this happen, the King (within one month) must indicate his reasons for rejection, and 
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upon receipt by the Council of Ministers of any rejection by the King, the Council re-examines 
the project; in the case of a second approval, the Prime Minister shall take whatever action he 
deems appropriate and informs the Council accordingly.283 
 
2.5.4.5 Royal Decree 
	
A parallel procedure in monarchic systems is that the Head of State in his capacity as head of 
the executive branch directs its members to put a new law into effect.  In Saudi Arabia, the 
statutory instrument for the issuance of such new laws is the Royal Decree.284 
 
2.5.4.6 Promulgation and enforcement 
	
Following Royal approval, all citizens must be informed of the new law and made aware of its 
provisions; this is achieved through publication in national newspapers.  From the date of 
publication, the new law comes into effect. However, there are other types of regulations, 
known as Subsidiary Regulations, which are issued by government agencies, and operate to 
elaborate on the Statutes and to offer additional specific details to existing legislation.  
Therefore, by using the powers delegated to the Council Ministers, this category of regulations 
is enacted by one or more of the Council members.  Also, royal or ministerial approval is not 
required in this level of legislation. This kind of regulation authorizes government agencies to 
issue the necessary rules for the performance of their duties in an effective manner, and to 
enable them to operate in a more streamlined manner, without requiring them to consult the 
relevant legislative bodies. Thus, legislation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia divided into two 
types: Basic System of Government and Subsidiary.285 
 
The supreme legislative authority in Saudi Arabia is the Constitution, which is a set of rules 
that describe the basic functions and parameters of the state as well as the form they must take. 
Through the identification of religion, language and the authorities that hold the burdens of 
government, these general principles determine the rights of the citizens, and this basic form 
of legislation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia empowers the King to issue statutes by Royal 
Order.  These regulations issued by the State regulate various aspects of economic and social 
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life, for example, commerce, and labour regulations amongst others.  This power accords the 
regulatory authorities within the Kingdom the right to enact laws and regulations so as to 
achieve the national interest or to stop corruption. 286 
 
As Sub Regulation (mentioned above) is the lowest form on the legislative ladder in the legal 
system of Saudi Arabia, any such regulation or legislation must be consistent with higher 
legislation that already exists, and should not modify or revoke or be inconsistent with higher 
legislation.  Usually, subsidiary legislations are issued by the Council of Ministers, or the 
competent Minister, or any person who is authorized to enact new rules. Nevertheless, for 
primary legislation, there are three stages for the enactment of laws other than supreme 
legislation (which is issued by Royal Decree), which should be passed by the legislature, 
consisting of the Consultative Council, the Council of Ministers and the King’s approval. 
According to the development of statutory amendments and regulations governing such 
activities as commerce, trade, business, labour, taxation, customs and banking, special courts 
must be established to settle disputes.  These disputes can have a significant impact on the 
judicial system and on the design of the courts of the Kingdom, as will be explained in the next 
section.287 
 
2.6 Regulatory Structure of the Saudi Stock Market 
	
2.6.1 Capital Market Law 
	
The Financial Market Law restructured the capital market to boost confidence on the basis of 
transparency. The Council of Ministers approved the implementation of this law in 2003. This 
law marks an important qualitative leap in the history of the Saudi capital market. It is designed 
to restructure the capital market in the Kingdom based on new and sophisticated standards to 
enhance the confidence and attractiveness of the market and to ensure the provision of more 
disclosure, transparency, protection, and justice for client. Under its new structure, the financial 
market contains the following components and elements.288 
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The Capital Market Law serves as an umbrella law and an integrated organizational reference 
for the market. It specifies the main principles and foundations that cover all aspects of the 
market in terms of identifying supervisory, regulatory, and operational structures and 
institutions for the market; determining their powers and functions; and disclosing and 
disseminating information whether in the primary market or secondary market (trading), It is 
aimed at curbing the exploitation of information and rumours and provides for penal sanctions 
order to ensure justice in the market.289 This law also determines the roles and functions of the 
new supervisory, regulatory, and operational financial institutions in the market and defines 
the separation of regulatory and supervisory roles as well as executive and operational roles. 
This law separates these roles through the establishment of the following new market 
institutions. 290 
 
First of all: The Capital Market Authority is a regulatory and supervisory body that oversees 
the market. It has financial and administrative independence and reports directly to the Prime 
Minister. The regime has granted broad powers and authority to this body so that it can perform 
its duties and functions and fully play its role.291 This body serves to organize and develop the 
financial market, issue regulations necessary to implement the provisions of the law, achieve 
appropriate justice and efficiency in issuing securities, and provide justice and full disclosure 
in companies to protect investor and securities dealers. 
 
The stock market is created and entrusted with the executive and operational functions of the 
market; it is generally described as a joint stock company and is the only party authorized to 
conduct business as a formal market for the trading of securities in the KSA. The regime has 
devoted a special chapter to the financial market and its objectives, which include ensuring 
equity and efficiency in trading, ensuring transparency of listing requirements and trading 
systems, providing safe and fast regulations with high level of efficiency for settlements, and 
creating and applying professional standards for market intermediaries and their agents. This 
chapter also identifies how to form a board of directors and the actors represented therein from 
the public and private sectors.292 
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A Securities Disputes body for the purpose of inquiries and an Appeals Committee consisting 
of legal advisers with expertise in law and jurisprudence of transactions, commercial and 
financial matters, and securities was established. This committee has the jurisdiction to hear 
and determine all claims, disputes, and offenses relating to securities and that fall within the 
provisions of the rules, regulations, and instructions issued by the Authority for the market and 
the public and private sectors.293 
 
 A department called SDC was created within the market. This body was responsible for 
carrying out deposit, transfer, settlement, and clearing operations and registration of securities 
traded in the market. This was the only entity in the Kingdom authorized to perform this work. 
According to the law, entries in the records are considered evidence and conclusive proof of 
the ownership of securities.294 
 
 To ensure disclosure and transparency in the financial market, the law devotes a separate 
chapter to these issues. As per the law, any source of a security or an underwriter cannot place 
any financial security on the market without providing a prospectus to the Commission and 
gaining its approval. This prospectus must contain key information and data. Annual and 
quarterly reports must be provided to the Authority, and any issuer of securities must inform 
the Authority of any significant events that may affect the price of the securities.295 
 
Another chapter covers fraud and insider trading of information, which are prohibited in the 
market. Thus, the law prohibits fake trades that are conducted to influence the prices of 
securities traded in the market although they do not lead to any real transfer of ownership of 
securities. The law also prohibits any deal based on inside information available to some people 
but not to the general public and that has not been announced.296 
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The last chapter specifies the penalties for violations related to securities and identifies the 
offenses and penalties entailed, whether these violations are related to the offering of securities 
or the secondary market, which relates to trading and information. This chapter outlines the 
role and powers of the Authority in this area and determines the relevant jurisdiction for 
disputes related to securities.297 
 
This law contains ten chapters, each of which focuses on one aspect of the financial market, 
and the regulations contains 67 articles. Knowing that CMC which mentioned in the system, 
will be instead of the Ministerial Committee and (Oversight Committee), the working 
mechanisms and operation of currently law trading, will remain the same in the market. In 
addition, local banks will continue to act as intermediaries.298 
 
2.6.2 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
	
The Capital Market Authority is a regulatory and supervisory body that oversees the market. It 
has financial and administrative independence and reports directly to the Prime Minister, which 
was established in 2003 under the Capital Market Law (CML) to supervise and control the 
parties coming under its authority.  The regime has granted broad powers and authority to this 
body so that it can perform its duties and functions and fully play its role. This body serves to 
organize and develop the financial market, issue regulations necessary to implement the 
provisions of the law, achieve appropriate justice and efficiency in issuing securities, and 
provide justice and full disclosure in companies to protect investor and securities dealers. 
 
The Capital Market Law (CML) sets out the principal functions of the CMA.  The CMA is 
entrusted with the following duties:299 Regulate and develop the capital market and promote 
appropriate standards and techniques for all sections and entities involved in Securities Trade 
Operations; Protect investor and the public from unfair and unsound practices involving fraud, 
deceit, cheating, manipulation, and inside information trading; Maintain fairness, efficiency, 
and transparency in transactions of securities; Develop appropriate measures to reduce risks 
pertaining to transactions of securities; Develop, regulate, and monitor the issuance of 
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securities and under-trading transactions; Regulate and monitor the activities of entities 
working under CMA; and regulate and monitor full disclosure of information related to 
securities and issuers. 
 
2.6.3 The Committees for Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) 
	
Committees for Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) established under paragraph (a) of 
Article / 25 of the Capital Market Law issued by Royal Decree No. M / 30 in 2004, for the 
adjudication of disputes that fall within the scope of laws of the Capital market authority and 
its executive regulations , and classified as a first-degree court. In accordance with the CML, 
the Committee must consider directly in the complaint within a period not exceeding 14 days 
from the date of filing of the complaint to the CRSD. Also, According to Article II of the 
regulations of CRSD, prohibits the deposit of any complaint with the Commission, unless it is 
first deposited with the Capital Market Authority and before the lapse of 90 days from the date 
of the deposit.300 
 
Since the Capital Market Law picks up numerous cases and provisions, the CRSD implements 
its jurisdictions to assessment lawsuits in accordance with such rules. The CRSD has 
jurisdiction to hear a broad range of disputes, in the following points:301 To consider the 
grievance of decisions and actions made by the Capital Market Authority or the Saudi Stock 
market which is known as the administrative lawsuit; To review lawsuits arising between 
investor themselves relating to the CML and its implementing regulations, as well as CMA and 
the exchange market regulations, rules and instructions in terms of public and private actions, 
what is known as the civil lawsuit; To consider litigations filed by the CMA (as a general 
prosecutor) against violators of the CML and its implementing regulations, what is known as 
the (penal lawsuit). 
 
The Saudi capital Market Law (2003) grant CRSD (Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes) powers to investigate and settle complaints and suits. Grant CRSD the power to issue 
subpoenas and necessary decisions to resolve the suit.  Also, The Capital Market Law grant 
CRSD the power to impose sanctions moreover, it has the power to order the presentation of 
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evidences and documents, and CRSD the power to issue a decision awarding damages. 
furthermore, Grant CRSD the power to issue a decision awarding damages. According to the 
law of the capital market, any investor in the Saudi stock market has the right to claiming 
lawsuit against an investor, whether an individual (natural person) or (legal entity), It can also 
have the right claiming lawsuit against those who violate the Capital Market Law and its 
implementing regulations; on the basis of paragraph (a) of Article fifty-seventh of the Capital 
Market Law.  
 
2.6.3.1 Committee of Appeal 
	
Appeals committee was established according to paragraph (g) of Article 25 of the Capital 
Market Law, and form of three members one of whom is a representative of the Panel of 
Experts and the second representative of the Ministry of Finance and the third representative 
of the Ministry of Commerce. The Committee may appeal in its sole discretion to dismiss a 
decision issued by CRSD or confirm those decisions or reconsider the complaint or lawsuit, 
moreover, the appeals committee's decisions are final. 
 
It May appeal decisions that issued by CRSD of through appeals committee within 30 days 
from the date notified in accordance with paragraph (f) of Article 25 of the Rules read with 
Article 39 of the regulations of CRSD. In accordance with Article 45 of the regulations of 
CRSD, the decision of the Commission acquires peremptory; either lapse of the prescribed 
time limit for appeal, Or give all parties in the lawsuit convinced the decision, or the decision 
of the Appeals Committee to confirm the CRSD's decision or by refusing to consider the 
CRSD's decision, or a decision by the Appeals Committee the reconsider of the case again.302 
 
2.6.4 Saudi Stock Market (SSM) 
	
In 2007 a joint stock company established under the name "the Saudi Stock market (Tadawul)" 
and is the Web site of the Saudi stock market and carrying capacity systemic financial market, 
Implementation of Article XX of the Capital Market Law.303 "Tadawul" has set its vision of 
becoming an integrated financial market, offering a comprehensive and diversified financial 
services and compete on a global level, and her message is based on providing products and 
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services for financial markets, with all the efficiency, effectiveness and excellence in order to 
achieve added value for all beneficiaries and participants in the market. 
 
The company's share capital of 1.2 billion riyals, divided into 120 million shares fully owned 
by the Public Investment Fund, As the statute of the company states that are part of the 
company's shares for public subscription raised at a time determined by the extraordinary 
general meeting of the company. Also,  Council of Saudi financial market management 
"Tadawul" of the nine members are appointed by the Council of Ministers and the nomination 
of the chairman of the Financial Market Authority and include membership of the Council of 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the 
Saudi Foundation Arabian Monetary Agency, and four representatives of the licensed 
brokerage firms and representatives for contributing to listed companies.304 
 
 At a time when it is trying to achieve a number of objectives, including: Management and 
operation of the financial market efficiently, and provide high quality excellent services to 
ensure the management and operation of the financial market efficiently and effectively, 
Ensure efficiency, quality and fairness of the market, supporting efforts to raise the level of 
investment culture among investor efforts, providing excellent high quality services to 
customers, which include (brokers, investor, exporters, data service providers, and others. The 
company also is working to develop the potential and capabilities of technical and regulatory 
market by a leading financial market offers investment and financing channels competitive 
development through the provision of appropriate mechanisms for companies to obtain the 
necessary financing, Encourage both investor and exporters and local and international 
mediators to participate in the market.305 
 
It is worthwhile to mention that Tadawul company has sought since its inception to the latest 
electronic trading systems application, in the following section will provide the historical 
stages of the development of electronic trading in the Saudi stock market, and the latest 
electronic trading system that has been applied on the Saudi stock market. 
 
																																																								
304 ‘Home’ (2016) <https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal> accessed 7 April 2017. 
305 ibid. 
	 96	
2.6.5 Saudi Companies Act 
	
The Companies Act can trace its roots to the Commercial Court Rules, issued by King Abdul 
Aziz in 1931306. The commercial court system adapted from the Ottoman laws, in turn, is 
derived from the French group issued in 1807307. This group is based on a set established by 
Louis XIV in 1773, which itself is a codification of customs and business practices that were 
prevalent in the Middle Ages. The Companies Act was a composite of 633 articles governing 
regulations on company activities. Most of the provisions of the Commercial Court were not 
sufficient and did not keep pace with the evolution and growth of companies in Saudi Arabia, 
many of the issues relating to such companies did not cover issues such as the liquidation of 
the company, merger with another company, and other matters relating to companies.308 
 
Therefore, the Saudi Companies Law was promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/6 dated 
22/03/1385 AH. It contains 233 articles that cover companies in the financial, commercial, 
industrial, agricultural, and service areas. This law includes general provisions, provisions 
relating to a company’s statement of solidarity, simple recommendations, joint ventures, 
contributions, recommending shares, limited liability, cooperative companies, conversion and 
integration of companies, liquidation of companies, foreign companies, violations of sanctions 
regime, and a body for resolving commercial disputes.309 
 
‘The Companies Act provides for the establishment of new joint-stock companies and the 
initial distribution of shares, which led to the Act becoming a cornerstone in the legislative 
framework of the Saudi Stock market. All provisions governing joint-stock companies are set 
forth in Articles 48 to 148 of the Saudi Companies Act’.  
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2.6.6 New Companies Act 
	
The current Companies Act was passed by Royal Decree in 1965. It is now almost 50 years 
old. Furthermore, changes have occurred, such as the rise in oil prices in 1973 and the 
accompanying development programs that covered all parts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and included all aspects of life310. 
 
Therefore, various entities to whom the Companies Act applies, such as government 
departments, businessmen, economists, administrators, and experts, have demanded a new 
Companies Act that takes into account the many developments in companies that have been 
adopted by most states’ systems. Therefore, there is a need to accelerate the formulation of a 
new Companies Act that applies to the various advancements in trade and investment market 
requirements, including all texts and acts that ensure a balance between the rights of investor 
and boards of directors. 
 
Accordingly, the study and development of the current Companies Act was approved, and the 
new project was undertaken by the Ministry of Commerce and studied very carefully by a body 
of 1427 experts with the participation of all relevant authorities. A very sophisticated and 
modern version was developed so as to avoid the gaps in the current system, after the draft was 
subjected to several audits by the Ministry of Commerce and the Shura Council; however, it 
has not yet been officially released by the state.311 
 
The new draft law for companies contains 240 articles divided in 12 chapters. It abolished 17 
articles of the old law and introduced 21 new ones, bringing the total number of articles to 240. 
The most prominent of these amendments include the introduction of a control board for each 
joint-stock company, specialized supervision of a company’s business, the entitlement to 
convene a general assembly, and the preparation of detailed financial statements.312  
 
The system also introduced a special chapter (holding companies) that granted the right to own 
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patents, trademarks, and privileges. Cancelled joint ventures, which are not legally established, 
are not subject to publicity. The new system requires investor in joint-stock companies to pay 
50% of the nominal value of the shares at the IPO, instead of 25% in the current system. The 
company’s capital is divided into shares of equal value and is not fragmented, with the value 
being not less than 10 Riyal instead of 50 Riyal in the current system.313 
 
According to the draft law, the Capital Market Authority is authorized to supervise the 
contributions included in the financial market and control of companies, the issuance of rules 
governing their work, and the regulations of mergers. Without impacting the powers of the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), according to the Banking Control Law and Law on 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, the new draft system requires a cumulative 
voting method for selecting members of the board for corporate governance so that no 
shareholder may use the right to vote314. 
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Chapter 3: The Saudi Stock Market Disclosure 
Regime 
  
3.1 Introduction 
	
The aim of this chapter is to examine the current system of disclosure in Saudi Arabia and to 
assess whether it is adequate for its intended purpose, which can be found in the Companies 
Act 1965, Listing Rules 315  and Corporate Governance regulations. The researcher shall 
question whether, in light of the limitations of the current approach, a new set of rules is 
necessary to facilitate the release of information required by investor.  Finally, the existing 
framework will be analysed from the perspective of the protection of investor.  
 
One of the main elements of the stock market is disclosure and transparency, which is 
considered to be an important requirement for the proper functioning of market forces. 
Consequently, information asymmetry may threaten the growth of the stock market and cause 
inefficiency. The stock market crash in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 2006 highlighted the 
lack of transparency and disclosure.   
 
Thus, “Black argues that the two key elements of investor protection are (1) disclosure of 
information about listed companies and (2) confidence that the company's insiders won't cheat 
investor out of the value of their investment through "self-dealing. Transactions or outright 
theft. If these essential prerequisites are achieved, strong capital market can develop”.316 
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Consequently, transparency and disclosure is regarded as one of the main elements of an 
improved stock market regulations as expanded disclosure reduces information asymmetry and 
therefore reduces transaction costs in secondary markets, resulting in increased share liquidity. 
Share liquidity, as noted by Black317, Levine and Zervos and others 318, is a primary factor in 
market development.   
 
Moreover, Black proposes that the provision of credible information about the value of a 
company's business (and therefore a reduction of information asymmetry) is an essential 
prerequisite for strong public securities markets, and that strong public market can facilitate 
economic growth.319 
 
Fair disclosure is critical for protecting investor, because information disclosure is a key factor 
in their investment decisions. Therefore, disclosure regulations aim to accomplish a number of 
goals. This involves, inter alia, the protection of investor and the promotion of efficiency. 
Disclosure and transparency also help investor make decisions within their respective 
companies. Consequently, a study Bhat and other, found that an increase in disclosure and 
transparency helped improve the environment of a given company. 320  Moreover, these 
decisions are fully informed and investor are completely aware of the operational and financial 
factors affecting their companies. On the other hand, disclosure and transparency help 
companies properly display their positions and prevent forgery and deception. These factors 
also increase the ability of the stock market to monitor the boards and executive departments 
of its participating companies.321 One of the most important lessons learned from the Saudi 
stock market collapse of 2006 was the detrimental effect of weak disclosure and transparency 
standards in annual and periodic reports as mentioned in chapter Two.  
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3.2 The Concept of Disclosure and Transparency 
 
Robert defined transparency as accounting disclosure322 that goes beyond the principles of 
public acceptance, accounting standards, and legislative requirements in financial reports to 
provide investor with the information they need to make their decisions.323 Frank and Thomas 
defined transparency as external users having access to the same information as members of a 
company's management team, thus giving these external users the ability to control 
management.324 Ragab defined transparency as the disclosure of any inside information that 
affects stock prices.325 
 
3.2.1 Determinants of Disclosure and Transparency 
	
Robert determined several factors affecting disclosure and several determinants of 
transparency. These were as follows326:  Robert mentioned (90) of financial and non-financial 
elements disclosed by large companies in their annual reports, as well as the amount of general 
information about the balance sheets, income statements, and statements of cash flows 
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elements disclosed by the company; Moreover, The disclosure group on research and 
development; The movement of the company's corporate data, including: the identities of the 
company's managers, the rewards and benefits usually assigned to board members, the stock 
owned by managers and employees, the company's major shareholder, and the rate of property; 
Information regarding the operational and information regarding the company's financial 
analysis. Finaly: The timing of the financial report's publication. Robert's study reported that 
the relationship between transparencies, legal and political systems, and legitimacy is tied to 
the limitations of transparency. The presence of these systems is necessary to achieve 
transparency, and in the case of financial reports these systems help create better levels of 
transparency. 
 
3.2.2 Barriers of Disclosure and Transparency 
	
There are many obstacles a company may face when trying to achieve transparency. Some of 
these obstacles are:  A lack of incentives for managers to deal with the interests of shareholders. 
There should be incentives for managers to disclose information regarding the company's 
current and future performance to external parties.327 As the presence of these incentives for 
managers of companies has two potential effects. 
 
The first effect of these incentives is that they encourage managers to choose the alternative 
that results in showing the external parties that the company's profits are high, if the bonuses 
and incentives are associated with increasing the company's profits. The second effect of these 
incentives is that they cause management members to disclose information openly, causing the 
administration to provide accurate information about their finances. According to Eldahrawi, 
the model achieves adequate security by not risking real disclosure; by obtaining a fixed salary, 
a member of management is not affected by the results of the economic unit.328 
 
Some managers attempt to mislead third parties by only disclosing good news about their 
company, even though they know that there is also news that does not reflect well on the 
																																																								
327  Benjamin M Oviatt, ‘Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder 
Relationship: Incentives for Congruent Interests’ (1988) 13 Academy of Management Review P214. 
328 Kamal al-Din Mustafa Eldahrawi, ‘A Model for Managers Incentives to Encourage the Disclosure 
of the Accounting Optional’, (1987) XXIV Journal of College of Commerce for Scientific Research 
P162. 
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company's finances. If an incentive program were in place, a manager who made this mistake 
would face a penalty; that is, something would be deducted from his or her total rewards. In 
addition to raising the value of the company's stock in the long term, an incentive program 
would also help neutralize conflict between managers and shareholders.329 Changing Saudi 
Arabian accounting standards may improve the regulations of disclosure and thereby decrease 
the possibility of recording managers' economic transactions, which may not be in the best 
interest of the shareholders. The second obstacle a company may face when attempting to 
achieve transparency is the competitive advantage companies gain when they do not practice 
transparency. Company executives often complain that transparency reduces their ability to 
compete, even though no research indicates or confirms this phenomenon. 
 
It is unknown whether or not the relationship between disclosure and competitiveness is causal 
or merely correlative. The researcher believes that the expanded flow of information is an 
essential requirement for free-market economics. This flow of information facilitates 
transparency and encourages competition, which leads to the improvement of the work at hand. 
Without this flow of information, it would be impossible for companies to grow and survive 
within the competitive business environment. Though many corporations object that disclosure 
reduces their competitiveness in the market, it is the opinion of the researcher that this objection 
is based on individual interest rather than public interest. It also has to do with a lack of 
awareness about the meaning and importance of disclosure.330 
 
The third obstacle to transparency is the balance between cost and revenue. Accounting 
information is not free, and being transparent usually costs money. This means that disclosure 
requires an accounting system that accounts for the standard balance between cost and 
revenue.331 
 
3.3 Theoretical Perspectives on Disclosure  
	
The importance of disclosure is best understood in the context of the role and meaning of 
information in the stock market.  The basic question is; what role does information play in a 
																																																								
329 Oviatt (n 323). 
330  S Subramanian and V Nagi Reddy, ‘Corporate Governance Disclosures and International 
Competitiveness: A Study of Indian Firms’ (2012) 11 Asian Business & Management P195. 
331Shahrokh M Saudagaran, International Accounting: A User Perspective (CCH 2009). 
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competitive market? Information plays a fundamental role in stock prices, and consequently 
underlines the importance of delivering investor with as much significant information as 
possible.  
3.3.1 Asymmetry of Information 
  
The term ‘information asymmetry’ refers to the fact that company managers are more 
knowledgeable than investor are regarding the status of the company.332 The managers are able 
to access accurate information regarding the financial status and future value of the company. 
This information may either support or not support the company's qualification for an active 
role in the market. This information can also be used to create an attractive image of the 
company for investor.333 The company’s ability can be expressed using the information about 
profits distributed to the investor and the state of the asymmetry of information distributed. 
Reflect on the state of uncertainty, so it can reflect the inefficient status of the information. The 
company’s internal parties (including owners and administrators) are supposed to be more 
informed than others (external parties) regarding the status of the company.334 
 
In his famous essay, 'The Market for Lemons', American economist George Akerlof 335 
explains the information asymmetry problem. He does so using the US auto market, which he 
argues is a failed market. A 'lemon' refers to something with an appearance that suggests a 
higher level of quality than the item actually has. People assume that every used car is likely a 
'lemon', which leads to the prices of used cars usually being less than their true values.336 
 
Akerlof conducted a study with eight individuals buying used cars. If one individual found a 
serious flaw in the car, this increased the attempts of the used car dealer to try to sell that car 
																																																								
332 Paul M Healy and Krishna G Palepu, ‘Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the 
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature’ (2001) 31 Journal of accounting and 
economics P405. 
333 Katrien Mortelmans, Enhancing Work Resumption of Patients on Sub-Acute Sickness Absence: 
Intervening in Information Asymmetry Among Medical Stakeholders Involved in Disability 
Management in Belgium (Leuven University Press 2006) vol P361. 
334 James Bradfield, Introduction to the Economics of Financial Market (Oxford University Press 2007) 
P365. 
335 George A Akerlof, ‘The Market For“ lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ 
[1970] The quarterly journal of economics P488. 
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to get rid of it. This led to more pressure on car dealers to keep used car prices as low as 
possible. This led those who had used cars in excellent condition to not attempt to sell their 
cars, as these individuals knew they would not get the right price for their respective car. This 
is because people would assume the used car was of low quality and thus deserved a low price. 
This in turn caused the balance of the market to remain low.337 
 
In a seller's market with high-quality cars, people want to sell their cars for prices that are 
appropriate for their cars and buyers are willing to purchase these cars for these prices. 
However, buyers are often unable to obtain the information that would tell them whether the 
car they are interested in of high quality or is a 'lemon'. In this respect, the market has failed to 
provide an equal opportunity for fair exchange between sellers and buyers. This means that the 
higher the price the buyer is willing to pay, the higher the minimum price the seller is willing 
to accept. This means that the market is far from achieving efficiency and that it remains an 
invalid option for achieving the optimal allocation of economic resources. The reason for this 
inadequacy is the asymmetry of information being shared between either sides of the buyer–
seller relationship. There is also a lack of incentives for each party to disclose the correct 
information to the other party. The solution is to create conditions that motivate the parties to 
disclose the correct information and to generate appropriate incentives for the exchange 
process.338 
 
Several studies have been conducted on this topic, including Spence's339 study of the labour 
market. Asymmetric information studies have been applied to the financial structures of 
institutions by Pyle and Lelland 340 and Ross 341. Scott 342 identifies financial accounting and 
reporting as mechanisms to control information asymmetry problems. These mechanisms work 
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by converting inside information into outside information. According to Kothari343  , 'the 
theoretical literature shows that both mandated and voluntary disclosures reduce information 
asymmetries among informed and uninformed market participants'. He suggests that reduced 
information asymmetry has desirable effects on the cost of capital and the volatility of security 
prices, which motivates regulators to strive for high-quality accounting standards.344 
 
Healy and Palepu345 and Black346 discuss several well-known solutions to the information 
asymmetry problem such as contracts to provide full disclosure, the use of intermediaries to 
search for private information, and regulations that requires private information disclosure.  
 
3.3.2 Agency Costs Theory 
	
Jensen and Meckling347 suggest that an agency relationship can be seen as a contract between 
investor (the principal) and managers (the agent) in order to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent'.348 
 
'Agency cost' refers to the cost that arises because of the conflict of interest between investor 
and campaign managers. Agency theory arises as a result of the separation of ownership of 
governance institutions.  The most important requirement of an agency contract is that an agent 
performs their responsibilities to maximize the benefit of the owner. In exchange, the agent 
receives the appropriate payment.349 
 
Managers have more information than investor regarding the status of the institution. Managers 
sometimes pay attention to the achievement of their personal goals rather than the achievement 
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PP10,12. 
345 Healy and Palepu (n 328). 
346 Black (n 6). 
347 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4),  Journal of financial economics P305. 
348 Muzahem (n 340). 
349 Jensen and Meckling (n 343). 
	 107	
of the investors' objectives350. When this occurs, what is required is some sort of cost borne by 
the investor to achieve their goals. This is where a primary agency cost source comes in. This 
cost is borne by investor to ensure that they have some control over achieving their goals. In 
the case of a lower degree of protection for the investor (or if laws are lacking or not applied 
optimally), managers are able to use their skills to use the institution for their personal benefit  
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,).351 Managers can acquire good reputations 
by distributing stock dividends to shareholders, who think this distribution is the result of ideal 
voltage for managers.  
 
Studies have shown that managers do not hate the distribution of cash flows to investor in the 
form of stock dividends. When there are few investment opportunities, companies may also 
resort to borrowing to provide liquidity and improve the distribution of earnings per share.352 
Despite his conviction that spending does not provide any economic benefit to a company, 
Fama described spending as part of an optimal operating managers hold; thus, spending is one 
incentive for managers to work harder towards the creation of an economic surplus. Fama does 
not consider these costs to be part of the cost of owning a company until they exceed a certain 
level or coincide with the poor performance of that company. Thus, Fama's views are not 
consistent with those of Jensen and Meckling353, who describe this spending as unethical 
behaviour and therefore consider it to be part of the cost of the company.354 
 
According to Jensen the cost of sharing company information is worth more than the financial 
situation of the company.355 There remains an inability of stock market dealers to obtain 
adequate information to rationalise their investment decisions. This may be because of the 
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limited information distributed from financial reporting, or it may be because managers pave 
the income methods and have an effect on the adequacy of disclosure.356 
 
3.3.3 Signal Theory 
	
Signal theory is a special type of asymmetry of information that occurs between the internal 
and external parties of a company. Signal theory occurs when administration members know 
more than other parties do about the quality of the institution. It also occurs when those parties 
use the production and reporting of information for their own benefit, or when administration 
members use reporting of information for their own benefit. This leads to higher costs resulting 
from the signals provided by the administration to external parties.357 
 
The signalling process depends on the financial structure of signalling mainly through the 
borrowing and acquiring of an equity ratio through the company's administration. It works as 
a system used for providing important information to creditors and future shareholders, thereby 
reducing the level of asymmetry of information between dealers.358 Institutions that use false 
signals may acquire profits, but the sanctions and the potential risks of this activity are greater 
than the revenues. A company's level of debt can be used as a tool for signalling to ensure that 
signalling is used only by high-quality institutions. This means there is a positive relationship 
between the quality of a company's enterprise and its level of borrowing.359 
 
3.4 Regulatory Framework for Disclosure in the Saudi Stock 
Market 
  
The analysis of the previous section recommends that an information asymmetry between 
investor and the market is best reduced by a system of truthful disclosure, where stock market 
investor rely on the availability of accurate information to make quick decisions. As such, these 
investor favour regulations that governs capital market by applying the principles of 
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transparency and disclosure to determine the content and scope of application.360  In this 
section to assess the pattern of the disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia whether or not these 
regulations will helped to protect the investor. Which can be found in the Companies Act 1965, 
Listing Rules361 and Corporate Governance regulations. Such regulations have been released 
by the Capital Market Authority. This regulations includes a set of rules, regulations, and 
procedures issued by the Commission for applying provisions to the stock market law, 
including Listing Rules and Corporate Governance regulations.362  
 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith they identify three mechanisms of overall corporate 
transparency: corporate reporting, private information acquisition, communication and 
information dissemination.363 The Capital Market Authority is working to raise the level of 
disclosure and transparency in the stock market and ensure justice among investor by ensuring 
the commitment of listed companies to disclose significant developments, and the underlying 
events, and to ensure that financial reports are accurate. This must be done in a timely manner 
and without delay in order to allow investor to make investment decisions in accordance with 
accurate and reliable information from the company. For the CMA to ensure justice, efficiency, 
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and transparency in securities transactions, and to ensure that information is provided to 
investor in the stock market fairly and equally364, it developed the Listing Rules, which include 
the complete obligations of listed companies.365 
 
3.4.1 Disclosure of Company’s Future Plans 
	
 There is a significant importance attached to the disclosure of the company's future plans, as 
this increases the value of any strategic plans for investment and allows this to be used as an 
important source for decision-making (investor).  It is no longer acceptable that investor within 
the stock market are limited to historical or current information only; indeed, the required 
information goes beyond current to the future, making it imperative for investor to study and 
understand the future prospects in order to speculate and think about the consequences of the 
decisions and actions in the future.366 
 
For example, a report emanating from the US Congressional Committee, which investigated 
the causes of the collapse of Enron Corporation, pointed out that one of the main reasons for 
this collapse was due to the lack of disclosure of mutual operations between this company and 
its investment companies.367 From the financial studies angle transparency means providing 
information for the purpose of protecting the future of the investor, and to allow the community 
to recognize that the company is able to fulfil its obligations. 368 
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The Saudi stock market currently has 180 companies listed.369 The Saudi market does not 
disclose the plans and investments of most of its companies; currently, only four companies 
share some of their information on a monthly basis (Savola Group370, Cisco371, ZOUJAJ372, 
SRMG373 ) while others share information on a quarterly basis.374 That being said, the reports 
issued by these companies or consulting firms are always accurate and always use precise 
numbers from which stockholders can accurately judge whether or not to invest. 
 
Moreover, the regulations regarding disclosure is in the Listing Rules. According to these rules, 
companies and their boards of directors must annually disclose their plans and investments in 
the form of annual reports. Companies may still remain committed to disclosing the minimum 
level of information; however, providing information without specific details does not tend to 
increase investment.375 Some companies issue their reports during the third or fourth quarter 
of the year. Investment channels work based on new production lines. There is often 
speculation regarding the shares of these companies based on what is stated in these reports. 
Many companies usually happen to hear such speculation, which indicates that though 
transparency legislation exists, enforcement of this legislation is relatively minimal. 
 
However, disclosure regulations exists and is applied and that transparency will increase in the 
event of an expansion. Such an expansion would influence the investment decisions of 
management members or stock traders and protect the investor, as there would be a higher 
demand for companies to disclose their investments and investment plans. Alternatively, this 
																																																								
369‘Symbols Traded Tadawul’ (2015) <https://www.google.com/search?q=+Symbols+Traded&ie=utf-
8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b#safe=strict&q=Symbols+Traded+Tadawul> Accessed 8 April 2017. 
370 Savola Group was established as a Saudi public joint stock company in 1979, The aim of the 
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371 Saudi Industrial Services "Cisco" was founded in 1988 as a shareholding company transformed into 
a holding company recently, it has a capital of 680 million riyals. 
372  National Co. for Glass Industries (ZOUJAJ), a joint stock company in the field of industrial 
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374  Thamer Al Saeed, ‘Disclosure’, Al Jazeera (2013) <http://www.al-
jazirah.com/2013/20130825/ec16.htm> accessed 8 April 2016. 
375 Article 43 of the Regulations of the Listing Rule. 
	 112	
type of expansion could create problems for companies that did not practice transparency.  
 
 3.4.2 Director Responsibilities 
	
Annual reports always appear as a fixed item on the agenda for the annual meeting of the 
general assembly. This portion of the meeting addresses absolving the quittance of the 
assembly's board of director’s members. The board discusses this item routinely so that it does 
not take up more than a few minutes of each meeting.376  However, in 1999 a study by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) found that in order for 
transparency to be realised in published reports, these reports should include the following 
information:377 
 
 Financial and non-financial company information; The management team's analysis of the 
financial and non-financial company information; Projective reports and information; 
Information about the company's management and shareholders; Background information 
about the company. A good example of such a case is what happened in Mobily378 Telecom 
company which suffered from transparency and integrity; the company "polished" their 
financial statements to indicate that they had maximised their income or adopted a historical 
cost rather than indicating the true value of the company. Such tactics are not uncommon for 
the majority of Saudi joint-stock companies.379 Manipulation of the financial statements of 
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378 Etihad Etisalat Company was founded in the history of December 14, 2004 as a shareholding 
company after winning a license a second mobile phone in Saudi Arabia with a capital of five billion 
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on the relationship between the timing of companies listed in the Saudi Stock Exchange, and the number 
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such companies may be motivated by many factors. These companies may want to hide their 
losses, inflate their profits, mislead their rivals, or circumvent taxes without the complicity of 
the investor and the other party.380 
 
Mobily Telecom is one of the top five most influential companies in the Saudi stock market. 
Mobily asked traders to stop trading its shares on the stock market for the purpose of its audit 
committee meeting. They then came out of that meeting without results, and the company did 
not announce its third quarter results. On November 2nd, 2014, the Capital Market Authority 
ordered stock market traders to stop trading Mobily's shares. This was at the request of Mobily, 
as the company wanted to wait until the announcement of their primary financial statements 
for the financial period ending on September 30th, 2014, before allowing stock trading again.381  
 
Within three days of the end of this financial period, the financial statements of the company 
were released. The release of these statements coincided with the recognition and declaration 
of the existence of a large mistake made by the company in which the company's restricted 
revenue was not reflected in their financial statements.382 This discrepancy necessitated a 
																																																								
of characteristics for these companies, during the period 2001- 2005. This study also investigated the 
effect of the establishment of the CMA on the timing of the announcement of financial reporting and 
found that the contributions and data from Saudi companies were announced more quickly, since the 
implementation of the CMA. The average duration of company’s advertisements for annual financial 
information declined to 28 days, in 2005. The study also found that large companies announced 
information faster than small companies do, and high-debt companies take longer to announce financial 
information compared to companies with low debt. Companies that with positive news delivered news 
faster compared to companies with negative news, which were purposely delayed. The study also 
showed a difference in timing of announcements, according to the industry and the type of company. 
See Ali A, ‘The Relationship between the Timing of the Announcement of Financial Information and 
the Characteristics of the Saudi Joint Stock Companies’ (King Saud University Repository 2006). 
380 James Wahlen and others, Financial Reporting, Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation (Nelson 
Education 2014). 
381 Argaam, ‘Suspended Mobily Share Trading’ (2014). 
382 A different situation similar to the Mobily scenario occurred with the Tesco Company in the London 
stock market. The main difference between the Mobily situation and the Tesco scenario was the reaction 
of the regulators. Tesco is a retail company, which operates supermarket and types of stores in many 
countries around the world, including countries in Asia, America, and Europe. Tesco's activity is most 
highly concentrated in Britain, where its total sales reached more than 70.9 billion pounds, the 
equivalent of 112.78 billion USD. In mid-2014, Tesco announced that there was a problem with their 
financial statements. Due to their increase in revenue, the company initially expected to write off the 
equivalent of 263 million pounds for that period and previous periods. However, some information 
leaks from the company's financials determined that the value of the 2014 write-off was actually 1.6 
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change in the company's financial statements for the previous financial year, which involved 
write-off revenues in excess of 6.28 billion SAR, as well as a write-off net profit of more than 
1.7 billion SAR. The CAM then agreed to return to Mobily to stock trading. This was expected 
to close the stock for three consecutive sessions and to create lower proportions without any 
requests. It was also expected to settle the stock at approximately 60 SAR. At one point, the 
company's stock exceeded more than 4 billion SAR in a single session.383 
 
The company amended its financial statements for the past periods, resulting in the removal of 
the equivalent of 1.35 billion SAR from the balance of the company's retained earnings. This 
means that the account now amounts to only 12.8 billion SAR. This explains the failure of the 
Board of Directors to keep the quarterly distribution of the company's profit policy (1.25 per 
share) and its inability to pay a total of 417 million SAR (only 3.3% of the total retained 
earnings). Mobily aimed to regain the confidence of their investor and to clarify that they still 
had money despite what had happened. They reassured the investor that their stock was still in 
the hands of an honest company and that their stock-still had a future of growth and success 
ahead. However, it seems that Mobily failed to convince the necessary financial institutions of 
their bright future, as the company was actually in debt by over 14 billion SAR. Mobily was 
																																																								
billion pounds. Moreover, more than eight company managers have been laid off within the company, 
including the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of British operations. All employees responsible for the 
discrepancy problem were removed from the company's roster. These layoffs were conducted after the 
formation of a commission of inquiry led by independent external auditors (Deloitte and Frishvild) 
under the guidance and supervision of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC). Following the failure of the Board of Directors to catch this mistake, 
members of the Audit Committee were responsible for finding who was responsible for this grave 
mistake. The complicity of senior officials in this discrepancy was evident, including the company's 
Chairman and junior staff members. The collusion of some of Tesco's suppliers was also discovered. 
Following discovery of this mistake, Tesco's CEO announced the existence of this imbalance and vowed 
to take all measures in favour of the investor to amend the error. However, the stock lost more than 
50% of its market value during that period, falling from a value of 370 pounds to 160 pounds per stock. 
The CEO then announced to the company's investor that he would correct the errors that had occurred 
and that the company would emerge from the incident unharmed. It should be noted that there was a 
connection between the Mobily incident and the Tesco situation: the same company— 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)—served as the external auditor for both companies. See ‘Tesco, What 
Went Wrong? - BBC News’ (2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29716885> accessed 8 April 
2017. 
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already facing the problem of liquidity in both the short and long term.384 
 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Mobily acknowledged the real reason for the suspension 
of the company's stock, stating that ' On Wednesday we found that the stock had been 
frequently traded, so we suspended the stock to preserve information about the shares until 
such a time that our investor would have equal opportunities to use the information. This raises 
several questions: Who sold the shares, and why? How did this individual obtain the internal 
information, and in what capacity? Were the company's owners or their relatives responsible? 
Could one of the members of the board of directors have been responsible?.385 
 
A legal controversy exists regarding the importance of a quittance in terms of the responsibility 
of board members. However, this decision will not change the fact that transparency is now 
entrenched in the business laws of most of the world's countries. These laws require companies 
to take responsibility for the preparation of their financial statements, and they dictate that the 
company is the only party responsible for errors, fraud, or manipulation of those documents.386 
Each company is also responsible for ensuring that it has an effective internal control system 
to help to reduce the likelihood of such abuses occurring.387 
 
These business responsibilities388 have all been incorporated into US law (Sarbanes & Xola,) 
																																																								
384 ‘Mobily" describes the Reason for the High Loss for 2014 and Confirms Its Ability to Meet All Its 
Financial Obligations Facility’, Argaam (2014) <http://www.argaam.com/article/articledetail/490125> 
accessed 10 April 2015. 
385‘Chief Executive Officer of “Mobily” Khalid Al Kaf Interview with Channel "AL Arabiya’, AL 
Arabiya (2014) <http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/companies/2014/11/03/.html> accessed 10 April 
2015. 
386 Avshalom M Adam and Tal Shavit, ‘Roles and Responsibilities of Boards of Directors Revisited in 
Reconciling Conflicting Stakeholders Interests While Maintaining Corporate Responsibility’ (2009) 13 
Journal of Management & Governance 281. 
387 Companies Act, 77,78.79. 
388 After a number of scandals and accounting major companies such as Tyco International, Enron, 
WorldCom issued, Adelphia and Peregrine System. especially After, Enron company was declared 
bankrupt by the US Bankruptcy Code. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the company's assets were worth 
63.4 billion USD. After this scandal, a new law was issued to protect the market and investor from 
future incidents of a similar nature (the Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act). 
US Congress also issued the SOX Act Law, which held CEOs, CFOs, and chartered accountants 
responsible for irresponsible or dishonest business decisions affecting stockholders. CEOs and CFOs 
were now directly legally responsible for any deliberate misstatements in their companies' financial 
statements. In conjunction with this law, the Securities Commission and the US stock market created 
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389 The creation of these laws were initiated by the bankruptcy of a number of giant 
corporations, much of which was caused by the failure of these companies' management teams 
to adequately disclose important information. Many other countries have also began following 
this transparent approach to business laws.390 
 
Accordingly study by Al-Bogami aimed to test the benefits of the initial financial reports for 
individual investor and institutions specializing in the Saudi stock market. The study used three 
methods to investigate: First, a review of disclosure practices regarding the initial financial 
reports consisting of a sample of 11 joint-stock companies in the period between 1987 and 
1991. Second, a questionnaire was provided to individuals, specialized institutions specialized, 
and financial managers in the period from April to June 1994. Third, the response to the stock 
prices following the announcement of the initial financial reports was tested using the weekly 
stock prices of 39 joint-stock companies from 1-1-1987 to 15-6-1991. The study found that the 
initial financial reports used by investor in the Saudi stock market needed more standards and 
regulations to increase their use, as the experimental results showed that Saudi investor were 
using the third and fourth quarter reports, mainly to predict annual results.391 
 
This led to decision No. 2217 of the Minister of Trade, which was made on 25-03-2002. This 
decision required the managers of each joint-stock company to provide recognition 
demonstrating that the company's financial statements do not include any incorrect statements 
or information and that the company did not omit any data or information, which would be 
misleading if omitted.392 This decision represents a major step for the role of preparers of 
financial statements for protecting investor; this decision is further defined in Article 76393 of 
																																																								
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) for chartered accountants. This council is 
tasked with overseeing the Regulations, inspection, and discipline of accounting firms. 
389 US Securities and others, ‘The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry’ (2006) 29 Retrieved 
September 2006. 
390 Similar laws in other countries C-SOX - Canadian equivalent of Sarbanes–Oxley Act and German 
Corporate Governance Code - 2002 German corporate governance code. 
391  Sultan AS Al-Bogami, ‘An Examination of the Usefulness of Interim Financial Statements to 
Investor in the Saudi Stock Market’ (University of Dundee 1996). 
392  ‘Ministerial Decree No. (2217) Dated 01/11/1423 AH on Internal Surveillance in Joint Stock 
Companies’ (2013). 
393 Companies Act, “Article (76): Members of the Board of Directors shall be jointly responsible for 
damages sustained by the company, the stockholders, or third parties due to their maladministration of 
the affairs of the company, or their violation of the provisions of this Law or the company’s bylaws. 
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the company Act. The General Assembly's annual meeting will rely mainly on this recognition. 
If a company's exclusion of information is discovered after the publication of their financial 
reports, the preparers of these financial statements will now be held responsible for any errors, 
fraud, or manipulation of these documents. 
 
The greatest impact of this decision is that it confirms the responsibility the company's 
management has for its internal control system. The control system is considered to be the 
backbone any successful accounting unit; when the control system is, there is less likelihood 
for error. Control over a company's business belongs to the jurisdiction of the company's 
general assembly, as stipulated in Article 129394 of the company Act: 'Investor shall exercise 
control over the company's accounts'. Because this may be difficult to achieve, Article 130395 
stipulates that a company may appoint an auditor to take charge of that task on their behalf if 
necessary.396 
 
The Companies Act contains explicit provisions regarding the work of each company's board 
of directors. This includes the provisions of Article 68397, which dictates rules regarding 
providing verification of a member of the board of directors of the shares of security' in the 
date specified for that task, and including any violation of this type in its report to the general 
assembly. Article 69398 states the necessity for any member of the board of directors to inform 
the Council of matters regarding his personal business interests and how these might affect the 
company. 
  
																																																								
Any condition contrary to this provision shall be considered nonexistent. Liability shall be assumed by 
all members if a wrongful act arises from a resolution issued and adopted by them all. But with respect 
to resolutions adopted by majority vote, dissenting members shall not be liable if they have expressly 
recorded their objection in the minutes of the meeting. Absence from the meeting at which such 
resolution is adopted shall not constitute cause for relief from liability, unless it is established that the 
absentee was not aware of the resolution, or unable to object after becoming aware of it. The approval 
of the Ordinary General Assembly to exonerate the members from liability shall not be required when 
filing a liability claim. Such a claim shall not be heard after the lapse of 3 years from the date of 
disclosure of the harmful act." 
394 Article (129): The investor monitor the accounts of the company in accordance with the provisions 
set forth in the company's Regulations and subject to the following provisions: 
395 Companies Act, 130. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Companies Act, 68. 
398 Companies Act, 69. 
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This high level of efficiency is usually due to a contract obligation to auditors and accountants. 
It is also sometimes due to the high internal audit quality of these companies. Article IV399 of 
the indicative list of corporate governance states that a company's contract should specify the 
supervisory role of the company's disclosure and transparency applications. 400  Moreover, 
according to the list criteria of the Listing Rules, disclosure and transparency standards are 
legally binding. Article IX 401  of the Corporate Governance regulations stipulates a few 
disclosure and transparency standards. Regulations for shareholding companies, including 
mandatory standards for disclosure and transparency, are mentioned in the Listing Rules.402 
 
The Chairman of the board of directors shall inform the company's general assembly of any 
business or contracts that may be of personal interest to one of the members of the board of 
directors. Attached to this report is a special report from the auditor. According to the content 
of Article 131403 , the auditor has the right to review the company's books, records, and 
documents. Article 132404 requires the auditor to submit the annual report of the general 
assembly. The auditor should be guaranteed by the company's management that he will be able 
to complete his work with no hindrances. If violations of the company's rules or system are 
discovered, the auditor has the right to state the facts regarding these issues with the company's 
accounts.405  
 
																																																								
399 "Article 4: Facilitation of Investor Exercise of Rights and Access to Information 
(a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify the procedures and precautions 
that are necessary for the shareholders’ exercise of all their lawful rights. 
(b) All information which enable investor to properly exercise their rights shall be made available and 
such information shall be comprehensive and accurate; it must be provided and updated regularly and 
within the prescribed times; the company shall use the most effective means in communicating with 
shareholders. No discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to investor in relation to providing 
information." 
400 Article IV OF Corporate Governance Regulations  .  
401 “Article 92: Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report In addition to what is required in the Listing 
Rules in connection with the content of the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the 
annual financial statements of the company, such report shall include …etc.” 
402 Article IX OF Corporate Governance Regulations  . 
403 Companies Act, 131. 
404 Companies Act, 132. 
405 Michael B Adams, ‘Agency Theory and the Internal Audit’ (1994) 9 Managerial Auditing Journal 
8. 
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Article 76406 of the Companies Act states that any members of a company's board of directors 
asking about the damage that arises from the mismanagement of the company's affairs is in 
violation of the Companies Act.   
 
There is a proven method for effectively choosing review board members and determining the 
ideal duration of their membership and methods of work. The Commission is based on the 
board of directors; this creates a fundamental defect in the control of the companies, as it makes 
the Council of company both the adversary and sentence at the same time. Additionally, the 
Audit Committee is entrusted with monitoring the company's accounts in conjunction with the 
company's chartered accountant and also with ensuring the company acts in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 123.407 
 
3.4.3 Who Should Bear Fines? 
	
 The CMA announced ten resolutions, these resolutions regarding the imposition of 'varying 
fines' on some of the stock market's companies.408 The previous disclosure of information was 
either delayed or inaccurate for these companies. This can be seen as a continuation of the 
approach the CMA has taken with the fining of such companies. However, the real cause of 
error for these companies was poor management. These delays in disclosure affected investor 
while secretly benefitting people who had access to the information before it was made public. 
 
Since the establishment of the Authority, everyone has been convinced that the application of 
these fines is unfair to investor. However, the Authority still ignores the real offender in the 
imposition of a fine, so the CAM bears the responsibility to the owners of the company. Beyond 
the size of the fines to each company and their impact on profits, the principal goal of the 
legislature—during the preparation of the CAM and the rules and regulations governing the 
financial market—was to enable the CAM to impose fines to ensure the commitment of all the 
departments in the companies to the regulations and rules, particularly with respect to 
disclosure and transparency, in order to provide a healthy environment for the stock market 
																																																								
406 Companies Act, 76. 
407 Companies Act, 123. 
408 Abdulrahman Alkhareef, ‘The CAM’s Fines Remain on Those Affected’, Al-Riyadh newspaper 
(2014) <http://www.alriyadh.com/952255> accessed 21 April 2016. 
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rather than for the purpose of raising CAM  revenue.409 
 
Therefore, the objective of the fine should be to evaluate and correct administrative errors and 
ensure that they do not recur for protecting investor, and the achievement of these objectives 
requires agreement regarding the decisions on the fines. Therefore, CAM continuing to impose 
fines on the companies will not achieve the goal, and the resulting delay in disclosure is still 
far from bearing consequences. If a company pays the fine and considers it part of its annual 
expenses, the company can benefit from the delay of the announcement by using inside 
information in the speculative market, which is clearly seen in the trading companies that rise 
or fall in the proportions, and the reason is revealed after the market closes or days after. 
Following the damage to the company's shareholders, the CAM also punishes them by fining 
their company.  
 
Therefore, the CAM should reconsider its decisions regarding fines, even if this forces it to 
modify or add material to the Listing Rules so that it is the general manager or CEO that 
primarily bear the full fines because of errors or delays, along with the Board of Directors, as 
it is the administrative and supervisory authority for the executive management. Because high 
salaries and bonuses are paid to officials and members of the Board, this must be matched in 
terms of responsibilities, and they must be providing transparent and clear justifications for the 
fines, especially if some of them were for delays in the declaration of information that is no 
longer important to investor.410  
 
One example would be the delayed Allianz Insurance company announcement after the close 
of trading in 2-1-2014, whereas, Monetary Agency's decision that approved the renewal of the 
permit to practice certain insurance activities was received in 1-1-2014, which means it was 
only a delay of one day.  While the company's share rose a week from the date of approval and 
benefited from speculators, the CAM and the rest of the investor did not know why, which 
means that CAM needs to identify the real offender in hiding information and not rely on the 
dates of the letters. In addition to the frequent and strange errors in the News "quarterly results," 
and without punishing the offender. 411  Corporate commitment to transparency requires a 
																																																								
409 ibid. 
410  Martin J Conyon and Simon I Peck, ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top 
Management Compensation’ (1998) 41 Academy of Management Journal P146. 
411 “The Capital Market Authority announces the issuance of a CMA Board resolution to impose a 
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greater understanding of the CAM and the application of the market regulations, which ensures 
that the one who breaches market regulations will bear the responsibility.412 
 
 It is worth mentioning that, it is important that the disclosure and transparency guidelines 
dictated by the Saudi Capital Market Authority remain sufficient as guidelines for the 
implementation and compliance of listed companies in the Saudi market. Sometimes it is even 
necessary for the Council of the CMA to punish companies who do not comply with one or 
more of the principles of disclosure and are punishing this or that company financial fine and 
defamation.  For example, there tend to be some irregularities in governance conventions. Such 
issues might include conflicts of interest and internal trafficking by members of the board of 
directors. Moreover, some companies are punished by the CMA to the management of firm 
according to breach on more than one principle of disclosure. If a company breaches such a 
principle more than once, they may be having to pay a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 (SAR).413 
They may also be formally charged with defamation. The legal principles inherent to disclosure 
rules require severe punishment in the case of repeated violations, as is mentioned in the Listing 
Rules and corporate governance regulations. This is different for investor, who make 
investment decisions based on a company's financial statements. 414  These statements are 
supposed to exercise absolute integrity and transparency.  
 
3.4.4 Disclosure of Material Information 
	
IOSCO argues that the most significant methods for ensuring investor protection, which are 
considered to be one of the main elements in the development of stock market, is to require the 
full disclosure of information material to inform investors' decisions.415 When talking about 
																																																								
penalty of SR 10,000 (Ten Thousand Saudi Riyals) on Allianz Saudi Fransi Cooperative Insurance 
Company, due to its violation of clause (A) of Article (46) of the Capital Market Law and clause (A) 
of Article (41) of the Listing Rules. The company failed to inform CMA and the public about obtaining 
a permit renewal of SAMA on 01.01.2014 AD, to practice insurance activity in the following sections 
(general insurance, health insurance, protection and savings). It was later announced on 02/ 01/2014 
AD after the market was closed”. See http://cma.gov.sa/en/News/Pages/CMA_N_1490.aspx. 
412 Alkhareef (n 404). 
413 ‘Saudi Stock Market Regulator Fines Seven Companies for Disclosure Violations | The National’ 
(2014) <http://www.thenational.ae/business/markets/saudi-stock-market-regulator-fines-seven-
companies-for-disclosure-violations> accessed 14 April 2017. 
414 H Kent Baker and John A Haslem, ‘Information Needs of Individual Investors’ [2015]P66. 
415 IOSCO Multilateral MOU, IOSCO (May 2002). 
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the CMA, we are talking about a government sector, but it is not traditionally a sector with a 
lot of the monotonous bureaucracy that might be expected in a government sector according to 
traditional thinking. Considering the CMA laws and its regulations , it is important to note that 
relatively the CMA stopped reviewing and developing these regulations, as there were 
criticisms that resulted in the need for short, non-detailed laws. This is acceptable given that 
the Saudi market is an emerging market, and companies listed in the market were not familiar 
with detailed and sophisticated laws. However, the companies have now gained a lot of 
experience, so it is a good time to provide more efficient and sophisticated regulations.416 
 
The shortcut in the regulations led to a lot of uncertainty and a lack of clarity with regard to the 
instructions. It was necessary, as with developed countries, for a draft of the regulations to 
written and published to the public so that it could be discussed and studied by the bulk of 
specialists, including workshops and seminars, to ensure better regulations  . For example, on 
the subject of disclosure, which is a very important and very broad subject, it has been found 
that the most important information on this subject can be found in Chapter VII of  Capital  
Market Law articles 40–48 417 and articles 25–39418 of the Listing Rules, as well as Article 
IX 419 —which became obligatory —from the list of Saudi corporate governance. While 
disclosure and transparency were detailed in the rules, this does not mean that all obligations, 
with respect to this section, exist in this legislation. For example, the laws and regulations of 
the British market authority (the UK Listing Authority or UKLA) can be found in seven 
chapters (129 pages).420 This is undoubtedly not an accurate benchmark for comparison, but it 
does show the extent of the shortcut with respect to the obligations of disclosure in the Saudi 
stock market. 
  
																																																								
416 Carol Ann Frost and others, ‘Stock market Disclosure and Market Development: An Analysis of 50 
International Exchanges’ (2006) 44 Journal of accounting research P437. 
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418 Listing Rules Articles 25–39.  
419Corporate Governance Regulations Article IX. 
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One of the points that needs to be clarified in this section is that article 46421 refers to the 
requirement to disclose when any significant change from the source. This term (which is 
essential) is often repeated in the regulations, and many commitments are developed based on 
it, but this term it is not defined in the first article, which provides the definitions of terms, nor 
in the list of terms issued by the CAM. There is a reference to a similar term in the Listing 
Rules issued by the CMA in article 25.422 It provides only an explanation and an example, and 
it may be appropriate to refer some notes on this important article.423 
 
Among the criticisms of this article; linking these “significant change” of what can happen to 
change the price of shares, although it may occur without an important development. Similarly, 
there may be an important development that does not change the price of securities on the 
market. This is not an accurate criterion, and should perhaps be linked to developments that 
lead to a change in earnings or book value, for example, or other aspects that are more accurate 
and disciplined. 
 
Mentioned in the same article, paragraph (b/4),424 is another criticism, where the regulations 
pointed to one example amid nine examples on how the source must disclose anything as soon 
as it happens. This example refers to ‘any significant change in the source production 
environment or trade, for example the availability of resources and accessibility’. This 
statement is not enough to be clear commitments. For example; in the case of high or low prices 
for products, should this development be entered as a change to the production environment? 
With regard to the practice of companies in the market, this is generally not a commitment. For 
example, some petrochemical companies’ profits rise by close to 100% based on the high prices 
of products, but this development is not disclosed.425 
																																																								
421 "Article 46: Notification Related to Securities (a) An issuer must notify the Authority without delay 
of any significant change in the holding or identity of those persons holding more than 5% of the issuer’s 
shares or convertible debt instruments”. 
422 Article 25 OF Listing Rules. 
423 ibid. 
424 "(b) An issuer must notify the Authority and the public without delay of the following information: 
4) any decision to call, repurchase, draw, redeem or propose to buy any of its securities and the total 
amount and value thereof". 
425 ‘CMA: Listed Company Required to Inform Public About Any Material Developments That Are 
Not Public Knowledge’ (2015) <https://cma.org.sa/En/MediaCenter/pk/Pages/Disclosure-Awareness-
Report-English.aspx> accessed 8 April 2017. 
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Moreover,  paragraph b/7426 in the same article: ‘increase and decrease in the total sales of the 
source, including equal to or more than 10%’. For example, it has been found that banks often 
do not disclose the number of branches that have been opened in the quarter. With these 
branches, it could collectively raise the total sales (or processes with regard to banks) by 10%, 
especially for emerging banks, where opening one branch could change the total sales. Hence, 
there is a question regarding the ambiguity of this paragraph, and it may be insufficient with 
regard to achieving transparency. 
 
There is a single article regarding exemption from the disclosure, which is Article 18 of the 
Listing Rules,427 and it does not mention that if the firm see that the issue of the disclosure will 
lead to damage or misleading, so it is eligible to apply for the exemption.  While the British 
rules that were referred to earlier separated and showed detailed controls for cases where non-
disclosure or delayed disclosure were accepted, and the conditions for doing so, and then 
dispersed between the internal information that accept the delay, which does not accept. 
 
 
3.4.5 Rumours and Duty of Disclosure 
	
Rumours are the scourge of investment within financial market. However, eliminating them is 
highly problematic because for some they constitute a hidden weapon for seeking advantageous 
information. Thus, investor should be protected from rumors that are published in newspapers 
that can misinform their investment decision.428 The Saudi securities market has wrestled with 
rumour difficulties, using disclosure and transparency rules in an attempt to eliminate them. 
The market has had some success by urging the timely publication of information by listed 
companies. However despite this limited success, rumours continue to impact the market for 
small investor.429 
 
 Stock market must be protected from incorrect news or information. The rate at which news 
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428 Fábio Marques da Cruz and others, ‘The Influence of Rumors in the Stock Market: A Case Study 
with Petrobras’ (2013) 25 Transinformação 187. 
429 Mark Schindler, Rumors in Financial Markets: Insights into Behavioral Finance (John Wiley & Sons 
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and information is confirmed or denied, in particular news related to new company inclusion 
or listed companies in the market, can greatly impact market activities. The spread of news 
without Capital Market Authority of Saudi Arabia (CMA) confirmation or denial creates 
uncertainty for investor looking to this kind of information to guide investment decisions.430 
However, there is an important aspect that is not touched on in stock market regulations, which 
is how to deal with rumours that circulate in the market. This is detailed clearly in the British 
legislation, and in this case it mentioned the duty of exporters.431 
 
On 31 March, 2016, the CMA published amendments to part 8, article 40, paragraph (e) of the 
CMA Listing Rules stating that "an issuer must determine the need to publish an announcement 
to the public in response to rumours related to any material development, and the CAM may 
require such publication to be made by the issuer as it sees appropriate.” CMA listed companies 
must therefore carefully adhere to these new instructions relating to news announcements and 
substantive events that have occurred or are expected to occur, including the publication on the 
Saudi stock market site https://www.tadawul.com.sa. Based on the above, listed companies are 
obliged to disclose and to respond to rumours regarding any material developments.  
 
Investor behavior is very important in the Saudi stock market. The credibility of the source of 
market information obtained by investor relating to existing companies or companies under 
establishment must be determined because of the significant impact it can have on investor. 
Within the market there are investor and rumour mongers looking to use information at the 
expense of small investor. The role of the CMA within the market is to provide important 
information about listed company shares and disseminate information to investor through its 
Web site and oblige companies published in the daily newspapers. However, some investor 
instead bases their investment decisions on the comments and views of non-authorized persons. 
This can not only hurt their investments, but also can detrimentally affect the market by 
generating random, unnecessary increases or drops in share prices.432 
 
																																																								
430 John M Sheffey, ‘Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond to Rumors and Other 
Publicity: Reexamination of a Continuing Problem’ (1981) 57 Notre Dame Law P755. 
431 Cruz and others (n 424). 
432 Under DTR 2.7 the issuer has an obligation to take right action if there is press speculation and 
rumours. 
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3.4.6 Disclosure of Directors' Remuneration 
	
 The controversial issue of board of directors' remuneration remains a thorny issue, and is 
linked to the more complex problem of conflicts of interests.433 It is the job of members of 
boards of directors to make decisions and plan strategy for the deployment of company 
resources in order to achieve the company's stated goals and objectives regardless of their own 
personal interests. Among the most important of these objectives is the goal of generating 
profits commensurate with the volume of investment.434 
 
However, it can be difficult to assure that board members are willing to subjugate their own 
interests to those of shareholders, a situation relevant to some market failures that have 
followed major financial collapses. It can be problematic to guarantee that a group of self-
interested individuals will make decisions for the benefit of a large number of unknown 
investor.435 It is a global phenomenon that daily changes to stock ownership positions can 
compromise the moral and ethical conduct of some who sit on boards of directors. The 
possibility exists that boards of directors’ members may take steps to amplify personal benefits 
by inflating bonuses. Investor must therefore be protected against any use of coding systems 
that obfuscates director remuneration methods. Remuneration must  be clearly identified 
through transparent disclosure.436 
 
 The Saudi Companies Law has not ignored this important issue since its release nearly 50 
years ago. The method for determining directors' remuneration is listed in article 74, stating 
that the directors’ remuneration must not exceed 10% of the net profits of the issuer after 
deduction of expenses, depreciations, and such reserves as are determined by the general 
meeting or by the issuer’s by laws, and after distribution of a dividend of not less than 5% of 
the issuer’s capital to the shareholders.437 
 
Despite article 74, data on bonuses to Saudi companies’ board members shows that 17 
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companies listed on the Saudi market (out of a total of 169 companies as of 1 January, 2015) 
did not comply with the provisions of article 74. Board member remuneration for these 
organizations included annual bonuses for board members despite some losses generated in 
their previous year’s work. For example, some companies, such as Al-Ahsa Development, 
recommended a bonus in excess of 10% of the company’s net profit despite the fact that the 
company’s board report confirms the policy of bonuses not to exceed 10%. Add to that the fact 
that none of the companies covered by the list distributed any cash dividends to investor even 
though cash dividends are a required prerequisite to board member bonuses.438 
 
In Article 74 of the of Saudi Companies Law, the legislature determined that directors' 
remuneration is to be establishment as part of contract negotiations between the company and 
the director. The only requirement imposed by the Saudi Companies Law is that remuneration 
not exceed 10% of the net profits of the issuer after deduction of expenses, depreciations, and 
such reserves as are determined by the general meeting or by the issuer’s bylaws, and after 
distribution of a dividend of not less than 5% of the issuer’s capital to the shareholders.439 
 
 However, within the new Companies Act, modifications were added with respect to board of 
directors’ remuneration. Controls have been added specifying that remuneration must be fair 
and proportionate to the terms of reference of a member of the board of directors, the business 
responsibilities performed, and to the targets set by the board of directors for the fiscal year. 
Furthermore, a member of the board of directors may receive remuneration for membership in 
the general assembly’s Audit Committee, or for any additional operational, technical, 
administrative or advisory positions assigned by the company.440 
 
 It is important to note that the disclosure of remuneration is not as important as the way in 
which it is identified, and here the legislative system intersects with the principles of corporate 
governance and the market system. All of these principles focus on the importance of the 
structure of boards of director’s bonus issuance and disclosure in order to maintain a healthy 
economic and investment environment. 
 
																																																								
438  ‘Directors’ Remuneration’, Argaam (2010) <http://gulf.argaam.com/article/articledetail/149298> 
accessed 2 April 2015. 
439 Article 74 of the of Saudi Companies Law. 
440 ‘directors’ remuneration’ (n 434). 
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3.4.7 Should Risks Be Disclosed? 
	
Stock market are characterized by the relationship between risk and expected profits. However, 
if a certain market is described as being high risk, it does not mean that the risks are unknown 
or cannot be predicted ex anti. Business risks can be followed like a recipe, and skilled market 
analysts know they can be predicted well in advance.441 Understanding the market equation 
allows professional managers to maintain investors’ property and predict risk before it 
manifests. Disclosure is therefore crucial to facilitate communication between companies and 
current and future shareholders. Disclosure makes use of relevant studies and legislation, and 
develops transparency related to company risks.442 
 
The term risk means the potential for a lack of clarity or potential uncertainty related to the 
likelihood of expected future market gain or loss. All companies are subject to risks, but the 
identification and classification of the importance of risk varies from one company to another, 
according to the company’s risk management.443 Studying and disclosing company risk is 
important to help the company chart an appropriate course, and to psychologically prepare 
investor to accept risk while providing reassurance of the company's ability to cope and resolve 
risk related matters. This will give the company internal stability and confidence in its ability 
to cope with potential risks without a sudden shock such as a collapse of the company's share 
price in the market.444 
 
Some studies conclude that risk disclosure weakness is one of the most prominent445 problems 
faced by companies today. It is a failure that can undermine overall investor confidence in the 
market potentially provoking a larger financial crises such as in 2008.446 The question is 
whether local investor, aware of the potential future risks to the company, for example events 
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faced by investor in the integrated telecommunications market, will nevertheless choose to 
invest in these companies? The answer will certainly be impacted by the behaviour of investor 
around the world in reaction to certain studies showing how increased levels of risk disclosure 
impact the decisions of institutional investor.447 
 
In the United Kingdom, the government is offering a regulations that will oblige all listed 
companies to issue an Operating and Financial Review "future strategies, resources, risks and 
uncertainties, including policies in relation to employee and the environment".448 
 
 From the above it can conclude that the importance of disclosure of the risks. In Part IV and 
under Article X of the list of corporate governance paragraph 3 / b "Ensuring the 
implementation of control procedures appropriate for risk management by forecasting the risks 
that the company could encounter and disclosing them with transparency".449 
 
It remains to say that the risk disclosure of Saudi listed firms does not create adequate 
information among investor who may face potential risks. The current level of disclosure does 
not adequately inform small investor of potential future risk, thereby limiting information 
regarding the desirability of available investment opportunities. Risk is a new topic on the 
Saudi market, therefore regulatory and educational authorities, as well as those who engage in 
related occupations, must give it more attention. 
 
3.4.8 Do Existing Penalties Ensure Proper Implementation of Disclosure 
Rules? 
 
If market regulators expect major market players such as investment banks, auditors, 
underwriters, and issuers to supply required information, a system of credible punishments 
must be in place to offset any perceived advantages market players may see in withholding that 
information. 
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 Referring to the market’s need for credible and efficient enforcement mechanisms, Alan 
Cameron, former Chair of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, was quoted 
as saying that “we do need to understand its full ramifications, namely that the credible threat 
of enforcement is needed to ensure that such a system works – and that is the hard part.”450   In 
order for a market to achieve transparency and offer real fairness to its participants, two key 
elements must be present: regulations requiring issuers to disclose important information and 
a reliable enforcement mechanism. Information disclosure is crucial to offset existing market 
information asymmetry.451  While disclosure rules do exist within the Saudi market facilitating 
a more even playing field for Saudi investor, the system is not complete.  
In terms of enforcement,452 Recital 16 of the IAS regulations provides:   
“A proper and rigorous enforcement regime is key to underpinning investors’ confidence in 
financial markets. Member States, by virtue of article 10 of the Treaty on European Union, are 
required to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with international accounting 
standards. The Commission intends to liaise with Member States, notably through the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), to develop a common approach of 
enforcement.”  
There are sanctions for breach of Listing Rules, administrative actions are usually enforced 
against the listed company for breach of listed rules, including suspension, cancellation.  First 
of all, Cancellation means de-listing a company from the stock market.  Under the Saudi 
regulations, the Saudi Authority has the power, at any time to cancel the listing of a company 
as it believes appropriate, as set out in one of the overall provisions to protect investor. 
According to LR 5.2.1 R453 the FCA has a power to cancel any companies from listing.     
Secondly, one of the administrative sanctions is suspension which means temporarily stopping 
a company’s shares from trading in the stock market. Saudi Listing Rules Article 35 gives the 
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Authority the power to choice between cancellation and suspension in the same circumstances 
as it deems appropriate. The same thing in the UK, according to LR 5.1.1 R.454 
  
However, Saudi regulators are empowered to issue subpoenas and inspect premises - the kind 
of investigative powers crucial for credible enforcement. Nevertheless, the authority is 
incomplete: only brokerage firms and listed companies may be inspected whereas the right to 
such inspection should be universal.  
 
 Reliable enforcement penalties are another key ingredient to successful enforcement. Penalties 
must be strong and swift enough to create a real deterrent. In the Saudi market, regulators have 
a range of penalties available from trivial monetary penalties and warnings to suspension. In 
Article 56 of the Capital Law which provides for the responsibility of continuing obligations 
and civil liability, but does not include a criminal penalty.455 In order to give real teeth to the 
country’s regulatory scheme, consideration should be given to adding criminal penalties to the 
existing civil penalties. It could be argued that Saudi Arabia would benefit from following the 
example of the United Kingdom. In the UK, under FSMA 2000 s397, false disclosure is 
considered to be a criminal offence if it makes a false impression in the market, by for example, 
misleading statements. This in turn carries a punishment of up to seven years’ imprisonment 
or an unlimited fine. A good example is the case in 2005 of R v Bailey and Rigby where the 
chief executive and the chief financial officers were convicted of misleading statements. They 
were sentenced to, respectively, nine months and eighteen months, in prison.456 
 
To carry this out, penalties should target listed company directors personally, rather than being 
limited to the company itself. Such a position is justified in light of the fact that directors are 
elected by investor and given the responsibility of managing and developing the company 
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through an approach carried out within the rules of the market. Any breach of these rules is a 
violation of the director’s fiduciary responsibilities. 457 
 
Within the current Saudi system investor are empowered to sue directors for damages if the 
director breaks the rules. However, this option should be extended to regulators for three 
important reasons. To begin with, because Saudi market investor have shown very limited 
activism toward enforcing director malfeasance, expanding the power to regulators could be a 
powerful strategy to tighten compliance. Secondly, damage created by improper director 
activity is not limited to investor. It additionally wreaks havoc on the market directly by 
undermining investor confidence. Because the threat reaches beyond the investor level, it is 
reasonable to allow the regulator, as representative of the market, to hold the power to sue. 
Finally, giving regulators the power to impose personal penalties will create a strong deterrence 
because directors will feel more reluctant to undertake improper actions when they could face 
the loss of personal assets.458 
 
Civil liability determines the interactions between individuals or organisations. In civil 
liability, certain laws set out rules which must be followed – for example, who will supply the 
evidence. The claimant has a right to pursue a private action in the civil court against any 
persons who breached the disclosure rules, and also to demand compensation for any losses 
they have incurred. It is also possible for the authorities to act for an individual or a company 
to secure public enforcement. Civil sanctions involve financial penalties.459 
 
3.5 The Stock Market Interim Reports 
	
Saudi Arabia highlighted the importance of developing the capital market accounting 
information and publishing it periodically for investor, and therefore it needed investor 
accounting information to allow appropriate investment decisions. 460   Since the annual 
financial reports cover a relatively long period, called the adoption of one of the ways 
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contemporary high-impact, and tangible to help investor rationalize their decisions and clarify 
their vision of the future. Namely, initial reports—of statements issued by companies for 
periods of less than a full financial year, often for a period of three months (quarterly)—address 
weaknesses in the annual financial reports as a source of information and reflect the historical 
events of the past year.461 
 
Therefore, the CMA obliges companies to publish this information and disclose it at certain 
times of the year—as initial quarterly financial reports—because of its impact on the market 
value of the shares. Based on this study that focused on the effect of knowing the announcement 
of quarterly earnings on stock returns in the Saudi stock market. The study used the event study 
method to analyse the impact of quarterly dividends on the rate of return on the stock. The 
market model was used to calculate the expected return and the earnings per share at 
equilibrium, and it compared the actual returns weekly to study the market reaction to the 
announcement of quarterly earnings. The results of the study indicated that the Saudi stock 
market was efficient overall, with strong similarities in the period between the beginning of 
1989 and mid-1992. She pointed to the possible existence of factors that affected the speed-
adjusted stock returns as a result of the announcement of new information, including the 
general economic situation and the volume of speculation in the market in that period.462  
 
 One of the main characteristics of the initial financial reports is that they provide useful 
information for allowing investor to make appropriate decisions at the appropriate time. They 
provide accounting information to investor at a time when they are in dire need, before they 
lose their ability to influence decisions.463 
 
3.5.1 Importance of Interim Financial Reports 
	
Information is considered the main pillar in the decision-making process in the field of 
securities investment. The investor, the issuer of the securities, and the community benefit from 
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the availability of accounting information, and the availability of information on the company’s 
broadcasts reassurance to the investor, who is paid to direct investments towards optimal 
investments. This helps the company to collect the necessary funds, and this effectiveness leads 
to economic growth in the community. 464 
 
The availability of information leads, on a regular basis in the stock market and to a reasonable 
degree of confidence, to justice being ensured among investor. This reduces the chances of 
trading based on inside information, preventing investor with inside information to make 
profits at the expense of the rest of the investor, On the other hand, the provision of information 
at frequent intervals helps investor to reduce the degree of uncertainty when predicting earnings 
and earnings per share.465 
 
Previously, it has been mentioned in talking about the concept of the efficient market that in 
the stock market, which reflects the price of all available information about the company, the 
initial financial reports help to achieve greater efficiency in the capital markets, since the 
availability of more financial reporting means that stock prices reflect the latest information on 
each company, which leads to more efficient pricing of securities. 466 
 
 Finally, it can be say that the purpose of the initial financial reports is to improve the timeliness 
of information, which means the provision of information to decision makers when they need 
it. The failure to provide information in a timely manner led asylum investor to other sources 
of information that were not suitable and appropriate alternatives for making sound investment 
decisions.467 
 
A study highlights the extent of the market response to earnings announcements and the initial 
reports of the 411 most important companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange, over a period 
of three years from 1995–1997. The response was evaluated using the reactions, prices, 
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deviations, size, and intensity of the trading, which depended on the annual accounting 
disclosure and semi-annual report. The study discussed the relationship between stock trading 
and various measures of earnings surprise and properties, during the period of the annual and 
semi-annual disclosure. The organisation of the market system and the disclosure of the 
financial situation in France were also discussed. A conclusion was reached that the governor 
had been arranged according to multiple criteria for projected profit, for which small deviations 
were found, in some cases, prior to the announcement. The study also found a strong negative 
deviation before the announcement of negative rates of return on the stock and identified that 
bad news is more disruptive than good news in the markets.468 
 
3.5.2 The Concept of Interim Financial Reports 
	
Due to changes and rapidly successive events experienced by companies, they were no longer 
satisfied by issuing annual reports, as there was increased need for information covering shorter 
periods than a year; hence, it was significant to derive financial reports that kept investor 
abreast of the results of the company's business and financial position, on an annual or semi-
annual or even quarter. 469  According to International Accounting Standard No. (31), 
preliminary financial reports must contain either a full or abbreviated set of financial statements 
for an initial period, and the initial period of preparation for the financial reports must be shorter 
than the full financial year.470 
 
As defined by the standard, the initial financial reports issued by the Saudi Organization for 
Certified Public Accountants471 were ‘financial statements issued by the facilities for a specific 
period of time that (initial periods) duration of less than full financial year, usually for a period 
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of three months (quarterly)’ (Saudi Commission Accountants Chartered in 1144, the Financial 
Accounting Standards).472 The following can be said about the initial financial report:473 
 
The period of the report should be less than one financial year and may be bi-annually, quarterly 
or monthly, depending on the respective state laws. Moreover, these reports are different from 
reports that are for a special purpose or for internal use, even if they are characterized by the 
patrol. Interim financial reports for both internal and external use. Furthermore, Preliminary 
financial reports are not a substitute for annual financial statements, but rather complement 
them. Also, The purpose of these reports is to provide users with information that will help 
them make better decisions in stock market; and these reports provide accounting data, 
appropriate properties, and the appropriate time to make decisions. 
 
However, with recent technological developments in the world of business, the need for the 
periodic disclosure of business results and the financial condition of the facilities is necessary 
to provide information to users in a timely manner, and with regard to the timing of the initial 
reports, two questions should be asked: 
 
 1) What is the time period that must be considered for preparing the interim financial reports 
(semi-annual, quarterly, monthly, etc.)? 2) How long after the end of the period should ‘interim 
financial reports’ be published?  It is common for the initial reports to prepared semi-annually 
or quarterly; some countries, such as the US and Canada, adopted initial reports on a quarterly 
basis, while other countries, such as Britain and France, adopted a semi-annual basis. 474 
 
Those that support the preparation of semi-annual reports over quarterly reports believe that 
the quarterly reporting is not reliable at predicting annual financial results as a result of seasonal 
factors. For example, a company may announce huge profits in one of the quarterly reports, 
while the same company will announce losses in the annual report. In addition, there are many 
problems with the allocation of costs in the initial reports, but these problems can be mitigated 
in the semi-annual reports, while being exacerbated in the quarterly reports. On the other hand, 
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favourable opinions of the quarterly reports are based on the benefits to investor, as the access 
to information at the appropriate time is greater than any potential problems from the quarterly 
reports. Furthermore, the problems with cost allocation in the initial reporting can be alleviated 
by setting the initial reports in accordance with the principle of complementarity.475 
 
Researcher supports quarterly reports, as the important thing for investor is the availability of 
reliable and timely information for decision-making, even if it is less accurate. As a study was 
conducted by Ismail and Chandler, the study examined the timing of the initial financial reports 
issued by companies listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock market and focused on determining the 
relationship between the timing and characteristics of the firm, such as size, profitability, 
growth, and capital structure. The study analysed 117 quarterly reports for the period ending 
September 31- 2001, except for one company that delayed issuing a quarterly annual report for 
more than two months, i.e., the maximum period. The study provided evidence for an important 
link between the timing of the reports and the four characteristics of the companies.476  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
	
 This chapter has dealt with the protection of investor from the perspective of the disclosure 
regime under the current regulations of disclosure in Saudi Arabia. As was referred to 
previously, a stock market with meaningful disclosure rules and the readiness to enforce them 
is one of the key elements that ensures the protection of investor.   
 
 The importance of disclosure appears, for the investor and the market, to be stimulated through 
an interest in securities, on the basis of the information published through the financial 
statements and reports prepared by the company. This ensures that investor build realistic 
expectations for revenue that could be generated by these securities. It is these key 
considerations that help investor make appropriate investment decisions after developing a 
sound footing away from any rumors and speculation. Therefore, the disclosure provides a 
level of protection for investor, and, in addition, helps to improve the company's image, which 
eventually lead to the protection of investor.   
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From the results of this chapter, it can be seen that the disclosure of information about the 
future of the company and its activities has a role in promoting confidence in the financial 
reports of listed companies in the Saudi stock market which will reflect the confidence of 
investor. The chapter also details the importance of risk disclosure to prevent the damage of 
rumors as well as the importance of the disclosure of material information and remuneration 
of the board of directors. Rumours can be considered harmful to the integrity of any stock 
market, and therefore, using disclosure rules can attempt to eliminate the dissemination of 
rumours and false or misleading news. To enhance disclosure in the stock market is to ensure 
the accuracy of the information contained in financial statements, and therefore it should 
enforce regulations that obliges members of the board of directors to take responsibility for any 
errors, fraud, or manipulation. The disclosure of these elements creates a positive investment 
atmosphere that is free of fraud and details any conflicts of interest between managers and 
investor. It also prevents illegal speculation, which, in turn, helps the development of, and 
enhances confidence of investor in the stock market. 
 
However, there have been criticisms as to how a potential shortcut in the regulations has led to 
considerable uncertainty and a lack of clarity with regard to the instruction. This includes the 
regulations, and how to deal with the rumours that inevitably trade in the market and articles 
regarding disclosure of material information. This shows the extent of the shortcut that has 
been taken in respect to the obligations of disclosure in the Saudi stock market regulations. It 
is something that needs to be reviewed, and detailed regulations developed as a consequence, 
in order to assist the investor. 
 
It has been discussed that the market’s need for reliable and effective enforcement mechanisms 
and in addition to this it can be seen that credible enforcement penalties are crucial element in 
effective enforcement, and therefore it should be considered whether it would be beneficial to 
add criminal penalties to the existing civil penalties. To be effective, it can be argued that 
penalties should target listed company directors directly, rather than being limited to the 
company itself.  
 
  As previously stated, market efficiency is linked to the availability of information Such 
disclosure leads toward a reduction in asymmetric information, which is one of the main 
sources on which investor, within joint-stock companies, base their investment decisions. It is, 
therefore, important to prepare interim financial reports, to provide a source of access to 
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appropriate information, to enable investor to make the appropriate decisions. It is vital that 
these interim financial reports are then made available to investor as they will contain 
information that could affect stock prices. 
 
As a result of the conclusions drawn from this chapter, the proposal is to reduce the irregular 
period, specified for the publication of the interim financial reports by the CMA, from fifteen 
days from the end of the period to ten days. It is considered that this would improve the 
appropriate time for publishing preliminary information, thereby reducing the potential for any 
leak of information before it is advertised. 
 
The CMA identified a need for seminars and workshops to be arranged to raise awareness of 
the terms ‘investment and financial’ for investor, in order to illustrate the importance of the 
information published in the interim financial reports, prior to making investment decisions. 
There is also a need to conduct further studies on the factors that lead to variation in the market, 
following the announcement of the preliminary financial reports between quarters. It is also 
considered logical to identify the motives for investment in the Saudi stock market in order to 
identify the foundations upon which investor make investment decisions. 
 
This chapter argues that investors' knowledge, and the way in which information is obtained 
and used, are problems in the Saudi Stock Market. It also stresses the importance of investor 
education and the need for stricter disciplinary actions against market manipulators who are 
taking advantage of small investors' lack of experience.  Moreover, it proposes some reforms 
in the legislation, such as stricter disciplinary actions against market abuse, tighter supervision 
and some necessary changes to the disclosure rules. 
 
The researcher also noted that the lack of Arabic studies, dealing with initial financial reporting 
in general, and the lack of studies in Saudi Arabia in particular. Many of the previous studies, 
all of which depended on weekly stock prices, were completed before the application of the 
electronic trading system in 2001. This system contributed to the development of the Saudi 
stock market before the collapses of the market in 2005 and 2006 and the establishment of the 
Saudi Stock market (Tadawul) in 2007. The importance of the current study for Saudi Arabia 
and the environment currently appears on the stock market. After regulatory developments in 
the market, recent fluctuations in stock prices prompted investor to increase interest rates in 
the information contained in financial reports. 
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Chapter 4: Insider Trading in Saudi of Stock 
Market-Challenges and Opportunities 
 
4.1 Introduction  
	
Compared to other illegal actions, insider trading remains, at least among legal academics and 
economists, one of the most controversial economic transactions. A number of practices have 
a harmful effect on investor level of confidence.477 Saudi has not been immune from insider 
trading, as has been indicated in chapter one in crash of the Saudi stock market section. These 
practices fall under the general title of market abuse, which can be divided into two main 
categories: insider trading and market manipulation. The main aim of this chapter is to compare 
the regulations of insider trading in Saudi Arabia with that in the UK. The second category, 
market manipulation, will be explored in the following chapter.  
 
As indicated in the last chapter, due to the increasing importance of information in the financial 
market, investor should be protected by having access to information that enables them to make 
credible investment decisions. Selling or buying shares based on confidential information leads 
to personal financial gain at the expense of people who do not have access to the same 
information. This imbalance creates inequality and undermines investor confidence in the 
integrity of the market. 
 
According to a study  Bhattacharya and Daouk the 103 countries that have stock market reveals 
that insider trading laws exist in 87 of them, but enforcement - as evidenced by prosecutions - 
has taken place in only 38 of them.478 It can be seen that a very similar situation currently exists 
in the Saudi stock market. Saudi Arabia only introduced a framework for dealing with insider 
trading in 2004 and therefore regulations are still in development. 
 
																																																								
477 Emilios E Avgouleas and others, ‘The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis’ [2005] OUP Catalogue. 
478 Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, ‘The World Price of Insider Trading’ (2002) 57 The Journal 
of Finance P75. 
 
 
	 142	
This chapter aims to answer the question as to whether the regulations of insider trading in the 
Saudi stock market protects investor from insider trading. It will do this by critically reviewing 
the existing legal framework in order to assess the effectiveness of current Saudi laws for 
preventing insider trading and mitigating crime, in addition to their level of complexity. In 
addition, this chapter examines the socio- environments of Saudi Arabia to see whether the 
future regulatory efforts that CAM may undertake are likely to succeed from the perspective 
of investor protection.  
 
In order to analyse insider trading regulations in Saudi Arabia three significant matters that 
must be addressed to deal effectively with insider trading, were identified. These are: defining 
the activity, sanctions, and enforcing civil or criminal liability. In order to implement effective 
regulations against insider trading it is essential to define it correctly. The definition of insider 
trading has to cover the following four areas: who is an insider; what is inside information; 
how is inside information transferred; and what action is banned.  
 
4.2 Definition 
	
The term insider trading has been used in different spheres and has been examined from several 
aspects. This section reviews the definitions of insider trading according to economic and legal 
concepts. 
 
4.2.1 The Concept of Insider Trading  
	
Insider trading can be defined as dealing in the securities of a company for the purpose of 
obtaining the benefits of a person possessing information that affects the prices of those 
securities if disclosed. 479  Another researcher says that insider trading happens when an 
individual or entity with prior knowledge of generally unavailable information on securities 
tries to purchase or sell those securities; that information, if given to the public, would 
materially affect the prices of those securities.480 
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4.2.2 The Economic Concept of Insider Trading  
	
During the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain,481 a seller entered into a 
contract to sell tobacco to a buyer at an agreed price. Prior to the completion of the transaction, 
the buyer was warned that the end of the war might affect the price of the tobacco and did not 
with disclose that information to the seller. A debate arose in the Supreme Court, which held 
that the buyer was not obliged to disclose this information to the other party.482  
 
In the same context, the case of Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd483 represents an example of an 
imbalance in the information provided by Lord Atkin: ‘A buys a roadside garage business from 
B, abutting on a public thoroughfare; unknown to A but known to B, it has already been decided 
to construct a bypass road which will divert substantially the whole of the traffic from passing 
A's garage. There is an enforceable contract and A is entitled to recover and retain the purchase 
price. The same would be true if B knew that A was unaware of the intended plan to construct 
a bypass road.484    
 
The cases described above represent the economic dimension of insider trading. They illustrate 
the insufficiency and imbalance of information between parties, whereby a preferred party is 
privy to more information that the other party and is able to earn profit or avoid loss, which is 
contrary to the efficient market hypothesis theory.485 
 
4.2.3 The Legal Concept of Insider Trading 
	
When corporate insiders directors, officers or employees  know in some way that their 
company will be merging with another company and then trade on the Stock market on the 
basis of this information before it is made public, these parties might benefit from buying shares 
at a lower price.486  
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As in the aforementioned case of Laidlaw v Orgun, it is legally and ethically acceptable to buy 
or sell shares based on information collected from the stock market and public shareholding 
companies.487 Trades should be based solely on this financial information.  Problems arise 
when this information comes through confidential sources. These sources gain this information 
due to the virtue of their position or due to their association with others insider, and this violates 
the fairness of the stock market. The knowledge does not come from the individual’s efforts to 
monitor the stock market and analyse public data but from privileged information, creating an 
unfair advantage.488 
 
It does not enter into the concept of inside information with respect to findings based on 
economic and financial research and analysis. Mere rumours are not considered insider 
information, as insider information must include a specific meaning and be based on fact. Even 
exploitative rumours are not considered insider information, even if they later turn out to be 
true, as the issue of the issuance of the information rather than the time of the issuance of that 
information.489  
 
In the case490  of R v De Berenger,491  when Berenger falsely reported Napoleon’s death, 
stockbrokers and the public were forced to buy into the government debt, through which 
Berenger and members of the syndicate gained their advantage.492 Under UK legislation, 
insider trading can be considered on two levels—criminal conduct and civil sanction—which 
the Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA)493 defines as prohibited behavior. So The 
UK vision toward insider trading  is comprises four prohibited forms: dealing (based on inside 
information), encouraging other to do so, procuring, and disclosing the inside information.494 
																																																								
487 Organ (n 478). 
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Therefore, selling or buying shares based on this confidential information leads to personal 
financial gain at the expense of people who do not have access to the same information. This 
imbalance undermines confidence in the stock market, which leads to many people being 
reluctant to invest in stock market. As a result, the market loses value, and economic growth is 
obstructed.  Hence, fear of unlawful interference in the stock market has a significant impact.495  
 
Lawmakers pay attention to the stock market and protect against dangers that could affect the 
national economy. In Britain, the first ban on the exploitation of information occurred in the 
year 1696.496 From this idea, a body of parliament emerged to prosecute individuals guilty of 
trading scams.497 However, these measures were not sufficient, and the British Parliament 
adopted the Companies Act of 1980, which banned the exploitation of insider information,  
This was then replaced by the Company Securities “Insider trading” Act of 1985 498and then, 
																																																								
regulated through Part V of the Companies Act 1980. Furthermore, in 1985, the Companies Act was 
modified by adding insider trading to the Companies Securities (Insider trading) Act 1985. Then, in 
1986, insider trading was amended by financial services.  UK Government gave more authorities to 
enforce the insider trading provisions under the Financial Services Act 1986, sections 173-178. The 
provisions were cancelled under both the Company Securities (Insider trading) Act 1985 and the 
Financial Services Act 1986. 
The self-regulatory regime at the time was also a reason for inefficiency. The powers gave to the UK 
Government by the FS Act 1986 that made little progress.  Despite the fact that insider trading has been 
illegal in the UK since 1980, there were still some challenges to successful prosecution. However, the 
Company Securities (insider trading) Act 1985 banned insider trading, and the offence of insider trading 
is contained in Part V of the CJA 1993. See US Senate and others, ‘Illegal Insider Trading: How 
Widespread is the Problem and is There Adequate Criminal Enforcement’ [2006] Hearings Before the 
Comm on the Judiciary. And see Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (Oxford 
University Press, USA 2014) P73. 
495Iosco, ‘Report of the Emerging Market Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions. Insider Trading How Jurisdictions REGULATE IT’ [2003]. 
496 The Commissioners reported was described as follows: 
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Companies and Corporations, erected for the introducing, or carrying on, of Manufacturers, to the 
private Profit of the first Projectors, that the Privileges granted to them have, commonly, been made no 
other Use of, by the First Procurers and Subscribers, but to sell again, with advantage, to ignorant Men, 
drawn in by the Reputation, falsely raised, and artfully spread, concerning the thriving state of their 
Stock: Thus the first Undertakes, getting quite of the Company, by selling their shares for much more 
than they are really worth...the management of the Trade and Stock comes to fail into unskilful Hands. 
see ‘House of Commons Journal Volume 11: 25 November 1696 | British History Online’ (2015) 
<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol11/pp593-598> accessed 8 April 2017. 
497 Before 1980, the United Kingdom had no obvious law forbids insider trading, as is illustrated in the 
famous case of Percival v Wright. 
498 The rules were as follows: 
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finally, the Criminal Justice Act of 1993.499 
 
The Saudi vision of insider trading violates partial transparency and disclosure of information, 
which creates an unfair advantage. Which Article 50 of the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  
states: “Any person who obtains, through family, business, or contractual relationship, inside 
information (hereinafter an ‘insider’) is prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in the 
Security related to such information, or to disclose such information to another person with the 
expectation that such person will trade in such Security.”500   
 
Accordingly, the regulatory approach in the current legal frameworks of KSA was originally 
adopted “parity-of-information” theory. 501  Accordingly, all investor are prohibited from 
dealing if they have obtained non-public sensitive information. The foundation of the 
prohibition against insider trading in this theory is based on ‘fairness’ and ‘equality of access 
to information’. The philosophical foundation of insider trading law in KSA and UK as has 
been seen is based on what has been called the "market stability theory", which aims to protect 
market integrity and stability. This approach is dissimilar to what can be found in other 
																																																								
Section 1(1) of the Company Securities (Insider trading) Act 1985: 
“Subject to section 3, an individual who is, or at any time in the preceding 6 months has been, knowingly 
connected with a company shall not deal on a recognised Stock market in securities of that company if 
he has information which- 
(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the company 
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected, and in the position by virtue of which he is 
so connected, not to disclose except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that 
position, and (c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities.” 
Section 9 of the Company Securities (Insider trading) Act 1985: 
“For purposes of this Act an individual is connected with a company if, but only (a) he is a director of 
that company or a related company, or 
(b) he occupies a position as an officer (other than a director) or employee of that company or a related 
company or a position involving a professional or business relationship between himself (or his 
employer or a company of which he is a director) and the first company or a related company which in 
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expect a person in his position not to disclose except for the proper performance of his functions.” 
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jurisdictions as that of the U. S. where insider trading is linked with fiduciary duty and which 
based on the misappropriation theory.502 
 
4.3 Should Insider Trading Be Legal? 
	
Current debates focus on whether insider trading should be regulated in the stock market. My 
view, which will be supported throughout the discussion, is that insider trading has a 
deleterious effect on investor level of confidence and integrity of the stock market503. This is 
apparent in the following four pillars that determine how harmful insider trading is to the stock 
market: fairness and the ethics of insider trading, the effect of insider trading on transparency, 
																																																								
502 Marc I Steinberg, ‘Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative 
Analysis’ (2001) 22 U Pa J Int’l Econ L P635. 
503 Contrary to an overwhelming consensus, a considerable number of professional economists and legal 
theorists503, believe that laws making insider trading illegal should be revoked. The key point to this 
argument is that fraud will be discovered earlier. Moreover, one of the main benefits of insider trading 
being legal is that companies will either disclose all relevant information, or will themselves impose 
confidentiality rather than being satisfied with the idea that the rule somehow protects their secrets. 
Some believe that insider trading is a legal form of compensation for company employees, authorizing 
lower salaries to benefit stockholders. This concept is an encouraging innovation, however, some argue 
that promising rewards for developing a strategy or product would cause a rapid increase in the stock. 
See Seyhun, H (2000). Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading. London: MIT Press. PP28-30. 
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information. Insider trading is already, essentially, legal.” See ‘Should Insider Trading Be Legalized? 
October 19 2009 07:35 | Business News | Minyanville’s Wall Street’ (2009) 
<http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/articles/insider-trading-Rajaratnam-
minyanville/10/19/2009/id/24985?page=full> accessed 8 April 2017. Also, Doug Bandow, a senior 
fellow at the Cato Institute, for example, writes: “The objective of insider trading laws is counter-
intuitive: prevent people from using and market from adjusting to the most accurate and timely 
information. The rules target “non-public” information, a legal, not economic concept. As a result, we 
are supposed to make today’s trades based on yesterday’s information. Unfortunately, keeping people 
ignorant is economic folly. We make more bad decisions, and market take longer to adjust” See Ralston, 
‘Whispers Made Me Rich’ (2013). However, Until now, arguments for the revocation of insider trading 
laws have received little serious attention. Some critics argue that insider trading laws create only ‘the 
illusion of fairness’ and that small traders are convinced that they have a fair chance while, in fact, they 
are habitually overpowered by large traders. The debate outlined above elucidates that the 
recommendations regarding the laws of insider trading by academics and researchers differ extensively. 
This can be attributed to 1) differences in the standards used to assess insider trading; and 2) differences 
in whether the implications of the effects of insider trading on the economy are regarded as positive or 
negative. 
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in formativeness and on the efficiency of the market and the protection of investor and 
confidence in the market; and international regulatory standards as justification for regulations. 
Insider trading is considered illegal in most international and national laws so that the average 
investor will not capitulate to unfair advantages.504 
 
Fairness and the ethics of insider trading: One of the most common arguments against insider 
trading is based on ‘fairness’ and ‘equality of access to information’. Some commentators 
believe that insider trading is unfair because it enables certain stock owners to benefit by 
obtaining pertinent information before it can reach other investor, leading to the exploitation 
of inside information in stock market operations.505 As Gregory and Linen argue, the greater 
the transparency, the more investor can enjoy a sense of equality and justice in financial 
markets, and the happier these investor will be to provide capital. Transparency means 
providing information for the future protection of investor and for increasing community 
awareness that the company is able to fulfil its obligations.506 
 
The effect of insider trading on transparency, in formativeness and on the efficiency of the 
market: A significant perspective from which to discuss the subject of insider trading is 
whether it has an impact on the transparency and efficiency of the market. Economists rely on 
theories showing a relationship between insider trading and the transparency and efficiency of 
the market;507 the concept that has been embraced by economists is the relevance of stock 
market information. Stephens and Beck-Dudley introduced an important thesis on the 
relationship between insider trading and the Efficient market theory.508 
 
With the breadth and pace of economic activity, it has become necessary to have strong 
financial markets. The stock market, which represents the most important area of investment 
and allows profiting of both large and small investor, requires the availability of a sufficient 
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amount of information about traded financial securities in order to characterize efficient 
markets, especially since stock price values fluctuate from year to year and from period to 
period, and are often affected by data and information about the market and export company 
conditions, which reflect directly on the prices of traded securities.509 
 
Regardless of its degree of influence in investment decisions, and whether information is public 
or private, information refers to data, news and the numbers of confirmed and unconfirmed 
indications that relate to a particular economic reality group. This information may relate to 
the state and the government in general, a commercial company or the management of public 
or private administrations.510 General information, such as that published in newspapers and 
specialized websites, should be available to all; however, certain private information may be 
unannounced, such as that offered by advisory centres when conducting studies and economic 
research into various fields of investment for a particular investor to enable it to take an 
appropriate decision. Sometimes, confidential information prohibits the dissemination of 
information by third parties except in accordance with official procedures, such as those that 
affect a significant impact on a stock or when the system imposes the obligation to maintain 
price confidentiality.511 
 
The importance of such information is determined by how great a benefit an interested person 
in possession of the information will gain from it, and the value is associated with the extent 
of confidentiality. The value of information decreases as the number of individuals having 
access to it increases. Moreover, this value is linked to how easy or difficult it is for third parties 
to obtain the information, in the sense that funds and effort often must be expended to acquire 
it.  Information plays an important role in stock market transactions, whether they are for or 
speculative investment or not, because it provides an indication of the direction of the market 
and the performance of companies, allowing traders to make informed investment decisions. 
Information is one of the most important indicators of the practical reality of the companies 
listed in the stock market; it directly impacts investment decisions. However, there are several 
types of information, and these types are not all equal in terms of value and importance. It is 
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crucial that the laws and regulations protect confidentiality and maintain conservation of this 
information by imposing penalties on those who disclose it or on those who do not reveal 
information that must be disclosed.512 
 
Therefore, the key ingredient that is lacking in low efficiency market is easy access to 
information about companies and their shares. If there are numerous dealers in a market, stock 
prices are affected and the cost of dealing in the market rises. 513Furthermore, the movement 
of stock prices in the market in the form of random paths does not reflect the information on 
company shares. Not all dealers in a market have the same opportunities to make a profit when 
there is a large class of traders and market makers who have easier access to information.514 
 
Due to the increasing importance of information in the financial market, market security laws 
impose an obligation on issuers to immediately announce information to prevent exploitation 
by insiders in order to ensure equality in access to market information to protect investor. 
Insider information, in essence, is known only to a limited number of people who, by the nature 
of their work in a company have access to relevant information, which puts them in a privileged 
position over other dealers. Such individuals could exploit their position for profit or loss 
prevention, which adversely affects justice and equality in financial market transactions. As a 
result of such exploitation by dealers, several economic crises emerged that shook the global 
financial market. Saudi companies and the capital market system have been keen to impose 
obligations on those who possess such information not to disclose it, or use it for their own 
good or for the benefit of others, before it is announced to the general public, in order to achieve 
justice and equality of access to that information. These regulations include provisions that 
criminalize insider trading behaviour and deter it with sanctions in order to maintain the 
integrity of the market and protect investor.515 
 
Protection of investor and confidence in the market: Another rationale for regulating insider 
trading is that investor should be protected so that market confidence is maintained. The 
integrity of the market is vital to its efficiency. As previously mentioned, investor in the stock 
																																																								
512 Gigler and Hemmer (n 320). 
513 Michael S Rozeff and Mir A Zaman, ‘Market Efficiency and Insider Trading: New Evidence’ [1988] 
Journal of Business P25. 
514 Mensah and Werner (n 462). 
515 Rozeff and Zaman (n 509). 
	 151	
market need access to information that enables the making of sound investment decisions. The 
use of inside information by select investor creates inequality and undermines investor 
confidence in the market and its integrity; leaked internal information and exploitation are the 
main causes of weakness and instability in the market. Therefore, to increase investor 
confidence, improve market liquidity and positively affected the market as a whole, it is 
necessary to consolidate the principles of justice and the right of access to information among 
all dealers without exception.516 
 
Leaking internal information and a lack of transparency are harmful to a large number of 
dealers. This situation requires the creation of clear, strong standards for the maintenance of 
transparency and the prevention of the diversion of information so that justice among investor 
can be realized. Equal access to information for all investor is one of the challenges facing any 
securities market; the inability to protect the confidence of small investor is a fundamental 
reason why some refrain from investing in the stock market, thereby hampering its 
development.517 Loss of confidence in the market has led to investors’ fears of dealing with the 
financial market. Therefore, these negative effects should be eliminated by criminalizing the 
exploitation of inside information and protecting investors’ confidence.518  
 
4.4 Insider Trading in the Saudi Securities Law 
 
Three elements are necessary for insider trading to take place: 1) an insider 2) insider 
information and 3) a transaction based on this information. The most important elements are 
“insider” and “inside information” since the definition of these two terms is the central point 
of the problem of examining the law of insider trading. 
 
4.4.1 Who is an Insider? 
 
In order to offer certainty in the rules regulating insider trading, there has to be a clear definition 
of the elements in the action of “insider trading”.  The insider must be aware that the 
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information he/she obtained is inside information. Moreover, he/she must have obtained from 
insider issuer. The FSMA 2000 defines an insider as follows: 
 
“An ‘insider’ is any person who has inside information:  as a result of their membership of the 
administrative, management or supervisory body of an issuer of qualifying investments; and as 
a result of holding capital of an issuer of prescribed investments; , or as a result of having 
access to the information through their employment, profession or duties; as a result of criminal 
activities; or which they have obtained by other means, eg a tip-off from a friend, and which 
they know, or could be reasonably expected to know, is inside information.”  Moreover, Article 
50 of the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  defined insider: “Any person who obtains, through 
family...)519 
 
According to Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  and CJA 1993, insiders can be divided into the 
following two categories: Primary Insiders, this category includes the president of the 
company, the debtor public officials, members of the public administration, the managing 
director, and members of the supervisory board, as well as the major contributors within some 
systems. 520  They are supposed to flag special company information because they have 
decision-making authority by virtue of their position in the company.521  
 
Secondary Insiders, according the UK and KSA regulations secondary insiders who are those 
persons who have received or obtained information directly or indirectly from a person who is 
an insider. However, under the CJA 1993 and the ISA 2007 there is no obligation of a 
relationship between the tippee and the inside source. On other hand there, is a requirement of 
knowledge of the source of information. This requirement will limit the scope of insiders, 
which let to be almost impossible to prove. 
 
This category includes all the company's employees from non-range managers, such as the 
secretary general manager or the secretary’s chief financial officer,522 and those who are not 
related to the functional work of the company, but the nature of their professions and their work 
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allows them to know this confidential information, such as the legal advisor, accountant, and 
financial analyst.523  
 
As has already been noted, financial literature used to divide insiders into primary and 
secondary insiders. Primary insiders were, for example, members of the board of directors, 
managers and in-house lawyers and accountants. These individuals were in positions which 
made it possible for them to gain access to information, either through their management or 
supervisory roles.  Secondary insiders received their information from primary insiders. This 
could come either directly or indirectly, but however the information was transmitted, 
secondary insiders were clearly aware of its importance. People who could fall into this 
category of secondary insider included anyone who worked within an organization, but for an 
external agency, namely external lawyers and accountants.524 
 
A number of authorities argue that this is an arbitrary and irrelevant distinction. They maintain 
that dividing insiders into two types adds an unwelcome complication for prosecutors and 
regulators, who are obliged to demonstrate not merely that an individual had inside information 
about a specific security, but also show precisely how they came to get this information.  In 
addition, critics believe that this categorization does not reflect the reality of insider trading; 
for example, it is not common for insider dealers to deal themselves.  Since insider trading 
invariably includes both a primary insider and a secondary accomplice, or tippee, it is pointless 
attempting to allocate guilt and roles between these individuals. Both are involved; both are 
culpable. Contemporary legislation does not distinguish between primary and secondary 
insiders.525  In the UK, for example, Section 57 of the 1993 Criminal Justice Act (CJA) defines 
an insider as anyone who has inside information (and knows that it is inside information), 
gained from an inside source (and knows that it has come from an inside source). 
 
4.4.2 Inside Information  
	
Here, the definition of insider information is discussed, as well as the four criteria that 
determine whether insider information will have a significant effect on the security in respect 
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to market price.   
 
4.4.2.1 Definition of Insider Information  
	
Information plays a fundamental role in stock market, highlighting the importance of delivering 
investor with as much significant information as possible. Because of the importance of 
information in the stock market, securities regulations require issuers to immediately announce 
“public information” to prevent exploitation (insider information) and ensure fairness in market 
information access, protecting both investor and the market. It is therefore necessary to classify 
between public information and insider information, and it is both rational and legitimate for 
investor to use public information.526 
 
In contrast, insider information is the fundamental problem in the regulations of insider trading. 
Therefore, a clear definition of insider information is needed to draw the line between public 
and insider information. 527   In order to clearly distinguish between public and insider 
information, legislators have looked abroad for determinative insider information criteria. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Kindom (UK) have adopted a number of 
criteria regarding the definition of insider information, but the four most popular will be 
discussed in the next section. It is worth noting that most countries follow the same standard 
regarding the categorisation of information. Thus, information is insider information if each of 
the criteria in the definition is met. 
 
In the UK, there are two definitions of inside information under Section 56 of the CJA 1993411 
and Section 118(C) of the FSMA 2000. Article 56 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 states 
insider information “relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to 
particular issuers of securities and not to securities generally or to issuers of securities 
generally; is specific or precise; has not been made public; and if it were made public would 
be likely to have a significant effect on the price of any securities.”528  
 
Article 52 of the Companies Act of 1990 states: “An individual who has information as an 
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insider is also guilty of insider trading if he encourages another person to deal in securities that 
are (whether or not that other knows it) price-affected securities in relation to the information, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing would take place in the 
circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or he discloses the information, otherwise than in 
the proper performance of the functions of his employment, office or profession, to another 
person”.529   
 
“The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in question occurs on 
a regulated market, or that the person dealing relies on a professional intermediary or is himself 
acting as a professional intermediary.”530  Article V of the Saudi Market Conduct regulations 
has banned insider trading and prohibits a person from disclosing any inside information to any 
other person he knows or ought to have known will possibly trade financial securities with the 
relevant inside information. It also requires the disclosure of any inside information obtained 
from a person who is known to, or ought to have been known to, be possibly trading on 
financial securities with relevant inside information. 531 
 
Article IV of the Saudi Market Conduct regulations defined inside information as information 
specifically related to financial papers that have not been advertised to the general public, was 
information not available to them in any other form, and which the average person would 
understand that if the nature and content of that declaration were made public it would affect 
the price of the securities and their value.532  
 
4.4.2.2 The Four Criteria of Insider Information  
	
The insider information definition includes four criteria. First, the information must be non-
disclosed information. Second, the information must be correct. Third, the information will 
affect the price. And fourth, the information is related to the issuer of those shares.533 
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4.4.2.2.1 Non-Disclosed Information  
	
Insider information must be undeclared, confidential. If the stock information is unknown to 
the public, and the insider or other, either by virtue of kinship or friendship, exploit this 
information when buying or selling shares of the company, then he will bear the responsibility, 
534 According to  Article 50 of the Saudi capital Market Law (2003) . 535 
 
The Saudi Securities Law did not specify what information the public can act on via 
instructions, disclosures of exporting companies, accounting standards, and auditing standards. 
It could be say that an individual does not bear responsibility for dealing in stock market with 
information if:  
1. Such relevant information and data was published once in the local daily newspaper at least in the 
Arabic language or came from a press statement published in at least one daily newspaper. 2. If the 
person submitted the information to the Capital Market Authority, and the information was part of the 
report issued by the board of directors or had been informed by the Capital Market Authority. 3. If the 
initial results were published within the company's business after the auditor conducted its initial 
review process. 4. If the information was received within the annual report, or a half or quarter report, 
prepared by the board of directors and provided to the Capital Market Authority.536  
 
As a general rule, confidential information includes the data, documents, and information that 
are traded and examined on the boards of public shareholding companies and in the documents 
of auditors and inspectors.   
 
In the UK there are two definitions of insider information. The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 
1993 uses the term “has not been made public,” while the Financial Services and Market Act 
(FMSA) 2000 uses the term “not generally available.” However, both definitions appear to 
imply the same meaning, that is as long as information is published according to stock market 
regulations, it is regarded as “made public” or “generally available.”  Because the market needs 
time to absorb information, there may be a period during which insiders can take advantage 
before information is officially public. Once disclosure take place, they are then free to openly 
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use the information. Thus it is important to define precisely when information has been made 
public. 537   According to the wording of the CJA 1993 and FSMA 2000, information is 
considered public at the time of disclosure. There is no provision for time needed by investor 
to absorb the information, or that the information must be reflected in the market price of 
securities. This gap creates a loophole that unfairly allows insiders to take advantage and 
escape liability. Although admittedly, it would be difficult to pinpoint when the market has 
absorbed the information rendering it public. 
 
British legislators singled out a provision on the condition of public information in Article 58 
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1993. Information is declared public in the following 
circumstances:538   1) It is published in accordance with the rules of a regulated market for the 
purpose of informing investor and their professional advisers. 2) It is contained in records that 
by virtue of any enactment are open to public inspection. 3) It can be readily acquired by those 
likely to deal in any securities to which the information relates, or of an issuer to which the 
information relates, or it is derived from information which has been made public.  
 
Article 58 of the British Criminal Justice Act of 1993 explicitly states that these cases were not 
limited to these examples and stipulates that information is publicly declared even if:539 1. It 
can be acquired only by persons exercising diligence or expertise. 2. It is communicated to a 
section of the public and not to the public at large. 3. It can be acquired only by observation.  
4. It is communicated only on payment of a fee. 5. It is published only outside the United 
Kingdom.  
 
The first provision demonstrates that public information does not mean that it is already known 
to everyone, but it can only apply to persons who are expected to trade stocks that are affected 
by that information.  The second provision demonstrates that information is not kept secret 
even when it is only published to a limited number of people compared with all the traders in 
the market. The information remains within the framework of confidentiality if the company 
has consulted a number of people, both within the company or outside, to determine the purpose 
of this piece of information, where the information has not been released to the general public.  
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The third provision demonstrates that after advertising and publicity, the information is no 
longer confidential.  The fourth provision demonstrates that statistics or data derived from the 
stated information by the financial analysts or economists, although it is undeclared or known 
to a limited number of people, are not considered confidential.540  
 
This raises the question that if the company of the confidential information discloses it to the 
other contracting party, would that make the information declared and, thus, the deal legal? it 
has been believed that the answer to this question lies in the goal envisaged by the lawmakers: 
Saudi and British laws banned the exploitation of information in dealing equity, and the laws 
are aimed at establishing the principle of equality to protect investor541 in the publication of 
that information and to achieve justice in transactions  as the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce wrote "The abuse of informational advantages, which other investor cannot hope 
to overcome through their own efforts, is unfair and inconsistent with the public's legitimate 
expectation of an honest and fair securities market where all participants play by the same 
rules"542.  As it can be argued that the concept of enhancing market efficiency is not the only 
approach for insider trading, there are another approach, which is the 'fairness perspective'.543 
 
However, according to British law, the information is no longer confidential if disclosed to the 
other contracting party, while Saudi law may not count it as public disclosure. Publishing must 
be determined in accordance with the law, not the individual publishing the information.  
 
It is possible that the information remains undisclosed, although published, as long as it did not 
do enough for the investor.544 It is difficult to determine the time between the dissemination of 
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information and the presumption of knowledge of the investor because the situation varies 
depending on the information, markets, times, means of publication, and the extent of the 
company’s penetration in the market. For example, a public shareholding company that has a 
large market share and many investor may benefit within a few hours after information 
becomes public, but the duration will be much longer for those who need the information to 
come from an economic or financial analysis after publication.545  
 
4.4.2.2.2 Precise Information  
	
It is not enough for information to be undeclared; it must also be correct. Rumours are not 
considered insider information because the information must be precise and correct. Article 56 
of the British Criminal Justice Act of 1993 states the internal information must be accurate or 
specific.546  
 
The CJA 1993 uses the two terms "specific" and "precise," while section 118C (5) of the FSMA 
2000 exchanges the terms “specific or precise,” used in the CJA 1993, with the single term 
“precise.” The government minster explained the difference to the House of Commons 
standing committee and why the term “precise” alone would be interpreted as only “narrow, 
exact and definitive”.547 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) also offered a description of 
the meaning of “precise information.”  In the case Arif Mohammed v. FSA, the Financial 
Services and Market Tribunal held that a piece of information is “precise” even in the absence 
of certainty if there is still “relevant.” Therefore there is a clear distinction between mere 
“rumours” and actual “information.”548   
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British courts have considered that rumours relating to a specific company may affect stock 
prices the same way as insider information. For example, “Elaine,” an employee at the 
Antrkintnntal Bank, hears a rumour through her work that the company Panacea is about to 
announce excellent test results for the medical product Wonder Drug. Elaine then purchases 
1,000 shares of the company. As the rumour concerns a specific company and affects the price 
of its shares, a British court has heard the case against Elaine, who has been accused of insider 
trading, However, Elaine was able to prove that the information (the rumour) was scattered 
widely.549  
 
Accordingly, press expectations for higher stock prices are not confidential information that 
can be exploited. Such expectations are personal views based on assumptions, figures on the 
British balance of trade, or industrial output and are not specific information.  The reason for 
the required correctness of the information lies in the lack of responsibility of the person when 
dealing in the shares as a result of a rumour spread that influenced the price. Furthermore, 
lasting price changes result from published, verified information, while rumours soon proven 
false result in only temporary price fluctuations. Market will always be susceptible to rumours 
that temporarily affect prices.550  
 
4.4.2.2.3 Information that Affects the Stock Prices  
	
The information prohibited in the selling of shares must be relevant to the shares of a public 
shareholding company, and it must also have an impact on the prices of these shares in the 
event of publication. Article 50 (A) of the Saudi Capital Market Authority states: “Insider 
information means information obtained by the insider and which is not available to the general 
public, has not been disclosed, and such information is of the type that a normal person would 
realize that in view of the nature and content of this information, its release and availability 
would have a material effect on the price or value of a Security related to such information, 
and the insider knows that such information is not generally available and that, if it were 
available, it would have a material effect on the price or value of such Security.”551  
 
The British Act of 1985 prohibits information “which if it were made public (information) 
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would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security”.552 British 
law has also confirmed this approach in the law of 1993, in which Article 56 explains the 
information is likely to have a significant impact on stock prices. Furthermore, according to 
British law, if the information’s effect on stock prices is not significant or material, the criminal 
charges may be dropped.553  
 
The question arises about the criterion on which the British law stands, on whether it is likely 
to materially affect the dissemination of information on stock prices. The Supreme Court of 
the United States of America in the lawsuit “Basic Inc. v. Levinson” laid out one method for 
answering this question. The court ruled: The effect is essential when there is a strong 
possibility of the average investor that the undisclosed information would change the decision 
taken, both in the sale or purchase. 554 From this perspective, it can be said the information is 
likely to have material impact on stock prices, while British law contends the person must know 
the information will affect prices. The first approach seems to depend upon the average 
investor's decision, while the second depends on each investor’s personal knowledge of the 
nature of the undisclosed information.  
 
There are many types of information that may substantially affect a company’s stock price. For 
example, information regarding the company's annual profits would influence the company’s 
stock prices, as would information that the company will change its investment policy. Other 
pivotal information would include the conclusion of an important contract, hiring new 
management, or a merger with another company to achieve significant profits. In determining 
the extent of the impact of information on stock prices, the standard used is the level of impact 
at the time of the issuance of the purchase order or sales to the broker, not at the time of its 
implementation, determining the impact on the stock price ratio, or the so-called 
“significance,” is difficult and best left to the discretion of the court authority.555  
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4.4.2.2.4 Information Related to Shares or the Issuer of those Shares 
(Companies)  
	
It is not enough for information to be undeclared, to be correct, and to have a substantial impact 
on prices after the announcement, but insider information must also be related to shares or the 
issuer of such equity shares (the company). This information may be either external or 
internal.556 An example of external information would be one company submitting an offer to 
manage or merge with the company issuing the stock. An example of internal information 
would be the announcement of greater profits. Since such information relates to public 
companies, and not a particular company or certain companies, trading shares upon that 
information is not a violation of law. However, that applies only to shares that are traded on a 
regulated market (stock exchanges).557  
 
It is important to note that the person who is an insider by virtue of his position or his job in 
the company with inside information related to shares of the company, and he is trading the 
shares of the company based on private information, he will be conducting prohibited trading 
according to Article 50 of the Saudi capital Market Law (2003) .558  
 
According to the definition of insider trading mentioned earlier, an important question arises 
with respect to the scope of insider information. That is whether it is considered insider 
information if it relates to a "single issuer" or a “group of issuers.” For instance, in the UK, 
information is considered "insider" when it relates to "particular securities or to particular 
issuers of securities and not to securities generally or to issuers generally”.559 However in Saudi 
Arabia, insider information is more narrow, relating only to traded securities. Saudi law 
therefore does not clearly state whether information related to issuers or securities in general 
is considered to be insider.  
 
Also, an important question arises with respect to the scope of insider information. The 
question is whether information can be considered insider information if it relates only to stock 
market listed companies or if it includes companies that have not yet gone public.  The KSA 
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limits insider information to those securities listed in the stock market. However, the 
prohibition against insider information is general to all companies, according to Saudi market 
law.  Nevertheless, the scope within Saudi market law is limited.  
 
It can be seen from this section that there is confusion over what constitutes an insider and 
what is an inside source and the scope of the inside source is limited to four types in Saudi law.  
Therefore, this confusion would be avoided if Saudi law separated the definitions of ‘insider’ 
and ‘inside source’ and had not limited the scope of the inside source. 
 
 For example, in the UK the Criminal Justice Act 1993 section 57 part (2) provides: (2) For the 
purpose…a person has information from an inside source if and only if, (a) he has it through- 
(i) being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities; or (ii) having access to 
the information by virtue of his employment, office or profession; or (b) the direct or indirect 
source of his information is a person within paragraph (a).560 
 
4.4.3 Transactions 
	
Three transaction features should be considered relative to inside information: The first feature 
‘in relation to an investment, means acquiring or disposing of the investment whether as 
principal or agent or directly or indirectly561, and includes agreeing to acquire or dispose of the 
investment, and entering into and bringing to an end a contract creating it’. Otherwise, ‘a person 
deals in securities if he procures, directly or indirectly, an acquisition or disposal of the 
securities by any other person’.562 
 
Second, the crucial time for the commission of an insider trading offence is at the time of the 
selling and buying of the security according to inside information. An insider does not commit 
an offence if he obtains the inside information after the transaction is completed, as it is obvious 
he has not infringed on the provision.563 
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The third feature is what the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993 defines as ‘securities’: shares, 
depositary receipts, warrants, gilts, local authority stocks, and contracts for differences and 
debentures in companies. Also included in this list are derivatives and contractual rights of 
differences.564 
 
 Finally: The UK Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA) section 57(1) defines an insider, section 
57(2) defines an inside source, section 56 defines inside information and section 52 defines 
prohibited activities. It should be noticed that Saudi regulations not define insider trading in 
this way. 
 
4.5 Theoretical Framework for Insider Trading Sanctions 
	
Academics and regulators have advanced a number of theories to justify and present a 
theoretical basis for the imposition of sanctions against insider trading. The following sections 
examine these theories and apply them to Saudi stock market. 
 
4.5.1 Fiduciary Duty 
  
The theory of fiduciary duty is considering one of the oldest theories presented as a foundation 
for the prohibition of insider trading.565 Moreover, in the insider trading framework, there are 
three categories of 'fiduciary' positions: directors, professional advisers and officers. According 
to the general responsibility of fidelity duty, “which the employees owe could be satisfactorily 
broad to create liability for insider trading”.566  
 
Fiduciary Duty theory assumes the existence of a relationship between two parties, with one 
party committed to a special duty towards the other. Parties owing this duty are called 
fiduciaries. The individuals to whom they owe a duty are called principals. They also have a 
duty to avoid any conflicts of interest between themselves and their principals or between their 
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principals and the fiduciaries' other client .567 The focus of commitment in this theory is to the 
honesty of the conditions of the contract and the circumstances surrounding it, and the 
preservation of the other party’s interests, including non-disclosure of information and not 
exploiting the principal’s funds for private benefit. In case of a breach of this duty, the party 
should return the interest that he earned to the principals who committed the duty of the 
fiduciary.568  
 
 
4.5.2 Misrepresentation  
	
 Individuals who hold classified business data are to never pass it on, or to misappropriate it, 
to a third party for special profit or leverage. Such data refers to all business information and 
ranges from company self-generated information to every part within the company. The action 
in committing such an offence is termed the misappropriation theory. It is built upon two key 
premises.569 
 
Firstly, the guilty party who has a fiduciary duty towards the company has to protect the 
classified information. This statutory charge exists because it prevents the negative situation 
from occurring as it means that they are bound by law not to be a detriment to the business 
whom they care for, and would be held legally accountable for breach of their duty. The other 
premise is that companies "own proprietary rights to information” and if this is violated and 
the perpetrator steals classified information i.e. uses it without permission, this is once more 
against the law. The theory also dictates that all third parties cannot use their connection to the 
company as any kind of transaction without the company's consent. There is no significance 
on the existence of any relationship between the dealer and the corporation.570 
 
This theory rules that the company is the injured party because of impairments such as financial 
instability in the market and the integrity of its management when classified information seeps 
out, as well as the business’ credibility taking a hit. The insider are the ones usually blamed 
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too, causing them lack of credence. This explains that according to the misappropriation theory 
the company deserves recompense in damages or repayment of profit loss from this chain of 
events. 
 
The preceding theory’s necessity for the presence of fiduciary or confidence relationship is 
used in places such as the United States's jurisdictions.571 Nevertheless, there is a further 
application put into action by numerous other jurisdictions, including the UK where those 
guilty of trading classified information "by those who have unequal access to the material 
nonpublic information." include “tippees” – those who secondarily trade from the wrongdoers 
holding the information-. This is stated in the “access” doctrine.572 
 
This idea of misrepresentation holds true for the Saudi Arabian ordinance held by sharia and 
Islamic law theory. This is because the penumbra regulations which is situated within the 
“shadow” of the conventional contract regulations includes the Islamic Law of contracts and it 
forbids fraud (tadlees) as well as deceit (taghreer).  These regulations disallow ambiguity 
(gharar) or deliberate attempts at falsification (ghabn or ghubn). For example, Saudi Arabian 
law rules that absence of disclosure can be viewed as taghreer and in such an event, the solution 
is to provide the aggrieved victim with the choice to annul their contract.573 
 
 
4.6 Available Remedies 
	
There are number of remedies are available to combat insider trading, which will be examined 
from a comparative perspective. The two most common sanctions are criminal and civil 
remedies. Moreover, this section will also cover to the concept of civil law and common law 
jurisdictions since the basics of such sanctions vary in both legal systems, for example, 
directors' duties and unjust-enrichment remedies. Criminal sanctions can be located in KSA 
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and UK jurisdictions of insider trading regulations, which include fines and potential 
imprisonment if parties are found guilty of insider trading. 
 
4.6.1 Criminal Sanctions 
	
The regulatory regimes in the KSA and the UK are similar and a comparison between their 
approaches discloses the practicality of combining more than one kind of sanction. The 
classification of an insider trading offence relies on its characteristics, the standard of proof, 
the type and purpose of the sanctions and the prosecution procedures. However, there has been 
considerable disagreement about the regulations of insider trading in the UK, since it was 
regulated by the CJA 1993 (Sections 52-54).574  In addition, based in changes to the extent of 
liability of trading on inside information, the CJA no longer considered the concept of the 
theory of fiduciary duties575 to provide the necessary conditions of a link between the issuer of 
inside information and the individual. 576  It is only a criminal offence, which results in 
unsuccessful prosecution in most cases. Thus, the enforcement records show that the conviction 
rate since 1985 has only been around 50 percent.577 
 
It has been argued that this situation is still problematic. First, because of the term ‘standard of 
proof’ the suspected dealing must be proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, which leads to low 
rate of successful prosecution. Second, insider trading is considered a criminal sanction, which 
is inappropriate because there are only slight differences between the legal and illegal insider 
trading processes. Therefore, regulators are unable to establish legislation to create a definition 
for an offence ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. Furthermore, civil sanctions apply to either 
individuals or markets, whereas, criminal sanctions apply to individuals only.578  
 
Moreover, it has been proposed the adoption of the US approach, which makes it a combination 
of criminal and civil offences, because the burden of proof in a purely circumstantial case is 
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less onerous in the civil context579. Furthermore, civil sanctions apply to either individuals or 
markets, whereas, criminal sanctions apply to individuals only. The reason behind unsuccessful 
prosecution in most cases of insider trading is that prosecution relies on the characteristics of 
the offence, which requires a standard of proof.580 
 
The standard of proof—beyond the shadow of a doubt—has been the main factor in insider 
trading regulations. However, because of the classification of the offences and their penalties, 
some interesting questions have arisen. First, which standard of proof should be applied? 
Second, it is argued whether insider trading should require higher or lighter proof. A lighter 
measure of proof may be incompatible with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); 
however, a heavier measure would limit prosecution for insider trading. Insider trading 
regulations must consider this matter. 
 
In Lord Advocate v Mackie 581 (unreported), Mackie who was hired by a company as an 
analyst was charged for encouraging others to deal based on inside information that Mackie 
had accessed during a briefing conference with the company chairman. However, the 
conviction was withdrawn on appeal because the evidence presented was not beyond a 
reasonable doubt. There was conflicting evidence about what was said at the meeting. The 
chairman reported that he had told Mackie about the company’s profits, but this was not 
corroborated and was not sufficient to prove the case against Mackie. Information on takeover 
offers are required to be announced to the public. ‘However, persuading a jury that they can be 
satisfied to the criminal standard that they are clear beyond a reasonable doubt of such guilty 
knowledge, even on the strongest circumstances evidence, is likely to be extremely difficult’582. 
 
In the UK, the legal community has called for reform to the legislation for insider trading 
offences. Accordingly, in May 1997, Gordon Brown, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
announced the reform of the financial services regulations. To provide new authority to 
eliminate insider trading, the FSAM was given the power to address the loopholes that were 
left by criminal law, including the unlimited imposition of civil penalties and the terms of a 
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lighter burden of proof. However, the debate continued as to whether insider trading under 
FSAM was a civil or criminal offence.583 
 
Since it is usually argued that prevention is better than cure, forbidding insider trading is not 
sufficient in terms of limiting offences thereof. Several approaches, including enhanced 
corporate governance, directors’ duties, and disclosure obligations, can be taken to reduce the 
risk of insider trading, to protect the confidentiality of inside information and improve market 
integrity.  
 
Criminal sanctions can be located in KSA and UK jurisdictions of insider trading regulations, 
which include fines and potential imprisonment if parties are found guilty of insider trading. 
For instance, in KSA anyone who violates any of the provisions of the legislation and 
associated regulations is subject to a fine of 100,000 SR in addition to a fine of not less than 
twice, but not more than five times the profit achieved, or weakness or loss avoided. In the UK, 
the equivalent fine is no more than 5,000 pounds, and/or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding six months if the case has been considered before the Magistrates Court. If the case 
is considered by the Crown Court, there is no limit to the amount of the fine and/or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years.584 The same can be said for the KSA and 
UK laws, as both consider insider trading to be a criminal offense.  
 
In 1986, Lord Justice Roskill's Fraud Trial Committee reported that "... the British public had 
no confidence whatsoever in the ability of the criminal justice system to bring the perpetrators 
of serious fraud effectively and expeditiously to book. " "Lord Justice Roskill and his 
committee added that they considered that, on the basis of the evidence that they had received, 
the public was justified in this view". "The system just did not work".585 
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4.6.2 Civil and Common-Law Sanctions and Remedies 
 
In this section, the common law and civil law view of insider trading by representative the 
common law approach; exposing several civil law aspects of insider trading and the possible 
remedies. 
 
Civil remedies are becoming more popular with regard to insider trading. Academics and 
regulators believe that such measures provide the most successful tools for preventing 
offenders. 586civil sanctions have two main sources: the first arises from the general principles 
of common and civil law, whereas the second involves the use of special legislation. The Saudi 
legislature suggests civil and criminal liabilities for ‘manipulation’, whereas insider trading is 
subject only to criminal sanctions even while both manipulation and insider trading are kind of 
market abuse. 
 
Saudi and UK lawmakers have not regulated for civil remedies arising from dealing in 
prohibited shares of public joint-stock companies. The rules underlying breach of fiduciary 
duty can be applied to the relationship between a company and a member of its board of 
directors. Saudi legislation also chooses not to regulate for a specific civil remedies arising 
from insider trading. It is, therefore, essential to refer to the general rules of civil remedies, 
which may be used to handle insider trading. 
 
There are many theories that can be invoked with regard to civil remedies arising from trade in 
outlawed shares of public joint-stock companies. Banned equity deals involve breach of legal 
statutory duty, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence and/or 
trade secrets. This section will show how these theories relate to different demands. Then it 
will look at, each theory separately to determine its suitability with regard to civil remedies 
arising from prohibited trading. 
 
The first main cause of action is breach of fiduciary duty: In Britain, the president or the 
members of the board of directors of Fiduciary Duty are committed to the company, but they 
are not committed by this duty towards the investor of the company they represent, nor are they 
committed to other companies that trade the company’s shares based on undisclosed 
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information. Therefore, they are not committed to declare undisclosed information to the other 
party.587  As Swinfen-Eady J. held in the case of the Percival v Wright  about the directors’ 
duties regarding the stockholders “The directors of a company are not trustees for individual 
investor and may purchase their shares without disclosing pending negotiations for the sale of 
the company's undertaking”.588 
 
However, this distinction does not apply in Saudi law because the president and members of 
the board of directors of a joint-stock company have responsibility towards the company and 
investor for each violation committed. According to Articles 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, and 77 of the 
Saudi Companies Act, any breach of Fiduciary Duty constitutes a breach of the laws and 
regulations  .589  
 
In Saudi Arabia, the chairman and members of a company’s board of directors must adhere to 
Fiduciary Duty based on the following:  First, the text of the Article 69 of the Saudi Companies 
Act, which prohibits behaviours that would create a conflict of interest.  Second, the text of the 
Article 74 of the Saudi Companies Act, members of the board of directors are not allowed to 
declare any information that discussed in the general assembly meetings, and it is not permitted 
to take advantage of what they know and use it for their own interest. Third, the board of 
directors is like the agent of the company and must represent and defend its interests, and then 
the members are committed (Fiduciary Duty) to do so in a personal capacity.590  
 
Fiduciary Duty theory demonstrates a limited scope, as this duty, particularly in British law, 
does not apply towards investor of the company nor to investor in other companies trading in 
the first company’s stock.591  Fiduciary Duty also does not apply in the relationship between 
the company and the secondary trader, who does not have a relationship with the company, 
and it also does not apply in the relationship between the primary trader and a secondary party 
to the contract that has been buying stock from him or has sold those shares to him. Although 
a member of the board of directors may breach Fiduciary Duty towards the company, the 
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company can get compensation if it proves a financial loss due to this breach.592  
 
The second main cause of action is breach of confidence. The aims of this theory are to avoid 
the disclosure of confidential information or the erroneous exploitation of it without the consent 
of the claimant. In this case, the insider will be guilty of violation of the claimant, according to 
the theory’s full conditions. However, this theory is more extent than the theory of fiduciary 
duty. The theory of breach of confidence requires the application of three conditions: 1) the 
insider information must be confidential; 2) there should be a contracted obligation to maintain 
information confidentiality; and 3) unfair advantage has been used.593  
 
When the obligation of confidentiality emerges, a party is prohibited from using or disclosing 
confidential information to obtain benefit for himself or for another party, or to cause harm 
through possession of that information. This indicates that the terms of realization of the theory 
of disclosure of confidential information or the disclosure of trade secrets are similar in Saudi 
and British laws in which there are information confidentiality requirements. Moreover, the 
laws of both countries state that the disclosure of sensitive information could harm the interests 
of the claimant or a particular party.594 According to Section 63(2) of the CJA 1993 "... makes 
it impossible for a contract tainted by insider trading to be declared void or unenforceable by 
the common law doctrine of illegality."595 
 
From the above, it could be argued that this theory does not include a secondary trader who 
obtained the information but does not have a relationship with company; if a derived company 
relationship exists, there is an obligation to keep the information confidential. However, 
according to the requirements of UK and Saudi laws, this theory applies to both primary and 
secondary insider.  The action of breach of confidence considers only the relationship between 
the trader and the company related to the undisclosed information, which means that this theory 
does not apply to other relationships between the contractor and other traders. Consequently, 
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those already affected by the exploitation of the inside information have no right to claim.596  
 
 
The third main cause of action is breach of statutory duty. There is a civil right of action for 
breaching statutory duty. This duty of statutory assumes the existence of a legal provision that 
prohibits the exploitation of inside information to achieve the interests of the client, or for the 
benefit of others. This prohibition is stated under Article 50 of the Saudi capital Market Law 
(2003) 597 and several provisions in the Market Conduct regulations. Article 52 and Article 53 
of the British Criminal Justice Act of 1993 598banned the following activities: 1. The purchase 
or selling of securities based on inside information, as principal or agent.  2. Encouraging 
another person to deal in securities that are (whether or not that other person knows it) price-
effected securities in relation to the information. 3. The disclosure of insider information to 
someone else for reasons not related to the proper performance of the functions of his 
employment, office, or profession.  
 
This theory does not develop full solutions to the problematic process resulting from the 
dealing of shares based on insider information because most legislation did not organize civil 
liability through private articles, which calls for resorting to some general rules to understand 
the basis of this responsibility.  Several theories have emerged in this regard. For example, in 
the UK regulations, there are civil rights for actions that violate legal duty through a tort action 
according to Chase599 Manhattan Equities Ltd v Goodman600 
 
The right of ‘action damages’ can be set when a person suffers a loss due to the breach of a 
rule by an authorized person. FSAM 2000 S.150 (278) gives normal people the right to recover 
a loss by demonstrating.601  As previously mentioned, in the absence of statutes to rectify a 
breach of legal duty, tort law can remedy certain insider trading situations, such as when a 
fraudulent or negligent announcement has been made that motivates a person to trade in such 
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a way as to inflict a loss upon him. It could be envisioned in such circumstances that it is 
incumbent upon the insider to disclose all related information. However, in cases of failure to 
disclose information or where there is no obligatory disclosure or no duty of supervision to the 
claimant, the insider in such cases does not have legal responsibility.602 
 
However, under sharia law, the mechanisms tend to differ from those available in common law 
systems, the available mechanism is taghreer ("misrepresentation"), Such trading also breaches 
the provisions of Capital Market Law for any person to trade based on inside information. it 
can be argued, therefore, that the Saudi legislature has gone some way to oblige market traders 
to disclose inside information to the other contracting party before a deal; otherwise, the trader 
must refrain from dealing by mechanism by ghabn or ghubn (misrepresentation).603 This refers 
to the relationship between dealers. The relationship between the company and a client is a 
fiduciary duty towards the company, which requires the trader not to exploit the company's 
funds for his personal benefit, and not to give priority to his own interest over the interest of 
the company. 
 
Nevertheless, there is administrative sanction. First of all, administrative sanctions are 
generally the simplest to apply and the slightest severe compared with criminal and civil 
sanctions. Moreover, most of administrative sanctions are nonmonetary. In the Saudi stock 
market, administrative penalties such as warning، compensation of persons who have suffered 
damage as a result of the offense, or compel the offender to pay objectionable gains and other 
administrative penalties.  Such sanctions do not reach the objective of discouraging deterring 
the insider trading, but in the case of brokers. For instance, the broker might lose his license 
which consider extremely serious sanction. Otherwise, the effectiveness of these sanctions anti 
inside traders is nothing. Which It will be discussed in detail in chapter six. 
 
It has been concluded that above civil law and common law remedies are not sufficient to 
deterring others from engaging in such activities, these remedies may be useful to restore what 
the injured party lost. therefore, to regulate insider trading it should be a more reasonable 
objective would also include prevention as well as compensation. 
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4.7 Available Defenses/Exemptions against Insider Trading 
	
Insider trading act can be found to be in violation of insider trading regulations or considered 
legitimate, subject on the circumstances and conditions. A number of situations are considered 
to be exempt from insider trading regulations. These defenses purpose at offering a protection 
against the abuse of prosecuting investor who breach the rules but who have a reasonable 
excuse for doing so. In conclusion, these kinds of defenses aim protection for investor. 
Moreover, the purpose behind such immunities is the that the implementation of these 
regulations depends deeply on the circumstances of these act.  
 
According to the CJA 1993, defences are divided into two categories: 1) general defences, 
which are contained in Section 53, and 2) special defences, as stated in Schedule 1, in which 
the prohibitions against disclosing information, dealing and encouraging dealing do not apply. 
However, the burden of proof is on the defence in each case.604  
 
Defences concerning dealing and encouraging offence: When an individual is dealing in 
securities or encouraging another, he will not be considered guilty of insider trading if he was 
not at that time involved in trading leading to profit because of the fact that the information in 
question was related to price sensitive information with respect to securities.605 Moreover, if 
an individual "At  the time he believed on reasonable grounds that the information had been or 
would be disclosed widely enough to ensure that none of those taking part in the dealing would 
be prejudiced by not having the information" or "that he would have done what he did even if 
he had not had the information". 606 Moreover, “Chinese Walls" are considered a legal defense 
and include situations where an insider can prove that, because of Chinese Walls in the firm, it 
was difficult for him to get the information in demand.607 
 
‘Dealing’ and ‘encouraging’ are the only offences for which the ‘special defences’ stated in 
Schedule 1 can be implemented. However, these defences also protect ‘market information’ 
and ‘market makers’ as they conduct their business. The market information defence is 
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contained in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 of the CJA 1993.608 
 
As mentioned earlier, with civil liability based on a breach of an obligation of contract, or 
illegal act, the burden of proving liability belongs to the plaintiff, who is either the public 
prosecutor, the other contracting party, or the company. In this case, it is necessary to prove 
that the trader used internal company information to buy or sell the stock.609 In the UK, the 
plaintiff must prove that a trader has taken advantage of inside information beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The defendant can deny responsibility for his actions. According to UK legislation, 
where there is no conclusive evidence to deny responsibility, the trader must prove that he used 
inside information to achieve a legitimate purpose.610 
 
Saudi legislation makes allowance for special reasons to avoid responsibility in the case of 
trading based on inside information along the same lines as in the UK legislation, according to 
the provisions of Article (53) of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act, these special reasons include 
the exploitation of information in the deal, and the encouragement of third parties to handle or 
disclose information. Reasons for the denial of responsibility, in accordance with the UK 
legislation, according to the provisions of Article (53), include not expecting to make a profit 
or avoid a loss, and the belief that information was widely available before trading or 
encouraging third parties to trade.611 
 
4.8 Enforcement Mechanisms 
	
In order to ensure safety regulations are effectively imposed and enforced, there are two towers 
of strength which provide the basis to all companies. Firstly, the characteristics and strength of 
the regulator and, secondly, the overall competence of the courts. As a result of the high 
financial cost that private enforcement must tolerate, typically, safety laws bring in a public 
enforcer. For example, in America the SEC. Landis (1938) was the earliest to contend that the 
principle advantage of safety laws is the formation of a public enforcer.612  
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In order to thoroughly gain an awareness of regulators and supervisors, specific topics must be 
addressed. Firstly, the key and primary element of a market supervisor is that it ought to be 
isolated and separate from political persuasions. To evade political influences, it should not 
come under the responsibility of the executive. Secondly, another crucial element of the 
supervisor is its overall control and strength. There are 3 chief powers which are typically 
assumed: the power to regulate, the power to sanction misbehavior and the power to 
investigate.613  
 
Three chief techniques can be adopted to identify insider dealing. These are whistle blowing, 
market surveillance and supervision. In Britain, ‘supervision’ involves members who are 
subject to FSA authority and there is no structured system of supervision conducted. This 
system does not involve unauthorized associates of corporations which cover up transaction 
accounts.614  
 
The singular method for identifying insider trading with this specific system is via internal 
compliance measures in authorized corporations. A second device is market surveillance and 
investigation. Although, frequently, stock market is incredibly private in relation to 
highlighting the nature of their organization’s processes.  In order to identify any strange or 
suspicious transactions within the market in the Saudi, electronic market observation devises 
are utilized. Although, as a result of the purpose of these devices, they are not obtainable to the 
public. Thirdly, whistle blowing is an additional device which is trailed by the FSA to identify 
insider trading. However, it is not as efficient as the SEC as it has the permission to pay 
abundances to all informers – only excluding informers who are purely conducting their job, 
for example obedience officers. This inducement was deliberated in the Criminal Justice Act 
declaration procedure but it was finalized that the inducement was “too American” to be 
seriously utilized.615   
																																																								
613 Wilson Andis, ‘The Administrative Process’ (1938) PP12,14 . 
614 Michael Filby, ‘The Enforcement of Insider trading under the Financial Services and Market Act 
2000’ [2003] P334. 
615 The FSA rule of whistleblowing is "... based on the Public Interest Disclosure Act, PIDA 1998, 
which was passed in order to offer protection for employees who report matters of public interest from 
victimization by their employers. "W6 The FSA encourages whistle-blowers to come forward in the 
following matters: "(a) a criminal offense; (b) a failure to comply with any legal obligation; (c) a 
miscarriage of justice; (d) the putting of health and safety of any individual in danger; (e) damage to 
the environment; (f) deliberate concealment relating to any of the above. 
	 178	
IT surveillance schemes are the principle method for detecting insider trading transactions.  
Saudi market has not implemented whistle blowing as a scheme of enforcement, as the end will 
harmfully affect the effectiveness of enforcement in market. The nature of Saudi market is not 
available. consequently, an appropriate assessment of its effectiveness is not achievable. 
Lastly, what is most crucial is that there is a setting constructed which enables representatives, 
stockholders or depositors to understand that insider trading laws and regulations are strictly 
imposed and will have penalties if not abided by.  
 
4.8.1 Enforcement Process 
	
The appropriate strengths for implementing and inspecting insider trading defilements will be 
addressed and explored in the upcoming paragraphs. The crucial elements for the efficient 
implementation of enforcement methods are the levels of control and given powers to the stock 
market authorities to investigate violations. Insider trading laws and regulations would be 
considerably destabilized with the absence of operational examination powers. In Britain, the 
FSA is allowed huge exploratory power and control in relation to insider trading. They are able 
to investigate and demand data and information from any individual who is associated to or 
connected with the investigation.  
 
The FSA’s singular obligation is that they present the occurrence of “circumstances 
suggesting” that market abuse has been conducted. In comparison to the assessment 
recommended by Parliament which necessitates simply “reasonable grounds to suggest”, this 
test is substantially less authoritative.616 It can request for a permit which enables a constable, 
typically escorted by an FSA officer, to hunt and examine the property. The constable has the 
power to request any individual on the property to clarify documents or data they have 
uncovered. The FSA’s control and power is supported by the regulations that failing to comply, 
interfering or destroying evidence, or providing incorrect data or information is categorized as 
an illegal act and is punished via a fine, a prison sentence or both.617  
 
One feature that arbitration committee in Saudi stock market must, if the dispute contains a 
criminal offence, refer the issue to the public prosecutor (Bureau of Investigation and 
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Prosecution).618  Essentially, this ought to be altered and the physical control and powers must 
be thorough and documented correctly, as, currently, this committee is unable to carry out an 
investigation on the supposed individual’s property.  
 
Finally, The Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  grant CRSD (Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes) powers to investigate and settle complaints and suits. Grant CRSD the 
power to issue subpoenas and necessary decisions to resolve the suit.  Also, The Capital Market 
Law grant CRSD the power to impose sanctions moreover, it has the power to order the 
presentation of evidences and documents, and CRSD the power to issue a decision awarding 
damages. furthermore, Grant CRSD the power to issue a decision awarding damages.619 
 
 4.8.2 Enforcement Obstacles 
There are a series of obstacles and restrictions which can impede on the effectiveness of insider 
trading rules inside Saudi market. Firstly, a key restriction is social. Tipping is classified as a 
social duty and responsibility and insiders are underneath a huge level of social pressure to 
confidentially divulge any delicate private data and evidence. The financial literature does not 
contain many investigations about the impact of beliefs, social rules and values, despite the 
fact that it is logical to deduce that people behave differently in different social environments. 
It is individuals rather than markets who engage in decision-making, resulting in an interplay 
of individual preferences, organisational culture and social rules. 
 
Prior research suggests links between individual religiosity and risk aversion. For ex-ample, 
Miller and Hoffmann  report a negative correlation at an individual level be-tween religiosity 
and attitude towards risk620. Similarly, Osoba  utilises individual panel data to show that risk-
averse individuals attend church more often than risk-seeking individu-als621. Hillary and 
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Hui622  examine whether religion affects corporate behaviour in the US, and subsequently 
found that firms located in counties with a higher level of religiosity display lower degrees of 
risk exposure.623 Organisational investment decisions (e.g. pension plans, general corporate 
decision-making) have been recognised in the wider literature to be influenced by religiosity 
and social rules to a certain extent.  
 
The purpose of the present study is to explore the impact of social environments and religion 
on financial markets, thus producing new insight into this topic. More specifically, the study is 
concerned with the religion of Islam and investigates how ethical norms affect stock markets. 
Individual investment choices are subject to a number of restrictions under Islam, particularly 
interdiction of investment in publicly traded companies associated with, among others, alcohol 
and tobacco production and gaming (‘sin stocks’), as well as in securities that accrue interest. 
Thus, the formulated hypothesis is that the portfolio choice of stocks is impacted in countries 
where individual codes of conduct and social rules are determined to a great extent by 
religion624. 
 
Saudi Arabia is one country where religion – a highly strict form of Islam – holds a dominant 
influence in society, and where the majority of the population (97%) are Muslims. For these 
reasons, Saudi Arabia is the context chosen to examine whether ethical norms affect markets.  
Since the holy cities of Makkah and Medina are located on its territory, Saudi Arabia has a 
pivotal role within the Muslim world, which significantly shapes its identity as a country. 
Islamic financial services have experienced great growth in Saudi Arabia, but the market also 
contains stocks that do not comply with Sharia’a and trading in securities that comply with 
Sharia’a is not a legal obligation. As such, it is up to market players to make portfolio choices 
and market-makers’ ethics determine moral obligations625. 
  
Compared to other stock markets in emerging economies, the Saudi stock market stands out 
due to the manner in which it developed and the specificities of the Saudi economy. In recent 
times, there has been a substantial increase in market capitalisation and trading volume, but 
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most investors are not institutional but individuals. Moreover, only a minor percentage of buy 
and sell transactions are undertaken by nationals of countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) and other Arab residents, while the percentage of transactions by non-Arabs is almost 
null. Consequently, foreign investment is extremely low626. 
 
A short introduction to various aspects of Saudi society is provided in the following part in 
order to demonstrate the major influence of Islam and thus justify the choice of Saudi Arabia 
as the research context627. Politics: Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy ruled by Islamic law 
and with the Qur’an as the constitution, as promulgated by the 1992 Basic Law of Government. 
Many governmental sectors, including the judiciary, education and scientific research, are 
under the control of religious scholars628.  
 
Education: In Saudi Arabia, education is focused primarily on Islamic studies. At every school 
level, the curriculum emphasises the study of Islamic religion and learning how to apply 
Islamic customs in daily life. Furthermore, all students in higher education must take a religion 
course.  Cuisine: Islam also determines what people can and cannot eat; thus, pork is banned, 
while Islamic rules must be followed in the slaughter of other animals. The drinking of alcohol 
is not permitted either. Culture: Social behaviour is also subject to restrictions and there is rigid 
legal and social enforcement of dress code629. 
 
The aspects discussed above make it obvious that Saudi society and social interactions are 
significantly shaped by religion. The social researcher can take advantage of the sectarian 
nature of Saudi society and the latest transformations in the Saudi stock market to explore a 
phenomenon in a near-laboratory experiment.  This gives rise to questions such as whether the 
characteristics of the social environment contribute to stock market volatility and whether it 
has any market effects on the effectiveness of insider trading rules. 
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In fact, there was no significant difference between the peoples of the GCC countries, they 
combine all of these one religion and one language, customs and traditions are similar or 
convergent, also geographically. There is a study supports the point mentioned above, but it is 
concerned with the study of the Kuwaiti market, Emirates and Bahrain “For example, more 
than 65% of traders in the Kuwait Stock Market stated that they believe it is their social 
responsibility to tell friends and relatives of any inside information they possess. The same 
situation can be found in both the Dubai and Abu-Dhabi stock market: in Dubai, 55% of traders 
stated that they believe disclosing information is a social responsibility, and in Abu-Dhabi, 
68% did so. In Bahrain, 60% of traders said that they believed it is their "social responsibility" 
to disclose any inside information.”630The same obstacle can be drawn to more advanced 
countries. For instance, in his course of examining and discussing insider trading laws in the 
United States, the French lawyer Andre Tunc stated that: 
 
"We did not do anything against insider trading until 1967, when we decided to fight it by 
borrowing your classical weapon against improprieties disclosure. We were very clumsy in 
using it, however, and we completely failed... in conformity with our style of legislation, the 
crime was defined and punishment provided in a single sentence of twenty-nine lines -- in 
contrast to the British Companies Act 1980. Obviously, it is impossible to eradicate improper 
insider trading and tipping in a decade in a country where such activities were a tradition on 
the part of the most respectable directors and officers, and where tipping was even a social 
duty, being expected of relatives andfriends "631. 
 
Islamic law explicitly prohibits fasad and fraud. Compliance is ensured not so much by direct 
enforcement of the law, but by social pressure exerted by periodic sermons, reminders and 
admonitions by religious authorities via different media (e.g. television, radio, newspapers)632. 
 
Secondly, an additional restriction is the judge’s method in relation to applying insider-training 
laws and regulations. In financial illegal circumstances or “white collar crimes”, the judge has 
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typically shown a level of compassion for individuals who have been exposed to the severities 
of the standard criminal justice schemes. An insider trader in Britain, commonly known as 
Roger the Dodger, was sentenced to 180 hours of community service following him generating 
a 34-million-pound crash.633 
 
 If this is the circumstance in well-developed countries it is a fortiori, In Saudi, where stock 
market is relatively new to the area, the methods and situations are significantly worse than the 
systems which have been outlined in well-developed countries such as Britain. When 
discussing crime in Saudi, it is important to acknowledge that the idea of a crime standing with 
the absence of an unswerving victim is still considerably under developed. This is particularly 
relevant for crimes relating to finance as they are often victimless and, consequently, the judges 
are unwilling to enforce custodial sentences.  
 
The notion that the market is a secure environment is considerably destabilized as a result of 
these areas being majorly under developed. Lastly, a major restriction is that the judges, 
typically, are missing a general awareness and education on these crimes. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that this is not relevant only to Saudi, the UK has also experienced 
similar restrictions. For example, in Britain, the Lord Chancellor is given the power to employ 
the personnel of the Tribunal, by Schedule 13 to FSMA 2000. However, it is compulsory that 
these employees are lawyers with the minimum of seven years of general qualification. 
 
Additionally, a minimum of ten years of general qualifications or equivalent must be held by 
the President and the Deputy of the Tribunal. Furthermore, the Lord Chancellor must “… also 
appoint members of a lay panel, who must be people who appear to him to be qualified by 
experience or otherwise to deal with matters of the kind that may be referred to the 
tribunal…”.634 These necessities which guarantee efficient and successful implementation are 
not accessible to Saudis’ securities laws and insider training, which, eventually, weakens the 
implementation of laws and regulations throughout Saudi stock market.  
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4.9 Conclusion 
	
This chapter examined the existing legal framework for the Saudi regulations of insider trading 
compared with those used in UK from investor protection perspective. Important issues were 
identified that must be addressed to deal effectively with insider trading: defining the activity, 
sanctions, and enforcing civil or criminal liability and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The term insider trading has been used in different spheres and has been examined from several 
aspects. The economic concept focuses mainly on trading that is based on an imbalance of 
information. The legal concept reinforces this belief. 
 
Three elements are required for insider trading to take place: an insider, insider information 
and a transaction based on this information. In addition, the insider must be aware that the 
information obtained is inside information and must also have benefited personally from use 
of the inside information.  
 
The definition of insider information, as well as the four criteria that determine whether insider 
information will have a significant effect on the security traded with regard to market price. 
Three transaction features should be considered with regard to inside information. 
 
The classification of an insider trading offence relies on the characteristics of the offence, the 
standard of proof, the type and purpose of sanction and the prosecution procedures. There are 
four prohibitions when inside information has been acquired: dealing, gaining benefit, 
encouraging others to benefit from the inside information, and disclosing the inside 
information. Once these prohibitions have been violated, an insider trading offence has been 
committed. 
 
Insider trading is regulated by legislation in both Saudi Arabia and the UK. In Saudi Arabia, 
regulations is embodied by the CMA Act and market conduct regulations, whereas in the UK, 
the Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) and EU 
directives underpin regulations, these play an important role. However, the way that insider 
trading is treated in different legislative frameworks has created some confusion as to whether 
the offence should be classified as civil, administrative or criminal. 
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The person affected by insider trading must resort to the law by filing a lawsuit requesting 
compensation. Any request for compensation is subject to the general rules of litigation.  
Neither Saudi nor UK legislation includes any special provisions for civil liability arising from 
inside trading information. Responsibility for this is subject to the general rules. It is advisable 
to organise special measures to encourage the dissemination of any information that could have 
a substantial effect on stock prices. Inside information tends to be exploited due to its 
confidentiality. Public dissemination of such information can prevent the temptation to exploit 
its use. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, a number of reasons can be invoked to invalidate action in lawsuits dealing 
with outlawed shares of public joint-stock companies. These include breach of a legal 
obligation, breach of the duty of honesty, truthfulness and the disclosure of confidential 
information or trade secrets. With regard to lawsuits dealing with trading based on inside 
information, reasons that invalidate action include breach of legal statutory misrepresentation, 
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence and/or trade secrets. In the UK, Breach of 
fiduciary duty can be applied to the relationship between a company and a member of its board 
of directors. 
 
In the Saudi stock market, Administrative sanctions are generally the simplest to apply and the 
slightest severe compared with criminal and civil sanctions, Moreover, most of administrative 
sanctions are nonmonetary.  Such sanctions do not reach the objective of discouraging deterring 
the insider trading. It has been concluded that civil law and common law remedies are not 
sufficient to deterring others from engaging in such activities, these remedies may be useful to 
restore what the injured party lost. therefore, to regulate insider trading it should be a more 
reasonable objective would also include prevention as well as compensation. 
 
The lack of effective investigatory authorities, which obstructs the capability of the Saudi stock 
market to increase enforcement. Consequently, it is necessary to ensure that these authorities 
have the required powers to enhance enforcement, which will lead and encouraging improved 
investor confidence and the growth of the stock market 
 
There are a series of obstacles and restrictions which can impede on the effectiveness of insider 
trading rules inside Saudi market. Firstly, social obstacle can deter the effectiveness of insider 
trading rules in Saudi markets, which is tipping that considered a social responsibility, and 
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insiders are under social pressure to confidentially disclose any sensitive non-public 
information. 
 
Secondly, an additional restriction is the judge’s approach in relation to applying insider-
training laws and regulations. When reviewing crime in Saudi, it is important to acknowledge 
that the idea of a crime established with the absence of an unswerving victim is still 
considerably under developed. This is particularly relevant for crimes relating to finance as 
they are often victimless and, accordingly, the judges are unwilling to enforce jail sentences.  
as well as that, a main restriction is that the judges, usually, are missing a general awareness 
and education on these crimes. 
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Chapter 5: A Framework for the Analysis of Market 
Manipulation in Saudi Stock Market 
 
5.1 Introduction 
	
One of the biggest concerns of investor in today’s securities market is market manipulation. 
As mentioned in the first chapter that there are many practices that affect and harm the integrity 
of Saudi stock6 market. Which led to the collapse of 2006, one of These practices is” Market 
manipulation”.635  Therefore, market manipulation is harmful to the integrity of the stock 
market when a trader alters trading volumes, which causes trades to directly affect the prices 
and quantities of securities traded in the market, market values of those securities are adversely 
expected. 636  Consequently, the public loses confidence in the stock market’s remaining 
investor who lose more financial resources putting them at an unfair disadvantage.  The result 
devolves the stock market turns into a legal casino. Thus, the primary purpose of market 
manipulation regulations is to provide basic investor protection from fraud and misleading and 
to protect investors’ confidence.  
 
However, Market manipulation is a poorly understood phenomenon, due in part to legal 
standards that categorize manipulative behaviour as either an act of outright fraud or the 
nebulous use of market power to produce an artificial price.  This chapter’s main objectives are 
to define market manipulation and elucidate its common forms. The aim of this is to discover 
how well the law covers the most common forms of market manipulation as defined in the 
chapter and in comparison with the UK’s approach to regulating market manipulation under 
the FSMA 2000. Moreover, the chapter examines the current system of controlling market 
																																																								
635 The perception that market manipulation is present in the Saudi stock market is widespread amongst 
Saudi traders and investors. Although there is no substantial evidence to support this view, it is a strong 
perception. The idea has emerged from chatrooms, newspapers and some companies’ financial reports. 
Reaching an accurate conclusion on whether the Saudi stock market is actually suffering from market 
manipulation behaviour is difficult because no practical or statistical studies have been conducted on 
this topic. However, the lack of evidence concerning market manipulation does not eliminate the 
importance of identifying the Regulations of market manipulation, as such practice may have a strong 
effect on the Saudi stock market. 
636 Douglas Cumming and others, ‘Exchange Trading Rules and Stock Market Liquidity’ (2011) 99 
Journal of Financial Economics P651. 
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manipulation in Saudi Arabia to assess whether it is adequate for the intended purpose in aspect 
of investor protection. 
 
Many researchers in this field refer to the manipulation that was happening in the financial 
market of Amsterdam:  Among the plays which men perform in taking different parts in this 
magnificent world theatre, the greatest comedy is played at the Exchange. There, … the 
speculators excel in tricks, they do business and find excuses wherein hiding places, 
concealment of facts, quarrels, provocations, mockery, idle talk, violent desires, collusion, 
artful deception, betrayals, cheatings, and even tragic end are to be found 
-- Joseph de la Vega (1688), describing the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.637 
 
Among the most famous cases of manipulation that led to the enactment of systems and 
institutions used today was the complicity of groups of traders (investment banks, market 
makers, and company executives) to raise prices on the New York Stock market in what 
became known as the complicity of the stock (stock pool). It resulted in the enactment of the 
Securities Exchange Act in 1933, followed by laws regulating the financial market and the 
establishment of the Capital Market Authority in 1934.638 
 
investors’ confidence in the fairness and transparency of the market enhances its liquidity and 
efficiency, thereby promoting equality in market transactions, strengthening confidence in it 
and helping ensure adequate and sustained funding of the institutions listed on the stock market. 
This will in turn lead to increased exchanges in the market, resulting in an increased rate of 
economic growth. However, market manipulation damages the integrity of market, and thus 
weakens investor confidence in it. Accordingly, authorities around the world need to have 
adequate systems in place to detect, investigate and prosecute market manipulation, which will 
prevent illegal practices within the stock market, to protect investor and ensure durability and 
make market immune to financial crises.  
 
 
																																																								
637 Tālis J Putniņš, ‘Market Manipulation: A Survey’ (2012) 26 Journal of Economic Surveys 952. 
638 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, ‘Stock-Price Manipulation’ (1992) 5 Review of financial studies 
P503. 
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5.2 Definition of Market Manipulation  
	
The term market manipulation was described as ‘a term of art’ by the US Supreme Court.639
 
This indicates how difficult it is to describe the term market manipulation in one all-
encompassing definition. Defining manipulation is no simple task. Many attempts have been 
made to define this term by judicial, jurisprudential and regulatory bodies, but the results are 
still unsatisfactory in both the legal and economic literature. As the word manipulation has 
changeable meanings, it could be expanded to include numerous of practices or restricted to a 
limited action. 640  In addition, market manipulation is associated with different types of 
behaviour and activities, which make defining the term even more difficult, as presented in this 
chapter. 
 
5.2.1 The Jurisprudential Approach 
	
A number of attempts have been made to define market manipulation by academics. One 
definition of market manipulation is ‘deliberate interference with the free play of supply and 
demand in the securities markets’.641 Another possible definition is ‘where someone seeks to 
distort the price of financial instruments, or effect transactions or orders to trade or disseminate 
information in a manner that gives or is likely to give false or misleading signals about financial 
instruments’.642 
 
 A final definition of market manipulation is ‘conduct intended to induce people to trade a 
security or force its price to an artificial level’.643 The first and second definitions given above 
are more applicable, because the second definition is a general definition, while the first and 
second definitions are comprehensive and give methods by which market manipulation occurs. 
																																																								
639 Santa Fe Industries, Inc v Green (1977) 430 US 462, 477. 
640 Robert A Jarrow, ‘Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and Short Squeezes’ (1992) 27 Journal 
of financial and Quantitative Analysis 311. 
641 Bernd H Klose, Asset Tracing & Recovery: The FraudNet World Compendium (Erich Schmidt 
Verlag GmbH & Co KG 2009) P9. 
642  ‘FSMA Market Abuse Regime: A Review of the Sunset Clauses - Lexology’ (2008) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=26a6d941-7e69-427d-a271-f3a20b6a36cf> accessed 
8 April 2017. 
643 ‘Market Manipulation Law’ (2002) 1 The Ministry of Economic Development Reform of Securities 
Trading Law P15. 
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Avgouleas’ definition of manipulation includes the main features that are missing features from 
the abovementioned definitions. According to this author, manipulation can be defined as 
follows: 
 
‘Behaviour effected through any one, or a combination of any of the following: 
misrepresentations and other false statements or concealments, artificial transactions and 
trading schemes, which are made or structured in such a way as to induce market participants 
to engage in the trading of financial investments or the exercise of rights in financial 
investments. Relevant trading must be in such a direction or the exercise of rights must be 
effected in such a way as to either lead the price of these investments to an artificial level, 
and/or enable the perpetrators of the behaviour to materialize, from interests held in the specific 
or related investments, financial gains that would not be possible, in the absence of such 
behaviour’.644 
 
This definition is more organised than the previous ones; moreover, it includes the most 
important components of manipulation, such as intent, measurement of manipulation and 
manipulative practices.  However, this definition still has some important gaps, as it does not 
mention the ‘artificial level’ or ‘artificial transactions’.  These definitions can be divided into 
three main categories according to their core characteristics. The first is that market 
manipulation occurs if trading interferes with the laws of supply and demand. The second is 
that manipulation takes place if it ‘induce(s) people to trade’. Finally, if a trade’s purpose is to 
either increase or decrease a security price artificially, then it will be considered market 
manipulation. 
 
These three categories might be restricted to two categories, as interfering with supply and 
demand would simultaneously encourage others to trade while creating an artificial price.645 
Therefore, it is beneficial to consider each of the following remaining categories: (1) creating 
artificial prices and (2) the intent of inducing others to trade. 
 
																																																								
644 Avgouleas and others (n 473). 
645 Daniel R Fischel and David J Ross, ‘Should the Law Prohibit“ Manipulation” in Financial Markets?’ 
(1991) 105 Harvard Law Review P503. 
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5.2.2 The Legal Concept of Manipulation 
	
“Professor Loss, invariably described as the Father of modern securities law, has noted that 
manipulation is ‘related to the field of fraud – but not altogether a part of it as a matter of legal 
analysis”. 646 
 
Laws forbidding manipulation generally define it as including the establishment of ‘artificial’ 
or ‘false’ market prices. Because of the absence of a legal definition of manipulation, there has 
been disagreement between the courts and commentators in its identification and description.647 
 
Because of the lack of a clear legal definition of manipulation, some commentators, such as 
Fischel and Ross, demanded the law should not pay consider any sort of definition. They 
claimed that manipulation that does not ultimately succeed in changing prices because of 
symmetrical price pressure effects is non-fraudulent. Moreover, they concluded that 
manipulation should not be regulated, since manipulation is sure-to-lose, making it entirely 
self-deterring.648 
 
It is difficult to agree with Fischel and Ross, since manipulation that does not result in harm 
does not support their view that trade-based manipulation is unprofitable. Simply changing 
prices gives the average investor a reference price that reflects supply and demand. However, 
as mentioned above, it has been difficult to find a comprehensive definition of market 
manipulation. Therefore, it can be identified via some manipulative practices, such as ‘wash 
trading’, ‘pump and dump’ and ‘churning and burning’, which can be readily identifiable.649 
 
The concept of market manipulation does not have to involve trading. It can include spreading 
false or misleading rumours about a company to increase or decrease the stock prices. 
However, there are concerns that regulators and lawmakers will confuse market manipulation 
with modern technology and the structure of stock market. The problem lies in the failure to 
differentiate between what is legitimate speculation and what constitutes manipulation, which 
																																																								
646 Loss and Seligman (n 538). 
647 Vivien R Goldwasser, ‘Regulating Manipulation in Securities Markets: Historical Perspectives and 
Policy Rationales’ (1999) 5 Austl J Legal Hist P149. 
648 Fischel and Ross (n 641). 
649 Dionigi Gerace and others, ‘Stock Market Manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’ (2014) 
8 Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal P105. 
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is a testament to the competition for the smartest, fastest and most profitable. Thus, it is 
important for lawmakers and regulators to limit and prevent market manipulation without 
prejudice and allow the natural development of the market.650 The agreement opinion is that 
carefully targeted laws are required to effectively prosecute and prevent harmful market 
manipulation. Through changing a market’s price formation and discovery process and 
victimising ordinary investor, market manipulation is commonly understood as having a 
harshly negative influence on market efficiency and integrity”.651 
 
5.3 Forms of Market Manipulation 
  
Although there is no clear definition of the term ‘market manipulation’, there are some 
common practices that are believed to be manipulative because they involve commonly 
occurring elements. These forms are classified as manipulation by analysts and commentators. 
While addressing these forms, many classifications of market manipulation become evident.652
 
According to Allen and Gale 653 , there are three types of manipulation: 654  Manipulation 
influencing value 655  , Manipulation influencing price through disseminating misleading 
information656 and Manipulation influencing price through trading volume.657 
 
																																																								
650 Albert S Kyle and S Viswanathan, ‘How to Define Illegal Price Manipulation’ (2008) 98 The 
American Economic Review P274. 
651 ibid. 
652 Fischel and Ross (n 641). 
653 Allen and Gale (n 634). 
654 ibid. 
655  Occurs when a manipulator decides to affect the value of a share. This manipulation is often 
contributed to by a company’s decision-makers. Examples of this type include decisions regarding 
mergers and acquisitions, such as an announcement of an offer to buy or merge with a company leading 
to a rise in the share price of the target company; the advertisers then sell their shares before announcing 
that negotiations have stalled. 
656 Occurs when manipulators publish incorrect information or information that is correct but shown in 
a way that can be interpreted wrongly by others.  This impacts other traders’ expectations about the 
value, and enters into it, publishing (joint stock company) misleading information about its financial 
position, and do some analysts recommendation or give positive information to the shares they own. 
The rapid evolution of information technology, especially the Internet and mobile phones, had made it 
easy to disseminate misleading information. 
657 Occurs when a trader causes trades to directly affect the prices and quantities of securities traded in 
the market, adversely affecting the expectations of the rest of the market of the values of those securities. 
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However, Avgouleas has created a clear division that includes many forms and practices, which 
is adopted in this section.658 He divided forms of market manipulation into the following three 
categories: (1) manipulation based on information, (2) manipulation based on artificial 
transactions and (3) price manipulation43.
 
Each of these categories will be addressed separately.  
 
5.3.1 Information-Based Manipulation 
	
The first form of market manipulation is information-based manipulation. There are two main 
approaches in this form.  First, manipulation occurs though broker misrepresentations and 
investments analysts’ reports; second, it may be achieved through market manipulation and 
internet manipulation.659  
 
The first mechanism takes place when broker or investment analysts give misrepresented 
information about specific securities in the market to obtain benefit for themselves. For 
instance, a broker may take a stock option and deliver misleading information about a certain 
security to increase the price of that and obtain an advantage. Moreover, if the broker owns 
shares, a conflict of interest will emerge. For illustration, a broker recommends that his client 
should buy a specific share; then, before advising others to buy it, the broker purchases this 
share for himself to take advantage of the increase in the price that occurs right after the 
broker’s recommendation.660 
 
The second mechanism that is regularly used in information-based manipulation is Internet 
manipulation involving the dissemination of incorrect information or rumours or the use 
artificial transactions (discussed in detail in the next section). To change the price of the 
security through the Internet, text messages, email and so on may be used as means of market 
manipulation.661 Market manipulations also included in this mechanism, as seen in the case of 
R. v De Berenger ln De Berenger. Here, when Berenger falsely reported Napoleon’s death, 
stockbrokers and the public were forced to buy into the government debt; as a result, Berenger 
and members of the syndicate gained their advantage.662 
																																																								
658 Avgouleas and others (n 473). 
659 FSA Consultation Paper No. 10, "Market Abuse Part 1: (1998) Consultation on a Draft Code of 
Market Conduct”. 
660 Gordon De Brouwer, Hedge Funds in Emerging Market (Cambridge University Press 2001) P158. 
661 Avgouleas and others (n 473).  P104. 
662 New Zealand Governance Centre (n 488). 
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This is important because information has a direct impact on the prices of securities and trading. 
One of the important elements used in determining stock prices is accurate information. 
Therefore, when information is inaccurate – for instance, because of the spread of rumours –
prices are affected in a manipulative manner. Thus, manipulators spread rumours or false 
information to serve their own interests and to influence other investor.663 
 
5.3.2 Manipulation Based on Artificial Transactions 
	
The second category is called manipulation based on artificial transactions; Article I (2)(b) of 
the EU Market Abuse Directive and FSMA Section 118 give clear descriptions of such market 
activities.  
 
This form of market manipulation is intended to create artificial transactions on a particular 
share, at a time when there is no real deal available. For example, an individual may have a 
certain number of shares, sell them nominally to a relative or friend, then buy them back in a 
short period of time – possibly on the same day. This is done to convince other traders that 
price changes have taken place for that share and discuss its activity.664 Such sales are also 
called ‘wash sales’, ‘matched orders’, or ‘pools’. However, the cornerstone of this kind of 
market manipulation is ‘fictitious trades’. To distinguish between legitimate transactions and 
artificial transactions.665   
 
The concept of ‘matched orders’ is similar to that of ‘wash sales’. However, this kind of 
manipulation involves entering buy and sell orders at the same time identical to certain security.  
The aim of this plan is to give buy and sell orders to many brokers that do not know each other 
to create the impression that there is a great and renewed interest in these shares.666 
Manipulative information can be given to newspapers and financial media, which then promote 
specific shares. If the manipulator begins to buy without selling, then the prices tend to climb, 
																																																								
663 Avgouleas and others (n 473). 
664  Apostolos Ath Gkoutzinis, Law and Practice of Liability Management: Debt Tender Offers, 
Exchange Offers, Bond Buybacks and Consent Solicitations in International Capital Market 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) P128. 
665 Eva Lomnicka, ‘Preventing and Controlling the Manipulation of Financial Markets: Towards a 
Definition of “Market Manipulation”’ (2001) 8 Journal of Financial Crime P297. 
666 Philip McBride Johnson and Thomas Lee Hazen, Derivatives Regulations: Successor Edition to 
Commodities Regulations (Aspen Publishers Online 2004) P1311. 
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and this incites the public to purchase the shares. The prices will continue to rise until they 
reach a level that satisfies the ambitions of the manipulators, who will then sell these shares. 
The price does not decrease soon after the factors that brought it up are shifted; the 
manipulators may avail themselves of the opportunity of the deterioration in turning to the 
downward trend after they were speculating on the climb. The issue may be an agreement 
between a group of dealers – often written – to give authority to the director to trade in a 
particular stock during a certain period and distribute any profits among themselves or sharing 
losses if they occur; such agreements are called manipulation agreements (pools).667 
 
5.3.3 Price Manipulation 
	
There are three main mechanisms for price manipulation. These are ‘trade-based 
manipulation’, ‘contract-based manipulation’ and ‘market power manipulation’.668 
 
5.3.3.1 Trade-Based Manipulation 
	
This concept of this kind of manipulation is linked to the trading itself, whether buying or 
selling, carried out to materially affect the prices of the securities, driving them up or down to 
create an incorrect impression. This takes advantage of the assumption that there is a 
relationship between trading and price movements, since acquisitions increase the price of a 
security and auctions decrease it price. As a result, manipulator gains as a result of trade-based 
manipulation.669  In this case, there is a need to determine intent, because the intent of the 
manipulator must be to effect others by creating a misleading impression. 
 
There are different forms of trade-based manipulation, such as trading at the end of the day, 
sale-based manipulation and purchase-based manipulation. The trading at the end of the day 
strategy is based on giving a misleading impression about the stock, whether to convince 
traders that price changes have taken place for the security or to give the impression that the 
security is active; this represents fraud and manipulation.670 
																																																								
667  The Ministry of Economic Development. Reform of Securities Trading Law. (2002). Market 
Manipulation Law. 2 (1), P15. 
668 Avgouleas and others (n 473). 
669 ibid, P. 132. 
670 ibid, P. 137. 
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There are two different types of trade-based manipulation, namely purchase-based 
manipulation and sale-based manipulation; these can be seen as two sides of the same coin. 
The main objective of purchase-based manipulation is to ‘corner’ the market; this is also known 
as ‘market pegging’, and it serves to control the supply and demand of a certain security, then 
sell it at a price that suits the manipulator.671 ‘Bull pools’ are another example of such a 
practice. In general, sale-based manipulation is based on the idea of selling a security to 
decrease its price to benefit from this lower price and purchase it at this price. The aim of this 
scenario is to profit from the price difference because selling gives a negative impression of a 
certain security, which leads traders to sell at lower prices.672   
 
5.3.3.2 Contract-Based Manipulation 
	
In contract-based manipulation, the manipulator benefits indirectly from a certain security 
indirectly; the aim is not to sell a security at a high price or buy at a low price but to take 
advantage of another contract or clause.673 For example, a corporate ‘office manager’once 
attempted to increase the price of his company’s shares to ‘trigger a bonus clause in his 
compensation package based on the firm’s stock price’.674 
 
5.3.3.3 Market Power Manipulation 
	
The last form of price manipulation is market power manipulation. Market power can be seen 
as synonymous with market monopoly.675 In this type of manipulation, person or group buys a 
huge amount of certain financial papers for the purpose of attaining a monopoly; the group can 
then control the price and sell the shares in the market at a price that it sets.676 Moreover, the 
manipulator has the power to control the supply and demand of a certain security, then sell it 
at a desirable price.677 
																																																								
671 ibid, P. 137. 
672 Fischel and Ross (n 641). 
673 Andrew Verstein, ‘Benchmark Manipulation’ [2014] Browser Download This Paper P300. 
674 Fischel and Ross (n 641). 
675 This concept is borrowed from anti-trust laws. 
676 “Bisha Agriculture Co. of Saudi Arabia is but one example. This increasing phenomenon is due to 
the low capital of new listed companies as they average from $15 million to $30 million which makes 
it easy for speculator to control the supply side of these shares. 
677 Benjamin E Kozinn, ‘The Great Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a Problem in the 
Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle’ (2000) 69 Fordham L Rev 243. 
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Monopolies emerge in the commodities market in the same way as in the stock market, but as 
opposed to monopoly in the stock market, manipulation of the commodities market is legally 
forbidden. In the stock market, monopolies only become illegal if actions are carried out that 
are already prohibited conduct in the securities markets. In terms of market control, market 
power manipulation involves cases where an institution or individual controls the supply and 
demand of a certain security, which will empower the institution or individual to change the 
price according to identified interests.678  
 
5.4 Relationship Between Market Manipulation and Protection of 
Investor 
 
Whether natural supply and demand characteristics of the market are reflected in manipulative 
practices, or whether the prohibiting or control of market Manipulation should take place, are 
just two queries that may arise during the discussion of this topic. Below, it will be explained 
how the prohibiting of market manipulation is often viewed with much agreement in the 
literature. According to Barnes, ‘the price of a share is determined by supply and demand… Its 
price is… what an investor believes it is worth. A share price reflects all known information… 
of all investors’. 679 The concept of market efficiency was mentioned above, with a deeper 
explanation of the principle provided below. 
 
Conversely, market manipulation undermines this efficiency.680  Market manipulation will 
involve artificial transactions, so this might hinder supply and demand for instance. Moreover, 
presentation of honest and useful information is at odds with the action of spreading false 
information or circulating rumours. Therefore, supply and demand is regularly disregarded 
when a manipulators engaging in fraud seeks to affect share values through rumours, which is 
																																																								
678 Stephen Pirrong, The Economics, Law, and Public Policy of Market Power Manipulation (Springer 
Science & Business Media 2012) P16. 
679 Paul Barnes, Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse (Gower Publishing, Ltd 
2009). 
680One of the most important concepts of the efficient-market hypothesis addressed by financial and 
accounting studies was made clear by Fama: “It was generally believed that the securities market were 
extremely efficient in reflecting information about individual stocks and about the stock market as 
whole.” This EMH hypothesis includes information and pricing efficiency, in addition to operating 
efficiency. According to this theory, stock prices are efficient when they reflect the real values of shares 
because financial market whose primary objective is the allocation of financial resources to the most 
productive projects must be efficient if they are to optimally achieve their objectives. See Fama (n 84). 
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considered harmful to the growth and the integrity of any stock market.681 
 
Fundamentally, by reviewing forms of market manipulation, such as information-based 
manipulation, artificial transactions, and price manipulation, it can be concluding that the 
production of artificial values, pretend trades and false information results from market 
manipulation. Because the resulting trade does not reflect foundational financial principles, 
market efficiency declines. Just market practices should be seen as being undermined by 
market manipulation, because equal access to information and chance to assess it is necessary 
for every investor.682  
 
Furthermore, honest and truthful resources, as well as their fair access, allow a strong trading 
arena to be created, otherwise this is undermined. The chance of large investments also 
decreases, as does liquidity, because there is weakens confidence regarding the market among 
investor if manipulation is occurring. All these damage resulting lack of growth of the stock 
market. Market failure and breakdown, which impacts upon the entire economy of a state or 
beyond, can also be a greater hazard when manipulation occurs.  A state’s economic situation 
is reflected in its stock market, which was explained previously.  Consequently, many ordinary 
people stand to suffer from the activities of a few who abuse their positions to engage in 
manipulative practices.683 
 
Positive market operation is undermined by manipulation of markets, therefore it requires 
improved legislation to enable proper operation, on the findings of the research. Essentially, 
financial markets’ efficiency is at odds with the activities of artificial value shifts, transactions 
and misleading information that manipulation involves. Actual transactions and values that 
reflect a strong market are tired to greater transparency.684 
Furthermore, rumours should not impact upon investors’ knowledge, with sources that have a 
strong reputation providing trustworthy information. Conversely, manipulators often spread 
untrue information and create artificial dealings, which devastation the efficiency of a fair 
market. The transactions that traders undertake will be impacted on in an adverse manner by 
																																																								
681 Lomnicka (n 661). 
682 Barnes (n 675). 
683 Gkoutzinis (n 660). 
684 Jarrow (n 636). 
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fake trades, rumours and untruths that can influence their choices, which is a further problem 
of manipulation of markets. Additionally, market Manipulation is harmful to the growth and 
the integrity of the stock market, because these manipulative practises reduce market efficiency 
and create artificial prices, which leading large economic downturns and collapse of market 
following bubbles.685 
 
Nevertheless, the additional protection there is for investor within regulations, the stronger the 
market will be. Investors’ fair and equitable access to precise data can assist with creating 
market efficiency, which is a situation that can be created through regulations against 
manipulation of markets. Ultimately, regulations is required for both disclosure and 
manipulation, if efficiency is to be promoted in markets. Misleading and untruthful information 
as a foundation of certain manipulative behaviour could be challenged through better release 
of information, although it is not the focus of this assessment. Market efficiency would then be 
improved through such measures. Furthermore, confidence typically increases in the market 
,when supply and demand are in balance, which leads to improved stock market growth. 
 
Whether investor themselves or the entire market should be the focus of safeguarding 
regulations is one question that requires answering, once policy makers realize the damage 
occurring from manipulation.  Legislating against manipulation would be a means of ensuring 
that confidence in the market is achieved and will helped the growth of stock market.   
However, prohibiting manipulation may be at odds with the need to permit continued purchase 
and selling by investor, if regulations is implemented at an individual level.686 
 
The unregulated market will be little different to this situation in terms of hazards. 
Consequently, manipulation should be regulated and prohibited, with appropriate trading 
systems adopted to protect the investor from manipulative practices. In summary, all investor 
should be able to have equal opportunities to use the information ‘equal access to information, 
confidence in the public setting mechanism, and confidence that the public information is not 
false or misleading’. Regulations against manipulation of market could help to bring this 
																																																								
685 John Armour and others, ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical 
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situation about.687 
 
A small but growing number of theoretical studies have investigated the behaviour of 
manipulators and its impact on the efficiency of the market. According to Vila, who focused 
on pre-sale manipulation strategies, manipulators publish rumours aimed at lowering share 
prices, then buy later when the prices have gone down.688 Allen and Gale studied purchasing 
and sales manipulation; this type succeeds because of the contrasting information between 
traders about who is buying and whether they are familiar with the market and information or 
manipulators.689  
 
Allen and Gorton argue that “[t]he natural asymmetry between liquidity purchases and liquidity 
sales gives rise to profitable trade-based manipulation. If liquidity motivated sales are more 
likely than liquidity motivated purchases, buy orders are more informed on average and 
therefore have a larger effect on prices.” 690  Benabou and Laroque focused on cases of 
manipulation in which traders (such as financial analysts, market observers, and company 
insiders) declared expectations about future stock prices that did not agree with their 
assessments of the shares.691  Van Bommel modelled the use of imprecise information to 
influence stock prices:692 
 
"Jarrow 693, Cherian and Kuriyan and Cherian and Jarrow 694 build on the model of Hart and 
derive conditions under which trade-based manipulation is not possible. In Cherian and 
Kuriyan’s model manipulation is not possible with rational agents when price responses are 
symmetric.  Jarrow demonstrates that a sufficient condition to exclude market manipulation 
strategies is that the price response function depends only on a trader’s aggregate stock 
holdings and not on his past sequence of trades, in other words, when prices do not exhibit 
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‘momentum’”.695 In his book on market manipulation, Avgouleas wrote second- and fourth-
quarter summaries of economic theories related to manipulation and an economic analysis of 
the types of manipulations and their mechanisms.696 
 
In Saudi Arabia, manipulation is based primarily on spreading misleading rumours and 
information about the earnings of a firm. After the recent financial crash, some 400 cases 
of manipulation were detected. Thirty cases went to court and many large investor were 
convicted, with one being imprisoned. This is clear evidence that the Saudi stock market 
was manipulated.697 
 
5.5 The Catholic Marriage Between Internet and Market 
Manipulation 
	
The Internet is one of the pillars of the technological era. It is considered one the most important 
methods of manipulation.698 The Internet has become an easy, low-cost way to broadcast 
information to huge numbers of people instantaneously.699 Security price manipulation can 
occur through fabricated information and rumors, which spread quickly through the the 
Internet. Varying degrees of such manipulation occur in both developing and developed 
markets, meaning it is a pervasive issue.  One instance of this is when an innovative fingerprint 
identification programmed for credit card purchases was reported to have been developed by 
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Comparator Systems Corporation (Comparator), via the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ). Such reports led to a $1 billion market 
capitalization of the firm being seen over the course of a day, a tremendous rise from its 
previous $36 million, while a $0.03 to $1.75 increase in the firm’s share price also occurred.700 
In Saudi Arabia, only a limited percentage shift in share value is possible due to intra-day 
trading limits on the market, meaning that such significant climbs in value would not be 
possible. 
 
The Internet is undertaken by a great many investor, with their setting up and such engagement 
being a significant means of communication within the Saudi market, swiftly gaining 
widespread use.  Furthermore, there is pervasive use of Twitter, Snapchat, WhatsApp and other 
social media. Clearly, the characteristics of such platforms mean that there is often rapid false 
information and rumors. It is possible that over 100,000 investor will hear a certain report or 
news within minutes, with incorrect information being disseminated widely, willingly or 
otherwise, via SMS and other communication means, having perhaps begun on social media 
platforms that are usually incredibly busy while trade is occurring.701 
 
There is a regulatory gap in Saudi market that is helping the spread of manipulation schemes 
that are based on rumors. In Saudi there is no direct prohibition from spreading false 
information; unless an untrue statement of material fact instead, issuers are obligated to respond 
to any ongoing rumors that are affecting the price of the issuer.  This requirement is perfect in 
theory but it obliges very stringent surveillance and enforcement capabilities in practice. It is 
difficult to supervise and regulate these Internet channels, in fact hat the Saudi market itself is 
actually grounded on such information. As mentioned, shortcomings exist in the current 
regulatory framework governing this area, although chapter three has provided an in-depth 
explanation of the existing structure of legislation. 
 
In spite of this regulatory gap, Mature market typically possess proper information 
intermediaries and gatekeepers, which means that the Saudi market’s framework is lacking 
rigour. Therefore, simply implementing stronger legislation is unlikely to tackle the problems, 
																																																								
700 Nancy Toross, ‘Double-Click on This: Keeping Pace with On-Line Market Manipulation’ (1998) 32 
Loy LAL Rev 1399. 
701 Robert A Prentice, ‘The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule 
10b-5’ (1998) 47 Emory lj 1. 
	 203	
despite it certainly being required. Furthermore, market manipulation plans and the 
dissemination of false news’ impact would be mitigated, in terms of the sharp increase and 
decrease in prices from a flurry of market activity, if companies’ share prices were steadied 
and preserved to a degree by professional market makers. Manipulation schemes particularly 
target amateur, inexperienced and poorly informed investor, who seem to comprise the 
majority and who should be provided with proper instruction, which is a significant obstacle 
for regulators.  The enhancement of market organizations and systems must incorporate such 
education as part of improvement plans, as it is a difficult are to change. 
 
5.6 Regulations (Prohibiting) Market Manipulation 
	
In this section, it will focus on the first illegal market activity described above, namely market 
manipulation. This crime is discussed and analysed based on the parameters outlined in the law 
and outside sources related to market manipulation in the Saudi regime and in the British 
regulations. Then it will cite some examples of market manipulation. Finally, it will analyse 
some of the decisions and provisions that have been published by the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority. 
 
Chapter VIII, article 49 of the Saudi caiptal market law 702  defines the crime of market 
manipulation and reflects upon certain cases as follows:  
(a) Any person shall be considered in violation of this Law if he intentionally does any act or 
engages in any action which creates a false or misleading impression as to the market, the 
prices or the value of any Security for the purpose of creating that impression or thereby 
inducing third parties to buy, sell or subscribe for such Security or to refrain from doing so or 
to induce them to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by such Security.703 
 
(b) The Authority shall set out rules determining the acts and practices which shall constitute 
violations of paragraph (a) of this Article. These rules shall specify the acts and practices 
excluded from the application of the provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article. The powers of 
the Authority provided for in this paragraph shall include the power to set forth the rules, define 
the circumstances and procedures aiming at stabilizing the prices of Securities offered to the 
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public, and the manner in which and the period during which these actions must be taken. 
(c) The following acts and practices shall be among those which shall be considered types of 
manipulation that are prohibited by paragraph (a) of this Article: 
1) To perform any act or practice aiming at creating a false or misleading impression of an 
existing active trading in a Security as may be contrary to the reality. These acts and practices 
shall include, but not be limited to the following: 
(a) Undertaking transactions in Securities which do not involve a true transfer of ownership 
thereof. 
(b) Entering an order or order for the purchase a particular Security with prior knowledge that 
an order or orders of substantially the same size, price and timing for the sale of the same 
Security has been or will be entered by a different party or parties. 
(c) Entering an order or orders for the sale of a particular Security with prior knowledge that 
an order or orders of substantially the same size, price and timing for the purchase of the same 
Security has been or will be entered by the same party or different parties. 
2) To affect, alone or with others, the price of a particular Security or Securities traded on the 
Exchange through executing a series of transactions in such Security or Securities creating 
actual or apparent active trading or causing an increase or decrease in the prices of such 
Securities, for the purpose of inducing third parties to buy or sell such Securities as the case 
may be. 
3) To affect, alone or with others through any series of transactions such as buying or selling 
or buying and selling a Security traded on the Exchange for the purpose of pegging or 
stabilizing the price of such Security in violation of the rules set forth by the Authority for the 
safety of the market and the protection of investor.704 
 
By studying and analysing the above articles from a legal point of view, it becomes clear that 
the regulator classifies as market manipulators both those who act unlawfully and those who 
do not act lawfully (i.e., both action and inaction can result in the offence of market 
manipulation). Therefore, the designation of manipulation has three forms: first, participating 
in agreement with an offender/offenders to do one of the prohibited acts; second, participating 
in inciting, such as broadcasting rumours or recommendations that influence the price of 
securities; and third, participating in what is known as rounding between investment funds or 
making a deal based on incorrect information that was promoted by offenders to influence the 
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stock. The aim of profiting illegally, either personally or on behalf of others, can be achieved 
through a number of means, including the promotion of speculators with influence and making 
a deal according to information from the same sources, from unofficial sources (e.g., chat 
rooms), from newspapers or from information published on the Internet.705 
 
However, questions have been raised about, Will Intent be an Obstacle for Enforcing the Law? 
Regulatory bodies continue to question and disagree over whether an offender’s intent should 
be considered. Certain regulatory frameworks are not concerned with manipulative intent, 
whereas different frameworks are. It is common that the manner of intent is distinguished 
within the jurisdictions  that are concerned with it; scienter is the term applied in securities law 
to wrongful intent, with the term mens rea also having associated meaning. For example, 
fraudulent intention may have to have been instigated or engaged in by the accused under 
certain jurisdictions,  others prosecutor require evidence of manipulative intent, while others 
may need evidence of actual intent  to initiate or participate in artificial transactions. Thus 
whether there was wilful deception or fraud or not, it may only be necessary by prosecutor to 
show that prices were artificially altered through the activities of the accused.706 
 
The accused individual’s intention can be ascertained based on whether their actions possessed 
any lawful drive or sound justification in business practice, which must be challenged by the 
prosecutors under the regulatory framework. The burden of proof and conception of intent 
under Saudi Arabian law is affected by the country making a civil and criminal offence of 
manipulation. A decrease in the burden of proof would result, making it simpler to apply the 
law to transgressors, if a set of objective criteria  were set for proving manipulative intent. 
 
There are two main types of market manipulation: abusive behaviour 707and false information. 
Three pillars must be present to cause an action to be classified as either of the two types of 
market manipulation; in the absence of any of the two, the action is no longer designated as 
criminal behaviour. Following are the three pillars: 
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Legal qualifications: There is no crime and no punishment except by law, as outlined in Article 
59, which describes fraud and market manipulation.708 
Material elements: This is stipulated in paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article 49. Although 
paragraph (c) has been applied to certain cases, paragraph (a) is the preferred section for 
application to the crime of market manipulation, in general. Paragraph (a) states the 
following:709 
 
Any person shall be considered in violation of this Law if he intentionally does any act or 
engages in any action which creates a false or misleading impression as to the market, the 
prices or the value of any Security for the purpose of creating that impression or thereby 
inducing third parties to buy, sell or subscribe for such security or to refrain from doing so or 
to induce them to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by such Security. 
 
It cab argued that  there are a number of cases taken from British and U.S. law that are in line 
with the spirit of this law and could therefore be applied. It will discuss each individual case in 
detail in the following section. 
 
As stipulated in paragraph (c), some of the behaviours that are fraudulent and misleading 
include three types of manipulation (1, 2, 3), which each contain three branches (a, b, c). To 
illustrate these, it has cite certain cases that occurred outside the Saudi system but which could 
be applied to the rules outlined in (c). These examples can make it easier to understand how 
the regulations should be applied.710 
 
Paragraph (c) also stipulates the following: ‘Acts and practices shall be among those which 
shall be considered types of manipulation that are prohibited by paragraph (a) of this Article: 
1) To perform any act or practice aiming at creating a false or misleading impression of an 
existing active trading in a Security as may be contrary to the reality’. Nevertheless, there are 
several forms and manipulation methods. Still, all of these methods are designed to achieve 
one purpose, which is to change the price of the securities for the benefit of a person by fraud 
and misleading others.711 
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The Saudi legislator has stipulated both criminal and civil penalties for market manipulation. 
The civil penalties aim to compensate people affected by the criminal offence when it is 
established in front of the Committee of Securities Disputes. Meanwhile, the criminal penalties 
stipulate fines and imprisonment. The term of imprisonment cannot exceed five years, while 
the fines imposed by the Commission or the Council, as stated in paragraph (b) of Article 59 
of the capital market law, comprise a minimum of 10,000 riyals and a maximum of 100,000 
riyals for each violation committed by the defendant.712  
 
In the UK, market manipulation is regulated under Sections 118 and 397 the FSMA 2000. 
Moreover, the UK regulations considers market manipulation as a criminal offence that incurs 
both civil and criminal punishments.  Furthermore, Section 397 elucidates two offences.713 The 
first involves creating a misleading statement that may involve one of three behaviours, as 
definite in Section 397 (1), and applies to a person who: 
“(a) makes a statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be misleading, false or deceptive 
in a material particular; 
(b) dishonestly conceals any material facts whether in connection with a statement, promise or 
forecast made by him or otherwise; or 
(c) recklessly makes (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, promise or forecast which is 
misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.”714 
In addition, the second criminal offence as stated in  Section 397 (3) " Any person who does 
any act or engages in any course of conduct which creates a false or misleading impression as 
to the market in or the price or value of any relevant investments is guilty of an offence if he 
does so for the purpose of creating that impression and of thereby inducing another person to 
acquire, dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite those investments or to refrain from doing so 
or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by those investments."715 
 
With regard to these offences the UK regulator the defences for these two sanctions which  is 
regulated under the firstly  Section 397 (4) 
(4) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (2) brought against a person to whom 
subsection (1) applies as a result of paragraph (a) of that subsection, it is a defence for him to 
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show that the statement, promise or forecast was made in conformity with  
(a)price stabilising rules; (b)control of information rules; or (c)the relevant provisions of 
Commission regulations (EC) No 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back 
programmes and stabilisation of financial instruments.716 
 
Secondly: (5) In proceedings brought against any person for an offence under subsection (3) it 
is a defence for him to show (a)that he reasonably believed that his act or conduct would not 
create an impression that was false or misleading as to the matters mentioned in that subsection; 
(b)that he acted or engaged in the conduct (i)for the purpose of stabilising the price of 
investments; and (ii)in conformity with price stabilising rules; F2. . . (c)that he acted or engaged 
in the conduct in conformity with control of information rules[F3; or (a)that he acted or 
engaged in the conduct in conformity with the relevant provisions of Commission regulations 
(EC) No 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back programmes and 
stabilisation of financial instruments.717 
 
 
5.7 Forms of Market Manipulation under Saudi Stock Market 
Regulations   
	
As it has been mentioned above, it has been difficult to find a clear and comprehensive 
definition for the term market manipulation in both Saudi and UK regulations (which examined 
in section 1 with the common forms of manipulation which discussed in section 2) it is useful 
to test the forms of market manipulation that have been determined by both regulations. 
Therefore, this section explains the market manipulation forms under Saudi capital Market Law 
(2003)  in comparison with the forms of manipulation under the FSMA 2000. 
 
5.7.1 Manipulation Based on Misleading Information 
	
Information-based manipulation involves releasing false information that will mislead others 
in the market. Furthermore, it is considered one of the most significant forms of manipulation 
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and may represent the first phase of other forms of manipulation.718  In this regard, this form 
is regulated under Chapter VIII, article 49 of the Saudi Arabian stock market law,719 which 
prohibits any act or practice aiming to create a false or misleading impression from a source, 
broker, trader or advisor linked to securities. For example, participating in what is known as 
rounding between investment funds or making a deal based on incorrect information are 
measures used by offenders to influence stock. According to this situation, the manipulation 
takes place because the misleading information related to a specific security leads to a higher 
price than the actual price.720 
 
However, information-based manipulation  has been banned  under Section 118 (7) of the 
FSMA 2000, 
 
This form of manipulation is broadcasting of information that would give a 
incorrect impression by a person who ‘knew or could reasonably be expected to have known 
that the information was false’721 
  
 
Moreover, Section 118 (7) states that ‘... the behaviour consists of the dissemination of 
information by any means which gives, or is likely to give, a false or misleading impression as 
to qualifying investment by a person who knew or could reasonably be expected to have known 
that the information was false or misleading’. 
 
According to the KSA and UK regulators, any kind of information that could affect the share 
price or mislead others is banned. However,  the FSA has defined dissemination in MAR 1.8 
as : “ 
1-  Knowingly or recklessly spreading false or misleading information about a qualifying 
investment through the media, in particular through information channels. 
2- Undertaking a course of conduct in order to give a false or misleading impression about a 
qualifying investment.”722 In this regard, an individual who spreads the information that has 
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been requested by the CAM and FSA, the availability of criminal intent and the availability of 
premeditation. Non-intentional actions do not fall within the criminal operations723.  
 
  5.7.2 Manipulation Based on Artificial Transactions 
	
The second category is called manipulation based on artificial transactions; such manipulation 
regulated under article II, paragraph b/1 of the Saudi market conduct regulations; this category 
includes wash sales, matched orders and pools. Moreover, 
Article I (2)(b) of the EU Market 
Abuse Directive724 and FSMA Section 118 give clear descriptions of such market activities.
 
 
To give a brief example, the Financial Services Authority has fined two former directors of the 
Cattles plc and its subsidiary Welcome Financial Services Limited a total of £600,000 for 
disseminating misleading information to other investor according to the credit quality of 
Welcome’s loan book and performing without integrity in discharging their responsibilities. In 
addition, the FSA banned both them from performing any functions related to any FSA 
regulated activities. Furthermore, John Black was banned by the FSA and fined £100,000; 
however, Blake has referred his case to the Upper Tribunal.725  As can be seen, although the 
Saudi and UK legislatures have both used the term ‘artificial’, this is not defined in the 
regulations. For both countries, the regulators described this term by giving examples, such as 
matched orders or pools. 
 
However, the FSMA 2000 under Section 118 (5), which states, ‘... the behaviour consists of 
effecting transactions or orders to trade... which: c. (b) secure the price of one or more such 
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investments at an abnormal or artificial level’.726 As discussed in the previous section, the UK 
regulator differentiates security prices that are at an abnormal or artificial level, which means 
that manipulation has occurred, since the manipulator has created an incorrect price for these 
securities. Therefore, the investor stabilises the price of the share according to his/her plan or 
interest by controlling it. In contrast, there is no similar approach in the Saudi regulations.727 
 
6.7.3 Manipulation Based on Fictitious Devices 
	
Section 118 (6) of the FSMA 2000 provides a clear explanation of manipulation based on 
fictitious devices, as follows: ‘.....The behaviour consists of effecting transactions or orders to 
trade which employ fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance’.728 The 
FSA gave examples of what it considers manipulating devices in MAR 1.7, as follows:729 
 
Firstly; “A transaction or series of transactions that are designed to conceal the ownership of a 
qualifying investment, so that disclosure requirements are circumvented by the holding of the 
qualifying investment in the name of a colluding party, such that disclosures are misleading in 
respect of the true underlying holding. These transactions are often structured so that market 
risk remains with the seller. This does not include nominee holdings.” 
 
Secondly: ‘Pump and dump’: Here, a manipulator has a huge amount of shares of the company 
– often a company with a small amount of capital – and attracts the attention of investor to the 
stock. Moreover, the manipulator supports rumours and spreads false and misleading 
information about the security to achieve greater profits. When the market begins to interact 
with these data and news, investor start buying the stock, leading to inflation of the stock price. 
Then, the manipulator starts to sell the stock, generating large profits. Once the misleading data 
and rumours explode, the bloated share price falls to low levels.730 
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Thirdly: ‘Trash and cash’: This involves holding a short position in a qualifying investment 
and then disseminating rumours about it to decrease its price.731 
 
An example of this form is the case of Barnett Michael. “The Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) has obtained a court order preventing Barnett Michael Alexander, a self employed 
trader, from committing market abuse (by entering multiple orders to buy and sell shares)  and 
ordering him to pay a £700,000 fine and £322,818 in restitution to firms which experienced a 
loss as a result of his actions”732 
 
“Article III of the regulations of the conduct of the Saudi market of paragraph (b) has stated: 
5) Entering an order or orders for the purchase or sale of a security in order to: 
Establish a predetermined sale price, ask price or bid price; 
Effect a high or low closing sale price, ask price or bid price; 
Maintain the sale price, ask price or bid price within a predetermined range; or 
Entering an order or a series of orders for a security that are not intended to be executed.”733 
 
This includes four forms that can be carried out by the violator alone, more than one 
manipulator in agreement with each other, or several manipulators under the umbrella of a 
master manipulator. They can spread rumours, or disseminating them the Internet or recycle 
them through the exchange of information among the mediators. 
 
Section 118 (8)734 also put forward a method to examine whether a specific behaviour is 
manipulation. Misleading conduct is considered market manipulation ‘when a regular person 
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gives a false impression through manipulation of the supply of, demand for or price of a specific 
share’.  However, the Saudi method has no measure to examine whether the conduct is 
manipulation. Thus, this has to be determined the collection of evidence and clues, proved by 
the Capital Market Authority or by their seducer to demand a fine (public right) and 
compensation (private right). It is necessary to prove damages and a causal relationship to be 
compensated. 
 
 
5.8 Evaluating the Forms of Market Manipulation and their 
Shortcomings 
	
There is no doubt that the steps taken by the Saudi legislature to regulate market manipulation 
were necessary to establish greater protection for investor in the market. Therefore, this 
approach to regulating market manipulation can be examined in two ways. First, it is necessary 
to consider the extent to which the regulations of market manipulation is successful and 
whether it encompasses all of the manipulative practices identified. Second, it is necessary to 
consider whether Article 49 in the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  and Articles II and III of 
conducts in the Saudi market law have covered the most common forms of manipulation 
practices, as reviewed in the previous section, as well as whether they cover the common 
manipulation behind the Saudi stock market collapse of 2006. 
 
Based on what has been a discussion in the previous sections, it show that  there is a very great 
similarity in the regulations of manipulation between the Saudi and the British regime, through 
the study of the Saudi regime and analytical legally and in accordance with the law of the Saudi 
capital market, in article ninth fortieth and  Article II and the third of conducts of the Saudi 
market law , as can be realized that the regulator has regulated  the market manipulation, and 
also stated several forms of manipulation and Saudi legislator did not differentiate between the 
manipulation in the market and who is involved in the manipulation.  
 
On this basis, it will be discuss behaviours that did not refer to Saudi a legislator, who could 
be considered to know the behaviour of manipulators. Because of their familiarity with 
governmental systems such as British law and financial institutions such as the Financial 
Services Authority and the London Stock Exchange, such legislators could be faced with full 
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legal action when manipulators are discovered.735 
 
One manifestation of a crime such as this occurs when company executives take so-called 
directors bonuses. When the fiscal year ends or the date of their reward is reached, they 
determine the value of the reward based on the share price performance. Then, the director, 
member or other insider will deal in the security at the closing of the market and then sell them 
in the days that follow. Directors bonuses, along with manager manipulation of the market, are 
among the types of market manipulation that are based on insider information.736 
 
Another form of manipulation includes wash trades and circular trades. This from of market 
manipulation can be found in the Saudi regime, and it can take the form of either personal or 
collective manipulation. Although they do not necessitate any real change or transfer of 
ownership of securities, circular trades can occur between two or more people who buy or sell 
orders with the prior knowledge that there are or will soon be similar orders for the same 
securities. In some cases, the manipulators conduct a series of operations that trigger actual 
orders (i.e., the real transfer of ownership of securities) or virtual active orders. Alternatively, 
they might create a security that has either a high or low price in order to attract others to the 
security or to maintain the stability of the price of the security leading up to the time when the 
manipulators plan to take advantage of it. The unlawfulness of this action is stipulated in the 
other paragraphs of Article 49 of the Saudi financial market system.737 
 
There is another form of manipulation that occurs when an offeree company wants to take over 
the other company (the offeror or company). This manipulation is called takeover fraud and 
seeks to make the offer to succeed or fail by convince investor of the offeree company; 
alternatively, in the case of reverse acquisition, it seeks to make the offeror or target company 
accept or reject the offer. However, takeover manipulation fails in several ways, for example, 
when the offeree company or its financial advisor bets on the deal for the top price and 
percentage on what is being purchased (the target of the proportion of the stock), this makes 
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existing investor of the offeree company less willing to accept the offer.738  
 
In contrast, when the offeree company or its financial advisor reduces the financial presentation 
or the acquisition ratio, this makes the available documents seem less attractive. Moreover, if 
the offeror or target company or its financial advisor raises the value of the offer and the 
acquisition ratio of the offeree company, the deal will end in failure. Sometimes, fraud and 
manipulation is used to make the offer succeed, such as when the offeror or target company or 
its financial advisor bets a higher price for the shares or overvalues the company’s shares to 
complete the transaction, and to make a more attractive offer, provides documents that will 
meet the approval of the investor of the offeree company, although they do not faithfully 
represent the value of the company.739 
 
Another option is making the offeree company’s investor more receptive to accepting the offer. 
When the officials of the offeror or target company and its financial advisor knows that the 
price that is offered for the acquisition of the offeree company is higher than the real price, the 
price is lowered slightly to cement the deal by making the investor of the offeree company 
more receptive to the offer. This also causes the offer to succeed. The Bottom line for the 
offeree company is that when the offeror or target company and the financial advisers carry 
out these acts, this kind of manipulation will take place.740 
 
According to the Saudi system, a joint stock company must carry out a portfolio evaluation, 
they have to do it four times a year (semi-quarterly) when they are dealing and trading in active 
investment of portfolios of stocks that are difficult to liquidate (illiquid stocks). At the end of 
the quarter (i.e. in the last days) before the valuation date, this will increase and performance 
of the general appearance of the investment portfolio development. This must be done several 
times if necessary, for example, when the operating profit of the company decreases, and this 
has led to its success in its investments and operating profit. In this case, manipulation of the 
market has occurred, because the company’s acts delude and mislead investor or other traders, 
making them think that the financial situation is better than it actually is.741 
																																																								
738 Mark Bagnoli and Barton L Lipman, ‘Stock Price Manipulation through Takeover Bids’ [1996] The 
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740 ibid. 
741 Capital Market law, Listing Rules. 
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Moreover, it will next look at cases of manipulation in the Saudi stock market. Specifically, it 
will examine private accounting fraud crimes in which board members and executive directors, 
in conjunction with companies’ internal financial accountants, inflate financial statements so 
that they look attractive and take advantage of this to raise the value of company shares. This 
situation is known as creative accounting,742 and its primary goal is to inflate assets in such a 
way that it is difficult to detect the inflation through internal audits. 743 A related case has been 
viewd in great detail in Chapter three namely; Mobily Company.   
 
Alternatively, shares can be reduced to give managers a bonus (i.e., a stock option). This means 
that when the management of a company wants to give one of the directors a rate or amount of 
equity, the director can falsify the dates and manipulate it, giving the director a larger 
proportion without any third parties knowing about it. The manipulated records appear in 
previous financial statements as a loss, which affects the existing shareholders.744 
 
The term stock option 745 indicates the right—but not the obligation—to buy or sell a stock in 
the future at a specified price and on a granted date. The right to buy a stock is called a call 
option, while its reverse, the right to sell a stock, is called a put option. The stocks are then 
returned to the ownership through the backdating of security-based documents—a form of 
security fraud—on the day the stock was trading at its lowest price. This puts the company in 
a better financial position based on its accounting reports, which attracts new employees and 
investor who did not read the previous financial statements. This manipulation can be detected 
by identifying the history of the stock price and how it was calculated. The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission requires the disclosure of stock options when submitting financial 
reports. 746  However, U.S. regulators began to fiercely resist such manipulations in 2002, after 
the collapse of one of the largest U.S. companies in the field of energy, Enron747, as well as the 
company WorldCom748 (in conjunction with the accounting office of Arthur Anderson). This 
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resistance took the form of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which sought to control companies’ 
accounting practices.  
 
This law prompted both U.S. and foreign companies to trade shares in the U.S. stock market, 
as they were now required to submit annual reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission regarding their internal regulatory accounting procedures, the system of civil and 
criminal sanctions set in place in case of non-conformance to these regulations, a certificate 
indicating the completion of an internal audit and a statement of the increase of financial 
disclosure in the company. 749 There is one aspect of this system that is difficult to apply, 
costing companies a lot when accountants and brokers review the financial statements. This is 
section 404, which ensures that an external auditor has checked whether the company has 
tightened its internal control over the accounting systems. In other words, the company is 
required to publish its financial report, concentrating on the internal audit structure and 
procedures for financial reporting. It should be referenced this point for two reasons: 1) there 
is a lack of qualified certified accountants in the Saudi Regime, and 2) accountants receive 
small financial return—never exceeding the rate of 1 to 10,000—leading to neglect on the part 
of professional accountants, which increases the level of manipulation that occurs in the 
industry. This, in turn, shakes the confidence of investor, devalues companies’ shares and, 
ultimately, often leads to bankruptcy. 
 
The British market operates on a different principle in the application of the law upon 
companies. This regulatory approach is called ‘Comply or explain’. Although this advanced 
principle requires a lot from companies, its application to global accounting standards, and 
especially those of Saudi Arabia, will foster a better environment and allow Saudi Arabia to 
catch up to other market more quickly.750 
 
5.9 Can Enforcement be Effective with the Existing Regulatory 
Gap? 
	
It is imperative to consider enforcement prior to determining whether or not the existing 
regulatory framework has provided investor protection in the Saudi stock market. It is a 
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relatively simple matter to import and utilise regulations from elsewhere, such as those already 
in use in developed markets. However, ensuring that the laws can be effectively implemented 
is a much more challenging proposition because it requires regulators, the public, the judiciary, 
gatekeepers and lawyers to fully comprehend and apply them.    
 
 As yet, Saudi criminal law does not treat market manipulation as a serious criminal offence. 
This stance poses a barrier to those seeking to introduce general regulations into the Saudi 
market, particularly with respect to securities regulations. Thus, the investor themselves, Saudi 
regulators continue to place little emphasis on the importance of imposing criminal penalties 
on those manipulating the market thus ensuring a low level of enforcement. 
 
This state of affairs indicates the level of apathy towards enforcement which currently pertains 
in Saudi. It can be surmised that regulators fail to uphold the law because they are aware that 
there are unlikely to be effective or deterrent sanctions imposed on any perpetrators, leaving 
those involved in manipulation free to continue with the practice.  However, it is feasible that 
if the rule of law was strengthened, investor might come to realise that the law would be 
enforced notwithstanding the force of the sanctions actually imposed. The rule of law must 
apply equally to all those who seek to circumvent it. Therefore, it is imperative that both 
criminal and disciplinary sanctions are applied to those who manipulate market and that 
perpetrators understand that the risk of legal action is real. 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
            
In chapter six FSMA 2000, which was the UK’s effort to more effectively control market 
manipulation, was compared to the contemporary efforts in Saudi stock market to legislate 
against market manipulation. The degree to which investor would be reassured and stock 
market expansion assisted through the regulations was also investigated.  
 
Unpredictability within a market and undermining of the actual economy can occur due to the 
value of a stock being significantly different from its price, which is an effect of the stock 
market’s fairness and justness being gravely compromised by market manipulation.  The array 
of investor of a company are often those who will be affected initially, with effects of both a 
longer and immediate-term duration seen. Market liquidity can be affected because victims of 
manipulation and other investor may choose to leave the market, as their assurances about the 
	 219	
market have been challenged, which marks a long-term impact. Furthermore, for the actual 
economy to be effectively assisted by the market, some of the vital requirements of the stock 
market are integrity and fairness, as suggested by previous studies. Similarly, rampant 
manipulation in the stock market leads to the opposite, as the must compensate for stock market 
losses. 
 
 Due to the lack of empirical research that has been made into manipulation of market in Saudi 
Arabia, it is problematic to determine the degree to which manipulation is occurring. 
Nevertheless, because the stock market in Saudi may be significantly affected by market 
manipulation, the introduction of regulations to counter such activity is crucial, regardless of 
the lack of research undertaken. 
 
During the 2006 crash in the Saudi stock market, many households had their investments wiped 
out. The market is not sufficiently transparent to reveal or prevent manipulation.  However, 
Market manipulation is a poorly understood phenomenon, due in part to legal standards that 
categorize manipulative behaviour as either an act of outright fraud or the nebulous use of 
market power to produce an artificial price.  
 
There is a major objective from market manipulation that is shared by all types and approaches, 
which is to deceive and defraud other individuals to the advantage of the manipulator, through 
altering securities values. Regardless, manipulation of a stock market should be clearly 
distinguished from speculative activity. Speculation includes positive aspects, which are legal, 
and negative aspects, which are illegal. In addition, the negative behaviour of manipulation is 
illegal. Market manipulation is an intentional misleading of investor and their decisions. Equity 
managers, government officers, industry experts, accountants, auditors and company 
executives may all engage in manipulation with the stock market. Sale washing, matched 
orders, pools, corners, churning, as well as pump and dump are the major forms of manipulation 
in the stock market.  
 
Organising the work of brokers and financial consulting and encouraging institutional 
investment through various investment funds, and project financial analysts body are all 
positive mechanisms introduced by the Capital Market Authority. The advantages insider 
traders have and power they hold will likely be mitigated and a measure of equilibrium gained 
over the long-term, following the introduction of these strategic policies. 
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Whether successful enforcement can be achieved, given the current lack of legislation, is a 
crucial question.  The degree to which investor are protected by the existing regulatory 
framework must be assessed, however the enforcement of any regulations is an essential prior 
question. Advanced market have regulations that are already known to be sound, therefore they 
could easily be applied to the Saudi stock market. However, the understanding, introduction of 
and adherence to regulations in the legal field, by gatekeepers, citizens and watchdog bodies is 
potentially a considerable problem. 
  
As yet, Saudi criminal law does not treat market manipulation as a serious criminal offence. 
Thus the implementation of securities legislation faces particular issues, while overall 
legislating of Saudi market is problematic due to such perceptions. Minimal application of the 
existing laws with respect to market manipulation, as well as the lack of imposing criminal 
penalties applied within the legal system thus ensuring a low level of enforcement.  
 
Thus Saudi Arabia continues to take an indifferent attitude towards the enforcement of 
manipulation laws. Thus manipulation in the market and criminal activity is ongoing, with the 
legal system and regulatory likely believing that any sanctions will not be successful, nor pose 
a deterrent to such activity. However, it is feasible that if the rule of law was strengthened, 
investor might come to realise that the law would be enforced notwithstanding the force of the 
sanctions actually imposed. The rule of law must apply equally to all those who seek to 
circumvent it. Therefore, it is imperative that both criminal and disciplinary sanctions are 
applied to those who manipulate market and that perpetrators understand that the risk of legal 
action is real. 
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Chapter 6: Fiduciary Obligations and Responsibility 
of Market Brokers 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
	
Demonstrating sensitivity to the issue of meaningful investor protection, this chapter attempts 
to initiate a debate on the questions of the liability of broker acting as fiduciaries in the Saudi 
context, and to examine the legal aspects of the broker’s role as the backbone of any securities 
market, in order to achieve the greatest degree of protection for investor and to inspire 
confidence in the stock market. The chapter concludes by examining how the law court 
determines and defines the fiduciary responsibilities of a broker’s client.751 The importance of 
this topic is determining the proper legal basis for the responsibility of the financial broker in 
the stock market, which represents a kind of protection for investor. 
 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to conduct an evaluation of regulatory duties related to 
the protection of investor in the stock market. These duties are provided by regulations 
regarding the brokerage business in Saudi Arabia, and are evaluated here. Chapter six focuses 
primarily upon the elementary regulatory protection provided where a broker offers the 
services of executing orders and making recommendations, and by association the framework 
of protection that is provided in the context of the legal system of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Broker is deemed significant since they work as intermediaries “who arrange on behalf of 
private investor the sale and purchase of shares”752. In well-functioning stock market, it has 
long been considered that a broker or brokerage firm should conduct its client ’ transactions 
with due skill, care and diligence in accordance with sensible practice in the brokerage 
business.  “It is for this reason, it is claimed, that stock market were established; to restrict 
entrance to market to brokers in order to ensure the conduct of its members and to limit 
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fraudulent practices”.753  Therefore, it can be argued that the behaviour of broker can affect the 
health of stock market. 
 
While, investment in the stock market is one of the most important types of investments for the 
time being.754 The importance of this type of investment to investors' desire to get the highest 
price of the security, and obtain the necessary legal guarantees to protect their securities, the 
risks that may cause their investments from fraud and manipulation of prices, also it perpetrated 
by some brokerage firms that take advantage of the lack of investors' experience in the field of 
securities to achieve their ends. 
 
From here it tended to provide most of the legislation to protect the investor, through legislative 
means, to ensure that securities prestige and the confidence of investor in the market, and the 
completion of this protection provided by this legislation, Therefore, these provisions of 
legislation to regulate the work of the broker, who enjoys a privileged legal status, who is an 
agent for its client , and so has extensive powers, can it be exploited, abused or used to cause 
the collapse of the market and then the impact on the national economy. 
 
In Saudi Arabia there is an increasing quantity of individual investor trading on the stock 
market who possess a limited knowledge of financial matters, such as financial analysis and 
risks of investment.  Saudi regulators, however, are encouraging investor to seek assistance 
from experienced personnel, such as brokers, and thereby create a more established and official 
stock market, like that in the UK, for instance.   
 
Recently, there has been substantial regulatory attention of broker with exploited conflicts of 
interest that invest their firms based on stock market imperfections and asymmetric 
information, which impairs stock market growth. Consequently, public confidence in stock 
market weakens while citizens and investor seek protection for their securities from unfair and 
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unsound practices and strive to achieve justice, efficiency and transparency in future securities 
transactions.755 
 
The brokerage is an important component of the financial system. Its services are essential, 
particularly regarding large volumes of trade and the lack of knowledge and information. The 
brokerage reconciles the wishes of the parties to the deal, that is, between the asylum and the 
viewers of capital. Therefore, it represents both the owners of the fiscal surplus in investing 
their surpluses and the owners of the fiscal deficit in meeting their need for financing.756 
 
The substance of the matter of illegal practice acts by stock broker function the current issue 
in Saudi Arabia, especially after the collapse of the Saudi stock market in 2006. As broker is 
dealing with massive amount of money which requires them to be precise and do not commit 
any errors in the implementation of client's orders that may entail enormous loss of the client 
invested fund, as broker play a very significant role in client’s protection in stock market.757 
 
“There are numerous accounts of emerging market today which show similar concerns: 
Khanna, in a case study of the Indian stock market, states that “Brokers were also often accused 
of collaborating with company owners to rig share-prices in pump-and-dump schemes”.758 
Zhou and Mei  argue that manipulation is rampant in many emerging market where regulations 
are weak and note that China’s worst stock-market crime in 2002 was a scheme by seven people 
accused of using brokerage accounts to manipulate company share prices”.759 
 
Within the financial sector, broker’s client  trust and act on their broker’s advice; therefore, 
there is a great deal of responsibility on the part of the broker toward his/her client.  There are 
various sources of the broker’s advice; for example, arising from client ’ communications with 
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the broker, or from the broker’s own research alone; however, it is a legal requirement for 
broker to divulge all information regarding their recommendations, both the opportunities and 
the risks. With such heavy responsibility, there is a fear of legal liability, and as such, 
recommendations must be well-researched and thoroughly considered.  Finding the appropriate 
recommendation suited to each individual client is not always straightforward. Institutions in 
emerging securities markets, such as Saudi Arabia, have not received a sufficient amount of 
research, particularly in the legal aspects related to the functioning of these companies. 
 
6.2 Are Brokers a Source of Market Manipulation? 
	
Brokers are a main element of any stock market as they act as intermediaries between traders. 
Because brokers have access to extensive inside information and possess a better understanding 
of the market due to their experience and practice within the stock market.760  
 
However, if we view a brokerage from the perspective of business services rather than as part 
of the market structure it appears to raise different legal matters. Previously, the only practice 
enabling profit to be made from offering brokerage services was charging commission for each 
transaction. However, it is now claimed that the business model adopted by most, but not all, 
financial institutions has transferred to charging fees based on the volume of assets under 
management.761   
 
Such a transformation in the business model has caused in two main developments in the 
practice. “Firstly, from an investor’s perspective, the investor is better off increasing the 
volume of trading; since the more trade which is executed, the less costly the charges become. 
Secondly, broker has become more aggressive in marketing other services in order to generate 
additional income”.762 As a result, there is a risk that broker may encourage their client  to 
change their investment plans or adopt a strategy, such as stock lending or margin financing, 
that would carry more advantage to the brokers, whilst at the same time exposing the client  to 
additional risks. 
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Broker is considered the fundamental players in market manipulation schemes because all 
offenders are required to trade through brokers.763 Thus, in order to manipulate the process to 
succeed in the market, the broker must be complicit in perpetrating the fraud. Consequently, 
regulators aim to enforce limitations on brokers, forbidding them from engaging in such 
activities.  The governance of stock market broker through the proper design and enforcement 
of laws and regulations, specifically in emerging markets, has recently received more 
importance. Therefore, there is an increasing belief that emerging markets, such as the Saudi 
stock market, require amendments to improve their legal and institutional environments.764 
 
Therefore, the Saudi capital Market Law (2003) , prohibits intermediaries from practicing in a 
way that against investor benefits, such as falsifying transactions for the purpose raising 
(commissions). The law is designed to limit the ability of the broker to publish any misleading 
or inaccurate information which may affect the investor decisions. The non-application of this 
law will lead to undermining the confidence of investor in the market, as well as limiting the 
evolution and growth of the stock market, as well as undermining the investor protection. 
 
Brokerage firms are playing more significant roles in the growing financial market and are 
essential in the modern state’s economic regulations. These brokerage firms are entrusted to 
perform the process of trading in the stock market and to conduct all other tasks related to the 
securities industry, emerging as a prominent financing competitor to banks. In order for the 
stock market to carry out its functions, the broker must play a critical role in the trading process. 
Broker enable investor to trade and, thus, provide liquidity. They are also responsible for 
ensuring that the entire process operates free from stock market fraud. Securities market in any 
country require brokerage companies to create an economic and financial environment to 
promote development in accordance with the modern standards and conditions. Therefore, 
these companies strictly control the laws in order to claim the role required of them.765 
 
																																																								
763 Lawrence M Salinger, Encyclopedia of White-Collar & Corporate Crime (Sage 2005) vol 1. 
 
764 Steven Mark Levy, Regulations of Securities: SEC Answer Book (Aspen Publishers Online 2011) 
PP22,31. 
765 Langevoort (n 751). 
	 226	
6.3 Theoretical Perspective on Brokerage 
6.3.1 Definition of Broker 
	
The Saudi legislature has cited several definitions of broker: The first definition:  "authorized 
person: a person who is authorized to carry on securities business by the Authority."766 This is 
a brief definition, and does not explain the nature of the authorized person, whether it is a 
natural person or legal entity. But the advantage of this definition is that it includes all aspects 
of the securities business (dealing and protect, consulting, and management). 
 
The second definition: the second Thirty Article of the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  
stipulates that “Broker means a joint stock company that carries on brokerage activities and the 
broker agent who is working at the brokerage company and carries out all or part the following 
activities:  acts in a commercial capacity as an intermediary in the trading of Securities, other 
than persons working on the basis of a contractual arrangement as defined in paragraph (b) of 
this Article, including any person who commercially acts as a custodian for Securities; presents 
in a commercial capacity an offer to others for obtaining financial assets in the form of 
Securities by opening an account through which transactions in Securities may be effected; 
effects in a commercial capacity Securities transactions for its own account other than by way 
of issuing Securities, in order to create a market in Securities and make a profit out of the 
difference between offer prices for Securities and demand; acquires or places Securities in a 
commercial capacity for an issuer or a person who controls an issuer; acts as an intermediary 
in a commercial capacity - other than persons who act on the basis of a contractual arrangement 
as defined in paragraph (b) of this Article - including in arranging currency or Securities 
swaps".767 
 
However, the UK legislature has defined  the term “Authorised Person” as  a person who is 
authorised under section 31 of FSMA768  which state that  “(1)The following persons are 
authorised for the purposes of this Act (a)a person who has a Part IV permission to carry on 
one or more regulated activities; (b)an EEA firm qualifying for authorisation under Schedule 
3; (c)a Treaty firm qualifying for authorisation under Schedule 4; (d)a person who is otherwise 
																																																								
766 Glossary of defined terms used in Saudi Authorized Person Regulations. 
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authorised by a provision of, or made under, this Act. (2)In this Act “authorised person” means 
a person who is authorised for the purposes of this Act.”769  Also, there is another definition 
under term of  “ Broker dealer” According to the rule of London exchange stock that  “Broker 
dealer” “in relation to transactions in securities of any description, a member firm which is not 
a market maker, a gilt inter dealer broker, or a wholesale dealer broker in those securities” 770 
 
Summarize the above, that the financial broker is a person legally representing a brokerage 
firm. It is not permissible for non-brokerage firms in the Saudi regime to do some or all aspects 
of the securities business, which is doing the work on behalf of the investor. Further, that the 
system has to clarify the conditions and obligations and rights of broker, which will be 
discussed in detail in the next sections. Moreover, Saudi market law distinguishes between a 
broker, a dealer and an investment advisor and all of them require to register as an authorized 
person. 
  
6.3.2  Functions of Broker 
	
Market broker deal with diverse investor, therefore, their functions in the stock market vary 
according to the investor with whom they are dealing. Their main functions are the negotiation 
of securities and advice and counselling.771 
 
6.3.2.1 Trading Securities 
	
The negotiation of securities relates to the implementation of buy or sell orders, from which 
market broker obtain a commission. Therefore, the broker works to achieve the best possible 
price (within the framework of negotiation). 772The commands are associated with a specific 
duration. The negotiation of securities requires knowledge of the conditions of the financial 
market and adequate information about the securities under negotiation. It also requires a great 
deal of experience in the movement of stock prices in the market. For example, the broker must 
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be able to decide correctly whether the time is right or whether it is better to wait until the right 
moment in order to achieve the best sale or purchase price for the customer.773 
 
6.3.2.2 Advice and Counselling 
	
Broker can provide advice and counselling to client  regarding investment decisions and the 
factors that may involve the sale and purchase of the values transmitted in operations. The 
remaining limits of counselling and advice provided to the client depend on the conditions 
agreed upon between the broker and the client.774 For example, the broker might be committed 
to play only the role of adviser and not have the right to decide or to exceed the supervision of 
the values transmitted.775 
 
6.4 The Brokerage Contract  
	
In the stock market, the brokerage contract defines the rights and obligations of the broker and 
the client. Brokerage contracts vary according to the distinctive characteristics of mediation in 
securities. They include consensual contracts, onerous contracts and executed contracts. 
 
6.4.1 Exchange Contracts 
	
In consensual contracts, which result from the mere agreement of the parties. It does not 
demand the performance of any formal or representative acts to fix the obligation, also, the 
parties of the contract are willing individuals to the conclusion of the contract. This freedom is 
not absolute but constrained by the restrictions imposed by law to protect the parties to the 
contract and the organisation of the work in the stock market. For example, one of the 
restrictions imposed by the law is that the brokerage contract is that the form prepared by the 
brokerage firm, which is consistent with capital market law and its executive regulations. The 
Saudi legislature has committed both sides to writing and concluding brokerage contracts in 
securities.776 
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It is worth mentioning that the brokerage contract in securities is not a submission contract 
because it does not contain arbitrary conditions on the part of the company. In the Saudi regime, 
Article (38 / b) of the regulations for authorized persons deals with the terms of the provision 
of services to customers. It states explicitly that the terms of the contract or agreement between 
the parties should adhere to the conventional formula. The Saudi legal system gives legislative 
guarantees to the client (investor) in dealing with brokerage firms in securities.777 
 
6.4.2 Consensual Contracts 
	
One advantage of brokerage contracts in securities is the consensual contract. This type of 
contract creates mutual obligations between the parties and obliges the brokerage company to 
sell and purchase securities for the account of the client. In exchange, the client pays the agreed 
commission. The broker is not paid a fee if the mediation does not lead to the conclusion of the 
contract. If there is no conclusion of the contract because of the broker’s intransigence, the 
court may compensate the broker in a suit of effort. In onerous contracts, the brokerage firm 
has the legal right to deduct the commission from the customer’s account without reference to 
the client.778  
 
6.4.3 Executed Contracts 
	
This type of contract concerns the content of the implementation, where the brokerage firm is 
committed to ensuring that the contract is fulfilled. Even if the client does not comply with the 
extradition of securities or the payment of securities that have been purchased, it falls on the 
brokerage firm's commitment to guarantee in all cases the implementation of its own money, 
as stated in the law. Thus, if the securities have perished, the brokerage firm bears the 
responsibility to provide other securities to perform the contract. In executed contracts, the 
commitment of the brokerage company is to ensure the implementation of the contract.779 
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6.5 Legal Aspect for Broker in Securities 
	
In securities trading, the brokerage process is a business, and the person who performs this 
work is considered, either natural person or legal entity, a dealer. The trader is natural person 
or legal entity who carries his or her name and account in a professional business. Regarding a 
commercial enterprise (i.e., a business brokerage), the Saudi Commercial Court system states 
explicitly in Article (2) (considered one of the business all that is conducted (c) with respect to 
bonds; all kinds of transfers or money exchange and brokerage).780 
 
After the issuance of the Capital Market Law in 2003, the mediation in securities was not 
considered until after the terms were offered, the necessary license was obtained from the 
Capital Market Authority, and proof of professional experience in dealing in securities was 
provided. There is no dispute that commercial brokerage companies serve brokerage purposes, 
but it is important that the company is committed to the obligations imposed by the law. 
However, the logical question that arises concerns the quality of the mediation. Is it a 
commission brokerage or a normal brokerage? Is it a special type of brokerage? In order to 
answer these questions, jurists follow a number of directions about the quality of mediation in 
the financial market, which the following example illustrates:  
 
A team of jurists mediated a securities broker who was a commission agent, based on the 
method of the direct broker of the coin.781 This greatly resembled the work of the broker 
commission because the broker contracts in his own name on behalf of the investor. According 
to this view, the commission agent contracts in his own name and the account of the investor, 
but if the brokerage firm receives buying and selling orders from investor, it is not lawful for 
companies to do business in their own names under the Saudi legal system.782 
 
This example does not include the Saudi Commercial Court Law issued by Royal Decree No. 
M / 2 and the date 1390, the Saudi Arabia Commercial Agencies Law issued by Royal Decree 
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No. M / 11 or the date of H20 / 2/1382 private proxy commission compact, except for the 
definition of the agency commission in the Commercial Court of Law, where the provision in 
Article 18 states, “The commission agent is a person engaged in the commercial activities upon 
trust or on behalf of others. The transactions of such agents shall be conducted in their names 
or by stating the address of the company of their authorizer”.783  
 
The commission agent, whether an individual or a company, can contract with third parties in 
his own name on the behalf of others. The broker in the securities brokerage does not sign his 
own name but carries out the orders issued to him by the investor, regardless of whether it is 
buying or selling. The regulations for the Law of the Saudi capital market with respect to 
licensed persons are stated in article (47), which stipulates the following:784 
 
“Contract Notes (a) An authorised person who effects a sale or purchase of a security with or 
for a client must send the client a contract note forthwith. Authorised Persons regulations 47 
(b) A contract note does not have to be sent where the authorised person is acting as manager 
and the client has confirmed that he will not require such contracts notes to be provided in 
writing. (c) Contract notes must provide the information required in Annex 5.5.”785 
 
Article (47) stipulates that the broker’s work lies in the agency of the client, which is both in 
buying and selling, under the Agency's own conditions. The condition that concerns us is 
dealing on behalf of and for the account of the client. Because the deputy broker for the client 
acts in the name and account of the client, the law requires the broker to open an account for 
the benefit of the client (investor) without being involved in the trade paper of the client or 
dispose of his money without a certified power of attorney from the same client. Based on the 
above, the fundamental differences between a brokerage in securities and an agency 
commission is that there is no support that a stock broker is a commission agent.786 
 
Although some opinions hold that the securities broker (commission agent), the nature of the 
place of contracting, and the securities of the movables starting. In response to this statement, 
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the standard of discrimination in the work of broker securities is to oblige the law as requested 
by the profession, which stresses specialized precision in performance.787 The stock broker 
must adhere to the principles, rules, provisions and standards set forth for the exercise of private 
business trading securities to ensure the stability of the performance of the financial market on 
the near and distant levels, unlike the commission brokerage, which is a possible place of 
activity in trading any kind of portables. Therefore, it is not acceptable that a stock broker is a 
commission agent regardless of the number of views about this matter.788 
 
In the preceding example, the last team of jurists reversed the view of the first team and 
differentiated between the broker contracting in his own name and the commission agent for 
the accounts of client. However, if his role was limited to the rapprochement between the 
parties to the transaction, he shall be an intermediary (broker) normal, and the evidence for this 
is the standard method of contracting. 
 
This is a critical point. The commission agent cannot be regarded as a stock broker or an 
ordinary broker because the intermediary (broker) of securities is subject to the provisions of 
the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  and its implementing regulations. They require the broker 
to obtain licenses from the competent authorities in order to do business in the trading of 
securities. In addition, the broker in the financial market will be a guarantor in the field of 
mediation in securities under the law. 
 
In another view, the mediation in securities is of a private nature. The researcher supports 
adapting mediation in securities as having an independent legal status subject to the system of 
the Saudi stock market. Under the law, the consequent commitment to the principles, rules and 
provisions and standards set forth in the law for the exercise of private business, a securities 
trading above this regulations and that intermediary (broker) is not a normal broker and is not 
an agent on commission. Brokerage firms usually hire natural persons as securities assistants 
(agents). Each securities brokerage firm must have one or more representatives who initiate 
brokerage business on behalf of the firm. The legal description of the assistant or agent varies 
depending on the relationship it has with the brokerage firm. If the relationship is an 
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employment contract, then obligations arise from the employment contract. If the relationship 
is with the company’s contract agency, it is an agent in accordance with an agreement with the 
brokerage firm.789 
 
However, the Saudi law on the capital market selects the form of the relationship between the 
securities brokerage firm and its agent. It states explicitly that the agent works for the brokerage 
firm. Article (32 / A) of the same system states, “Broker means a joint stock company that 
carries on brokerage activities and the broker agent who is working at the brokerage company 
and carries out all or part the following activities…. ”790. 
 
Based on the text, the agent is the company continued to mediation, and mediation is not 
practiced in his name or on his own account, but in the name and account of the company, 
which in turn earns the company the broker recipe, and the recipe merchant at the same time. 
The brokerage firm’s obligations are imposed by law and apply to both broker that trade stocks, 
as well as dealers. In contrast, the agent does not acquire rights nor assume obligations other 
than the dictates of his employment contract.791 
 
Even the  Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  has identified acts by proxy, as cited in Article (32 
/ A) of the same Act, which states, “(a) Broker means a joint stock company that carries on 
brokerage activities and the broker agent who is working at the brokerage company and carries 
out all or part the following activities: .792  
 
Acts in a commercial capacity as an intermediary in the trading of Securities, other than persons 
working on the basis of a contractual arrangement as defined in paragraph (b) of this Article, 
including any person who commercially acts as a custodian for Securities;793  Presents in a 
commercial capacity an offer to others for obtaining financial assets in the form of Securities 
by opening an account through which transactions in Securities may be effected; Effects in a 
commercial capacity Securities transactions for its own account other than by way of issuing 
Securities, in order to create a market in Securities and make a profit out of the difference 
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between offer prices for Securities and demand;  Acquires or places Securities in a commercial 
capacity for an issuer or a person who controls an issuer;  Acts as an intermediary in a 
commercial capacity - other than persons who act on the basis of a contractual arrangement as 
defined in paragraph (b) of this Article - including in arranging currency or Securities swaps.794  
 
6.6 How a Broker Provides Suitable Recommendations to his/her 
Client  
	
 It is known that in the original contract, that the relationship between the seller and the buyer 
directly, but that the legislature's failure to enforce this contract, this contract between the seller 
and the buyer only through brokers, and from here became broker are direct parties to the 
contract. On that arise between the seller and the broker and mutual commitments to each other.  
 
6.6.1 Fiduciary Duty of a Broker Dealer in KAS and UK 
	
When considering fiduciary duty, there are numerous meanings which can be addressed. At 
either equity or law, it is categorised as the uppermost standard of care. It is anticipated that a 
fiduciary or ‘fid’ should be tremendously devoted to the individual to whom they are indebted 
to or the ‘principal’ and they must not place their individual and personal needs and interests 
ahead of the duty.795 Additionally, if he/she does not have permission from the principal to do 
so, they must not generate proceeds from being a fiduciary. The term fiduciary was founded 
and originated from the Latin fides which means faith and fiduciary which means trust796.  
 
To explain further, when the relationship with the client and fiduciary contains a high level of 
trust, assurance and dependence, these qualities are expected to be illustrated by the fiduciary’s 
choice to represent them out of their freedom of choice or proficiency. It is imperative that the 
fiduciary ought to knowledgably agree to accept the trust and assurance to apply his proficiency 
and discretion and act for the client. For instance, it is forbidden by the law that, when one 
individual conforms to acting for a client in a fiduciary relationship, to act in any means or 
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method opposing or conflicting to the principle interests and aims of the client, or, additionally, 
behaving in a manner for his own personal gain relating to the specific subject.797  
 
The fiduciary must perform their full ability, compassion and attentiveness on behalf of their 
client as it is their fundamental right to receive the uppermost care from their fiduciary. 
Furthermore, when an individual has agreed to act as a fiduciary for a client, they are regarded 
in a specific light which requires them to act with excellent trustworthiness and is forbidden to 
attain any personal advantages which are only gained at the disadvantage of the client.798  
 
The court discussed the following elements of fiduciary duty when referring to the Bristol and 
West Building Society v Mothew case: “The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the 
obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. 
This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a 
profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest 
may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the 
informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient 
to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the 
fiduciary…” 799This specific case illustrates clearly how a principle has numerous fiduciary 
duties and responsibilities which they are expected to conduct gracefully for their client .800  
 
Finally, essentially a fiduciary duty is an ethical, yet, legal relationship amid a client and a 
defendant. Overall, one party is responsible and has the legal duty to do their upmost to 
generate the desired result for the client, as long as there is a full admission and even if it is 
stated that there is a conflict of interest between the parties.801  
 
As mentioned above regarding the fiduciary duty obligation in general, the same concepts are 
applied for a broker as it is seen in Saudi market law. Consequently, as a broker has a duty to 
act with the highest standard of good faith and loyalty. Thus brokers' obligations must be met 
																																																								
p3. 
797 D Theodore Rave, ‘Politicians as Fiduciaries’ [2013] P44. 
798 Jeffrey N Gordon and Paul Davies, Principles of Financial Regulations (Oxford University Press 
2016) P33. 
799 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18 per tt" Lord Millet 
800 Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto-Sakmann, Breach of Trust (Bloomsbury Publishing 2002) P71. 
801 John McGhee, The Role of Fiduciary Obligations in Commercial Disputes (2004)P16. 
	 236	
under the broker contract; this section will address the most prominent of these obligations. 
The broker should stick with seven obligations; it is on the whole: Because the Saudi regulator 
did not put a special chapter for the obligations of brokers. But it distributed between the lines 
of market laws and regulations.  One criticism of the Authorized Persons regulations is that the 
Saudi regulator confused the terms of the broker and its obligations in Part II - Article (5) under 
the title (The Principles for Authorized Persons). This confirms the need to amend several 
materials and revise commitments in a separate chapter in the Saudi capital Market Law (2003) 
.802 
 
A broker must adhere to seven obligations that clarify what a broker has to do in order not to 
breach his/her fiduciary duty obligation; these obligations are detailed as follows: 
 
Taking Into Account The Interests Of Client : the necessity of the broker taking into account 
the interests of its client , including integrity, skilled care, diligence, and implementing 
transactions with fairness and justice, to avoid any inconsistency between the broker's interests 
and the interests of the client, and, if such a conflict of interests arises, to disclose it to the 
client.803 
 
Informing client  about Last securities prices: The broker must inform traders of the Last stock 
prices, because it is based on this information the investor make a decision,804who make 
investment decisions based on a broker’s statements and recommendation. 
 
Protecting The Confidentiality of Investor Information: a broker has a fiduciary duty toward 
his client that must be committed to protecting investor information, and must not disclose this 
information, except in cases stipulated by law and regulations, as stipulated in Article 29 of the 
Authorized Persons regulations. An Authorized Person must keep information obtained from 
client  confidential, except where: '' 1) its disclosure is required by the Capital Market Law or 
its Implementing regulations or the applicable laws of the Kingdom; 2) the client has consented 
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to its disclosure; 3) its disclosure is reasonably necessary to perform a particular service for the 
client; or 4) the information is no longer confidential.805 
 
Ensuring the availability of the price of the securities in the investor's account before the 
implementation of the deal: Before executing investors' orders, the Broker is obligated to 
ensure the availability of the price of the securities in the investor's account. All members must 
make sure before the pro-ordered the availability of trading documents, written in the correct 
format, and that the Broker shall be liable for any defect in the stock delivery or non-payment 
by the buyer of value.806 
 
Executing trading orders according to the investor's instructions: The broker must implement 
the buying and selling of the security as instructed by the investor, in terms of type, time, and 
quantity. The brokerage firm, however, has the right to refuse certain clientorders if there is 
legal justification to justify its refusal807. Legal justifications for refusal include manipulation 
in the market or insider trading.808 
 
Informing The Investor Of The Outcome Of Implementation: When the broker receives orders 
from the investor in trading in certain securities, the investor should know the outcome of this 
order after implementation, and the broker is obligated to give notice to the investor 
periodically.809 
 
Customizing in A Timely Manner: The broker, after the implementation of the order, should 
deposit in the investor's account the transaction amount in the case of a selling order, and the 
security if it was a buying order, to enable investor to take advantage of the results from the 
deal, as stipulated by the Capital Market Authority law. 
 
However, according to the UK has similar concepts about fiduciary duty, the broker should 
comply with the FCA rules, which set out the fiduciary duty of a broker toward his client as 
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followed810:  Firstly, integrity: the broker need to take caution on its business with integrity, 
and ensure the integrity of transactions carried out by to their client .  secondly, skill, care and 
diligence:  broker should conduct its transactions' client  with due skill, care and diligence.  
 
In ICS Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (No2) [1999] Lloyds Rep PN 496 at 504 Evans-
Lombe J said that in carrying out its tasks for a client, an IFA: “…owed to its client  contractual 
duties to exercise the care and professional skills appropriate to an organization presenting 
itself as an expert independent financial adviser; to provide its client  with independent advice 
in their best interests and not to allow its own interests to conflict with those of its client …”811  
thirdly, management and control: a broker must take reasonable care to organize and control 
its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems.  fourthly, 
financial prudence: a broker must preserve sufficient financial funds.  fifthly, market conduct: 
a broker must observe proper standards of market conduct. sixthly, customers’ interests: a 
broker must pay due regard to the interests of its client  and treat them fairly.  moreover, 
communications with client : a broker must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its 
advice and discretionary decisions for any client who is entitled to rely upon its judgment. 
 
As broker’s duties of care will often require them to take advice. In Cowan v Scargill, Mr 
Justice Megarry said: That duty [of care] includes the duty to seek advice on matters which the 
trustee does not understand, such as the making of investments, and on receiving that advice 
to act with the same degree of prudence. ... Although a trustee who takes advice on investments 
is not bound to accept and act on that advice, he is not entitled to reject it merely because he 
sincerely disagrees with it, unless in addition to being sincere he is acting as an ordinary prudent 
man would act”.812 in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Pitt v Holt, Lord Justice Lloyd said 
“where tax matters are relevant (as they often will be), it is likely to be the duty of the trustees, 
under their duty of skill and care, to take proper advice as to those matters.”813 
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In addition, client’ assets; a broker must arrange adequate protection for client ’ assets when it 
is responsible for them. Finally, 814  relations with regulators a broker must deal with its 
regulators in an open and cooperative way and must disclose the appropriate regulator 
appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect 
notice.815 
 
6.6.2 Saudi capital Market Law (2003) and its Implementing Regulations 
Regarding Securities Fraud and Unsuitable Recommendations 
 
While the Saudi capital Market Law (2003) method relating to fraud has similarities, the Saudi 
law has categorized financial fraud into two principle chief frauds. The first category is market 
manipulation and the second category is where all insider trading falls into, yet, they each have 
distinct articles.  
 
Article 49 discusses the fraud of market manipulation briefly and mentions some defilements 
which disobey the law, however, there is no thorough state regarding the restrictions for the 
forms of frauds which have been addressed. It is a convenient method for adding additional 
defilements as it alters on a regular basis. The law has enabled and given the power to Capital 
Market Authority to produce updated regulations whenever it is necessary. From this 
exploration and investigation, this article forms the primary anti-fraud establishment in relation 
to securities fraud. Furthermore, the Saudi regulator (CMA) has the capability to identify the 
claim inappropriate endorsement claim that is provided by a client or broker.  
 
Additionally, Market Conduct regulations is a further instigating law which has been 
established by the CMA. This regulations has a specific element which is related to authorised 
person conduct. This particular regulations involves regulations associated with churning and 
prohibition of trading when recommended to discontinue. These two articles which have been 
addressed are associated with the suitability concept and, therefore, if a broker does so, they 
are encroaching upon the law.  
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Article sixteen says “An authorized person must not advise or solicit a client to deal or deal or 
arrange a deal in the course of managing for a client if the dealing would reasonably be regarded 
as contrary to the interest of the client, having regard to the number and frequency of trades 
relative to the client’s investment objectives, financial situation and the size and character of 
his account”.816  Article sixteen is centered on ‘churning’ which is defined as unauthorized 
trading. It continually comes along with inappropriate endorsement as a principle defilement 
conducted by a broker. Additionally, the article addressed and illustrated an evident image 
regarding inappropriateness of endorsement as it will be addressed more fully in relation to the 
suitability concept.  
 
The other article is article nineteen, which is in the same regulations which points out the 
following “Where an authorized person or any of its affiliates issues an investment 
recommendation, research, study or analysis relating to a security it is prohibited from: 
1)  providing advice to a client or making a trade for a client that is contrary to the 
recommendation unless the authorized person, prior to providing the advice or making the 
trade, discloses to the client the recommendation and the potential conflict of interest between 
the authorized person and the client; or 2) Making a trade for its own account in the security 
that is contrary to the recommendation.817 
 
This specific regulations forbids the broker from implementing transactions in contradiction to 
the endorsements, or studies expect if complete admission is given to the costumer. To make 
this clear, essentially, this defilement is categorised as an inappropriate endorsement for the 
client as it is evident that the client is being represented in an incorrect manner. Transporting 
the discussion to an additional law, the professionals are able to depend on the authorised 
person applying and executing laws which discuss in depth the suitability concept to allow the 
claim to be stronger and more dependable. This regulations will be addressed more thoroughly 
further in the study.818  
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6.6.3 KSA and UK Rules About Suitability 
	
The word ‘suitability’ in ordinary language means being ‘right or appropriate for a particular 
person, purpose, or situation’ 819  or ‘acceptable or right for someone or something’820. From 
the viewpoint of policymakers, there is an exact conception of suitability, which can be said to 
be ‘a policy judgement that investor should neither be encouraged nor permitted to invest 
outside their tolerance of risk’.821 This section attempts to explain the significance of suitability 
in a stock market under the regulations of a securities market. 
 
It might be a truism to say that insufficient financial recommendation would lead to 
misallocation of resources and therefore losses in the welfare of society.822  It is for this reason 
that it is argued that suitability helps in increasing investor confidence through the knowledge 
that no inappropriate advice will be offered. Therefore, it could be claimed that suitability is a 
significant regulatory duty since it promotes not only the efficiency of the economy by ensuring 
the quality of advisory services, but also the confidence of investor that they will obtain suitable 
advice. Suitability as a regulatory duty shows that it designed to ensure that broker would 
ensure that the content of the recommendation was suitable to the needs of  investor.823   
 
As a regulatory rule, it is believed that the idea of ‘suitability’ was established in order to 
impose two different kinds of duties upon advisers. The first is the need to tailor suitability to 
specific client needs and requirements, and therefore to enable them to make informed 
judgments about the suitability of securities. Secondly, the suitability of a financial product to 
be an ‘appropriate investment’, based upon a sensible foundation and recognized as a 
‘reasonable-basis suitability’. Key to suitability is that a broker should always have a 
reasonable belief that the securities they recommend are suitable for the client.824 
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6.6.3.1 Know your Client Rules in UK 
	
According to definition of fiduciary duty for broker that mentioned earlier, an important 
question arises with respect to the recommending transactions, and What a broker needs to 
know regarding opening a client account? In order to answer these questions examine Know 
your client rules in the UK, which are required by many laws of concept of knowing your client 
(KYC) is required client due diligence, such as that under COBS 9.2.1R and 9.2.2R, are 
Requires a firm to learn necessary facts about a client's knowledge and experience, such as 
his/her financial condition and his/her investment goals, to assess suitability.825 
 
Article COBS 9.2.1R it points out that “(1) A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that a 
personal recommendation, or a decision to trade, is suitable for its client. (2) When making the 
personal recommendation or managing his investments, the firm must obtain the necessary 
information regarding the client's: (a) knowledge and experience in the investment field 
relevant to the specific type of designated investment or service; (b) financial situation; and (c) 
investment objectives; so as to enable the firm to make the recommendation, or take the 
decision, which is suitable for him”.826 
 
According to previous article it is not very clear which information should be enough to know 
about broker's client . yet there is other article about Suitability which is COB 5.3 it would be 
more clear. Moreover, another rule can be useful which is The Money Laundering regulations 
2007.  Accordingly, the information might be gained a day or a month or even a year before a 
service is offered. However, firms should bear in mind COBS 9.2.5R in this event  
Nevertheless, if information has been taken in advance, broker will demand to to updating of 
client information.827 
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University Press 2008) P3.  
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6.6.3.2 Know your Client Rule in Saudi Law 
	
It is important for any broker or an authorized person to know necessary information before 
he/she accepts any client in order to open an account. Therefore, broker is required only to 
recommend “suitable” investments based on whether recorded information is held and has been 
provided by client as long as it not contains incomplete or inaccurate information about a client. 
So In article 39 of authorized person in Saudi, it states that “1)    Before an authorized person 
deals, advises, or manages for a customer, it must obtain information from the client concerning 
the customer’s financial situation, investment experience and investment objectives relevant to 
the services to be provided. Such information must be obtained as a precondition to providing 
such services. 2)    The information required under paragraph (a) of this Article must at a 
minimum include the information required by Annex 5.3. 3) The authorized person must 
request an update of such information from each client at least annually. 4)  If the client refuses 
to provide the information required under this Article, the authorized person may not deal, 
advice or manage for him. 5)  An authorized person must retain a record of all information 
obtained from the client pursuant to this Article.”828 
 
This Article concentrates on present data, and is something that should be annually revised and 
reviewed, updating as necessary.  As well as containing basic details regarding the client, this 
information ensures the broker can stay up-to-date with his/her client’s fiscal position, and the 
client’s investment knowledge and goals.  Annex 5.3, for example, requests information 
regarding estimated annual income and net worth (excluding residence), and questions whether 
the client already has an up-to-date investment portfolio, if so, how he/she expanded said 
portfolio, the extent and quality of any previous investment knowledge, and probes what 
qualities the client believes create the perfect portfolio.829   
 
Saudi law, however, does not disclose any data regarding institutional investor. It is important 
to note that Saudi law only records the following basic information from institutional client : 
name, address, date of registration, number of employees, capital, annual total turnover, bank 
details, and other financial particulars client  might decide to personally discuss.   Whether a 
client has requested a recommendation or not, in order to deliver the appropriate obligations, 
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the CMA has to complete any missing information, such as experience level or the role of the 
advisor in making investment judgments, for example. 
 
6.6.4 Broker Dealer Suitability Obligation Regarding to a Client     
6.6.4.1 The UK Rules About Client  
	
In situations where firms deliver portfolio management or investment advisory services, the 
COBS 9 suitability requirements look to make sure these firms collect sufficient details about 
their customers to act on their behalf in a compliant way.  Furthermore, that the services 
provided to, or for, their customers are suitable to their particular needs.  A trade decision or 
transaction can be considered improper if this information has not been collated or considered 
appropriately.830  The FCA's Principles for firms (PRIN) (PRIN 2.1), and particularly Principle 
9, are the starting point that the COBS 9 requirements expanded upon; stating that any client 
permitted to depend on the opinion of a firm must be able to rely on the firm taking reasonable 
care to make sure the advice is appropriate. 831 
 
The TCF Principle, based in Principle 6 of PRIN, is considered central as it enshrines the basic 
standard that firms must deal with their customers properly and give all necessary consideration 
to their welfare. Copied-out MiFID text is the basis of a magnitude of the COBS 9 rules.  The 
rule often known as the "client's best interests" rule, requiring a firm to act professionally and 
with integrity to achieve an optimum outcome for the client is contained in COBS 2.1.1R. 
Although not contained as part of COBS 9, it is never the less in the framework of suitability 
assessments significant.832  
 
The FSA also referred to there being The "irreducible minimum level of information" which a 
personal recommendation could not be provided is based on the principle of collating sufficient 
necessary information to achieve a suitable recommendation, rather than the obtaining of 
immaterial facts. However, the method of obtaining the requirement data to determine 
																																																								
830 Lewis D Lowenfels and Alan R Bromberg, ‘Suitability in Securities Transactions’ [1999] The 
Business Lawyer 1557. 
831 Nelson (n 823). 
832 Kern Alexander and Niamh Moloney, Law Reform and Financial Market (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2012) P25. 
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suitability is not advised upon by the FCA, nor therefore how businesses should collect the 
material required.833 
 
 6.6.4.2 The Saudi Rules about Client  
	
Saudi Authorized Person regulations indicated the concept of suitability theory obviously, this 
regulations can be applied in both individual and institutional investor. However, it is not 
interpreted to expand the concept for institutional investor, and provide very basic information 
for this important category. 834Thus Article 43 states:   
“(a.) An authorized person must not deal, advise or manage for a client or take collateral for its 
own account from a customer, unless the advice or transaction is suitable for that client having 
regard to the facts disclosed by that client and other relevant facts about that client of which 
the authorized person is, or reasonably should be, aware. 
(b.) In reviewing the suitability of advice or a transaction for a customer, an authorized person 
must have regard to: 
1) The customer’s knowledge and understanding of the relevant securities and markets, and of 
the risks involved; 
2) The customer’s financial standing, including an assessment of his net worth or of the value 
of his portfolio based on the information disclosed by that customers; 
3) The length of time the client has been active in the relevant markets, the   frequency of 
business and the extent to which he relies on the advice of the authorized person; 
4) The size and nature of transactions that have been undertaken for the client in the relevant 
markets; and 
5) The customer’s investment objectives. 
(c.) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this Article, if an authorized person has advised a client 
that a transaction is not suitable for him and the client decides to proceed with the transaction, 
an authorized person may accept an order to buy or sell the security from the customer, 
provided that a record of the advice provided to the client is retained. 
(d.) This Article does not apply to dealing for an execution-only customer.”835 
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There are some cases when a broker does not have an obligation to inform a client of the 
unsuitability of a recommended investment. A professional client may be advised as to market 
and prices with materials, discussions and views without a going as far as to "recommend" 
them, either professionally or personally. In this case the firm should enshrine their position 
with their client by detailing unambiguously that in the offering of data that no recommendation 
is attached. A principle question as to whether or not information imparted constitutes a 
recommendation is whether the client could have reasonably considered it to be a 
recommendation, and whether the firm presented the information in a manner that could be 
construed as offering a recommended approach. The contiguity, promptness or importance of 
a statement acting as a disclaimer will all have to be taken into account as to whether or not 
such a declaration can alter the nature of the communication. Should it be established that a 
personal recommendation was provided; a business is unable to contractually avoid the 
requirements of providing such a statement.836  
 
6.6.5 Broker Rights 
	
The broker plays an important role in achieving the economic interest of the State. The broker 
deals with financial assets, which are linked to financial institutions. Thus, the Saudi Legislator 
recognizes the importance in protecting the economic interest of the state and the interests of 
the investor. However, the broker has rights, as well, which the investor must respect.  
 
6.6.5.1 The Right to Obtain a Commission 
	
The broker collects a commission based on the contract with the client and peer commission 
fees. Saudi regime did not refer to this right directly, but obligated the broker to disclose to the 
client the commission due, as stipulated in Article 46 of the list of Authorized persons. The 
Saudi regime has set a minimum commission, has identified this amount in the Saudi market 
to SR 12 in any order has been implemented; it is equal to or less than the 10,000 SAR.837 
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837 Article 46 of The Saudi Authorized Persons Regulations  . 
	 247	
6.6.5.2 The Right to Monopolize the Brokerage Business 
	
This right is intended to ensure the sale and purchase of securities in the financial market is 
limited to stock broker alone; stakeholders (buyer and seller) must not enact deals without the 
involvement of a stock broker. This right of monopoly is limited to restricted stocks in the 
stock market; if a stock is not restricted, it may be traded without the involvement of a 
brokerage firm. The only condition is that it be announced at the stock exchange.838 
 
 As well as the UK legislator in  Part II Regulated And Prohibited Activities under section 19  
of FSMA” he general prohibition.(1) No person may carry on a regulated activity in the United 
Kingdom, or purport to do so, unless he is (a) an authorized person.  Moreover, an  Agreements 
made by unauthorized persons unenforceable against the other party. According to section 26 
of FSMA.839 
 
Under article 31 of the Capital Market Law (Brokerage business is restricted to a person 
holding a valid license and who is an agent of a joint stock company that is licensed to perform 
brokerage activities, unless such person is exempt from these requirements in accordance with 
paragraph (c) of Article 32.)840 
 
6.6.5.3 Broker Right to Expenses 
	
The broker has the right to reserve a portion of the client's funds if a balance is due and payable 
immediately, especially in the case of the client procrastination, and also has the right to recover 
the expenses incurred by the broker, which performs the process; they are often the ones 
stipulated in the expenses section of brokerage contract. These expenses may be administrative 
fees or expenses carried out by the broker as stipulated in Article 72 in the list of people 
authorized to Saudi Arabia. The right to recover the expenses did not refer to the Saudi regime, 
but it is the custom between the broker and his client.841 
 
																																																								
838  A Alarm, Commercial Broker in Financial Transactions (Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic 
University 1988).  
839 Section 26 of Financial Services and Market Act. 
840Capital Market Law. 
841 Ahmed Al Khamisa, Broker and the Investor in Securities Trading Disputes - the Study of Doctrinal 
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6.7 Responsibility of Broker in Saudi Law 
	
From examining what has been discussed above, it is clear to indicated that a broker has a 
fiduciary duty toward his/her client. Therefore, there is a requirement to know how the law 
court determines and defines the fiduciary responsibilities of a broker’s client. As it discussed 
previously there are special circumstances that illuminate what a broker dealer has to do in 
order not to violation his/her fiduciary duty obligations. which will be conversed in this section. 
A brokerage firm doing its job in the securities, trading selling and buying on behalf of its 
client, is taking into consideration the client's interest. This is the broker's commitment towards 
the client, and the brokerage must face consequences if it breaches this commitment. These 
consequences may take the form of either civil liability or criminal liability.842  In a civil 
liability, the brokerage firm will be required to compensate the client for all damages that occur 
to the client as a result of a breach of the brokerage company’s obligations. If the brokerage 
company commits a criminal offense in accordance with the capital market regulations and 
other related regulations, it faces criminal charges. Laws exist to alleviate abuses of the 
financial market as well as abuse of investor by brokerage firms. 843 
 
In the next two sections, it will discuss the implications of civil and criminal liability for 
brokerage firms in the securities.  
 
6.7.1 Civil Liability of the Broker in the Saudi Law 
	
A broker contract in the Saudi stock market is a binding contract for the parties of contract, and 
it imposes on the parties several obligations. A breach of those obligations will result in 
contractual liability. Moreover, the brokerage firms are responsible for illegal action, which 
fall under tort liability. Both civil and criminal liabilities require compensation for the damage. 
Breach of the obligations arising from the contract presupposes the existence of contractual 
link between the injured and responsible for the damage, before the damage has taken place. 
The illegal action or tort committed without a precedent contractual link between the injured 
and responsible for the damage negates the injured party's right of compensation. Civil liability 
																																																								
842 Carol R Goforth, ‘Stockbrokers’ Duties to Their Customers’ (1989) 33 St Louis ULJ 407. 
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	 249	
of brokerage can be divided into three categories: wrongdoing on the part of the broker; 
negligence on the part of the broker; and damage and causal relationships.844 
 
6.7.1.1 Wrongdoing on the Part of the Broker 
	
The first pillar of civil liability is wrongdoing on the part of the securities broker845. When a 
brokerage fails to abide by its obligations to the investor, the brokerage is then obligated to 
compensate for the wrongdoing. The broker's liability is based on expected due diligence; the 
trial judge, with the aid of experts in the field, determines the broker's fault and liability. In this 
section, I will examine the most important forms of civil wrongdoing by the broker in light of 
the Saudi regime, as follows. 846 
 
6.7.1.1.1 Breach of the Broker's Duty to Know the Customer 
	
As previously mentioned, broker are required only to recommend “suitable” investments based 
on whether recorded information is held and has been provided by client as long as it not 
contains incomplete or inaccurate information about a client.  So It is important for any broker 
to know necessary information before he/she accepts any client in order to open an account.  
The Saudi legislator committed the broker in Article 39 of the Authorized Persons regulations  
: "(a) Before an authorised person deals, advises, or manages for a customer, it must obtain 
information from the client concerning the customer’s financial situation, investment 
experience and investment objectives relevant to the services to be provided. Such information 
must be obtained as a precondition to providing such services. (b) The information required 
under paragraph (a) of this Article must at a minimum include the information required by 
Annex 5.3. (c) The authorised person must request an update of such information from each 
client at least annually. (d) If the client refuses to provide the information required under this 
Article, the authorised person may not deal, advise or manage for him. (e) An authorised person 
must retain a record of all information obtained from the client pursuant to this Article."847 
																																																								
 
844AlTuwaijri (n 802).  
845 Rowan Cruft and others, Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff 
(Oxford University Press 2011)P180. 
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It is also the broker's obligation to ensure the customer's capacity for the conclusion of 
transactions; this ensures there is no valid transactions on behalf of an incompetent client, 
which would cause the broker to bear responsibility for harm to others involved in the 
transaction.   
 
6.7.1.1.2 Breach of the Broker's Duty to Take into Account the Interests of 
Client   
	
If the general rule in the regular agency, it's an exchange contract, unless otherwise agreed, 
meaning identifying commission which depends on the will of the parties, unlike the brokerage 
contract which is consider contract of exchange, thus the broker must achieve a result, and 
through efforts treating them fairly and paying due regard to customers’ interests. Thus arises 
the contractual responsibility of broker, when he a breach of this obligation, which may cause 
damage to the customer.848 
 
In the case of (Securities and Resolution of Securities Disputes), No. 35 / L / D 1/2007 issued 
in case 9/27.849 Summarizing the facts of this case, the plaintiff submitted the Commission 
regulations suit in which he stated that he had handed over to the defendant the certificate of 
shares of the Saudi Electricity Company Certificate (8551 shares), as well as the certificate of 
shares of Nadec Company (52 shares). So as to deposit these shares in its investment portfolio 
at the prosecutor's branch in the (magnificent area), in order that he can buy and sell in galleries 
shares or equity funds, so the prosecutor's branch sent the certificates to manage stock. After a 
passage of time, the prosecutor offered to ask the prosecutor’s branch not to deposit the banking 
stocks portfolio to the plaintiff.  After reviewing the prosecutor's branch in the (magnificent 
area) several times, the official said he had not received any response from the Depository 
Share Centre. The prosecutor, therefore, filed a complaint that the General Directorate of the 
defendant repeat the request to return the original certificates, as well as requesting 
compensation for the damage he suffered during the period without receiving an answer to the 
complaint. Consequently, the plaintiff filed a complaint to the Capital Market Authority, 
represented by the Committee chapter in securities disputes.  In this case the broker breached 
its obligation to take into account the interests of the investor, and in breach of the duties of the 
secretariat, missed the investor stock certificate, as he was delayed for nearly seven months in 
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allocating the stock investor, and from disposing of his property and investment, The 
Commission, therefore, ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiff in the amount of 
8885709 SAR.850 
 
6.7.1.1.3 Lack of Communication with Client  
	
A brokerage contract requires the broker to enlighten and provide the necessary information to 
client in a way that is clear, fair, and not misleading, therefore, the client  can make appropriate 
decisions. If a broker deliberately neglects to inform or enlighten the investor with information 
or necessary data, provides inappropriate advice, or favors the interests of one investor at the 
expense of another, the broker is liable for damages. This article and its contents of 43  of the 
Authorized Persons regulations obligates the broker, when giving advice to the client, to take 
into account the client's understanding and knowledge of the capital market and the risks and 
financial position and the value of an investment portfolio.851 
 
6.7.1.1.4 Non-Delivery of Securities or Funds to Either the Buyer or the 
Seller 
	
As previously pointed out that the most important broker obligations are to deliver a stock price 
after the implementation of the sale or purchase for the account of investor, under the brokerage 
contract (contract of exchange),  not all deliver any of them exempts the broker of the 
responsibility for the damage that may affect the client, since not give up responsibility for the 
price of securities sold on behalf of the client. And in accordance with Article 67 of Authorized 
Persons regulations  . Unless paid to the client or a third party, based on the customer's 
instruction, or through a deposit account the customer's name, or if the money was due and 
payable licensee of a person.852 
 
6.7.1.1.5 Failure to Inform Traders of Stock Prices 
	
Consequent violation of the broker of the obligation determined by Article VII of trading rules 
in the Saudi stock market, Included in this picture contrary to Article broker  (8/5) of the 
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Authorized Persons regulations, which necessitated the broker obligation to provide the client 
with information in a clear, fair, and not misleading manner.853 The trading rules in the Saudi 
market state that the broker should be keen to implement all client orders and then inform the 
client the outcome of execution, whether the implementation was successful. The notice should 
contain the broker email and name and number of the account and  the type of security.854 
 
6.7.1.1.6 Failure to Implement Trading Orders According to Investor 
Instructions 
	
Failure to abide by investor instructions when trading is a clear violation of contractual 
obligations, and can cause significant damage to the investor. For example, an investor asked 
broker to trade on a certain security, but the broker trade instead on another security; or the 
broker trades on a banned security instead of permissible securities, causing the investor to lose 
the price of these securities or even to fall subject to legal liability. In all cases, if management 
of the investor's securities is not permissible according stock market law, the broker forfeits 
the commission, and is liable for compensation for the damage caused to the investor.855 
 
Another example is a broker trading contrary the investor's orders by buying a security at a 
higher price than the price fixed by the investor, a price which the financial capacity of investor 
or is contrary to his expectations. Likewise, a broker trading securities at a lower price instead 
of specified price that asked by investor. The broker may also breach the investor's trust by 
trading the wrong number of securities.  The damage caused by the broker's breach of the 
investor's order could have been avoided if the broker committed to his orders.856 
 
Moreover, Article 12 of the Market Conduct regulations stipulates: "An Authorized person or 
a registered person must execute client orders for a security before executing any order for his 
own account."857 The broker must include in the client order the information recorded on the 
customer's identity and security that the client wants to buy or sell, the amount of securities 
covered, the terms, and whether it is the market order or a specific order. If it is a specific order, 
it must record the price and the period of validity of the order, and the registration and 
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implementation of any amendments to the existing orders Moreover, the broker must execute 
orders on time according to the instructions issued by the investor.858 
 
6.7.1.1.7 Breach of The Duty to Execute Trades at the Right Time 
	
Saudi legislator committed a median speed of execution of investor orders without delay; the 
Article XV of the Market Conduct regulations that « An authorized person who executes a 
transaction based on a client order must ensure that the transaction is promptly allocated to the 
account of that client. An authorized person who executes a discretionary transaction must 
ensure that the transaction is promptly allocated to the account of the client for whom the 
authorized person decided to transact."859 
 
In the case of (Securities and Resolution of Securities Disputes), No. 22 / L / D 1/2006 issued 
in case 26/26. The prosecutor submitted the chapter in security disputes to the Committee. In 
the lawsuit he gave to the broker, the plaintiff stated that he ordered the sale for one day to the 
number of shares of 640 of the National Industrialization Company at a price of 582. Sales 
demand was then implemented, and the transaction amount (372.480) was suspended for a 
period of 51 days; the share price rose from (509) to (975). The plaintiff demanded 
compensation for losses suffered because of that comment in the amount of 300,000 riyals.  In 
this case, the broker breached its commitment to privatization in a timely manner, meaning that 
the amount was not allocated to the resulting sale within the 51-day stipulation; therefore, the 
Commission ruled to compensate the plaintiff the amount of 29,640 riyals. The Committee also 
felt that the broker violated his allocation in a timely manner, and that such breach required the 
responsibility of the violator.  Neither the violator nor the defendant proved the cause of 
responsibility for it, and as such, in this instance, the liability here is contractual liability.860 
 
It should be noted that the broker's commitment to the duty to execute trades at the right time 
is a scientific justification and legal reason for the commission. But this does not mean that the 
broker's commitment to perform the work, it is an obligation achieve a result, as always remain 
committed care and diligence.861  It is obvious by the nature of the broker contract that the 
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stockbroker is not obligated to implement the deals, as its commitment to ensure the safety of 
these deals , unless there is an agreement to the contrary of that, which led to the  extend the 
scope of its commitment to the implementation of the deal at a specific date. If a broker is 
delayed in depositing amounts resulting from the sale or purchase deal in the investor's account, 
whether this delay is due to either a technical defect or any other reason, the consequent 
inability of the investor to access his money causes him harm. Therefore, the financial broker 
shall indemnify the investor for the opportunities missed because of the imprisonment of his 
money.862 
 
6.7.1.1.8 Failure to Notify the Investor of the Outcome of the Investor's 
Orders 
	
It has already been mentioned that the broker must abide by the commands given to him by the 
investor; in addition, the investor must notify the investor of outcome of its implementation of 
these orders. As required per the trading rules of the Saudi stock exchange, the broker must 
send periodic notice to the investor indicating the processes that has account during that 
period.863 The broker must also a statement at least every three months, which shows all 
transactions and activities that took place during that period. The statement must include the 
broker's name, the client's name and account number, the type of securities and the type of 
transaction (sale or purchase), the settlement date, the commission, and other details.  The 
broker is liable for all damage caused to the investor as a result of the broker's failure to fulfill 
the duty of notifyinag the investor of the outcome of implementation.864 
 
In the case of (Securities and Resolution of Securities Disputes), No. 100 / L / D 1/2007 issued 
in case 108/27. The prosecutor offered the regulations suit to the Committee chapter in 
securities disputes, pointing out that the client saw the portfolio and did not find its shares 
owned by the Nadec company network of 5,000 shares.  In addition, that the client stated that 
it had been sold without his knowledge, and the transaction amount had been allocated in the 
two months after his account of the sales process! The prosecutor asked for compensation by 
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giving the difference between the sale price of 435 and the highest share price reached when 
the amount of deposit in his account on 2005/80/10, and demanded compensation for this error 
and expenses for the establishment of a lawsuit by 20%. According to the investor in the first 
package instructions, it violated his broker that executes orders, and also violated his allotment 
at the right time in the second deal. The Compensation Committee decided, and so skipped the 
opportunity to the investor, who therefore did not benefit because of the mediator in the 
allocation of the amount, and contrary to the broker delayed investors' orders by 44541280 
Real.865 
 
6.7.1.1.9 Failure to Ensure the Availability of the Stock Price in The 
Investor's Account Before the Implementation of the Deal 
	
One of the most prominent contractual errors that may be committed by the broker, and damage 
the client or other party in the deal, is to fail in the duty of ensuring the availability of the stock 
price in the investor's account before the implementation of the deal, especially if the value of 
these securities is great, or if there was doubt in the investor's ability to complete this 
transaction. It should be noted that such a commitment has been confirmed by the trading rules 
which necessitate the broker to ensure that all supporting documents are in the correct format, 
and the broker is responsible for any defects in delivery of shares, or non-payment by the buyer 
of value.866 
 
6.7.1.1.10 Disclosure of Confidential Information of the Investor 
	
The broker is required to keep confidential the investor's information. Failure to do so is a 
breach of contract for which the broker will be held liable. It should be noted that the Saudi 
legislature may ban such acts, but the Saudi laws do not specify images or methods of 
disclosure of secrets.867 This type of breach is described as the disclosure in the labor Law and 
the Banking Control Law, and the corporate Law uses the wording disclosure of confidential 
information. But the law does not specify means of disclosure of confidential information, or 
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how it is done, and that the text was that the disclosure is prohibited (in any way) in the Banking 
Control Law.868 
 
The emphasis on civil responsibility in the Saudi regimes is mentioned in Labor and company’s 
laws, where Article (83/9) of the Saudi Labor Law says, “If the work assigned to the worker 
allows him to get acquainted with the employer’s customers, or to have access to his business 
secrets, the employer may require the worker in the contract not to compete with him or reveal 
his secrets upon expiration of the contract. For this condition to be valid, it shall be in writing 
and specific in terms of time, place and type of work and to the extent required to protect the 
legitimate interests of the employer. In all cases, the duration of such agreement shall not 
exceed two years from the date of termination of the relationship between the two parties."869 
As for trading in the stock market,  the Saudi Labor Law stipulates in trading market rules that 
the broker must treat client information as strictly confidential, except in cases in which the 
law requires disclosure. Thus the broker is liable for damages caused to the client  a result of 
the disclosure of secrets; especially if this led to damage to his financial or commercial 
reputation.870 
 
6.7.1.2 Negligence of Responsibility of Broker 
	
The civil tort take place in the case of breach of a legal duty, which represents the need to do 
no harm to others. The broker is required to compensate the injured for damage; the basis of 
civil liability in Saudi Arabia regimes is wrongdoing.871 
 
It should be noted that these laws take the idea of "warranty" known in Islamic law, which is 
based on the idea of compensation for infringement of the offer or, and which corresponds to 
the idea of wrongdoing in the law.  As the wrongdoing is a violation of the rule of law, to 
commit an act or refrain from doing; and therefore it becomes an unlawful act. The tort 
liability's pillars do not differ from those in contractual liability, as it extends to the wrongdoing 
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-tort- which lies directly from the delegate has his works, and the consequent damage to others, 
So in this section will address the tort of financial institutions for their wrongdoings staff.872 
 
doings of his EmployeesBroker's Responsible for the Wrong6.7.1.2.1  
	
The punishment is personal, the person only asks for what he/she did, but it has appeared 
justifications by regulator believe that such as responsibility for these actions is towards other, 
whether this third party or one of who is under his responsibility.  Moreover, the economics 
field is fertile ground for the application of the idea of responsibility for wrongdoings of 
employees, to the extent that it has become seen as a general rule in the laws of economics.873 
 
It is worth mentioning that the Saudi legislature has stressed the responsibility of brokerage 
firms for their employees' mistakes, and it obligated them to establish a committee called 
"matching," in which brokerages monitor employees and ensure their commitment to the 
process of trading rules. 874   This, along with their submission to the management of the 
company, shows the importance of the role played by these workers in the capital market. 
Therefore, the broker will be investigated for every act that is not correct with the statutory 
provisions, or generally in line with the rules of honesty, integrity, or generally accepted 
practices in financial market among broker in financial securities. The worker at a brokerage 
firm who commits crimes such as practicing without a license, impeding Market Authority 
monitors, or manipulating stock prices, places upon his employer the criminal responsibility 
for his actions. 875 
 
The basic principle is that the broker (master) can require the (follower) to pay some of the 
compensation which was paid to the client; however, the broker (master) owes the (follower) 
some of the amount. This is achieved if (master) commits self-wrongdoings separate from the 
wrongdoings of (follower), and that wrongdoings may have contributed to the occurrence of 
the damage.  If (follower) proves that the broker has participated with him in the wrongdoings, 
the two will divide the compensation.876 
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6.7.1.3 The Damage and the Causal Relationship 
	
All three pillars must be achieved for responsibility to be assigned; it is not enough for the 
broker to commit wrongdoings. There is no responsibility without damage. Damage to 
customers of brokerage firms is divided into moral or material damage. Material damage is 
caused by the broker's breach of contractual obligations that leads to the client missing an 
opportunity or preventing a client from avoiding a loss that could have been avoided if the 
broker had implemented his orders appropriately.877 
 
In all cases, it required for entitlement to worker compensation for this damage, but the damage 
must be an investigator , it must be an investigator to fall in the future, As it does not 
compensate for the potential damage as the client does not have the right to claim compensation 
for the damage, but the expected direct by the broker.878 Moral damage to the client is non-
financial, such as damage to the client's personal or business reputation, resulting in the right 
to compensation in the face of the company's brokerage causing this damage. With regard to 
the corner causal relationship is the third pillar of civil liability, which would not be complete 
without it, and that must be established between the wrongdoing and what the right injured of 
damage.  Even when there were many causes of damage to a client, when the broker fails to 
catch these causes and prevent damage, the broker is responsible. In all cases, a causal 
relationship is assumed, and thus the broker is not responsible for the client's compensation 
unless the client proves that the annexes of the damage were the result of the strength or sudden 
accident is impossible to push or was the result of  wrongdoings by the client himself or due to 
the non-fault.879 
 
 
6.7.2 The Effects of Civil Liability of the Financial Broker 
	
When the pillars of the civil liability of the broker are available of the wrongdoings and the 
damage and causal relationship, the broker is obligated to compensate the injured for damage, 
in the form of payment of a sum of money to the injured. Whatever the nature of the damage, 
the injured has the right of access to justice - Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
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Disputes (CRSD)880- as prosecutor of lawsuit of civil liability of broker، If the general rules 
permit the parties to the contractual relationship to agree to amend the scope of the contractual 
obligations of the debtor, so it can be dispersed or mitigate or exemption with him.881 
 
As the rules of civil liability of contractual are not attach with public order and morality, as the 
rules are complementary to the will of individuals. But it may not be agreement on the 
exemption from the ideological responsibility of the financial intermediary or mitigated. This 
is what was taken by the Saudi legislator in a lot of rules and regulations which stipulates the 
broker's responsibility obligations, and so it has been found that the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority stipulates that in Article 31 of Authorised Persons regulations " Any condition 
providing for the exclusion or restriction of the liability of an authorised person, whether under 
terms of business or otherwise, shall be void if the exclusion or restriction contravenes the 
authorised person’s obligations under the Capital Market Law or the Implementing regulations  
."882 
 
As for tort Director, may not be in agreement on the exemption from liability for an unlawful 
act, and what he sees is a researcher also applies to tort broker, as the tort liability provisions 
relating to public order and morality.883 
 
6.7.3 Criminal Responsibility of the Broker in the Saudi Law 
	
Given the importance of the economic role played by the stock market, and given the size of 
the capital, operating in the market, as well as the number of dealers in the market, from various 
segments of society,884 it has become very important to the investor of stock market to protect 
and trust, as well as to maintain the integrity and transparency of transactions that take place, 
and to achieve equality between the different segments of investor through the criminalization 
of certain illegal practices which may perpetrated by the financial broker.885 Currently there is 
not sufficient administrative oversight to achieve the stated objectives. In this sense, it has been 
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found that the Saudi legislator did not lose sight of this important issue, from the need to 
provide criminal protection to the stock market and traders. When you look into the financial 
market system, , it has been found that the offense of many of the acts and practices that would 
prejudice the principles that are by transactions in the financial market, and the harm it and 
dealers in various categories.886 
 
6.7.3.1 The Practice of Brokerage Business Without a Licensee 
	
Tt has been realized  from the above that the Saudi regulator obligates the involvement of a 
broker in certain transactions in securities market, and this broker is represented by the 
brokerage firm. The broker and the firm must obtain a license to practice brokerage by the 
competent authorities.887 Customers do not need to extract this license from the fulfillment of 
certain conditions and requirements that have been mentioned in the system, but there are still 
people who will exercise this profession without a license and cheat as an authorised person, 
who shall perform brokerage activities without obtaining this license, fooling customers and 
plundering their money unjustly.888 
 
The broker may have a license that has expired, and has not been renewed; in this case, the 
brokerage is doing business without a license. This is what will be put in this research through 
formal element in the Saudi regime, and after that w the researcher is exposed to the material 
element in the second section, to the extent it relates to the crime or not, down to the mental 
element in Section III. Regulars corner: Texts that criminalize the practice of brokerage 
business without a license in the Saudi system, it is the requirement to the legislator, to extract 
licensing requests, It shows in the last section of brokerage in the sale and purchase of 
securities, limited the scope of his practice to obtain a license to practice the activity of 
brokerage.889 
 
Brokerage business in the Saudi law is limited to licensed companies with Article 31 of the 
Capital Market Law:  "Brokerage business is restricted to a person holding a valid license and 
who is an agent of a joint stock company that is licensed to perform brokerage activities, unless 
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such person is exempt from these requirements in accordance with paragraph (c) of Article 
32"890 
 
Physical corner. These crimes take place in brokerage business without prior authorization 
from the Saudi Capital Market Authority, based on the cancellation of licenses for one of the 
reasons set forth in the laws. This is the crime  that take place as soon as do the physical 
behavior of the offender without requiring legislator achieved a certain percentage,891 The 
legislature is not required to achieve any results in significant damage to this behavior, but the 
problem in the Saudi regime is considered such a crime, it is habitual crimes, requiring repeat 
the implementation of many similar acts to the crime. The crime of doing business brokerage 
without a license is a positive crime, is a continuous crime for the continuation of direct activity 
without a license. It also does not need to do a certain number of similar acts, it is sufficient to 
provide a service (administration), for example, only twice to others without the required 
license, for a crime other than the Saudi regime, which is required to occur three times and 
more. 892 Moral pillar : There are differences between the scholars of the law to require the 
mental element of the crime of brokerage business without a permit, there is Ray believes that 
this crime is enough to get you, at the time of the physical behavior, as one of the crimes 
legislation, without the need to prove the mental element.893 
 
This view is enough to get this crime just practicing any activity, it is contrary to the provisions 
of the Saudi legislator. As for the opinions of others who see, there is no room to say preclusion 
mental element in the physical crimes and the crime of which, as one of the economic crimes 
organized by the legislator accurately, the duty of individuals to follow the behavior of the 
legislature. If the person violates stipulations by the legislature, which is a breach and violation 
of the legislative order, both o negligence or failure to familiarity with the orders of the 
legislature. This view is regarded as most correct researcher, and therefore accused may pay 
the absence of the mental element of the crime when it was not the world of the need to extract 
the license for practicing the activity. However, a crime to disclose inside information and price 
manipulation, and the crime of trading based on inside information and the crime of publication 
of false rumors relating to securities, have all been reported in detail in chapters V and VI. 
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6.7.4 Conclusion 
	
In the interests of increasing investor protection, the aspects and consequences of the 
responsibility of the financial intermediary and fiduciary relationships, and the duties owed by 
the broker to their client, have been explored in this chapter. 
 
This chapter discussed the question of whether or not the broker owes a fiduciary duty towards 
his client by exploring the legal implications of the broker, represented by the commitments 
and the broker’s rights, and arising from the implementation of the work within the market and 
the market broker agreement with its client. Tt has been concluded that a broker owes a 
fiduciary obligation to their client . As it is seen in Saudi market law a broker must adhere to 
the seven obligations that clarify their responsibilities in order not to breach his or her 
obligation of fiduciary duty. 
 
It has been found through this chapter that obligations ensue broker in the face of his client 
under the agreement between them, and that came in order to ensure the safety of financial 
transactions, keeping the rights of client . It also shows that the broker has several rights under 
the law and contracts for mediation concluded with its customers. Brokerage is the overall 
regulatory process, aimed at reconciling the will of both the seller and the buyer, under the 
rules of the financial markets, carried out by someone known as a financial broker, who 
receives financial compensation in so-called "commission." 
 
It is a brokerage contract from netting exchange contract for both sides, and arranges 
obligations and reciprocal rights between peripherals, allowing each party to refrain from 
implementing the obligations, until the other party performs obligations return. The obligations 
of the financial broker under the brokerage contract impasse safety operations that it has 
undertaken within the stock market, the opening of independent accounts of its customers, and 
introduce them to the depository center electronic systems, and implementation of client orders 
and not be exceeded, and obligations rules of professional conduct imposed by the legislation 
and the rules of the stock market. 
 
under Saudi Arabia law, fiduciary duty contains comparable ideas.  In Saudi fiduciary duty is 
undoubtedly defined in its implementing regulations.  The clarity of this statement ensures both 
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the investor and the broker fully comprehend the meaning and implications of the notion. 
Suitability is a factor of both laws that has been discussed in various areas with diverse uses.   
 
In 2003 the Saudi Capital Market Law did not have to consider suitability. Nonetheless 
accounts of security fraud provided the CMA with an occasion to review and update existing 
regulations. These regulations noted the suitability concept within different guidelines, 
observing that some cases were guilty of positing unsuitable recommendations.  Not including 
the CML rule, these regulations do not indicate whether or not the scienter factor is essential 
for successful claims; for professionals this causes ambiguity.  Additionally, there are no 
standard regulations or guidelines issued by the Saudi Exchange, and as such there is no 
example for comparison in the Saudi stock market. Resolving cases is, therefore, problematic 
with people having to rely on self-judgment. 
 
According to Saudi stock market regulations it is clear to indicated that a broker has a fiduciary 
duty toward his/her client. Therefore, the broker's commitment towards the client, and the 
brokerage must face consequences if it breaches this commitment.  These consequences may 
take the form of either civil liability or criminal liability. such as the practice of brokerage 
business without a license is crime in the Saudi stock market regulations. Moreover, Civil 
liability of brokerage can be divided into three categories: wrongdoing on the part of the broker; 
negligence on the part of the broker; and damage and causal relationships. Also, the burden of 
proof is on the investor through proving wrongdoing, damages and the causal relationships. 
Both civil and criminal liabilities require compensation for the damage.   
 
It should be adding the adaptation and causation of Sharia to the Commission chapter in 
securities disputes decisions and not just the legal causation only, especially that the first article 
of the Constitution states that the Quran and Sunnah are the country's Constitution as the 
causation legitimate would be convince the prosecutor and defendant. also, there must be a 
general principles and standards for the provision of the compensation cases.  
 
The Saudi legislator's organization of the brokerage through the legislative system handled 
transactions that take place within the stock market, which in turn led to the organization of the 
work of broker, as this group formed an essential building block in the construction of a modern 
stock market, contributing to activate the financial system, which had a positive effect on the 
protection of investor. But the texts on work brokerage, spread between the stock market and 
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the instructions and regulations issued pursuant, which will lead to repeat many of the 
provisions in this legislation. 
 
The Saudi stock market system needs to give the text of the brokerage firm, the right of priority 
on the securities purchased or sold securities at a price, to be able to fulfil their rights, noted 
that the Saudi law guarantees the right of the investor in detail reflects the right broker. 
Reformulate brokerage firm commitments in the Saudi regime, and collected arranged in the 
special section in the list of authorised persons instead of dispersion between the material and 
the paragraphs of the stock market system, is necessary to strengthen the oversight role of the 
Capital Market Authority to the brokerage firms. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The 7th and last chapter has been divided into three sections; it will be started with the 
Summary of thesis  and then conclusion of each chapter in details and highlighted them; finally, 
suggestions will be highlighted as well as recommendations for further research. 
 
7.1 Summary 
	
One of the chief goals of this thesis has been to outline the current regulatory in the Saudi 
Arabian stock market by way of a regulatory analysis. This has been carried out with the 
purpose of determining the degree to which a series of examined regulatory features afford 
investor with sufficient protection, thereby reinstating their confidence in the framework of the 
Saudi stock market.  
 
To guide the achievement of the present work’s underlying aim, four main objectives were 
stated at the outset: first, to identify viable ways in which the efficaciousness of the current 
regulatory measures can be improved, thereby facilitating appropriate investor protection with 
respect to the issues of market abuse, fraudulent broker activities, and ineffective information 
disclosure; second, to determine how the confidence of investor can be improved in 
conjunction with the enhancement of market attractiveness; third, to gain insight into the 
etiology of the last Saudi stock market crash, thereby illuminating how a similar situation can 
be avoided in the coming years; and fourth, to produce and outline beneficial information that 
can be used to guide subsequent Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  reforms. 
 
It is important to recognise that while comparable objectives underpinned the introduction and 
legislation of the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  s (2003) and their related regulatory 
measures, the present thesis has centred on four primary considerations. The following 
constituted the rationale which motivated their selection: first, it was noted that they constitute 
the critical regulatory targets in almost every world nation, primarily because they function as 
the foundation of investor protection; second, the literature identifies the considerations as 
important contributors to the historical Saudi stock market crash; and third, as maintained by 
the present author, each consideration poses significant concerns for the existing regulations of 
the Saudi stock market from the viewpoint of investor protection. The four considerations can 
be outlined in the following way: 
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(i) The 2006 Saudi stock market crash underlined the prominent causal role played 
by ineffective transparency and insufficient information disclosure among listed 
firms. Moreover, since information disclosure is a critical determinant in guiding 
decision-making in the context of investment, reasoned and well-formulated 
regulatory measures governing the nature of disclosure must be present to facilitate 
investor protection. This thesis has sought to identify what these measures are. 
(ii) A further fact revealed by the crash was that insider trading is rife within Saudi 
Arabia, thereby meaning that unambiguous and stringent principles for the 
realisation of transparency and the avoidance of information diversion are required 
to afford protection to investor. A weak regulatory environment, devoid of precise 
measures intended safeguard investor against insider dealing, is a fundamental 
determinant of market instability. Hence, the researcher has used this thesis to 
identify the degree to which the supervision and counteracting of insider trading in 
the Saudi stock market is a viable way to facilitate investor protection. 
(iii) Investor confidence in a stock market is invariably diminished when market 
manipulation contributes to adverse impacts that detract from a consistent principle 
of equitability and justice. In view of this consideration, it is necessary for Saudi 
Arabia’s capital authority market to implement suitable regulatory systems with the 
aim of identifying, examining, and exacting penalties on those who engage in 
manipulative market activities. Ultimately, this will facilitate market stability 
against future financial crises, thereby providing investor protection. With this as 
one of the fundamental starting points, this thesis evaluated the existing system with 
respect to regulatory market manipulation in Saudi Arabia, proceeding to discuss 
the degree to which they are suitable in achieving the desired end. 
(iv) Broker play a prominent role because they function as intermediaries with 
respect to the private investor who seek to purchase shares, on the one hand, and 
the entities which sell such shares, on the other. One of the key characteristics of a 
well-functioning stock market is that broker conscientiously and faithfully fulfil the 
requests submitted by their clients, and this is critical because the origin of stock 
exchanges can be attributed to the desire to exclude irresponsible practitioners from 
positions. Since broker conduct is, therefore, significantly linked to the well-being 
of a stock market, this author has attempted to assess the regulatory obligations that 
apply to brokerage, thereby illuminating viable ways in which to facilitate investor 
protection. 
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Hence, in view of these considerations, it has been the main aim of this thesis to determine the 
degree to which the current regulatory environment pertaining to the Saudi stock market 
affords investor with sufficient protection against ineffective information disclosure, insider 
trading, and market manipulation (driven in part by the brokerage business).    
 
In order to examine these sensitive issues, this thesis first examined whether or not the 
disclosure regulations of the Saudi stock market provides adequate protection to investor and 
secondly assessed the effectiveness of the legal framework of insider trading regulations for 
preventing insider trading. Third, it ascertained how well the the law defines market 
manipulation and covers the most common forms of market manipulation under Saudi 
securities law. Lastly this thesis explored the responsibility that broker in the Saudi stock 
market have to achieve the greatest degree of protection for investor. 
          
 
7.2 Conclusion 
	
An evaluation of the regulations of the Saudi stock market the following conclusions can be 
drawn. 
 
                         Chapter 1: Introduction  
Chapter One provided an overview of the means used to ensure the thesis met its aims, by 
outlining its design and methodology, its restrictions and range - which were to analyse how 
investors’ interests can be safeguarded on the Saudi stock market, under securities law.  
 
As noted in this chapter, many authors of modern applied economics studies, such as Cameron, 
Gurley and Shaw, and more recently, Levine, confirm that a close relationship exists between 
the evolution of stock market and rates of economic growth. Stock market generally support 
economic growth and development through a number of their economic functions. 
Nevertheless, the absence of adequate financial sector policies and a developed financial 
system can produce disastrous outcomes, as illustrated by global financial crises. Moreover, a 
strong domestic financial system should therefore be appropriately maintained to enable 
countries to cope with the risks associated with globalization in general and the global 
integration of financial markets in particular. 
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As emphasized in this chapter, Stock market can promote social and economic development as 
they help form connections between groups of individuals and the projects or spheres they 
consider most valuable. In much the same way as a water drop cannot undergo evaporation 
from earth to atmosphere and cannot fall to the earth as rain if it is taken out of its natural cycle, 
stock market cannot benefit anyone if it is not in circulation. Finance and investment seekers 
will try to satisfy their needs overseas if they are not provided with suitable opportunities and 
protections by a jurisdiction. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter noted that while a minority of people see no reason to regulate the 
stock exchange, there is a growing tide of opinion which is pushing for both intervention and 
regulations in the market.  For any developing market to be commercially successful in the 
long-run, it is of great importance to implement robust securities regulations focusing on stock 
market development and investor protection. As has been observed by many researchers, the 
level of development of the general legal system associated with every jurisdiction is reflected 
to a significant degree in the level of protection that investor in the securities markets of a 
certain country are given. 
 
As explained in this chapter, the evidence supports the fact that stock market robustness is 
dependent on legal standards. In an effort to make their regimes stronger, countries throughout 
the world are giving priority to the development of supporting institutions and a system of 
implementation capable of stopping transgressions such as, insider trading and market 
manipulation. Additionally, a legal regime that promotes disclosure and protects investor is 
essential for stock market to develop effectively.  
 
Protection the market against crises is highly important, as discussed in this study. One strategy 
for avoiding crises is effective self-regulations. From this perspective, it is critical for the CMA 
to evaluate whether its resources are capable of identifying and dealing with systemic risk 
accumulations. Thus, self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as stock market which are not 
regulated by external bodies, have grown and developed gradually. This study determined that 
many developed countries use the Government Model to regulate their financial markets, with 
securities being regulated by an external public authority, so that the exchanges do not play a 
significant role in controlling and overseeing their markets.  
 
The UK uses the Government Model, hence the London Stock Exchange is self-regulating and 
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the FCA regulates securities, and Saudi Arabia decided to implement this model in 2003. The 
legal systems differ between Saudi Arabia and the UK, but it is possible to draw parallels and 
make comparisons between the two countries’ regulations, since neither relies on case law. In 
the UK, financial legislation stems from statutory and not case law; in Saudi Arabia, codified 
systems, which include Shari’ah law, are used to draw up regulations. 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Historical and Evolution of Saudi Stock Market 
This chapter started by demonstrating Saudi stock market’s legislative, functional and 
organizational features were assessed in terms of their historical development. Enhancements 
to regulations as the stock market has developed were considered, which contributes to the 
existing literature focus.  
 
As chapter 2 explore, the rules and policies relating to Saudi’s stock market have evolved in a 
number of phases. Changes to the stock market were promoted and introduced as a result of 
the 2006 crash in the Saudi stock market, therefore its significance as an event to Saudi’s 
economic and general history means that issues relating to it are also investigated here to 
encouraging the development of the stock market and most importantly to protect investor. 
 
An incredible expansion of Saudi stock market has been witnessed, despite its relatively brief 
duration of operation. Across the Arabic-speaking states, Saudi stock market has become the 
largest, achieved within a 15-year period. Three important phases of the stock market’s 
expansion are discussed in this chapter. The contemporary context and potential for 
reformation of the stock market is thus thoroughly informed by the market growth assessment.  
 
The factors discussed in this chapter demonstrate the significant effect they have on the Saudi 
of the stock market as well as that the collapse of the Saudi stock market was caused by directly 
and indirectly related factors. Also, these issues were selected because they are key targets for 
regulations in virtually every country and considered as the elements of protection for investor.   
 
Saudi stock market’s administrative, structural and functional features were lacking, as the 
2006 stock market crash made clear. Saudi has rarely seen such an economic calamity, which 
was not responded to in an effective manner by the CAM, or identified as a possible even prior 
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to it happening.  During the previous thirty years, a fast growth in the market has been seen. 
Participation and merging with global capital markets, organisations’ growth, market volatility, 
concentration, liquidity and magnitude are all standard variables for assessing stock market 
growth.  
 
Because market trading and speculation were not promoted due to insufficient disclosure 
regulations, while engagement of bigger institutional investor was lacking, for the first half of 
the 1980s there was somewhat sluggish stock market growth. Therefore, enhanced market 
liquidity and size were significantly enabled by the greater need for assets, following the 
increase in Saudi-based institutional investor. Considerable expansion of the market has 
definitely occurred. There was a 32-times growth in trading’s value, volume and transaction 
amount over the period of 1985-1998. Throughout the region, the biggest market is clearly 
Saudi Arabia, with a 160% expansion in market capitalization. Nevertheless, when considering 
other developing states’ market growth, Saudi market growth is somewhat less impressive, 
despite being significant in the region. 
 
 
                   Chapter 3: Stock Market Disclosure  
In chapter four the encouragement of investor assurance was assessed with regard to the 
existing disclosure and listing/corporate governance regulations. Furthermore, Saudi stock 
market’s disclosure regulations were evaluated for any trends, which was the main objective 
of the chapter.  
 
Disclosure received minimal attention until the more contemporary period. The extent to which 
a sufficient body of disclosure regulations exists in Saudi stock market is examined here. The 
extent to which the requirement of investor to access significant information will mean original 
regulations must be created, as well as the shortcomings in the existing disclosure regulations, 
is assessed. 
 
This study discovered that there are a number of frequently overlapping rules which determine 
how information is disclosed, including rules relating to listing and corporate governance. If 
securities are to continue being listed then essential, precise information must be disclosed 
clearly at an opportune time, since this practice will allow the stock market to function in a 
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systematic way. This chapter underscored the importance of not merely framing disclosure 
rules, but also applying them. 
 
As chapter 4 explore, Investment decisions taken by joint-stock companies’ investor and other 
interested parties, are largely informed by the information that is accessible relating to market 
efficiency, as previously stated. Consequently, the choices made by an investor will be more 
effective if they have information that is relevant to make them, which can be provided through 
releasing provisional financial reports.  Because stock values can be influenced by the 
information comprising these reports, investor should have access to them. Intermittent 
assessments by companies were found to lack principles for transparency and meaningful 
disclosure, while questions were raised regarding the influence that companies exerted on the 
auditing process.  
 
In Chapter Four, a series of rules which could help to protect investors’ interests were 
considered. These include: disclosing company long-term strategies; Director Responsibilities; 
Disclosure of Material Information; Rumours/Risks and the Duty of Disclosure and, finally, 
disclosure of the directors’, bonus structures. 
 
Saudi stock market’s listed companies would be likely to gain greater assurance regarding their 
financial statements, when their operations and financial prospects receive sufficient 
disclosure, as is apparent from the chapter’s conclusions. Furthermore, the Board of Director’s 
bonuses and relevant financial information disclosure, alongside reducing harmful coverage 
through adequate risk disclosure, are crucial factors. In this manner, shareholder and manager 
clashes of interest can be identified, while any chance of deceit will be diminished leading to 
a stronger investment environment. Additionally, protect investor will be aided by the 
reduction in illegal investments.  
 
This chapter noted that, a standardized financial statement that has been assessed by an auditor 
with the necessary qualifications must be supplied by organizational managers. This would 
indicate that investors’ worries about financial reporting are given due consideration by 
companies. Furthermore, since financial information may be perceived as less credible if it is 
interfered with excessively, managers must operate within clearly established boundaries and 
must not be allowed to become involved in financial reporting beyond those boundaries. This 
chapter also noted that there is shortcut in the regulations led to a lack of clarity such as 
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regulations, regarding how to deal with rumours and article regarding disclosure of material 
information 
 
Laws have to be enforced if they are to be followed, and anyone who disregards and 
contravenes the information disclosure regime is thus liable to one of three types of 
punishment: charges of civil or criminal liability or administrative sanctions, which have been 
evaluated in this chapter.  It would be more effective to use a mixture of the available sanctions, 
depending on the type of breach involved. The harshest penalty will come from being subjected 
to criminal sanctions, which are intended to act as a disincentive, since individuals’ careers, 
social standing and reputations will suffer.  In these cases, the burden of proof rests with the 
prosecution and is high, since it involves establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Civil and 
administrative sanctions have a lower deterrence value, and also demand a lower standard of 
proof. 
 
Criminal liability empowers the authorities to charge individuals for non-compliance with the 
rules of disclosure, both for violation or simple non-observance of the rules. Criminal sanctions 
should be reserved for cases involving fraudulent behaviour, and giving false or deceptive 
information, in order to circumvent complying with the disclosure requirements. If found 
guilty, the individual can be fined or even sent to prison. 
 
Administrative sanctions are brought to bear by the administrative body whose rules have been 
breached, and are not resolved in a court of law, but by a disciplinary committee. Regulatory 
bodies are given the legal power to impose sanctions by the law, but they do not have to follow 
court processes or defer to procedural assurances, such as an individual’s right to a fair trial. 
Administrative sanctions include imposing fines and suspending or cancelling a listing on the 
stock market – but they cannot imprison transgressors. Investor decide where to place their 
money according to the information they have at their disposal, so fair disclosure of 
information is vital to protect their interests and to create an equitable environment in which 
everyone has the same access to relevant facts, and in an equally apt. 
 
In conclusion, to answer the research question in terms of disclosure, the capital market law 
and its regulations partly succeeds in protecting investor by mentioning fair disclosure as one 
of the Act’s objectives. However, the there are some problems in enforcing disclosure rules, as 
mentioned before. 
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                           Chapter 4: Insider Dealing 
Chapter 5 looked at a crucial element in protecting investor – the issue of insider trading. The 
UK and KSA frameworks with regard to insider trading control are analyzed in this chapter as 
the central focus. Furthermore, the regulations to prevent illegal activity of insider trading is 
analyzed in terms of its complexity, shortfalls and success, in both the UK and Saudi Arabia, 
as a means of providing a larger legal framework to insider trading.  
 
Insider dealing is a contentious subject, which divides authorities and researchers. Some people 
believe that it is impossible to legislate against insider trading in terms of securities law; 
nevertheless, it is banned, albeit in a variety of ways, in most countries. It is impossible to 
legislate against insider dealing without defining what the term means, clearly and concisely. 
To do so, the following questions need to be answered: 
• Who is an insider? 
• What is inside information? 
• How is inside information transferred? 
• What actions are banned? 
 
This chapter noted that, the category insiders used to be divided between primary and 
secondary insiders. This is no longer the case, since most legislation does not acknowledge this 
division when defining insiders. The process of prosecution, the motives behind and form of 
punishment, evidence required and nature of the unlawful act will all influence how the 
incident of insider trading is characterized. Releasing inside information, allowing individuals 
to gain from inside information, acquiring personal advantage and dealing, are the four main 
categories of illegal action. Thus an illegal act of insider trading has been committed when one 
of these restrictions is breached. 
 
As a result of the conclusions drawn from this chapter, Compensations can be sought, through 
filing a lawsuit requesting compensation, by the individual impacted upon by insider trading. 
Any request for compensation is subject to the general rules of litigation.  In terms of insider 
trading and the pursuit of compensation, general rules is applied in such instances of unlawful 
action, as Saudi law lack specific processes. Therefore, it is advisable to classify special 
measures to encourage the dissemination of any information that could have a considerable 
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effect on stock prices.  
 
With regard to invalidate action in lawsuits dealing with outlawed shares of joint-stock 
companies, legal proceedings can be initiated on a variety of bases in Saudi Arabia. These 
include breach of a legal obligation, breach of the duty of fiduciary, and the disclosure of 
confidential information or trade secrets. However, breach of legal statutory misrepresentation, 
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence and/or trade secrets are all justifications for 
triggering legal proceedings, in relation to trading based on inside information.  
 
From the results of this chapter, in contrast to civil and criminal sanctions, the most minor 
sanctions that can be handed down, while also being the most straightforward, are 
administrative. These are largely not related to monetary compensation or fines. However, 
insider trading is unlikely to be prevented via such punishments. Therefore, although 
compensation can be awarded through common and civil law mechanisms to redress any harm 
done, the continuation of insider trading is unlikely to be deterred. Consequently, 
compensations need to be accompanied by effective deterrence measures, as part of the drive 
to legislate against insider trading. 
 
This chapter discovered that, better implementation of regulations relating to the Saudi stock 
market is undermined by there being an absence of enforcement bodies with real power. 
Therefore, the growth of the stock market and greater investor confidence will be possible by 
increasing the enforcement capabilities and controls that the relevant bodies possess.  Within 
the Saudi stock market, insider trading regulations  ’ success is affected by various barriers and 
limitations. Firstly, social obstacle, the dissemination of secret or sensitive information relating 
to a company may be a social demand that is made upon an insider, with insider advice deemed 
a social requirement that undermines the market’s trading regulations.  
 
Another obstacle is how regulations relating to insider trading are interpreted by a court. There 
continues to be a lack of appreciation in Saudi Arabia that if no clear victim of unlawful activity 
can be identified, there should still be a case to answer for the illegal action.  Consequently, 
jail sentences are often avoided by courts to punish wrongdoers, because of the perception that 
financial crimes typically do not produce victims. Furthermore, knowledge relating to financial 
crimes is often lacking among judges, which also proves to be an obstacle to enforcement. This 
is particularly relevant for crimes relating to finance as they are often victimless and, 
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accordingly, the judges are unwilling to enforce jail sentences.  as well as that, a main 
restriction is that the judges, usually, are missing a general awareness and education on these 
crimes.  
 
In conclusion, to answer the research question in terms of insider dealing, the capital market 
law and its regulations partly succeeds in protecting investor by banning insider dealing. 
However, there are some problems in enforcing insider dealing, as mentioned above. 
 
                    Chapter 5: Market Manipulation  
How well the the Saudi market conduct regulations defines market manipulation?  To what 
extant the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  covers the most common forms of market 
manipulation?  These questions were central to the discussion undertaken in Chapter Six. Thus, 
this chapter defined market manipulation, elucidates its common forms and examines the 
effectiveness of current laws in preventing these forms in comparison with similar UK 
regulations, whether these regulations will have helped the investor protection in Saudi stock 
market. The analysis suggests a need for further regulations to prevent market manipulating 
actions, which minimize the market efficiency, limit its growth and compromise its integrity. 
Manipulation could be prevented through a combination of improved transparency and 
availability of market information. These regulations should secure the market functions and 
enhance investor confidence and growth will be aided by the reduction of market manipulating. 
 
As this chapter explore that, market manipulation concept generally does not have to involve 
trading; it can include establishment of ‘artificial’ or ‘false’ market prices. However, there has 
been disagreement between the courts and commentators in identification and description of 
the concept of market manipulation, which is led to the problem that lies to differentiate 
between what is legitimate speculation and what forms manipulation. Therefore, it is critical 
for regulators to maximum and stop market manipulation without prejudice and allow the 
natural growth of the stock market. 
 
Market manipulation is an important matter for both the regulations of trading and the 
efficiency of the market. While this is a rising concern in several emerging stock markets.  
Moreover, this chapter has shown that integrity and fairness of the stock market is a necessary 
condition for the market’s expected role in supporting the real economy. By the same token, 
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rampant manipulation in the stock market leads to the opposite, as the must compensate for 
stock market losses. 
 
As noted in this chapter, although there is no perfect definition of the term ‘market 
manipulation’, but there are some common practices that are considered to be manipulative 
since they contain commonly occurring elements. However, there are many forms and methods 
of manipulation, but they are all designed to achieve one purpose. This is to change the price 
of the securities for the benefit of the manipulator through fraud and misleading others.  such 
as manipulation based on information, manipulation based on artificial transactions and price 
manipulation.  The main types of stock market manipulation are pump and dump, churning, 
corners, pools, matched orders and sale wash. 
 
Moreover, this chapter discovered that, the Internet is considered one the most important 
methods of manipulation.  It is hard to oversee and control these Internet networks, as the Saudi 
market is based on such information.  As stated, weaknesses exist in the current regulatory 
framework governing this area. Based on what has been explained previously, there is a 
regulatory gap in Saudi stock market that is facilitating the spread of manipulation schemes 
that are based on rumors. Since Saudi stock market regulations have no direct prohibition for 
such activates; unless a false statement of material fact instead, issuers are obligated to reply 
to any ongoing rumors that are affective the price of the issuer.  This obligation is perfect in 
theory but it obliges very severe surveillance and enforcement capabilities in practice. 
 
As a result of the conclusions drawn from this chapter, Manipulation should be defined ‘with 
respect to the intent, However, finding evidence of intent can be difficult. As a consequence of 
manipulation, a reduction in the burden of proof would result, making it easier to apply the law 
to wrongdoers, if a set of objective standards were set for demonstrating manipulative intent. 
Based on what has been a discussion in this chapter, it shows that try great similarity in the 
regulations of manipulation between the Saudi and the British regime, on this basis, there are 
behaviours that did not refer to Saudi a legislator, who could be considered to know the 
behaviour of manipulators. 
 
From the results of this chapter, Article 49 in the Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  and Articles 
II and III of conducts in the Saudi market law have not covered the most common forms of 
manipulation practices.  Whether successful enforcement can be achieved, given the current 
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lack of legislation, is a crucial question.  The degree to which investor are protected by the 
existing regulatory framework must be assessed, however the enforcement of any regulations 
is an essential prior question. Advanced markets have regulations that are already known to be 
sound, therefore they could easily be applied to the Saudi stock market. However, the 
understanding, introduction of and adherence to regulations in the legal field, by gatekeepers, 
citizens and watchdog bodies is potentially a considerable problem. 
  
As yet, Saudi criminal law does not treat market manipulation as a serious criminal offence. 
Thus the implementation of securities legislation faces particular issues, while overall 
legislating of Saudi markets is problematic due to such perceptions. Minimal application of the 
existing laws with respect to market manipulation, as well as the lack of imposing criminal 
penalties applied within the legal system thus ensuring a low level of enforcement.  
 
The Capital Market Authority has taken a number of steps in this direction, such as: organizing 
the work of broker and financial consulting and encouraging institutional investment through 
various investment funds, and project financial analysts body.  It is expected that such measures 
will have a positive effect on the strategic directions of change in the balance of power in the 
market over time for the benefit of insider traders. The principle of ‘prevention is better than 
cure’ should be adopted in addressing the problem of the manipulation of the stock market. 
Carrying out a search on the reasons for the manipulation of stock market will allow this 
problem to be addressed at the root. Investor should be educated on methods of manipulation 
so that they can prevent themselves from falling into manipulators’ traps. Effective 
mechanisms and means should be developed to ensure the high transparency of trading and 
detect the different forms of manipulation. 
 
In conclusion, to answer the research question in terms of Market Manipulation, the capital 
market law and its regulations partly succeeds in protecting investor. However, the regulations 
has not covered the most common forms of manipulation practices and does not define Market 
Manipulation properly. 
 
                         Chapter 6: Market Broker 
This chapter explored the responsibility that broker in the Saudi stock market have to achieve 
the greatest degree of protection for investor; under Authorized Persons regulations. Thus, the 
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following questions have been answered: ‘Are brokers a source of market manipulation?’ ‘Do 
broker owe fiduciary duty?’ ‘How does a broker provide suitable recommendations to his/her 
client?’ ‘What is the significance of suitability in stock market under its regulations ?’ What is 
the responsibility of brokers under Saudi Law?'. It was concluded that broker do indeed have 
a fiduciary responsibility to their clients. Saudi market law clearly sets out the seven 
requirements brokers must adhere to in order to comply with their fiduciary duty to their clients. 
 
There are several objectives of this chapter. Providing greater assurances with regard to the 
stock market and stronger investor safeguards, assessing the foundation of all securities 
markets in the shape of brokers’ activities and associated legislation, as well as strengthening 
and improving Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  and relevant regulations, were the major aims. 
The Saudi stock regulation’s implementation and enforcement of the most recent legislation 
should be assisted by this discussion, particularly with regard to the recent trends in legal action 
over poor broker advice.  
 
As explained in this chapter, Saudi stock market regulations also make it apparent that a broker 
has this fiduciary obligation towards his or her clients. This being the case, if this commitment 
to the client is disregarded and contravened, the brokerage will have to suffer the consequences 
and pay the penalty –whatever that might be. Thus, the brokerage could be convicted of civil 
or criminal liability. For example, in Saudi Arabia it is a criminal offence to run a brokerage 
practice without being licensed, according to Saudi stock market regulations.  
 
This chapter discovered that, it is important to consider that an entire country’s economy can 
be affected by manipulative practices, if a market ends up collapsing. In this regard, 
manipulation and taking advantage of one’s position as a financial broker is significant, as they 
often have many clients and enjoy a lack of regulative focus, thus greater efforts should be 
made to introduce more rules.  
 
This chapter noted that, a broker has considerable accountability in relation to their clients, 
because the broker provides recommendations and guidance, thus acquiring their confidence. 
Thus a broker often engages in a cautious and careful assessment before providing proposals 
and advice, because legal liability is often a major concern of broker due to their accountability. 
It may be a difficult process to provide client-specific advice. In terms of the regulations that 
have been devised in relation to brokerage firms, there has been considerable progress, as 
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indicated by this study. Thus within the Saudi stock market and securities regulations, the 
regulations and issues that a broker must take into account before engaging in business are 
much clearer.  
 
As indicated in this chapter Saudi regulations of stock market to an internationally accepted 
level, protection of client rights, risk-free nature of fiscal transactions and the guarantee of 
pacts between client and broker, can all be better ensured by introducing legal requirements.  
Furthermore, client-broker contractual agreements and the guarantee of certain broker rights 
are apparent within legislation.  A broker will gain fiscal remuneration, in the form of 
commission, from involvement in interactions between a purchaser and a seller, within the 
regulations associated with the stock market. 
  
As a result of the conclusions drawn from this chapter, Similar concepts exist concerning 
fiduciary obligations, with respect to each law. The application of rules section clearly states 
the fiduciary obligations in Saudi Arabia. The significance and consequences of this concept 
are clearly outlined to the broker and investor, due to the straightforward nature of the 
declaration.  The wide array of applications across different fields have been outlined, with 
regard to each law’s emphasis on suitability.  Suitability was not a major concern when the 
Saudi capital Market Law (2003)  was developed in 2003. However, the reassessment and 
amendment of regulations by the CMA began following the instances of securities fraud. The 
poor suitability of certain broker advice was decided in court cases; therefore, the regulations 
was adapted to incorporate issues of suitability. However, industry actors may be uncertain 
with regard to their obligations, because the degree to which successful prosecutions have 
rested on scienter liability has not been outlined in the regulations, apart from the CML 
recommendations.  
 
Moreover, the Saudi stock market provides no previous instances through which to contrast a 
situation, because the Saudi Exchange has not published rules and principles in this regard. 
Consequently, a great deal of personal assessment is used in the formation of judgments. This 
research has proposed various solutions depending on varied environments, while also 
analyzing what investor in stock market are provided with in terms of company assurances. 
The operations of these companies and the regulations that govern them in Saudi have not been 
adequately investigated in the literature, reflecting the general lack of focus on developing 
securities markets. 
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As noted in chapter, Brokerage civil liabilities can be separated into: broker unlawful activity; 
broker negligence; damage and contributory dealings and relationships. In these cases, the 
burden of proof rests on the investor, who has to show evidence of wrongdoing, negligence 
and causal relationships. If the damage is proved, the investor is entitled to compensation in 
both civil and criminal liability cases. In conclusion, to answer the research question in terms 
of Market Brokers, the capital market law and Authorised Persons regulations partly succeeds 
in protecting investor.  
 
 
7.3 Research Recommendations 
	
v Despite its best efforts, the CMA has not been entirely successful in its aim of 
controlling mass speculation because of its inexperience and the high number of traders 
compared to the number of companies and existing shares. One possible approach to 
dealing with market manipulation is to take criminal proceedings against individuals 
found to engage in price manipulation. Rather than delaying and learning by trial-and-
error, the CMA ought to learn from the regulations applicable in developed markets. 
For example, the issue of price manipulation in Saudi Arabia could be effectively 
addressed based on the British framework for control of market manipulation and 
insider dealing. Despite the monetary penalties it imposes on manipulators, the CMA 
actually stands to gain from such transgression because the penalties represent a 
financing source for it. 
v An understanding of how investor think and of the market characteristics must 
be achieved prior to any proposals for disclosure regulations reform can be made. The 
past crash was to some extent caused by the fact that small investor did not have enough 
knowledge and experience. From 2004, the stock market of Saudi was transformed into 
a speculative market. Owners have direct control over most of the market funds (90%), 
but many of them are inexperienced in this task, as observed by Almubarak.894  This 
has resulted in market manipulation by large speculators, who used such tactics as false 
trading, rumour dissemination and incorrect news to successfully promote herding 
																																																								
894  Almubarak. (2005). Concern in the Saudi market due to "Alhoamir" Control. Available: 
http://www.aleqt.com/2005/11/16/article_16039.html. Last accessed 02th OCT 2016. 
	 281	
behaviour. Among the various available options is allowing institutional investor to 
become more actively involved, which may create greater uniformity, regulate market 
competition and promote better transparency. A greater volume of information 
available is another positive outcome of enhancing the involvement of institutional 
investor, which will make sure that actual knowledge, instead of rumour, will govern 
investor’ activities.895 
v Recommendations or analyst advice must be subjected to regulations and 
analysts must be specially certified and allowed to provide advice only based on having 
licenses issued by the CMA. In this way, the CMA will be able to regulate the activity 
of analysts, which will be considered as violating the law in the absence of appropriate 
licensing. Such a strategy would have several benefits, including prevention of 
manipulative activity, insider trading, guarantee of the relevance of suggestions about 
securities in Saudi, and an emphasis on the fact that the duty of suggestion or advice 
provision is due care rather than due diligence. 
v The CMA should give the collected monetary penalties to the investor who have 
been directly affected by the transgression, while the individuals found guilty of price 
manipulation should be given a prison sentence. Although Islamic Law forbids market 
manipulation as a prejudice, no punishment is specified; similarly, insider dealing is 
prohibited as “cheating” and is considered to be a crime. The general principles of 
Islamic Law that forbid all activities that are harmful to others are respected by the 
CML. Indeed, it outlawed market manipulation. Since it is based on general principles 
of market operation, Islamic Law usually displays a high degree of flexibility and 
malleability. However, changes have to be made to practice to take into account the 
transformations in finance and trade. 
v Making sure that small investor are protected should be a priority for Saudi 
regulators. Other matters that require their immediate attention is the monopoly held by 
foreign institutional investor over global securities markets. The activity of these 
investor requires regulations and the protection of the overall financial system must be 
guaranteed, particularly as their entrance to the SSE Began 15/6/2015. 
v The wording of the financial statements must be clear to investor, especially as 
they may not be familiar with some technical terms. Investor may change their mind 
																																																								
895 IMF Report (2005). Available: http://www.alriyadh.com/130876. Last accessed 12th Jan 2016. 
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about investing in a company if they are confused by that company’s financial 
information. Ethical considerations and accounting principles and technicalities are 
often emphasized by companies during preparation of financial statements at the 
expense of the intended readers. The level of influence that published financial reports 
have over investors’ decisions can be said to depend on the degree to which those 
reports are understood by the investor. 
v It is proposed that a ten-day rather than fifteen-day limit for releasing 
preliminary financial reports should be stipulated by the CMA, based on the overall 
findings of this research. Publication of information would then be at less risk from 
being leaked prematurely, while generally being a more reasonable timeframe in which 
to release financial information. 
v There are few studies that have focused on Saudi Arabia and preliminary 
financial reports, reflecting the small number in general that focus on Arab countries. 
It is strongly recommended to pay great attention to this matter and conduct more 
studies in order to improve stock market regulations. 
v Inside information tends to be exploited due to its confidentiality. Public 
dissemination of such information can prevent the temptation to exploit its use. 
v The integrity and reputation of markets, their growth and efficiency are all 
hindered by manipulation of markets, therefore more regulations is advocated on the 
basis of this research. Making market information more accessible, as well as enhancing 
openness, can both diminish the extent of manipulation. Family investments and 
savings, efficiency of the markets and overall investor assuredness would be improved 
through the protection of markets via regulations.  
v Shares are often easier to interfere with when belonging to small companies, 
therefore they are usually the focus of manipulation. Consequently, these companies 
should be focused on in terms of regulations. It is important to put in place measures to 
curb illegal speculation, while taking parallel action to encourage beneficial speculation 
carried out by insiders.  
v During the tackling of stock markets’ manipulation, it will be easier to deter 
such activities than respond to them once they have occurred. Resolving the issues at 
their foundation will be possible by carrying out further studies into the causes of 
manipulation. Perpetrators likely methods should be identified and explained to 
investor, so they can avoid being embroiled in manipulative activity. Effective 
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mechanisms and means should be developed to ensure the high transparency of trading 
and detect the different forms of manipulation. 
v In order to enhance the Capital Market Authority’s regulatory and enforcement 
capabilities, rather than dispersed mentions of brokerage role there should be clear 
responsibility and powers given to the Authority in a specific section detailing 
authorized person. When detrimental financial consequences occur from brokerage 
companies’ illegal behaviour, there should be a strong adherence to legal procedures 
for investigating and prosecuting such activities. Moreover, Existing stock market law 
largely focuses on protecting investor rights, however there should be more guidelines 
and rulings with regard to the buying and selling of securities in relation to the 
brokerage companies to fulfil their rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 284	
Bibliography 
 
A	A,	‘The	Relationship	between	the	Timing	of	the	Announcement	of	Financial	Information	
and	the	Characteristics	of	the	Saudi	Joint	Stock	Companies’	(King	Saud	University	
Repository	2006).	
Al	Jazira	Capital,	‘Financing	Role	of	the	Saudi	Capital	Market:	Promising	Prospects’	(2010).	
Ali	SS,	‘Islamic	Capital	Market	Products	-	Developments	&	Challenges	(Occasional	Papers)’	
(Occasional	Paper,	The	Islamic	Research	and	Teaching	Institute	(IRTI)	2005),	
Occasional	Paper.	
Andis	W,	‘The	Administrative	Process’	(1938).	
Blanchard	O,	Rhee	C,	and	Summers	L,	‘The	Stock	Market,	Profit	and	Investment’	(National	
Bureau	of	Economic	Research	1990).	
Capital	Market	Authority,	‘About	Capital	Market	Authority’	(2014).	
Capital	Market	Authority,	‘Annual	Statistical	Report	-	Saudi	Stock	Market’	(2006).	
Charles	M,	‘The	Customer	Relationship:	Suitability,	Unauthorized	Trading,	and	Churning’	
(2007).	
Claessens	S,	Djankov	S,	and	Klingebiel	D,	‘Stock	Markets	in	Transition	Economies’	(2000).	
CLIFFORD	CHANCE	LLP,	‘GUIDELINE	ON	THE	APPLICATION	OF	THE	SUITABILITY	AND	
APPROPRIATENESS	REQUIREMENTS	UNDER	THE	FSA	RULES	IMPLEMENTING	MIFID	IN	
THE	UK’	(no	date).	
Gulf	base,	‘History	of	the	Saudi	Stock	Market’	(2013).	
Hereinafter	"IOSCO	Market	Manipulation	Report,	‘Investigating	and	Prosecuting	Market	
Manipulation,	Technical	Committee	of	the	International	Organization	of	Securities	
Commission’	(2000).	
International	Monetary	Fund,	‘Saudi	Arabia:	Financial	System	Stability	Assessment,			
Including	Reports	on	the	Observance	of	Standards	and	Codes	on		the	Following	
Topics,	Monetary	and	Financial	Policy	Transparency,		Banking	Supervision,	and	
Payment	Systems’	(2006).	
Investing,	‘Stock	Market’	(2014).	
Japan	Committee,	‘Corporate	Governance	Forum:	Revised	Corporate	Governance	Principles’	
(no	date).	
K	K,	‘Interim	Financial	Reporting,	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	within	the	
Scientific	Activities	of	the	Securities	Commission	Cycle,	and	Financial	Markets	in	
Cooperation	with	the	Syrian	Society	of	Chartered	Accountants’	(no	date).	
	 285	
New	Zealand	Governance	Centre,	‘Insider	Trading	and	Market	Manipulation	Overview	-	
White	Collar	Crime	and	Serious	Fraud	Conference’	(2010).	
Obstfeld	M,	‘Risk-Taking,	Global	Diversification,	and	Growth’	(National	bureau	of	economic	
research	1992).	
Polinsky	AM	and	Shavell	S,	‘The	Economic	Theory	of	Public	Enforcement	of	Law’	(National	
bureau	of	economic	research	1999).	
Ralston,	‘Whispers	Made	Me	Rich’	(2013).	
Samba	Bank	(2009).	
Saudi	Arabian	Monetary	Agency,	‘Annual	Report’	(2003).	
Saudi	Arabian	Monetary	Agency,	‘Annual	Report’	(2004).	
Saudi	Arabian	Monetary	Agency,	‘Annual	Report’	(2005).	
Saudi	Stock	Exchange	‘Tadawul’,	‘Annual	Report’	(2006).	
Saudi	Stock	Exchange	(Tadawul),	‘Annual	Statistical	Report’	(2007).	
Slaughter	and	May,	‘Criminal	Justice	Act	1993	Insider	Dealing	Provisions’	(2011).	
The	Capital	Market	Authority,	‘	’Saudi	Arabia	Annual	Report’	(2007).	
the	Financial	Accounting	Standards,	‘Saudi	Certified	Public	Accountants’	(2011).	
ΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΗΣ	Τ,	‘NTERNATIONAL	STOCK		EXCHANGES’	(2008).	
‘Ministerial	Decree	No.	(2217)	Dated	01/11/1423	AH	on	Internal	Surveillance	in	Joint	Stock	
Companies’	(2013).	
A	S,	The	Effect	of	the	Announcement	of	Quarterly	Earnings	on	the	Saudi	Stock	Market	(no	
date).	
Abdeen	AM,	Shook	DN,	and	others,	Saudi	Financial	System	(Wiley	1984).	
Adarov	MA	and	Tchaidze	MR,	Development	of	Financial	Markets	in	Central	Europe:	The	Case	
of	the	CE4	Countries	(11–101,	International	Monetary	Fund	2011).	
Al	Juhani	H,	The	Stock	Market	Crisis	in	2006	is	a	Warning	and	a	Call	for	Reforming	(Obekan	
Printing	and	Packaging	2006).	
Al	Khamisa	A,	Broker	and	the	Investor	in	Securities	Trading	Disputes	-	the	Study	of	Doctrinal	
Legal	and	Practical	(King	Fahd	National	Library	2013).	
Al-Aqeel	M	and	Spear	N,	Private	Information	Trading	in	Emerging	Markets:	Evidence	from	
GCC	Security	Markets	(2006).	
	 286	
Alarm	A,	Commercial	Broker	in	Financial	Transactions	(Imam	Muhammad	ibn	Saud	Islamic	
University	1988).	
Al-Bogami	SA,	‘An	Examination	of	the	Usefulness	of	Interim	Financial	Statements	to	
Investors	in	the	Saudi	Stock	Market’	(University	of	Dundee	1996).	
Al-Bogomi,	Sharek	at	Elmosahamah	Fe	Alnedaam	Saudi,	Joint-Stock	Companies	in	theSaudi	
Law	-	Comparative	Study	with	the	Islamic	Law	(Umm	Al-Qura	University	1986).	
Alexander	K	and	Moloney	N,	Law	Reform	and	Financial	Markets	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	
2012).	
Alexander	K	and	others,	Insider	Dealing	and	Market	Abuse:	The	Financial	Services	and	
Markets	Act	2000	(ESRC	Centre	for	Business	Research,	University	of	Cambridge	
2001).	
Aljloud	SA,	‘The	Law	on	Market	Manipulation	in	Saudi	Arabia :	A	Case	for	Reform’	(Ph.D.,	
Brunel	University	London	2016),	Ph.D.	
Alsanosi	MT,	‘Corporate	Governance:	The	Saudi	Arabian	Capital	Market	and	International	
Standards’	(Thesis,	University	of	Leicester	2011),	Thesis.	
AlTuwaijri	S,	Broker	Responsibility	in	the	Stock	Market	in	the	Saudi	System	(Comparative	
Study)	(Naif	Arab	University	for	Security	Sciences	2014).	
Al-Zumai	F,	‘Protection	of	Investors	in	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	Stock	Markets:	A	Case	Study	
of	Kuwait,	Bahrain	and	United	Arab	Emirates’	(School	of	Oriental	and	African	Studies	
(University	of	London)	2006).	
Aplin	T,	Bently	L,	Johnson	P,	and	Malynicz	S,	Gurry	on	Breach	of	Confidence:	The	Protection	
of	Confidential	Information	(OUP	Oxford	2012).	
Ashe	M	and	Counsell	L,	Insider	Trading:	The	Tangled	Web	(Fourmat	1990).	
Atrophy	G,	Criminal	Responsibility	for	Non	Legal	Acts	of	Stockbroker	(University	of	the	
Middle	East	2009).	
Awwad	AS,	‘Legal	Regulation	of	the	Saudi	Stock	Market:	Evaluation,	and	Prospects	for	
Reforms’	(University	of	Warwick	2000).	
Balassa	B,	The	Theory	of	Economic	Integration	(Routledge	Revivals)	(Routledge	2013).	
Barnes	P,	Stock	Market	Efficiency,	Insider	Dealing	and	Market	Abuse	(Gower	Publishing,	Ltd	
2009).	
Beasley	MS,	Carcello	JV,	and	Hermanson	DR,	Fraudulent	Financial	Reporting:	1987-1997:	An	
Analysis	of	US	Public	Companies:	Research	Report	(AICPA	1999).	
Bewaji	W,	Insider	Trading	in	Developing	Jurisdictions:	Achieving	an	Effective	Regulatory	
Regime	(Routledge	2012).	
	 287	
Bines	HE	and	Thel	S,	Investment	Management	Law	and	Regulation	(Aspen	Publishers	2004).	
Birks	P	and	Pretto-Sakmann	A,	Breach	of	Trust	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	2002).	
Bradfield	J,	Introduction	to	the	Economics	of	Financial	Markets	(Oxford	University	Press	
2007).	
Brazier	J,	Insider	Dealing	(Routledge	2012).	
Calder	A,	Corporate	Governance:	A	Practical	Guide	to	the	Legal	Frameworks	and	
International	Codes	of	Practice	(Kogan	Page	Publishers	2008).	
Campbell	D,	International	Securities	Law	and	Regulation	[2009]-I	(Lulu	com	2009)	vol	1.	
Cantrell	CA,	Stock	Options:	Estate,	Tax,	and	Financial	Planning	(CCH	2008).	
Caprio	G,	Handbook	of	Safeguarding	Global	Financial	Stability:	Political,	Social,	Cultural,	and	
Economic	Theories	and	Models	(Academic	Press	2012).	
Carvajal	A	and	Elliott	JA,	Strengths	and	Weaknesses	in	Securities	Market	Regulation:	A	
Global	Analysis	(2007–2259,	International	Monetary	Fund	2007).	
Choron	S	and	Choron	H,	Money:	Everything	You	Never	Knew	About	Your	Favorite	Thing	to	
Find,	Save,	Spend	&	Covet	(Chronicle	Books	2011).	
Cicchetti	CJ,	Dubin	J,	and	Long	CM,	The	California	Electricity	Crisis:	What,	Why,	and	What’s	
Next	(Springer	Science	&	Business	Media	2004).	
Coase	RH,	The	Problem	of	Social	Cost,	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics,	III,	October,	1-44,	1960	
(WE	und	OATES,	Hrsg:	The	Economics	of	the	Environment	1992).	
Cruft	R,	Kramer	MH,	and	Reiff	MR,	Crime,	Punishment,	and	Responsibility:	The	Jurisprudence	
of	Antony	Duff	(Oxford	University	Press	2011).	
Dailami	M	and	Atkin	M,	Stock	Markets	in	Developing	Countries:	Key	Issues	and	a	Research	
Agenda	(World	Bank	Publications	1990).	
Davies	PL,	Introduction	to	Company	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2010).	
De	Brouwer	G,	Hedge	Funds	in	Emerging	Markets	(Cambridge	University	Press	2001).	
Demirgüç-Kunt	A,	Developing	Country	Capital	Structures	and	Emerging	Stock	Markets	
(World	Bank	Publications	1992)	vol	933.	
Demirgüç-Kunt	A,	Financial	Structure	and	Economic	Growth:	A	Cross-Country	Comparison	of	
Banks,	Markets,	and	Development	(MIT	press	2004).	
Durieux	G,	Serieyssol	M,	and	Stephan	P,	French	Financial	Markets	(Woodhead	Publishing	
1995).	
	 288	
Erkens	MH,	Disclosure	Behavior	of	European	Firms	around	the	Adoption	of	IFRS	(Springer	
2016).	
Fahim	Khan	and	Mario	Porzio,	Islamic	Banking	And	Finance	In	The	European	Union	(Edward	
Elgar	2010).	
Fawn	A,	The	Legal	Status	of	Broker	in	the	Stock	Market	(Baghdad	University	no	date).	
Fernando	AC,	Corporate	Governance:	Principles,	Policies	and	Practices	(Pearson	Education	
India	2009).	
Gabre-Madhin	EZ,	Market	Institutions,	Transaction	Costs,	and	Social	Capital	in	the	Ethiopian	
Grain	Market	(Intl	Food	Policy	Res	Inst	2001)	vol	124.	
Gangal	OPM	SK	Gupta	&Anubhuti,	S.	Chand’s	ISC	Mathematics	Class-XII	(S	Chand	no	date).	
GHAMDI	E,	DUTIES	OF	INSURANCE	BROKER	(University	of	Southampton	2002).	
Gitlin	M,	The	1929	Stock	Market	Crash	(ABDO	2008).	
Gkoutzinis	AA,	Law	and	Practice	of	Liability	Management:	Debt	Tender	Offers,	Exchange	
Offers,	Bond	Buybacks	and	Consent	Solicitations	in	International	Capital	Markets	
(Cambridge	University	Press	2014).	
Gomez	C,	Financial	Markets,	Institutions,	and	Financial	Services	(PHI	Learning	Pvt	Ltd	2008).	
Gordon	JN	and	Davies	P,	Principles	of	Financial	Regulation	(Oxford	University	Press	2016).	
Griffin	S,	Company	Law:	Fundamental	Principles	(Pearson	Education	2006).	
Hafer	RW	and	Hein	SE,	The	Stock	Market	(Greenwood	Publishing	Group	2007).	
Hannigan	B,	Company	Law	(Oxford	University	Press,	USA	2015).	
Harrison	K	and	Ryder	N,	The	Law	Relating	to	Financial	Crime	in	the	United	Kingdom	
(Routledge	2016).	
Hine	D	and	Carson	D,	Innovative	Methodologies	in	Enterprise	Research	(Edward	Elgar	
Publishing	2007).	
Huang	H,	International	Securities	Markets:	Insider	Trading	Law	in	China	(Kluwer	Law	
International	2006)	vol	3.	
Ibn	Qudama	A,	Almaghni	(1st	edn,	Maktabat	al-Qāhirah	2008).	
Ibnrubbian	A,	‘Effects	of	Regulation,	Islamic	Law	and	Noise	Traders	on	the	Saudi	Stock	
Market’	(A	Thesis		S	ubmitted	for	the	Degree	of	Doctor	of	Philosophy,	Brunel	
University	2012),	A	Thesis		S	ubmitted	for	the	Degree	of	Doctor	of	Philosophy.	
Irfan	H,	Heaven’s	Bankers:	Inside	the	Hidden	World	of	Islamic	Finance	(The	Overlook	Press	
2015).	
	 289	
Johnson	PM	and	Hazen	TL,	Derivatives	Regulation:	Successor	Edition	to	Commodities	
Regulation	(Aspen	Publishers	Online	2004).	
Johnston	A,	EC	Regulation	of	Corporate	Governance	(Cambridge	University	Press	2009).	
Jones	MJ,	Creative	Accounting,	Fraud	and	International	Accounting	Scandals	(John	Wiley	&	
Sons	2011).	
Kaplan	H,	Joseph	M,	and	Pfeffer,	The	Law	of	Insider	Trading	Trading	(2012).	
Karmel	RS,	The	Relationship	between	Mandatory	Disclosure	and	Prohibitions	against	Insider	
Trading:	Why	a	Property	Rights	Theory	of	inside	Information	is	Untenable	
(HeinOnline	1993).	
Klein	LR,	Dalko	V,	and	Wang	MH,	Regulating	Competition	in	Stock	Markets:	Antitrust	
Measures	to	Promote	Fairness	and	Transparency	through	Investor	Protection	and	
Crisis	Prevention	(John	Wiley	&	Sons	2012)	vol	812.	
Kleinbrod	A,	The	Chinese	Capital	Market:	Performance,	Parameters	for	Further	Evolution,	
and	Implications	for	Development	(Springer	Science	&	Business	Media	no	date).	
Klose	BH,	Asset	Tracing	&	Recovery:	The	FraudNet	World	Compendium	(Erich	Schmidt	Verlag	
GmbH	&	Co	KG	2009).	
Kostyuk	A,	Stiglbauer	M,	and	Govorun	D,	The	Theory	and	Practice	of	Directors’	
Remuneration:	New	Challenges	and	Opportunities	(Emerald	Group	Publishing	
Limited	2016).	
Lahsasna	A,	A	Mini	Guide	to	Islamic	Contracts	in	Financial	Services	(CERT	Publications	Sdn	
Bhd	2012).	
Lahsasna	A	and	Hassan	MK,	‘The	Shariah	Process	in	Product	Development	and	Approval	in	
ICM’	in	MK	Hassan	and	Michaelhlknecht	(eds),	Islamic	Capital	Markets	(John	Wiley	&	
Sons,	Inc	2012).	
Landes	DS,	Mokyr	J,	and	Baumol	WJ,	The	Invention	of	Enterprise:	Entrepreneurship	from	
Ancient	Mesopotamia	to	Modern	Times	(Princeton	University	Press	2012).	
Laurence	H,	Money	Rules:	The	New	Politics	of	Finance	in	Britain	and	Japan	(Cornell	
University	Press	2001).	
Levy	SM,	Regulation	of	Securities:	SEC	Answer	Book	(Aspen	Publishers	Online	2011).	
Litan	RE,	Pomerleano	M,	and	Sundararajan	V,	The	Future	of	Domestic	Capital	Markets	in	
Developing	Countries	(Brookings	Institution	Press	2003).	
Lopez-de-Silanes	F	and	others,	A	Survey	of	Securities	Laws	and	Enforcement	(World	Bank	
Washington,	DC	2004).	
	 290	
Lorenz	J	and	Marguerite	L,	Ethics	for	Trustees:	A	Guide	for	All	Who	Serve	as	Trustee	(Author	
House	2011).	
Loss	L	and	Seligman	J,	Fundamentals	of	Securities	Regulation	(Aspen	Publishers	Online	
2004).	
M	(Abu	al-Qasim),	The	Need	for	Interim	Financial	Statements	as	Input	to	Increase	the	
Effectiveness	of	Accounting	Information	Published	and	Rationalize	the	Investment	in	
the	Stock	Market	Decisions	(no	date).	
Macey	JR,	Insider	Trading:	Economics,	Politics,	and	Policy	(American	Enterprise	Institute	
1991).	
Manne	HG,	Insider	Trading	and	the	Stock	Market	(Free	Press	1966).	
Mäntysaari	P,	Comparative	Corporate	Governance:	Shareholders	as	a	Rule-Maker	(Springer	
Science	&	Business	Media	2005).	
Mäntysaari	P,	Comparative	Corporate	Governance:	Shareholders	as	a	Rule-Maker	(Springer	
Science	&	Business	Media	2006).	
Masari	A,	The	Legal	Regulation	of	the	Corporate	Governance	(Maktabt	Alganon	Oa	Alagtsad	
2012).	
McGee	RW,	Accounting	Reform	in	Transition	and	Developing	Economies	(Springer	2008).	
McGhee	J,	The	Role	of	Fiduciary	Obligations	in	Commercial	Disputes	(2004).	
Michie	RC,	The	Global	Securities	Market:	A	History	(Oxford	University	Press	2006).	
Michie	RC,	The	London	Stock	Exchange:	A	History	(OUP	Oxford	1999).	
Minghella	L	and	Blair	MC,	Blackstone’s	Guide	to	the	Financial	Services	&	Markets	Act	2000	
(Blackstone	2001).	
Ministry	of	Commerce,	The	Explanatory	Memorandum	to	the	Draft	of	the	Companies	Act	
(1992).	
Mishkin	FS,	The	Economics	of	Money,	Banking,	and	Financial	Markets	(Pearson	education	
2007).	
Moliver	DM	and	Abbondante	PJ,	The	Economy	of	Saudi	Arabia	(Praeger	Publishers	1980).	
Morse	G,	Enid	A,	and	Morris	R,	Company	Law	(12th	edn,	Stevens	&	Sons	1983).	
Mortelmans	K,	Enhancing	Work	Resumption	of	Patients	on	Sub-Acute	Sickness	Absence:	
Intervening	in	Information	Asymmetry	Among	Medical	Stakeholders	Involved	in	
Disability	Management	in	Belgium	(Leuven	University	Press	2006)	vol	361.	
Muhammad		al-B,	Sahih	Al-Bukhari	(no	date).	
	 291	
Mutawa		saleh,	Securities	and	Applications	Disputes	in	Saudi	Arabia:	Administrative	-	
Criminal	-	Compensation	(King	Fahd	National	Library	2015).	
Muzahem	A,	‘An	Empirical	Analysis	on	the	Practice	and	Determinants	of	Risk	Disclosure	in	
an	Emerging	Capital	Market:	The	Case	of	United	Arab	Emirates’	(University	of	
Portsmouth	2011).	
Nelson	P,	Capital	Markets	Law	and	Compliance:	The	Implications	of	MiFID	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2008).	
Niblock	T,	State,	Society	and	Economy	in	Saudi	Arabia	(RLE	Saudi	Arabia)	(Routledge	2015)	
vol	6.	
Niblock	T	and	Malik	M,	The	Political	Economy	of	Saudi	Arabia	(Routledge	2007).	
O’Kane	M,	Saudi	Securities	Law	(Michael	OKane	2011).	
Oliver	M	and	Marshall	E,	Company	Law	(10th	edn,	Stevens	&	Sons	1987).	
Payne	J,	Takeovers	in	English	and	German	Law	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	2002).	
Pirrong	S,	The	Economics,	Law,	and	Public	Policy	of	Market	Power	Manipulation	(Springer	
Science	&	Business	Media	2012).	
Poser	NS	and	Fanto	JA,	Broker-Dealer	Law	and	Regulation	(Aspen	Publishers	Online	2007).	
Ramady	MA,	The	Saudi	Arabian	Economy:	Policies,	Achievements,	and	Challenges	(Springer	
Science	&	Business	Media	2010).	
Rees	B,	Financial	Analysis	(2nd	Edition,	Financial	Times	1995).	
Rezaee	Z,	Corporate	Governance	and	Ethics	(John	Wiley	&	Sons	2009).	
Rider	B,	Alexander	K,	Bazley	S,	and	Bryant	J,	Market	Abuse	and	Insider	Dealing	(Bloomsbury	
Publishing	2016).	
Rider	B,	Tajima	Y,	and	Macmillan	F,	Commercial	Law	in	a	Global	Context:	Some	Perspectives	
in	Anglo-Japanese	Law	(Kluwer	law	international	1998).	
Rider	BAK,	Abrams	C,	and	Ashe	M,	Guide	to	Financial	Services	Regulation	(CCH	Editions	
1997).	
Rider	BAK	and	Ashe	M,	Insider	Crime:	The	New	Law	(Jordans	1993).	
Roberts	R,	The	City:	A	Guide	to	London’s	Global	Financial	Centre	(John	Wiley	&	Sons	2008)	
vol	11.	
Salinger	LM,	Encyclopedia	of	White-Collar	&	Corporate	Crime	(Sage	2005)	vol	1.	
Saudagaran	SM,	International	Accounting:	A	User	Perspective	(CCH	2009).	
	 292	
Schindler	M,	Rumors	in	Financial	Markets:	Insights	into	Behavioral	Finance	(John	Wiley	&	
Sons	2007)	vol	413.	
Scott	WR	and	others,	Financial	Accounting	Theory	(0,	Prentice	hall	Upper	Saddle	River,	NJ	
1997)	vol	2.	
Seredyńska	I,	Insider	Dealing	and	Criminal	Law:	Dangerous	Liaisons	(Springer	Science	&	
Business	Media	2011).	
Shawkaani	M	al-,	Neil	Al-Awtaar	(Arabic	edition,	Dar	al-Jeel	1973).	
Sheikh	S,	A	Guide	to	The	Companies	Act	2006	(Routledge	2013).	
Shoult	A,	Doing	Business	with	Saudi	Arabia	(GMB	Publishing	Ltd	2006).	
Spada	MD,	New	York	Real	Estate	for	Brokers	(Cengage	Learning	2008).	
Speedie	MS,	‘The	New	Insider	Trading	Provisions’	(1994).	
Spence	AM,	Market	Signaling:	Informational	Transfer	in	Hiring	and	Related	Screening	
Processes	(Harvard	Univ	Pr	1974)	vol	143.	
Ssroukh	M,	The	Legal	Effects	of	Financial	Brokerage	(University	of	the	Middle	East	no	date).	
Stamp	M	and	Welsh	C,	International	Insider	Dealing	(FT	Law	&	Tax	1996).	
Stone	R	and	Devenney	J,	Text,	Cases	and	Materials	on	Contract	Law	(Routledge	2014).	
Teall	JL,	Financial	Trading	and	Investing	(Academic	Press	2012).	
Teweles	R	and	Bradley	E,	The	Stock	Market	(7th	Edition,	John	Wiley	&	Sons	1998).	
Verdier	D	and	others,	Financial	Capital	Mobility	and	the	Origins	of	Stock	Markets	(European	
University	Institute	1999).	
Vidal	E,	The	History	and	Methods	of	the	Paris	Bourse	(US	Government	Printing	Office	1910)	
vol	573.	
Vogel	FE,	Islamic	Law	and	the	Legal	System	of	Saudí:	Studies	of	Saudi	Arabia	(BRILL	2000).	
Wahlen	J,	Baginski	S,	and	Bradshaw	M,	Financial	Reporting,	Financial	Statement	Analysis	
and	Valuation	(Nelson	Education	2014).	
Walter	CE	and	Howie	FJ,	Privatizing	China:	The	Stock	Markets	and	Their	Role	in	Corporate	
Reform	(Wiley	2003).	
Wan	HA,	Electronic	Financial	Services:	Technology	and	Management	(Elsevier	2006).	
Ward	R,	Welch	EP,	and	Turezyn	AJ,	Folk	on	the	Delaware	General	Corporation	Law	(Aspen	
Law	&	Business	2006)	vol	2.	
	 293	
Weatherill	S,	Cases	and	Materials	on	EU	Law	(Oxford	University	Press,	USA	2014).	
Wilde	M,	Civil	Liability	for	Environmental	Damage:	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	Law	and	Policy	
in	Europe	and	the	United	States	(Kluwer	Law	International	2002)	vol	4.	
Yeomans	L,	Exploring	Public	Relations	(Pearson	Education	UK	2006).	
Zweigert	K	and	Kötz	H,	An	Introduction	to	Comparative	Law	(CLARENDON	PRESS ;	OXFORD	
University	Press	1998).	
Electronic	Bulls	and	Bears :	U.S.	Securities	Markets	and	Information	Technology.	(DIANE	
Publishing	no	date).	
The	Annalist:	A	Magazine	of	Finance,	Commerce	and	Economics	(New	York	Times	Company	
1940).	
Abdul	Malik	AR,	‘The	Role	of	Financial	and	Non-Financial	Disclosure	"over	the	Internet	to	
Improve	the	Decisions	of	Investors	Market	Securities	-	Theoretical	and	Practical	
Study’	(2005)	IV	The	scientific	journal	of	the	economy	and	trade	85.	
Adam	AM	and	Shavit	T,	‘Roles	and	Responsibilities	of	Boards	of	Directors	Revisited	in	
Reconciling	Conflicting	Stakeholders	Interests	While	Maintaining	Corporate	
Responsibility’	(2009)	13	Journal	of	Management	&	Governance	281.	
Adams	MB,	‘Agency	Theory	and	the	Internal	Audit’	(1994)	9	Managerial	Auditing	Journal	8.	
Aggarwal	RK	and	Wu	G,	‘Stock	Market	Manipulations’	(2006)	79	The	Journal	of	Business	
1915.	
Ake	B,	‘The	Role	of	Stock	Market	Development	in	Economic	Growth:	Evidence	from	Some	
Euronext	Countries’	[2010].	
Akerlof	GA,	‘The	Market	For“	lemons”:	Quality	Uncertainty	and	the	Market	Mechanism’	
[1970]	The	quarterly	journal	of	economics	488.	
Alabdulkarim	S,	‘An	Evaluation	of	Investor	Protection	in	Secondary	Securities	Markets’	
[2012].	
Alkhafaji,	‘Corporate	Governance	and	Today’s	Financial	Scandals’	(2003)	6	Business	
Research	Year	Book	Global	Business	Perspective	PP282,302.	
Alkhaldi	BA,	‘The	Saudi	Capital	Market:	The	Crash	of	2006	and	Lessons	to	Be	Learned’	(2015)	
8	International	journal	of	business,	economics	and	law	135.	
Allen	F	and	Gale	D,	‘Stock-Price	Manipulation’	(1992)	5	Review	of	financial	studies	503.	
Allen	F	and	Gorton	G,	‘Stock	Price	Manipulation,	Market	Microstructure	and	Asymmetric	
Information’	(1992)	36	European	Economic	Review	624.	
Almulhim	MH,	‘A	Critique	of	Saudi	M&A	Laws’	[2016].	
	 294	
Al-Twaijry	A,	‘Saudi	Stock	Market	Historical	View	and	Crisis	Effect:	Graphical	and	Statistical	
Analysis’	(2007)	5	Journal	of	Human	Science	1.	
Alzahrani	AA,	Gregoriou	A,	and	Hudson	R,	‘Price	Impact	of	Block	Trades	in	the	Saudi	Stock	
Market’	(2013)	23	Journal	of	International	Financial	Markets,	Institutions	and	Money	
322.	
Andersen	TB	and	Tarp	F,	‘Financial	Liberalization,	Financial	Development	and	Economic	
Growth	in	LDCs’	(2003)	15	Journal	of	international	development	189.	
Andriansyah	A	and	Messinis	G,	‘Equity	Markets	and	Economic	Development:	Does	the	
Primary	Market	Matter?’	(2014)	90	Economic	Record	127.	
Armour	J,	Deakin	S,	Sarkar	P,	Siems	M,	and	Singh	A,	‘Shareholder	Protection	and	Stock	
Market	Development:	An	Empirical	Test	of	the	Legal	Origins	Hypothesis’	(2009)	6	
Journal	of	Empirical	Legal	Studies	343.	
Asherman	J,	‘Doing	Business	in	Saudi	Arabia:	The	Contemporary	Application	of	Islamic	Law’	
(1982)	16	Int’l	L	321.	
Avgouleas	EE	and	others,	‘The	Mechanics	and	Regulation	of	Market	Abuse:	A	Legal	and	
Economic	Analysis’	[2005]	OUP	Catalogue.	
Baamir	AY,	‘Issues	of	Transparency	and	Disclosure	in	the	Saudi	Stock	Market’	(2008)	22	Arab	
Law	Quarterly	63.	
Bagnoli	M	and	Lipman	BL,	‘Stock	Price	Manipulation	through	Takeover	Bids’	[1996]	The	
RAND	Journal	of	Economics	124.	
Baker	HK	and	Haslem	JA,	‘Information	Needs	of	Individual	Investors’	[2015].	
Beach	JW,	‘The	Saudi	Arabian	Capital	Market	Law:	A	Practical	Study	of	the	Creation	of	Law	in	
Developing	Markets’	(2005)	41	Stan	J	Int’l	L	307.	
BECK-DUDLEY	CL	and	Stephens	AA,	‘The	Efficient	Market	Theory	and	Insider	Trading:	Are	
We	Headed	in	the	Right	Direction?’	(1989)	27	American	Business	Law	Journal	441.	
Benabou	R	and	Laroque	G,	‘Using	Privileged	Information	to	Manipulate	Markets:	Insiders,	
Gurus,	and	Credibility’	(1992)	107	The	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics	921.	
Bencivenga	VR,	Smith	BD,	and	Starr	RM,	‘Liquidity	of	Secondary	Capital	Markets:	Allocative	
Efficiency	and	the	Maturity	Composition	of	the	Capital	Stock’	(1996)	7	Economic	
Theory	19.	
Benos	A	and	Rockinger	M,	‘Market	Response	to	Earnings	Announcements	and	Interim	
Reports:	An	Analysis	of	SBF120	Companies’	[2000]	Annales	d’Economie	et	de	
Statistique	151.	
Bhattacharya	U	and	Daouk	H,	‘The	World	Price	of	Insider	Trading’	(2002)	57	The	Journal	of	
Finance	75.	
	 295	
Billmeier	A	and	Massa	I,	‘What	Drives	Stock	Market	Development	in	Emerging	Markets—
institutions,	Remittances,	or	Natural	Resources?’	(2009)	10	Emerging	Markets	
Review	23.	
BIS	M,	‘Financial	Stability	in	Emerging	Market	Economies’	[1997]	Bank	for	International	
Settlements,	Basle.	
Black	BS,	‘The	Legal	and	Institutional	Preconditions	for	Strong	Securities	Markets’	(2000)	48	
UCLA	L	Rev	781.	
Bommel	JV,	‘Rumors’	(2003)	58	The	Journal	of	Finance	1499.	
Boyd	JH	and	Smith	BD,	‘The	Evolution	of	Debt	and	Equity	Markets	in	Economic	
Development’	(1998)	12	Economic	Theory	519.	
Bushman	RM,	Piotroski	JD,	and	Smith	AJ,	‘What	Determines	Corporate	Transparency?’	
(2004)	42	Journal	of	accounting	research	207.	
Canepa	A	and	Ibnrubbian	A,	‘Does	Faith	Move	Stock	Markets?	Evidence	from	Saudi	Arabia’	
(2014)	54	The	Quarterly	Review	of	Economics	and	Finance	538.	
Caporale	GM,	Howells	PG,	Soliman	AM,	and	others,	‘Stock	Market	Development	and	
Economic	Growth:	The	Causal	Linkage’	(2004)	29	Journal	of	economic	development	
33.	
Carlton	DW	and	Fischel	DR,	‘The	Regulation	of	Insider	Trading’	[1983]	Stanford	Law	Review	
857.	
Cattelan	V,	‘From	the	Concept	of	Haqq	to	the	Prohibitions	of	Riba,	Gharar	and	Maysir	in	
Islamic	Finance’	(2009)	2	International	Journal	of	Monetary	Economics	and	Finance	
384.	
Claessens	S,	Klingebiel	D,	and	Lubrano	M,	‘Corporate	Governance	Reform	Issues	in	the	
Brazilian	Equity	Markets’	[2000]	Washington,	DC,	United	States:	World	Bank	
Mimeographed	document.	
Clarke	RN,	Conyon	MJ,	and	Peck	SI,	‘Corporate	Governance	and	Directors’	Remuneration:	
Views	from	the	Top’	(1998)	9	Business	Strategy	Review	21.	
Coffee	Jr	JC,	‘Future	as	History:	The	Prospects	for	Global	Convergence	in	Corporate	
Governance	and	Its	Implications’	(1998)	93	Nw	UL	Rev	PP	641.	
Coffee	Jr	JC,	Sale	H,	and	Henderson	MT,	‘Securities	Regulation:	Cases	and	Materials’	[2015].	
Commission	UL	and	others,	‘Fiduciary	Duties	of	Investment	Intermediaries.	Law	Com	No	
350’	[2014]	London:	UK	Law	Commission.	
Conyon	MJ	and	Peck	SI,	‘Board	Control,	Remuneration	Committees,	and	Top	Management	
Compensation’	(1998)	41	Academy	of	Management	Journal	146.	
	 296	
Cruz	FM	da,	Gomes	MYFS	de,	and	others,	‘The	Influence	of	Rumors	in	the	Stock	Market:	A	
Case	Study	with	Petrobras’	(2013)	25	Transinformação	187.	
Cumming	D,	Johan	S,	and	Li	D,	‘Exchange	Trading	Rules	and	Stock	Market	Liquidity’	(2011)	
99	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	651.	
Demirgüç-Kunt	A	and	Levine	R,	‘Stock	Markets,	Corporate	Finance,	and	Economic	Growth:	
An	Overview’	(1996)	10	The	World	Bank	Economic	Review	223.	
Demirgüç-Kunt	A	and	Maksimovic	V,	‘Law,	Finance,	and	Firm	Growth’	(1998)	53	The	Journal	
of	Finance	2107.	
Don	ME	and	Wang	J,	‘Stockbroker	Liquidations	Under	the	Securities	Investor	Protection	Act	
and	Their	Impact	on	Securities	Transfers’	(1990)	12	Cardozo	L	Rev	509.	
Dooley	MP,	‘Enforcement	of	Insider	Trading	Restrictions’	[1980]	Virginia	Law	Review	1.	
El	Wassal	KA,	‘The	Development	of	Stock	Markets:	In	Search	of	a	Theory’	(2013)	3	
International	Journal	of	Economics	and	Financial	Issues	606.	
Esmaeili	H	and	Gans	J,	‘Islamic	Law	across	Cultural	Borders:	The	Involvement	of	Western	
Nationals	in	Saudi	Murder	Trials’	(1999–2000)	28	Denv	J	Int’l	L	&	Pol’y	145.	
Fama	EF,	‘Agency	Problems	and	the	Theory	of	the	Firm’	(1980)	88	Journal	of	political	
economy	288.	
Fama	EF,	‘Efficient	Capital	Markets:	A	Review	of	Theory	and	Empirical	Work’	(1970)	25	The	
journal	of	Finance	383.	
Filby	M,	‘The	Enforcement	of	Insider	Dealing	under	the	Financial	Services	and	Markets	Act	
2000’	[2003].	
Fischel	DR	and	Ross	DJ,	‘Should	the	Law	Prohibit“	Manipulation”	in	Financial	Markets?’	
(1991)	105	Harvard	Law	Review	503.	
Fischer	R	and	Gerhardt	R,	‘Investment	Mistakes	of	Individual	Investors	and	the	Impact	of	
Financial	Advice’	[2007].	
Fortier	LY,	‘New	Trends	in	Governing	Law:	The	New,	New	Lex	Mercatoria,	Or,	Back	to	the	
Future’	(2001)	16	ICSID	Review	10.	
Frost	CA,	Gordon	EA,	and	Hayes	AF,	‘Stock	Exchange	Disclosure	and	Market	Development:	
An	Analysis	of	50	International	Exchanges’	(2006)	44	Journal	of	accounting	research	
437.	
Gedicks	FM,	‘Suitability	Claims	and	Purchases	of	Unrecommended	Securities:	An	Agency	
Theory	of	Broker-Dealer	Liability’	(2005)	37	Ariz	St	LJ	535.	
	 297	
Gerace	D,	Chew	C,	Whittaker	C,	and	Mazzola	P,	‘Stock	Market	Manipulation	on	the	Hong	
Kong	Stock	Exchange’	(2014)	8	Australasian	Accounting	Business	&	Finance	Journal	
105.	
Gerla	HS,	‘Confidentiality	Agreements	and	the	Misappropriation	Theory	of	Insider	Trading:	
Avoiding	the	Fiduciary	Duty	Fetish’	(2013)	39	U	Dayton	L	Rev	331.	
Gigler	FB	and	Hemmer	T,	‘On	the	Value	of	Transparency	in	Agencies	with	Renegotiation’	
(2004)	42	Journal	of	Accounting	Research	871.	
Glaeser	E,	Johnson	S,	and	Shleifer	A,	‘Coase	versus	the	Coasians’	(2001)	116	The	Quarterly	
Journal	of	Economics	853.	
Goforth	CR,	‘Stockbrokers’	Duties	to	Their	Customers’	(1989)	33	St	Louis	ULJ	407.	
Goldwasser	VR,	‘Regulating	Manipulation	in	Securities	Markets:	Historical	Perspectives	and	
Policy	Rationales’	(1999)	5	Austl	J	Legal	Hist	149.	
Gouda	BA,	‘The	Saudi	Securities	Law:	Regulation	of	the	Tadawul	Stock	Market,	Issuers,	and	
Securities	Professionals	under	the	Saudi	Capital	Market	Law	of	2003’	(2012)	18	Ann	
Surv	Int’l	&	Comp	L	115.	
Greenwood	J	and	Smith	BD,	‘Financial	Markets	in	Development,	and	the	Development	of	
Financial	Markets’	(1997)	21	Journal	of	Economic	dynamics	and	control	145.	
Grossman	SJ	and	Stiglitz	JE,	‘On	the	Impossibility	of	Informationally	Efficient	Markets’	(1980)	
70	The	American	economic	review	393.	
Gurley	JG	and	Shaw	ES,	‘Financial	Aspects	of	Economic	Development’	(1955)	45	The	
American	Economic	Review	515.	
Harmantzis	F,	‘Inside	the	Telecom	Crash:	Bankruptcies,	Fallacies	and	Scandals-a	Closer	Look	
at	the	Worldcom	Case’	[2004].	
Hazen	TL,	‘Defining	Illegal	Insider	Trading:	Lessons	from	the	European	Community	Directive	
on	Insider	Trading’	(1992)	55	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	231.	
Healy	PM	and	Palepu	KG,	‘Information	Asymmetry,	Corporate	Disclosure,	and	the	Capital	
Markets:	A	Review	of	the	Empirical	Disclosure	Literature’	(2001)	31	Journal	of	
accounting	and	economics	405.	
Hertog	S,	‘Financial	Markets	in	GCC	Countries:	Recent	Crises	and	Structural	Weaknesses’	
[2012]	Norwegian	Peacebuilding	Resource	Centre.	
Hilary	G	and	Hui	KW,	‘Does	Religion	Matter	in	Corporate	Decision	Making	in	America?’	
(2009)	93	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	455.	
Hill	J,	‘Comparative	Law,	Law	Reform	and	Legal	Theory’	(1989)	9	Oxford	J	Legal	Stud	101.	
	 298	
Hoffman	RE,	Spencer	NE,	and	Miller	LA,	‘Comparison	of	Partner	Notification	at	Anonymous	
and	Confidential	HIV	Test	Sites	in	Colorado.’	(1995)	8	J	Acquir	Immune	Defic	Syndr	
Hum	Retrovirol	406.	
Hu	J	and	Noe	TH,	‘The	Insider	Trading	Debate’	(1997)	82	Economic	Review-Federal	Reserve	
Bank	of	Atlanta	34.	
Huddart	S,	Hughes	JS,	and	Levine	CB,	‘Public	Disclosure	and	Dissimulation	of	Insider	Trades’	
(2001)	69	Econometrica	665.	
Hunton	JE,	Libby	R,	and	Mazza	CL,	‘Financial	Reporting	Transparency	and	Earnings	
Management	(Retracted)’	(2006)	81	The	Accounting	Review	135.	
Ibrahim	AA,	‘The	Rise	of	Customary	Businesses	in	International	Financial	Markets:	An	
Introduction	to	Islamic	Finance	and	the	Challenges	of	International	Integration’	
(2007–08)	23	Am	U	Int’l	L	Rev	661.	
iosco,	‘Report	of	the	Emerging	Markets	Committee	of	the	International	Organization	of	
Securities	Commissions.	Insider	Trading	How	Jurisdictions	REGULATE	IT’	[2003].	
Jaffe	JF,	‘Special	Information	and	Insider	Trading’	(1974)	47	The	Journal	of	Business	410.	
Jarrell	GA,	‘The	Economic	Effects	of	Federal	Regulation	of	the	Market	for	New	Security	
Issues’	(1981)	24	The	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics	613.	
Jarrow	RA,	‘Market	Manipulation,	Bubbles,	Corners,	and	Short	Squeezes’	(1992)	27	Journal	
of	financial	and	Quantitative	Analysis	311.	
Jensen	MC,	‘Agency	Costs	of	Free	Cash	Flow,	Corporate	Finance,	and	Takeovers’	(1986)	76	
The	American	economic	review	323.	
Jensen	MC,	‘Agency	Costs	of	Overvalued	Equity’	(2005)	34	Financial	management	5.	
Jensen	MC	and	Meckling	WH,	‘Theory	of	the	Firm:	Managerial	Behavior,	Agency	Costs	and	
Ownership	Structure’	(1976)	3	Journal	of	financial	economics	305.	
Jiang	G,	Mahoney	PG,	and	Mei	J,	‘Market	Manipulation:	A	Comprehensive	Study	of	Stock	
Pools’	(2005)	77	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	147.	
Khwaja	AI	and	Mian	A,	‘Unchecked	Intermediaries:	Price	Manipulation	in	an	Emerging	Stock	
Market’	(2005)	78	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	203.	
Klapper	LF	and	Love	I,	‘Corporate	Governance,	Investor	Protection,	and	Performance	in	
Emerging	Markets’	(2004)	10	Journal	of	corporate	Finance	703.	
Kozinn	BE,	‘The	Great	Copper	Caper:	Is	Market	Manipulation	Really	a	Problem	in	the	Wake	
of	the	Sumitomo	Debacle’	(2000)	69	Fordham	L	Rev	243.	
Kyle	AS	and	Viswanathan	S,	‘How	to	Define	Illegal	Price	Manipulation’	(2008)	98	The	
American	Economic	Review	274.
	 299	
La	Porta	R,	Lopez-de-Silanes	F,	Shleifer	A,	and	Vishny	R,	‘Investor	Protection	and	Corporate	
Governance’	(2000)	58	Journal	of	financial	economics	3.	
Langevoort	DC,	‘Selling	Hope,	Selling	Risk:	Some	Lessons	for	Law	from	Behavioral	Economics	
about	Stockbrokers	and	Sophisticated	Customers’	[1996]	California	Law	Review	627.	
Lee	IB,	‘Fairness	and	Insider	Trading’	[2002]	Colum	Bus	L	Rev	119.	
Leland	HE	and	Pyle	DH,	‘Informational	Asymmetries,	Financial	Structure,	and	Financial	
Intermediation’	(1977)	32	The	journal	of	Finance	371.	
Lev	B,	‘Information	Disclosure	Strategy’	(1992)	34	California	Management	Review	9.	
Levine	R,	Zervos	S,	and	others,	‘Stock	Market	Development	and	Long-Run	Growth’	(1996)	10	
World	Bank	Economic	Review	323.	
Linsley	PM	and	Shrives	PJ,	‘Risk	Reporting:	A	Study	of	Risk	Disclosures	in	the	Annual	Reports	
of	UK	Companies’	(2006)	38	The	British	Accounting	Review	387.	
Lomnicka	E,	‘Preventing	and	Controlling	the	Manipulation	of	Financial	Markets:	Towards	a	
Definition	of	“Market	Manipulation”’	(2001)	8	Journal	of	Financial	Crime	297.	
Long	MS,	Malitz	IB,	and	Sefcik	SE,	‘An	Empirical	Examination	of	Dividend	Policy	Following	
Debt	Issues’	(1994)	29	Journal	of	Financial	and	Quantitative	Analysis	131.	
Lowenfels	LD	and	Bromberg	AR,	‘Suitability	in	Securities	Transactions’	[1999]	The	Business	
Lawyer	1557.	
Mensah	YM	and	Werner	RH,	‘The	Capital	Market	Implications	of	the	Frequency	of	Interim	
Financial	Reporting:	An	International	Analysis’	(2008)	31	Review	of	Quantitative	
Finance	and	Accounting	71.	
Mohtadi	H	and	Agarwal	S,	‘Stock	Market	Development	and	Economic	Growth:	Evidence	
from	Developing	Countries’	[2001]	On	line]	Available	at:	http//www	uwm	
edu/mohadi/PA-4-01	pdf.	
Mosab	I.	Tabash,	‘The		Relevance	of	Islamic	Finance	Principles	in	Economic	Growth’	(2014)	3	
International	Journal	of		Emerging	Research	in		Management	&Technology	11.	
Mustafa	Eldahrawi	K	al-Din,	‘A	Model	for	Managers	Incentives	to	Encourage	the	Disclosure	
of	the	Accounting	Optional’,	(1987)	XXIV	Journal	of	College	of	Commerce	for	
Scientific	Research	162.	
Myers	SC	and	Majluf	NS,	‘Corporate	Financing	and	Investment	Decisions	When	Firms	Have	
Information	that	Investors	Do	Not	Have’	(1984)	13	Journal	of	financial	economics	
187.	
Naylor	JM,	‘The	Use	of	Criminal	Sanctions	by	UK	and	US	Authorities	for	Insider	Trading:	How	
Can	the	Two	Systems	Learn	from	Each	Other	(Part	Ii)’	(1990)	5	Company	Lawyer	83.	
	 300	
Nor	Izah	Ku	Ismail	K	and	Chandler	R,	‘The	Timeliness	of	Quarterly	Financial	Reports	of	
Companies	in	Malaysia’	(2004)	12	Asian	Review	of	Accounting	1.	
Nyasha	S	and	Odhiambo	NM,	‘Stock	Market	Development	In	The	United	Kingdom:	Prospects	
And	Challenges’	(2013)	12	The	International	Business	&	Economics	Research	Journal	
(Online)	725.	
Onour	IA,	‘Testing	Weak-Form	Efficiency	of	Saudi	Stock	Exchange	Market’	[2004].	
Organ	L	v,	‘Laidlaw	v.	Organ’	[no	date].	
Oviatt	BM,	‘Agency	and	Transaction	Cost	Perspectives	on	the	Manager-Shareholder	
Relationship:	Incentives	for	Congruent	Interests’	(1988)	13	Academy	of	Management	
Review	214.	
Perotti	EC	and	Van	Oijen	P,	‘Privatization,	Political	Risk	and	Stock	Market	Development	in	
Emerging	Economies’	(2001)	20	Journal	of	International	Money	and	Finance	43.	
Porta	R,	Lopez-de-Silanes	F,	and	Shleifer	A,	‘What	Works	in	Securities	Laws?’	(2006)	61	The	
Journal	of	Finance	1.	
Powell	Jr	LF,	‘Basic,	Inc.	v.	Levinson’	[1987].	
Prentice	RA,	‘The	Future	of	Corporate	Disclosure:	The	Internet,	Securities	Fraud,	and	Rule	
10b-5’	(1998)	47	Emory	lj	1.	
Putniņš	TJ,	‘Market	Manipulation:	A	Survey’	(2012)	26	Journal	of	Economic	Surveys	952.	
Rave	DT,	‘Politicians	as	Fiduciaries’	[2013].	
Rider	BA,	‘The	Control	of	Insider	trading—Smoke	and	Mirrors!’	(2000)	7	Journal	of	Financial	
Crime	227.	
Ross	SA,	‘Options	and	Efficiency’	(1976)	90	The	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics	75.	
Ross	SA,	‘The	Determination	of	Financial	Structure:	The	Incentive-Signalling	Approach’	
[1977]	The	bell	journal	of	economics	23.	
Rozeff	MS	and	Zaman	MA,	‘Market	Efficiency	and	Insider	Trading:	New	Evidence’	[1988]	
Journal	of	Business	25.	
Rubio	L,	‘A	Rule	of	Law	Emerges	in	Mexico,	Slowly’	(2001)	27	Wall	Street	Journal	Eastern	
Edition	A19.	
Rydge	J	and	Comerton-Forde	C,	‘The	Importance	of	Market	Integrity’	[2004]	Regulation.	
Sawkut	R,	Sannasee	V,	and	Seetanah	B,	‘Stock	Market	Development	and	Economic	Growth	
in	Developing	Countries’	[2010].	
	 301	
Securities	US,	Commission	E,	and	others,	‘The	Laws	that	Govern	the	Securities	Industry’	
(2006)	29	Retrieved	September	2006.	
Senate	US,	Committee	SJ,	and	others,	‘Illegal	Insider	Trading:	How	Widespread	is	the	
Problem	and	is	There	Adequate	Criminal	Enforcement’	[2006]	Hearings	Before	the	
Comm	on	the	Judiciary.	
Seyhun	HN,	‘Insider	Trading	and	the	Effectiveness	of	Chinese	Walls	in	Securities	Firms’	
(2007)	4	JL	Econ	&	Pol’y	369.	
Seyhun	HN,	‘Insiders’	Profits,	Costs	of	Trading,	and	Market	Efficiency’	(1986)	16	Journal	of	
Financial	Economics	189.	
Sheffey	JM,	‘Securities	Law	Responsibilities	of	Issuers	to	Respond	to	Rumors	and	Other	
Publicity:	Reexamination	of	a	Continuing	Problem’	(1981)	57	Notre	Dame	Law	755.	
Shleifer	A	and	Vishny	RW,	‘A	Survey	of	Corporate	Governance’	(1997)	52	The	journal	of	
finance	737.	
Smith	CF,	‘The	Early	History	of	the	London	Stock	Exchange’	(1929)	19	The	American	
Economic	Review	206.	
Solomon	JF,	Solomon	A,	Norton	SD,	and	Joseph	NL,	‘A	Conceptual	Framework	for	Corporate	
Risk	Disclosure	Emerging	from	the	Agenda	for	Corporate	Governance	Reform’	(2000)	
32	The	British	Accounting	Review	447.	
Spence	M,	‘Job	Market	Signaling’	(1973)	87	The	quarterly	journal	of	Economics	355.	
Stanford	Jim,	‘Privatization	If	Necessary,	but	Not	Necessarily	Privatization?’	(2008)	54	
Review	of	Income	and	Wealth	116.	
Steinberg	MI,	‘Insider	Trading,	Selective	Disclosure,	and	Prompt	Disclosure:	A	Comparative	
Analysis’	(2001)	22	U	Pa	J	Int’l	Econ	L	635.	
Stigler	GJ,	‘Public	Regulation	of	the	Securities	Markets’	(1964)	37	The	Journal	of	Business	
117.	
Stigler	GJ,	‘The	Theory	of	Economic	Regulation’	[1971]	The	Bell	journal	of	economics	and	
management	science	3.	
Stiglitz	JE,	‘The	Role	of	the	State	in	Financial	Markets’	(1993)	7	The	World	Bank	Economic	
Review	19.	
Stringham	EP,	‘The	Emergence	of	the	London	Stock	Exchange	as	a	Self-Policing	Club’	[2002].	
Subramanian	S	and	Reddy	VN,	‘Corporate	Governance	Disclosures	and	International	
Competitiveness:	A	Study	of	Indian	Firms’	(2012)	11	Asian	Business	&	Management	
195.	
	 302	
Tinic	SM	and	West	RR,	‘The	Securities	Industry	under	Negotiated	Brokerage	Commissions:	
Changes	in	the	Structure	and	Performance	of	New	York	Stock	Exchange	Member	
Firms’	[1980]	The	Bell	Journal	of	Economics	29.	
Toross	N,	‘Double-Click	on	This:	Keeping	Pace	with	On-Line	Market	Manipulation’	(1998)	32	
Loy	LAL	Rev	1399.	
Tunc	A	and	Tunc	A,	‘A	French	Lawyer	Looks	at	American	Corporation	Law	and	Securities	
Regulation’	(1982)	130	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	757.	
Valletta	RM,	‘Clear	as	Glass:	Transparent	Financial	Reporting’	(2005)	59	Healthc	Financ	
Manage	58.	
Velasco	J,	‘The	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	Shareholder’	(2006)	40	UC	Davis	L	Rev	407.	
Verstein	A,	‘Benchmark	Manipulation’	[2014]	Browser	Download	This	Paper.	
Vila	J-L,	‘Simple	Games	of	Market	Manipulation’	(1989)	29	Economics	Letters	21.	
Walter	I,	‘Conflicts	of	Interest	and	Market	Discipline	among	Financial	Service	Firms’	(2004)	
22	European	Management	Journal	361.	
Wilson	R,	‘Review	of	Islamic	Law	and	Finance:	Religion,	Risk	and	Return’	(1998)	13	Arab	Law	
Quarterly	423.	
‘164	Companies	Are	Listed	in	the	Saudi	Stock	Market	(Tadawul)’	[2014]	Middle	East	Journal.	
‘Accountability:	The	Link	between	Self	-	Accountability		and	Accountability	in		Islam’	(2012)	2	
International	Journal	of	Humanities	and	Social	Science.	
‘Market	Manipulation	Law’	(no	date)	1	The	Ministry	of	Economic	Development	Reform	of	
Securities	Trading	Law	P15.	
Al	Saeed	T,	‘Disclosure’,	Al	Jazeera	(no	date)	<http://www.al-
jazirah.com/2013/20130825/ec16.htm>	accessed	8	April	2016.	
Alkhareef	A,	‘The	CAM’s	Fines	Remain	on	Those	Affected’,	Al-riyadh	newspaper	(2014)	
<http://www.alriyadh.com/952255>	accessed	21	April	2016.	
Al-Nwaisir	S,	‘Saudi	Stock	Market	Needs	to	Be	Reformed	-	A	R	a	B		N	E	W	S-’	(2012).	
Alsultan	A,	‘New	Bubble	is	Forming	in	the	Saudi	Stock	Market’,	Al	Eqtisadiah	Newspaper	
(2006)	<http://www.aleqt.com/2006/07/03/article_5702.html>.	
Argaam,	‘Suspended	Mobily	Share	Trading’	(2014).	
Badrani,	‘The	New	Companies	Act’,	Alriyadh	(2011).	
	 303	
‘Chief	Executive	Officer	of	“Mobily”	Khalid	Al	Kaf	Interview	with	Channel	"AL	Arabiya’,	AL	
Arabiya	(2014)	<http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/companies/2014/11/03/.html>	
accessed	10	April	2015.	
‘Directors’	Remuneration’,	Argaam	(2010)	
<http://gulf.argaam.com/article/articledetail/149298>	accessed	2	April	2015.	
‘Mobily"	describes	the	Reason	for	the	High	Loss	for	2014	and	Confirms	Its	Ability	to	Meet	All	
Its	Financial	Obligations	Facility’,	Argaam	(2014)	
<http://www.argaam.com/article/articledetail/490125>	accessed	10	April	2015.	
Al-Dukheil	A,	‘The	Future	Vision	for	the	Saudi	Economy’	(Conference	of	Ministry	of	Planning,	
2002).	
Dickie	RB,	‘Financial	Statement	Analysis	and	Business	Valuation	for	the	Practical	Lawyer’	
(American	Bar	Association	2006)	
<https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HrJy_8uGboMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7
&dq=Dickie,+R+(2006).+Financial+Statement+Analysis+and+Business+Valuation+for+
the+Practical+Lawyer.+&ots=4U7zC4sL0U&sig=CMF0wn3UBovMMWNurXLGvIp_TSQ
>	accessed	4	April	2017.	
Jickling	M,	‘The	Enron	Collapse:	An	Overview	of	Financial	Issues’	(Congressional	Research	
Service,	Library	of	Congress	2002).	
Mohd	H,	‘Insider	Trading	From	Malaysian		Law	And	Islamic	Law	Perspectives’	(Malaysian,	
Azmi	&	Associates	2008)	<http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-0-387-84831-0_7>	
accessed	25	February	2018.	
‘	’Report	of	the	Islamic	Capital	Market	Task	Force...	-	Google	Scholar’	(no	date)	
<https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=%27Report+of+the+I
slamic+Capital+Market+Task+Force+of+the+International+Organization+of+Securitie
s+Commissions%27+%28July+2004%29&btnG=>	accessed	20	February	2018.	
‘[CITATION]	Saudi	Arabia’s	New	Basic	Laws:	The	Struggle...	-	Google	Scholar’	(no	date)	
<https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=%5BCITATION%5D+S
audi+Arabia%27s+New+Basic+Laws%3A+The+Struggle+for+Participatory+Islamic+Go
vernment&btnG=>	accessed	22	February	2018.	
‘CMA:	Listed	Company	Required	to	Inform	Public	About	Any	Material	Developments	That	
Are	Not	Public	Knowledge’	(no	date)	
<https://cma.org.sa/En/MediaCenter/pk/Pages/Disclosure-Awareness-Report-
English.aspx>	accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘Committee	for	the	Resolution	of	Securities	Disputes	(CRSD)’	(no	date)	
<http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Dispute/Pages/AboutMOC.aspx>	accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘Corporate	Governance	and	the	Credit	Crunch	|	ACCA	Global’	(no	date)	
<http://www.accaglobal.com/gb/en/technical-activities/technical-resources-
	 304	
search/2008/november/corporate-governance-and-the-credit-crunch.html>	
accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘FCA	Handbook	-	FCA	Handbook’	(no	date)	
<https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR/>	accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘Financial	Reporting	Frequency	and	Its	Impact	on	the	Stock	Market	-	The	Case	of	Switzerland	
by	Marisa	Nöldeke ::	SSRN’	(no	date)	
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997231>	accessed	4	April	
2017.	
‘FSA	Bans	and	Fines	Self	Employed	Trader	£700,000	for	Market	Abuse’	(no	date)	
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2011/053.shtml>	
accessed	9	April	2017.	
‘FSMA	Market	Abuse	Regime:	A	Review	of	the	Sunset	Clauses	-	Lexology’	(no	date)	
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=26a6d941-7e69-427d-a271-
f3a20b6a36cf>	accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘Home’	(no	date)	<https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal>	accessed	7	April	2017.	
‘House	of	Commons	Journal	Volume	11:	25	November	1696	|	British	History	Online’	(no	
date)	<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol11/pp593-598>	accessed	
8	April	2017.	
‘How	a	Broker	Provides	Suitable	Recommendations	to	His/Her	Clients:	ﻒﯿ ﻛ 	م ﻮ ﻘ ﻳ 	
ﻂ ﯿ ﺳﻮ ﻟ ا 	ﻲﻟ ﺎ ﻤ ﻟ ا 	ﻢ ﻳ ﺪ ﻘ ﺘ ﺑ 	ﺔ ﯿ ﺻ ﻮ ﺗ 	ﺔ ﻤ ﺋ ﻼ ﻣ 	
ﻪ ﺋ ﻼ ﻤ ﻌ ﻟ -	ﺚﺤ ﺑ 	ﺔ ﻐ ﻠ ﻟ ﺎ ﺑ 	ﺔ ﻳ ﺰ ﯿ ﻠ ﺠ ﻧ ﻹ ا 	ﺔ ﺳا ر د 	
ﺔ ﻧ ر ﺎ ﻘ ﻣ 	ﻦ ﯿ ﺑ 	ﻦ ﯿ ﻧ ﻮ ﻧ ﺎ ﻘ ﻟ ا 	يد ﻮ ﻌ ﺴﻟ ا 	و 	ﻲﻜ ﻳ ﺮ ﻣ ﻷ ا ’	(no	
date)	<http://www.mohamoon-
montada.com/default.aspx?Action=Display&ID=108593&Type=3>	accessed	5	April	
2017.	
‘Islamic	Law	of	Contracts:	Fraud	&	Deceit	|	Mace	Abdullah	-	Academia.edu’	(no	date)	
<http://www.academia.edu/3639684/Islamic_Law_of_Contracts_Fraud_and_Deceit
>	accessed	4	April	2017.	
‘London	Stock	Exchange	Limited	-	Company	Profile,	Information,	Business	Description,	
History,	Background	Information	on	London	Stock	Exchange	Limited’	(no	date)	
<http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/16/London-Stock-Exchange-
Limited.html>	accessed	3	April	2017.	
‘Managing	Uncertainty,	Mitigating	Risk	-	Tackling	the	|	Nick	Firoozye	|	Palgrave	Macmillan’	
(no	date)	<http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137334534>	accessed	4	April	
2017.	
‘Manuals’	(no	date)	<http://crsd.org.sa/En/Pages/Manuals.aspx>	accessed	14	April	2017.	
	 305	
‘Misrepresentation.pdf	-	English	Law	of	Contract:	Misrepresentation	Emily	M.’	(no	date)	
<https://www.coursehero.com/file/13920513/Misrepresentationpdf/>	accessed	8	
April	2017.	
‘Osoba	B.	(2003).	"Risk	Preferences	and	the	Practice...	-	Google	Scholar’	(no	date)	
<https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Osoba+B.+%282003
%29.+%22Risk+Preferences+and+the+Practice+of+Religion%3A+Evidence+from+Pan
el+Data&btnG=>	accessed	22	February	2018.	
‘Saudi	Stock	Market	Regulator	Fines	Seven	Companies	for	Disclosure	Violations	|	The	
National’	(no	date)	<http://www.thenational.ae/business/markets/saudi-stock-
market-regulator-fines-seven-companies-for-disclosure-violations>	accessed	14	April	
2017.	
‘Should	Insider	Trading	Be	Legalized?	October	19	2009	07:35	|	Business	News	|	
Minyanville’s	Wall	Street’	(no	date)	
<http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/articles/insider-trading-Rajaratnam-
minyanville/10/19/2009/id/24985?page=full>	accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘Suitability	-	Definition	of	Suitability	in	English	|	Oxford	Dictionaries’	(no	date)	
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/suitability>	accessed	9	April	2017.	
‘Suitable	Meaning	in	the	Cambridge	English	Dictionary’	(no	date)	
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/suitable?q=Suitability+>	
accessed	9	April	2017.	
‘Symbols	Traded	Tadawul	-	Google	Search’	(no	date)	
<https://www.google.com/search?q=+Symbols+Traded&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-
8&client=firefox-b#safe=strict&q=Symbols+Traded+Tadawul>	accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘Tesco,	What	Went	Wrong?	-	BBC	News’	(no	date)	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
29716885>	accessed	8	April	2017.	
‘The	Ministry	of	Commerce	and	Industry	&	the	Capital	Market	Authority	Clarify	the	
Mechanism	of	Applying	the	New	Corporate	Law’	(no	date)	
<http://mci.gov.sa/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/17-04-16-02.aspx>	accessed	4	
April	2017.	
‘UK	Corporate	Governance	Code’	(no	date)	<https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx>	accessed	8	
April	2017.	
 
 
 
 
 
	 306	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
